Submitted by Aelson Maciera (aelsoncm@terra.com.br) on 2017-05-02T19:40:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissBSSG.pdf: 1364337 bytes, checksum: f8e97e92d2d903b995e051eca713a9de (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (ronisp@ufscar.br) on 2017-05-11T20:06:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissBSSG.pdf: 1364337 bytes, checksum: f8e97e92d2d903b995e051eca713a9de (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ronildo Prado (ronisp@ufscar.br) on 2017-05-11T20:07:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissBSSG.pdf: 1364337 bytes, checksum: f8e97e92d2d903b995e051eca713a9de (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-11T20:10:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissBSSG.pdf: 1364337 bytes, checksum: f8e97e92d2d903b995e051eca713a9de (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-02-27 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Esta pesquisa tem por objetivo analisar o semióforo nacional do indígena nas obras Quarup (1967) e A expedição Montaigne (1982), ambas de Antonio Callado. Chauí (2000), na obra Brasil: mito fundador e sociedade autoritária, trabalha com o conceito chave que conduz parte deste trabalho: o semióforo. Para a autora, semióforo é um elemento que carrega em si significados e valores que se relacionam a um ideário mítico-simbólico que extrapola a carga significativa convencional que determinado objeto e/ou pessoa detêm. Para isso voltaremos nosso olhar principalmente para a análise dos personagens de ficção de Quarup, como os vários índios, muitas vezes sem nome, que ali aparecem e Ipavu e Ieropé, de A expedição Montaigne. Acreditamos que Antonio Callado empreende, em seu projeto literário, uma desconstrução destes semióforos, até então sobrevalorizados pela literatura nacional. Para chegar a essa desconstrução, o autor utiliza o discurso satírico, que é o recurso formal pelo qual questiona e, posteriormente, corrói o mito nacional brasileiro do indígena. Por isso, exploraremos também os recursos formais da sátira, a saber, a caricatura, a paródia e a ironia.

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The purpose of this thesis is to relate the six personalities dealt with by Ralph Waldo Emerson in his Representative Men to such proportions of the essayist's ideas as may be applied to these six representative types, to the end of arriving at an understanding of Emerson's aim in writing about these six men and about great men in general.

2024 / This dissertation investigates how the essay engages with historical and theoretical impasses related to the representation of traumatic memories in the wake of socio-political violence. Spanning several centuries, it encompasses the non-fiction texts exemplified by the sixteenth century works of Michel de Montaigne and Jean de Léry and essay films since the postwar era. Using close textual and visual analysis, I examine how the form of the essay, drawing from personal perspectives, moves between the exploration of individual trauma and the collective experience rooted in past traumatic events. The essay, I argue, presents formal innovations—from the use of subjective voice in literary form, transformed in the voiceover in essay films, to representation of animals—in the face of constraints on conveying historical trauma. With its tendency to emerge in times of crisis, the essay manifests itself as a critical response to historical violence. Michel de Montaigne’s Essais and the memoirs of Jean de Léry react to extreme events witnessed during the French Wars of Religion (1562–1598). The early essay film Le Sang des bêtes (1949) by Georges Franju, as well as later essayistic films by Chantal Akerman such as Dis-moi (1980) and No Home Movie (2015) grapple with traumatic memories of the Holocaust. My Friend Ivan Lapshin by Aleksei German (1985), a Soviet drama with essayistic elements, is haunted by the Great Terror under Joseph Stalin’s leadership. In attempt to re-write past individual trauma, the essay film Maison du bonheur (2017) by Sofia Bohdanowitz confronts oppressive patriarchal structures of societies. These divergent works share an urge to tell stories of traumatic experience from the margins of literature and cinema. In the studied texts, disturbance and cruelty as external forces relate uncannily to themes of consumption, where food becomes a locus of violence. Chapter one traces the origin of the genre of the essay film through analysis of Georges Franju’s short documentary film Le Sang des bêtes (1949) about animal slaughterhouses in the outskirts of Paris. Grappling with traumatic memories of the Second World War, Franju appeals to the origin of representation—the animal—to reinvent the form of documentary filmmaking and depict the trauma of witnessing French collaboration in deporting Jews during the Holocaust, alongside the dehumanization of war. The killing of horses for meat production brings to the fore the ambivalence of food tethered to ethical judgments of the self and others. Chapters two and three, based on close readings of Montaigne’s Essais and Jean de Léry’s memoirs, reconcile individual and collective trauma during a time of heightened violence of the Wars of Religion (1562—1598) and the colonization of the New World. In his Essais, Montaigne notably uses the shifting symbol of the horse and an errant figure of the author moving between personal experience and historical events to demonstrate the illusory line between “civilized” and “barbaric.” In Léry’s memoirs Histoire d’un voyage faict en la terre du Brésil (1578) and Histoire mémorable du siège et de la famine de Sancerre (1573), written in the wake of St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre, witnessing cannibalism and consumption of written records during extreme famine reflects his haunting fear of being unable to bear witness. Chapter four expands the notion of witnessing by accounting for an anxiety of transmission across generations. Introducing the question of gender in their works, filmmakers Chantal Akerman and Sofia Bohdanowitz explore individual and collective memory in post-Holocaust society through recourse to substitute grandmotherly figures. Scenes of cooking and non(eating) in their essay films become at once embodied representation of trauma and markers of new generation of filmmakers ignited by the second-wave feminism. / 2027-02-11T00:00:00Z

Michel de Montaigne a élaboré un imposant corpus au centre de ses Essais afin de rendre hommage à Raimond Sebond sans toutefois corroborer sa théologie philosophique ni reconnaître la pyramide des êtres1 à l'avant sommet de laquelle l'homme se situe par sa dignité et son esprit, comme preuve de l'existence de Dieu. L'Apologie de Raimond Sebond a été une opportunité de résumer sa propre pensée philosophique en réduisant fortement la différence entre les individus humains et l'animal. En dépit de l'extrême variabilité des individus, chacun porte en lui-même une forme entière de la condition humaine. D'après Montaigne, seul un fidéisme religieux soumis à la volonté divine a valeur de vertu suprême dans son rapport avec la toute-puissance incompréhensible et inconnaissable. L'unique réalité durable s'avère que «Dieu seul est» selon sa métaphysique bien particulière. Humiliation de l'homme et de sa rationalité, mise en perspective du savoir humain et de la science, critique de la connaissance humaine par l'insuffisance des outils de ses sens et de sa raison et finalement l'aveu d'un perpétuel mouvement sans constante existence dans l'être vient compliquer davantage les mises en cause, voilà les principales parties de son Apologie. Son humanisme fonde de nouveaux rapports de l'homme avec le savoir, l'être, la Nature ou Dieu sans enfermer son esprit dans l'arbitraire d'un système ou utiliser une méthode autre que celle d'instaurer une problématique continue vis-à-vis de la condition humaine, corroborant ainsi un prélude au relativisme culturel et philosophique. Inspiré des sources mêmes de la pensée occidentale, Montaigne redécouvre la sagesse païenne de l'Antiquité, à partir de sa lecture des néo-stoïciens, des sceptiques, des pyrrhoniens et de l'observation du comportement humain. Il conclut à l'utopie de la raison et de la science à sortir l'homme de l'«humaine condition». Montaigne a réussi à extirper la philosophie des griffes de la théologie en proposant dans ses Essais une façon de philosopher et d'obtenir sa propre vérité. Le souverain bien de l'homme et de l'humanité ne serait-il pas son Vivre à propos, comme éthique ou sagesse de tous les temps.

The thesis consists of five chapters: the first functions as an overture; the second, third and fourth deal with Plato, Cicero and Montaigne respectively; and the fifth raises some questions. The overture explores the ways in which Odysseus, Lucretius and Seneca approached death, and in the process introduces some obvious distinctions - between death viewed as the act of dying and death viewed as the state of being dead, between the death which comes to everyone and the death which comes to me, between our own death and the death of others - and anticipates certain recurring themes. The second chapter, on Plato, is concerned chiefly with the Phaedo and the question of what is involved in "the practice of death". This entails an examination of related concepts and terminology in the Gorgias and the Republic, and of the whole subject of Platonic myth. The third chapter discusses Cicero's views on death and immortality - both the considered reflections of the philosopher and the spontaneous reactions of the bereaved father - principally as these emerge from the Tusculan Disputations and the letters to Atticus. The fourth chapter approaches Montaigne - his own experiences of death, the relationship between his earlier and later approaches, the tension between his professed Catholicism and his pagan inclinations, the difficulty and perhaps undesirability of extracting a 'message' from the Essais on this or any other subject. The conclusion asks to what extent these various approaches succeed in what they set out to do, and whether any generalised, objective approach to death can ever successfully address the individual predicament, either in relation to one's own death or in facing bereavement.

Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre de cette étude, de démontrer que les Essais de Montaigne contiennent bel et bien, en dépit d’une forme éclatée et d’un propos non systématique, ce qu’il convient d’appeler une morale. Non seulement cette morale ne s’oppose-t-elle pas au scepticisme des Essais, mais elle lui est même d’une certaine façon coextensive : la morale de Montaigne est une morale de l’essai, lequel constitue l’expression la plus achevée de son scepticisme. Ce dernier, pour être bien compris, doit préalablement être mis en parallèle avec la « voie » (ἀγωγή) que propose Sextus Empiricus dans ses Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes, dont l’influence sur Montaigne pourrait être bien plus importante que ne le laissent croire plusieurs travaux récents. / We will argue, in the following study, that Montaigne’s Essays, despite their fragmented writing and unsystematic form, indeed contain what deserves to be called an ethics. This ethics, far from contradicting his scepticism, identifies with it in a certain way: Montaigne’s ethics is an ethics of the essay, which is the definitive expression of his scepticisim. The latter, to be correctly understood, needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus’ « way » (ἀγωγή), whose influence on Montaigne may be more important than it has been argued in recent years.

Cette recherche porte sur le rôle joué par la lecture de Montaigne dans la philosophie de Rousseau.Il convenait d’abord de repérer les traces de cette lecture et les différents témoignages qu’en donnent son œuvre publiée ainsi que ses manuscrits, d’établir les éditions dans lesquelles Rousseau lit les Essais et les perspectives dans lesquelles il le fait. Il fallait établir également les médiations qui ont joué un rôle dans la réception de Montaigne par Rousseau. Les Essais sont édités et lus au XVIIIe siècle selon des perspectives auxquelles il ne cesse de se confronter. Nombre d’auteurs du XVIIe siècle sur lesquels il s’appuie dialoguent avec Montaigne. L’étude de la relation que Rousseau entretient avec lui demande donc l’examen de toute une tradition philosophique qui s’appuie elle-même sur Montaigne.Cette dimension de l’héritage conduit à trianguler les références, implicites ou explicites, que Rousseau fait à Montaigne dans son œuvre philosophique. Il lui sert de point d’appui pour dialoguer avec Diderot traducteur de Shaftesbury et pour prendre parti, dès le premier Discours, en faveur de la religion naturelle. La lecture politique des Essais qu’il produit nourrit son opposition à toute forme de domination et lui permet de critiquer la position de Montesquieu sur le luxe. Cette lecture politique se développe dans le second Discours, pour dénoncer les effets de l’intérêt particulier, qui détruit le lien politique. Rousseau s’appuie encore sur les principes de La Boétie qu’il trouve dans les Essais pour penser la dépravation de l’homme en société. Le lien social ne demande pas de suivre une morale opposée à l’intérêt, mais de poursuivre l’intérêt universel qui nous lie aux autres hommes. Montaigne occupe aussi une place déterminante dans le dialogue que Rousseau entretient avec des auteurs comme Barbeyrac, Mandeville ou Locke.Cette thèse montre ainsi que la référence à Montaigne met en jeu les principes fondamentaux de la philosophie politique et morale de Rousseau. / The aim of this study is to analyze the role of Montaigne’s legacy in Rousseau’s philosophy.First, evidences and views of Rousseau’s reading of Montaigne have been examined in his published works and in his manuscripts. Editions in which Rousseau was reading Montaigne have also been identified.Then, mediations between Rousseau and Montaigne’s reception have been reviewed. Rousseau reads the Essais with the 18th century points of view. He relies on 17th century authors who judge Montaigne. Therefore, thanks to this philosophical tradition who deals with Montaigne, links between Montaigne and Rousseau are analysed.The implicit and explicit references to Montaigne in Rousseau’s work are triangulated. Rousseau quotes Montaigne to deal with Diderot, – translator of Shaftesbury, to defend natural religion as early as in his First Discourse on the Sciences and Arts.Rousseau has a political reading of the Essais. He denounces all kind of domination, and criticizes Montesquieu’s apology of luxury. The political reading of Montaigne increases in the second Discourse : the possessive individualism destroys the social link.Rousseau underlines the La Boétie’s principles in the Essais, which show the political depravation of society. The social link does not demand to follow moral rules against citizen’s interests. Humanity has to pursue a universal interest, which establishes a relationship between each human being and the whole humanity.Montaigne has a central position to understand the dialogues between Rousseau and Barbeyrac, Mandeville, and Locke. Rousseau refers to Montaigne when he defends his moral and politic fundamental principles.

Nous nous proposons, dans le cadre de cette étude, de démontrer que les Essais de Montaigne contiennent bel et bien, en dépit d’une forme éclatée et d’un propos non systématique, ce qu’il convient d’appeler une morale. Non seulement cette morale ne s’oppose-t-elle pas au scepticisme des Essais, mais elle lui est même d’une certaine façon coextensive : la morale de Montaigne est une morale de l’essai, lequel constitue l’expression la plus achevée de son scepticisme. Ce dernier, pour être bien compris, doit préalablement être mis en parallèle avec la « voie » (ἀγωγή) que propose Sextus Empiricus dans ses Hypotyposes pyrrhoniennes, dont l’influence sur Montaigne pourrait être bien plus importante que ne le laissent croire plusieurs travaux récents. / We will argue, in the following study, that Montaigne’s Essays, despite their fragmented writing and unsystematic form, indeed contain what deserves to be called an ethics. This ethics, far from contradicting his scepticism, identifies with it in a certain way: Montaigne’s ethics is an ethics of the essay, which is the definitive expression of his scepticisim. The latter, to be correctly understood, needs to be compared with Sextus Empiricus’ « way » (ἀγωγή), whose influence on Montaigne may be more important than it has been argued in recent years.

[pt] Sexto Empírico não fala de dúvida, e não faz uso deste conceito em sua clássica descrição do cético pirrônico. No entanto, desde a sua redescoberta na década de 1430 no contexto do humanismo florentino e até os dias atuais, o ceticismo é interpretado através da dúvida. Na presente tese, primeiramente mostramos que não há uma conexão direta entre o ceticismo pirrônico e o conceito de dúvida. Em seguida, analisamos alguns dos modos pelos quais a dúvida é introduzida no ceticismo, particularmente no período que vai do início do século XV ao final do século XVI, conhecido como ceticismo renascentista. Sexto Empírico não fala de dúvida, e não faz uso deste conceito em sua clássica descrição do cético pirrônico. No entanto, desde a sua redescoberta na década de 1430 no contexto do humanismo florentino e até os dias atuais, o ceticismo é interpretado através da dúvida. Na presente tese, primeiramente mostramos que não há uma conexão direta entre o ceticismo pirrônico e o conceito de dúvida. Em seguida, analisamos alguns dos modos pelos quais a dúvida é introduzida no ceticismo, particularmente no período que vai do início do século XV ao final do século XVI, conhecido como ceticismo renascentista. / [en] Sextus Empiricus does not speak of doubt, nor does he use this concept in his exposition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. However, since its rediscovery in the 1430s to the present day, skepticism has been interpreted through the concept of doubt. In the present thesis, we showed first that there is no explicit connection between Pyrrhonian skepticism and doubt. Then, we analyzed some ways through which the concept of doubt was introduced into skepticism, especially in the period from the beginning of the 15th to the end of the 16th century, known as Renaissance skepticism.