La Turquie est membre du Conseil de l’Europe (COE) depuis 1949. Ainsi, elle fait partie intégrante de l’histoire de la construction démocratique de l'Europe. Cette thèse fait une histoire quasi exhaustive de la démocratisation en Turquie inspirée par le COE de 1949 à 2013. Les acteurs sont l’Assemblée Parlementaire, le Comité des Ministres, la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, les autorités compétentes turques et la société civile. Les principales sources de ce travail sont les archives du COE, celles de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Turquie et des organisations du secteur privé et civil et les ouvrages académiques et littéraires. Dans ces relations durant 64 ans, quatre étapes se surviennent. 1. L’intégration de la Turquie aux institutions européennes, 2. Les interventions militaires en Turquie, 3. L’approfondissement de la démocratie en Turquie à la suite de la guerre froide, 4. Les procédures de suivi appliquées par les mécanismes du COE sur la démocratisation en Turquie. / Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) since 1949. Thus, it is an integral part of the history of European democratic construction.This thesis is a nearly complete history of democratization in Turkey inspired by the COE from 1949 to 2013. The actors are the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the European Court of Human Rights, the competent authorities of Turkey and civil society. The main sources of this work are the archives of the COE, those of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and organizations in the private and civil sector and the academic and literary works. In these relationships for 64 years, four steps occurred. 1. The integration of Turkey to the European institutions, 2. The military interventions in Turkey, 3. The deepening democracy in Turkey after the Cold War, 4. The monitoring procedures followed by the mechanisms of the COE on democratization in Turkey.

IN ENGLISH THESIS TITLE: Military Intervention Upon Invitation or with Consent of the State ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to (i) define reasonably general criteria for an intervention by invitation to be lawful, and (ii) analyze two recent cases of intervention by invitation. Based on an examination of state practice, legal documents and expert opinions, the theoretical part of the thesis concludes that only government can be allowed to invite intervention, and that the intervener's rights are defined by the intersection of what the invitation allows and what is allowed by other rules of international law. Even though the so-called effective control theory still significantly impacts both state practice and expert opinions, there is an apparent shift towards accounting for democratic legitimacy of the inviter, which often causes more harm than good in practice. In this part, the author also explains why only governments should be allowed to ask for intervention, and why broadening the group of possible inviters might destabilize international community. The practical part examines whether Russian interventions in Ukraine and Syria were justified by respective invitations. When the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych invited Russia to intervene, he was already removed from power and forced...

The 2016 Turkish failed coup attempt was a striking political event of the year. Although Turkey is a country with a long history of successful military intervention and deep-rooted coup culture, the coup organizers could not achieve the desired outcome in 2016. The coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 have resulted in the government's change where the military played an important role by influencing the political sphere. However, the result was different in the coup attempt carried out on 15 July 2016. As the President, a large segment of military, political parties and a significant part of the society had an anti-coup attitude and stood up against the military coup. For this reason, the thesis attempts to compare the 2016 Turkish failed coup with the previous successful coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997's in Turkey. The comparison is based on the hypotheses built on four civil-military relation theories and concepts: Military Professionalism, Civilian Supremacy, Social Cohesion and Public Institutionalism. According to the analyses, the findings indicate that the theories of Civilian Supremacy and Public Institutionalism better explain the failure of 2016 and the success of the previous coups than other theories.

The aim of this thesis is to answer how and why France intervenes in Sub-Saharan Africa in the new millennium. This region represented the pivotal part of French colonial empire and France maintained close mutual relationship even after decolonization, partly due to the numerous military interventions. Security and defence policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa underwent gradual changes since the 1990s', France started to participate in multilateral peace operations and outside its traditional sphere of influence. Since 2003, when the European Union launched the first operation on the African continent, the vast majority of French interventions took place within the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. There were twelve new operations in the examined period 2003-2012, from which four military missions were selected for the purpose of this research: Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, EUFOR DR Congo ibidem in 2006, EUFOR Chad/CAR in Chad and Central African Republic from 2008 to 2009 and naval operation EU NAVFOR Atalanta launched by the coast of Somalia in 2008. The thesis compares these cases in order to analyse motives which lead France to intervene in Sub-Saharan Africa and to prefere multilateral type of operation. The motives are assessed in the context of the...

In connection with the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the region of northern Africa in particular underwent significant political changes. One of the states in which widespread protests caused the overturn of the authoritarian regime and subsequently established the democratization process was also Egypt, whose case is profoundly analysed in the second part of the thesis. Generally speaking, the thesis is concerned with the analysis of civil-military relations in states characterized by the low political culture. In the first place, it focuses on societies undergoing democratization process where the military traditionally maintains strong position within the state and hence often assumes the role of the leader of the transition. Therefore, the principal objective of the analysis constitutes the role of the army at the time of transition to democracy. At the same time, the thesis poses three research questions aiming partly at the military position, partly at the motives determining the willingness of the military to intervene. In the second part, the thesis analyses the given case through five defined factors which it subsequently examines in two levels: conceptual and interventionist. The goal of the thesis it to explain which factors determine strong position of the army in given praetorian...

No description available.

No

Créée en 2002 en remplacement de l’OUA, l’Union africaine affiche l’ambition de trouver des solutions africaines aux problèmes africains en ajoutant l’article 4 dans son Acte constitutif. Cet article lui donne le droit de déployer une force militaire au sein d’un État membre pour protéger les civils lors de violations de droits de l’homme, de génocide ou de crimes contre l’humanité. Tandis que les conflits intraétatiques continuent de faire rage sur le continent africain, l’UA et ses États membres n’ont jamais autorisé — sans y renoncer — une intervention humanitaire contre l’un de ses membres. Ce mémoire vise à connaitre les raisons pour lesquelles les dirigeants africains ont renoncé à déployer une force militaire pour protéger les civils burundais en 2015, et ce, malgré le fait que l’UA l’a initialement recommandé quelques semaines plus tôt. En s’inspirant de la théorie réaliste des relations internationales, cette étude du conflit burundais de 2015 démontre que la non-intervention de l’UA est avant tout liée à un manque de volonté de la part des dirigeants africains qui ont privilégié leurs intérêts personnels ainsi que les intérêts économiques de leur pays au détriment de l’urgence humanitaire au Burundi. De plus, plusieurs dirigeants africains, qui ont un contentieux avec Paul Kagamé et qui voient le Burundi comme un contrepoids à l’influence rwandaise, se sont positionnés contre la MAPROBU pour léser le Rwanda. Ensuite, l’abandon de la MAPROBU s’explique aussi par le fait que le Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité est totalement dépendant de la volonté des États membres et ne dispose pas de l’autonomie institutionnelle nécessaire pour autoriser le déploiement des troupes de l’UA au Burundi. / Created in 2002 to replace the OAU, the African Union’s desire to find African solutions to African problems was demonstrated by the addition of Article 4 to its Constitutive Act, which gives the Union the authority to deploy a military force within a member state to protect civilians from human rights violations, genocide or crimes against humanity. While intrastate conflicts are still devastating the African continent, the AU has never authorized a humanitarian intervention against one of its members. This master’s thesis seeks to explain why the African leaders did not authorize the deployment of a military force to protect Burundian civilians in 2015, despite the fact that the AU had initially recommended it a few weeks earlier. Based on the realist approach in International Relations, this case study demonstrates that the decision not to intervene in Burundi is primarily due to a lack of commitment from African leaders who have prioritized their own interests as well as economic interests over the humanitarian urgency in Burundi. In addition, many African leaders, who see Paul Kagame as a rival, perceive Burundi as a counterweight to Rwanda’s influence. Therefore, their position against MAPROBU is also intended to undermine Rwanda. Secondly, the decision not to deploy MAPROBU could be explained by the fact that the Peace and Security Council (PSC) is totally dependent on the will of member states and does not have the necessary institutional autonomy to authorize the deployment of AU troops in Burundi.

The focus in this dissertation is on the rise of secessionism and its curtailment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Theories pertaining to centre-periphery relations, as well as right-sizing the state, are used for this purpose. Factors such as the DRC’s vast territory and colonial policies affected the centre-periphery relations after independence. The weak ties between the centre and the peripheries were important factors in the attempts at secession that followed independence. In addition, the political and administrative centre (Kinshasa) was too weak to keep the restive peripheries in check. International military intervention, thus, played an important role in defeating attempts at secession. The strategies of President Mobutu in strengthening the centre, as well as the lack of secessionism in the DRC after the collapse of the centre towards the end of Mobutu’s presidency, receive attention. / Political Sciences / M.A. (Politics)

Cette thèse examine les arguments et les modalités de justification des interventions armées des Etats, des coalitions étatiques et des organisations régionales dans les conflits internes d’autres Etats sous le prisme du droit international, lorsque ces interventions sont menées en dehors du cadre de l’ONU. Ce type d’intervention caractérise notre époque où les conflits intra-étatiques constituent l’écrasante majorité des conflits mondiaux et où l’ONU traverse une crise pluridimensionnelle. Les justifications, invoquées aussi bien par les Etats que par la doctrine, visent à légaliser ou du moins à légitimer ce qui serait, à première vue, considéré comme un recours à la force illégal au regard du droit des Nations Unies et en particulier au regard du principe de non intervention dans les guerres civiles. / This thesis examines the arguments and the modalities of justification of the military interventions of States, of the coalitions of the willing and of the regional organizations in the internal conflicts of other States by virtue of the international law, when these interventions take place outside the framework of the UNO. This type of intervention is current nowadays given that the intra-state conflicts constitute the overwhelming majority of world conflicts and taking into consideration the multidimensional crisis of the UNO. The justifications invoked by States as well as by the doctrine aim to legalize or at least to legitimize what would be considered at first sight as an illegal use of force under the law of the United Nations and in particular under the principle of non- intervention in civil wars.