Thesis advisor: Marilee Ogren / The suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartes’ cogito argument is assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience. The Cartesian texts are explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined. The relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each. Juxtaposing the two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes theory of mind. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: College Honors Program. / Discipline: Psychology.

This dissertation uncovers a strand in early twentieth century British literature that is currently missing from readings of modernism - a fascination with portraying meditative states of mind. Modernist authors were intrigued by the mind's capacity to be in constant movement between the present, past, and future - what they represented as a stream of consciousness. This study examines the potential of the "still," calm, and concentrated mind in modernist visions of consciousness by exploring how the meditative mind takes a different shape in theme and form in the writings of Virginia Woolf, D.H. Lawrence, and Aldous Huxley. Drawing from the works' preoccupation with physical practices such as spiritual and ritual dance, relaxation techniques, Yoga, the Alexander Technique, and meditative walking, this study highlights the role of the body in views on consciousness in modernist literature. This dissertation argues that looking at modernism through the lens of meditation allows us to see the period not only in terms of the split, wounded self in the fast-paced modern metropolis but reveals its yearning for what the authors in this study call "wholeness," "mind-body harmony," and "the spirit of peace" - a search for peace attainable within, if not without, an attempt to cure the self in the fracturing modern world through experiencing the mind at peace.

Works of fiction do things to us, and we do things because of works of fiction. When reading Hamlet, I mentally represent certain propositions about its characters and events, I want the story and its characters to go a certain way, and I emotionally respond to its goings-on. I might deem Hamlet a coward, I might wish that Hamlet stabbed Claudius when he had the chance, and I might feel sorrow at Ophelia’s senseless suicide. These fiction-directed mental states seem to resemble the propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and emotion, respectively — the everyday attitudes that represent and orient us toward the world. These mental states constitute our engagement with fiction, and the way in which they hang together is central to understanding our engagement with fiction. In that aim, this thesis hopes to provide an analysis of our belief-like attitudes about works of fiction. I argue that a folk psychological theory of fictional engagement should call upon belief, not imagination, to serve as the primary cognitive attitude with which we engage fictions.

David Rosenthal, in his Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, argues that it is a higher-order thought to the effect that the subject is in a conscious state that makes one conscious of his or her own mental states. In this paper, I argue that since phenomenal consciousness can be vague and Rosenthal’s HOT cannot, HOT is not a necessary condition of phenomenal consciousness. I use primarily Ned Blocks’ refrigerator hum case and Sartre’s example of non-positional awareness to argue that the threshold which determines the degree of first-person awareness necessary for a mental state to be conscious is vague itself, therefore consciousness is a vague concept. HOT cannot accommodate for borderline cases of phenomenal consciousness, therefore it cannot be a necessary condition of all conscious mental states. This is especially relevant in the discussion of non-human animal consciousness, as HOT theories such as Carruthers have been used to deny non-human animal consciousness on the basis of the on/off feature of such representational theories.

Tidigare studier har påvisat att språkliga förmågor har ett nära samband med Theory of Mind (ToM). På senare tid har studier med hjälp av ögonrörelseteknik kunnat undersöka ToMförmåga implicit och fynden tyder på att barn redan i tvåårsåldern verkar ha en välutvecklad implicit ToM-förmåga. Resultaten från en av dessa studier har funnit att språkutvecklingen kan spela en avgörande roll i tillägnandet av ToM och tyder på att det kan finnas ett orsakssamband mellan språk och ToM. En viktig aspekt för att närmare förstå ToMutvecklingen är att undersöka vilken betydelse den språkliga förmågan har i tillägnandet av ToM. Det är fortfarande oklart om specifika delar av språket har mer betydelse för ToMutvecklingen än andra och hur sambandet mellan språkliga förmågor och ToM ser ut. Syftet med föreliggande studie var att undersöka hur ToM-förmåga och False Beliefförståelse förhåller sig till språkliga förmågor hos typiskt utvecklade barn i treårsåldern samt om dessa förmågor påverkas av barnens demografiska faktorer. Studien inkluderade sammanlagt 21 treåringar. Den språkliga förmågan undersöktes med mått på impressiv och expressiv grammatik samt med mått på expressivt ordförråd, som en del av den semantiska förmågan. För att undersöka ToM-förmågan som helhet användes mått på olika delförmågor av ToM. Vidare undersöktes False Belief-förståelse explicit, med klassiska FB-uppgifter, och implicit, med hjälp av ögonrörelseteknik.Studiens resultat påvisar att språkliga förmågor och ToM-förmåga har ett mycket nära samband, och att den semantiska förmågan är den del av språkförmågan som har den enskilt starkaste påverkan på ToM-förmågan. Resultaten visar även att den impressiva grammatiska förmågan är mer betydande specifikt för FB-förståelse än för ToM-förmågan som helhet. Ingen påverkan på språklig förmåga, ToM-förmåga och FB-förståelse hittades vad gäller barnens demografiska faktorer. Resultaten av det implicita FB-testet visar att majoriteten av de deltagande barnen inte har förstått vad testet går ut på och därför kan inga slutsatser dras vad gäller barnens implicita FB-förståelse. Detta resultat motsäger den tidigare forskningen med yngre barn. Många frågetecken kvarstår kring implicita test, vilket visar på vikten av mer forskning inom området. I den aktuella studien diskuteras även komplexiteten i förhållandet mellan språkliga förmågor och ToM. / Previous studies have shown that linguistic abilities are closely linked with Theory of Mind (ToM). Recently, studies using eyetracking technology have been able to investigate ToM understanding with implicit measures. The findings suggest that children as young as two years old appear to have a well-developed implicit ToM understanding. Results from one of these studies have found that language development could play a crucial role in the acquisition of ToM, suggesting that there may be a causal link between language and ToM. An important aspect to further understand ToM development is to investigate the impact of language in the acquisition of ToM understanding. It remains unclear whether specific aspects of language are more relevant to ToM development than others and how language abilities and ToM are interconnected. The aim of the present study was to investigate how ToM ability and False Belief understanding relates to linguistic abilities of typically developing three-year-olds and if childrens´ demographic factors affect these abilities. The study included a total of 21 children.  Language competence was assessed with measures of reception and production of syntax and a measure of vocabulary production, as part of the semantic ability. In order to investigate ToM ability, measures of different types of mental-state understandings were included. False Belief understanding was assessed with explicit measures, using standard FB tasks, and with implicit measures, using eyetracking technology. The results obtained in the present study confirm that linguistic abilities and ToM ability are strongly related, and that semantic ability is the part of language that has the strongest influence on ToM understanding. The results also indicate that receptive syntax is more important to specifically FB understanding, than to ToM ability in general. The childrens´ demographic factors were not found to affect their language ability, ToM ability or FB understanding. Regarding children's implicit FB understanding the results of the implicit measures reveal that the majority of the participating children did not understand the purpose of the test and therefore no conclusions of their implicit understanding could be drawn. This finding contradicts previous research including younger children. Questions remain concerning implicit measures, indicating the importance of further research in this field. The present study also discusses the complexity of the relationship between linguistic abilities and ToM.

Bacterial cell division requires formation of the cytokinetic cell division septum at the mid-cell position, a process that is determined by three Min proteins; MinC, MinD and MinE. Regulation of cell division by Min proteins occurs via a multi-step process involving interactions between various Min proteins, as well as the membrane. In this cycle, ATP-bound MinD binds to the membrane surface where it can recruit MinC to inhibit formation of the cell division septum. MinE binding to this complex displaces MinC and stimulates ATP hydrolysis, leading to the dissociation of MinD from the membrane. These interactions give rise to a dynamic pattern of Min protein localization that appears to involve a polymeric state that is designed to create a zone that is permissive to cell division at the mid-point of the cell. The interaction between MinD and the membrane is a critical aspect of this cycle, yet the role of the lipid bilayer in MinD activation, localization and polymerization is not well understood. To probe the role of membrane charge and fluidity on MinD activation and polymerization, we developed a kinetic assay of MinE-stimulated MinD ATPase activity. We found that membrane charge is essential for MinD activation and that differences in membrane fluidity give rise to changes in its activity. Moreover, a burst phase was also observed during the first few minutes of reaction, but only on the most fluid anionic lipid tested. To help determine if the observed membrane-dependent changes in MinD activity are linked to any changes in MinD polymer structure, we have begun to develop a method to identify surface exposed regions of MinD through a combination of covalent labeling and mass spectrometry. Optimization of various steps for the assay has been done, and the assay can be applied to the future characterization of MinD polymer structure. Results from this assay, in combination with those from the kinetic measurements described here, will help to improve understanding about how membrane properties modulate MinD ATPase activity, and how this can influence the Min protein oscillation that is required to ensure normal bacterial cell division.

One common element of Kripke’s and Chalmers’ reactions to physicalist theories of mind is their reliance upon the intuition that concepts about conscious experiences are essentially identified by the “immediate phenomenal quality” of the conscious experience, how the experience feels from the subjective point of view. I examine how Kripke’s and Chalmers’ critiques require that concepts about conscious experiences be identified by their subjective feel and then move on to provide some ways in which this intuition about concepts of conscious experience could be wrong. Specifically, the intuition is not consistent with our intuitions about unusual cases reported by pain researchers and does not take such cases to be genuine cases of pain. These inconsistencies weaken the intuition, making it problematic for any critique of identity theory or physicalism to rely heavily upon it.

Despite numerous studies of the development of theory of mind, how children express their understanding of mind in less structured, play settings has gone largely unstudied. Many developmental accounts, regardless of disagreement on other theoretical issues, agree that the child’s engagement within social contexts is crucial to the development of understanding of mind. Our goals were to collect a detailed account of how children use their understanding of mind and how mothers align their support to the child’s capabilities within social interactions. In this longitudinal study, typically developing preschoolers (N = 52) engaged in a hiding game with their mothers in a semi-structured play setting when the children were 42-, 54-, and 66-months old. Aspects of children’s understanding of mind were rated including understanding of knowledge access, deception, false belief, and emotional response to false belief, as well as, affective charge and engagement with the task. Mothers’ utterances were coded for various characteristics, particularly role and content. Children’s understanding of mind increased across visits and positively correlated with false belief task performance at the 42- and 54-month visits, rs = .35 and .39, p < .05, but not the 66-month visit, rs = –.25, p = .10. Children’s enthusiasm was positively related to their understanding of mind at the first and second visits, but not the last. Mothers tailored the content of their utterances to the child’s growing expertise, but whether mothers adjusted the role of their utterances to children’s understanding of mind remains unclear. Observing children’s playful use of their emerging understanding of mind in social interactions allowed for the capture of subtle variations in how children express and caregivers support their understanding.

This paper explores and evaluates the famous Mary case put forward by Frank Jackson in support of what he calls the knowledge argument against physicalism. After laying out Jackson’s position, I set out to determine whether certain previous physicalist attempts at undermining it have been successful. Finding that they have not, I use their shortcomings to inform the construction of a new position, one which I argue renders the Mary case at odds with itself and frees physicalism from the knowledge argument’s grasp.

A phenomenological-hermeneutic method of study was used to understand the counsellor’s process of working through shadow. After analysis, 16 themes were derived, of which 13 themes depicted the counsellor’s process of working through shadow, and three themes depicted the implications of shadow work on the counselling process. The first 13 themes chronologically demonstrate the process of shadow work from the beginning birth of shadow to the eventual incorporation of shadow into a person’s beingness. The last three themes illustrate the implications of shadow work on the counselling process, specifically addressing aspects of client empowerment, therapeutic alliance, and countertransference. / ix, 278 leaves ; 29 cm.