During the Korean War the White House and the Army publicized the Medal of Honor to achieve three outcomes. First, they hoped it would have a positive influence on public opinion. Truman committed to limited goals at the start of the war and chose not to create an official propaganda agency, which led to partisan criticism and realistic reporting. Medal of Honor publicity celebrated individual actions removed from their wider context in a familiar, heroic mold to alter memory of the past. Second, the Army publicized the Medal of Honor internally to inspire and reinforce desired soldier behavior. Early reports indicated a serious lack of discipline on the front lines and the Army hoped to build psychological resilience in the men by exposing them to the heroic actions of other soldiers. Finally, the Cold War spawned a great fear of communist subterfuge in the United States, which was exacerbated by the brainwashing of prisoners of war. The White House and the Army reached out to marginalized elements of American society through the Medal of Honor to counter communist propaganda. The Korean War remains an understudied era of American history, yet it was incredibly important to the United States and the world. The war influenced the United States to maintain a large standing military prepositioned around the world to protect its interests. Achieving the status quo antebellum validated the containment strategy against communism, which heavily influenced the decision to intervene in Vietnam. The United Nations, ostensibly in charge of allied forces in the Korean War, gained credibility from preventing the loss of South Korea. Despite these important effects of the war on world history, scholars continue to focus on World War II and Vietnam. This study seeks to build on the relative dearth of scholarly material on the Korean War by examining in historical context the manipulation of a symbol that intersected both the military and the home-front to influence behavior.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2009. / Thesis directed by Keir A. Lieber for the Department of Political Science. "April 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 260-274).

Freie Univ., Habil.-Schr.--Berlin, 2000. / Literaturverz. S. 339 - 386.

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Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / Civil-military relations play an important role in Africa as these relations strongly influence the processes of development and democratisation. This thesis examines civil-military relations in Nigeria and Tanzania, as these two countries have experienced very different ‘patterns of influence, control, and subordination between the armed forces and the wider social environment’. Most theories of civil-military relations have been formulated by Western scholars and this study investigates if these theories are applicable to Nigeria and Tanzania. As only two cases are under focus, this thesis does not aim to dismiss any of the theories or to develop new theory; rather, I suggest new aspects and factors that should be included when studying African civil-military relations. The theoretical framework includes theories by Huntington, Finer, and Janowitz, as well as theories by more recent scholars. After presenting the history of civilmilitary relations in Nigeria and Tanzania, I analyse the theories’ validity in the two cases by evaluating five hypotheses based on these theoretical frameworks. The thesis concludes that even though the prevailing theories contain factors that are very important in the two countries and in Africa in general, it is important to keep the specificity of African countries in mind when studying their civil-military relations. The domestic context and internal factors in both Nigeria and Tanzania are very significant. The importance of identity and the economic situation should especially receive more attention in theories addressing civil-military relations in Africa. There is a strong interrelationship between the various theories, and as a result a holistic approach including all factors, actors and aspects should be used when studying civil-military relations in Africa and elsewhere.

This paper examines the role that military has played in the political development of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the modern Russian Federation. By utilizing the theoretical tenets of Eric Nordlinger, this paper endeavors to update and hopefully revise his classic work in civil-military relations, Soldiers in Politics. Chapter one of this paper introduces many of the main theoretical concepts utilized in this analysis. Chapter two considers the Stalinist totalitarian penetration model that set the standard for communist governments around the world. Chapter three follows up by addressing the middle years of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Both reformed the military in its relation to the party and state and made the armed forces a more corporate and professional institution. Chapter four pinpoints the drastic changes in both the state and armed forces during Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. The military briefly ventured to a point it never gone before by launching a short coup against the last Soviet president. Chapter five focuses on the last ten years in the Russian Federation. While still a professional organization typical of the liberal model of civil-military relations, the armed forces face great uncertainty, as economic and social problems demand more of their time and resources. Chapter six concludes by speculating on the future of Russian civilmilitary relations and reconsiders the importance of Nordlinger's elegant yet parsimonious work.

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Thesis (DPhil)—-Stellenbosch University, 2008. / This dissertation investigates the role played by France in the supply of military equipment and the transfer of technology to South Africa from 1960. This Franco-South African defence cooperation was opportune for South Africa, as she faced escalating international criticism over the apartheid issue and, from December 1963, the first military embargo, one joined by her erstwhile arms suppliers. The accession of the National Party (NP) to power in South Africa in 1948 brought a range of legislation that gave substance to the nationalist policy of apartheid. The suffering of the South African black population and the refusal of the South African government to revise its domestic policy, despite the growing international pressure, induced the newly-independent, Afro-Asian countries to press the United Nations (UN) to take tougher actions against Pretoria. At the same time opposing Black Nationalist movements, the African National Congress (ANC) the South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) adopted militant actions in response to increasingly repressive race legislation in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia. Furthermore, when in 1961 South Africa left the British Commonwealth, she lost the long-term military commitment from London she had enjoyed for much of the twentieth century. South Africa would now have to satisfy her defence needs elsewhere. Pretoria knew that she needed a strong, well-equipped defence force in order to face the growing internal conflict as well as a possible military onslaught from outside the country. As a result, South Africa faced the first arms embargo in 1963 when her traditional arms suppliers, Britain and the USA elected to observe the voluntary terms of the embargo instituted by the UN. France, at the time under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, identified an opportunity to strengthen her relations with South Africa and acquire the much-needed strategic materials for her nuclear programme; he decided to fill the space in the military market vacated by Britain and the USA. From 1964, France became Pretoria’s most important arms supplier, a relationship that lasted throughout the Gaullist administration. De Gaulle’s decision to supply South Africa with French military equipment and the transfer of technological know-how was based mainly on political, military and economic considerations. In short, De Gaulle wanted to free France from a military dependency on the United States, which had come to dominate NATO, and, by extension, Western Europe. Feeling hemmed in by les anglo-saxons, France, facing a shortage of North American uranium for her nuclear programme from 1957, sought new partners to shore up her own strategic vulnerability and ensure a role for her in world politics. Moreover, in the early 1960s, Apartheid had not yet become an electoral issue in France, as it was in Britain and the USA, and, in any case, France herself was drawing negative comment for her actions in the Algerian war of national independence. The logical outcome was a comfortable rapprochement, for the moment at least, between Paris and Pretoria. This military cooperation was broad-fronted and sustained until France implemented her first partial military embargo in 1975 and voted for the UN mandatory arms embargo in 1977. But, by this time, the weapons industry in South Africa, home-grown with French assistance, was well-established and placed South Africa in a position to launch military campaigns against the frontline states, commencing with Operation Savannah in late 1975. This study analyses the content and impact of the military cooperation between Paris and Pretoria and creates a better understanding of political and economic dimensions that were the key in the conduct of Franco-South African defence relations between 1960 and 1990.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Islam permeated throughout the military institutions of Malaysia, Pakistan and Indonesia and replaced the Western and foreign military cultures the military had inherited due to society becoming Islamized following the revival of Islam. The implementation of true Islamic model practices and values differ slightly from country to country depending first on the level of piousness of its existing military personnel, new personnel input and the military leadership. The second factor is the degree of motivational drive of the head of state in encouraging Islam. Islamized military institutions are also faced with the challenges created as a result of sects and schools that emerge in the form of Islamic parties and extremist groups. The argument will be that Islamic teachings in military affairs can result in peace, solidarity and solve the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) problems. In the final analysis, guided moderate Islamic influence' bring harmony to CMR in Malaysia, while the uncoordinated influence of Islam in the Indonesian military made the CMR problematic. It is different in Pakistan because the strong influence of Islam has encouraged the generals to wrest political power from civilians. / Lieutenant Colonel, Royal Malaysian Air Force