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How should we understand the question "Why be moral?" Can we answer this question? If so, how? In this paper I develop an exemplarist theory of practical moral justification; that is, a theory of the justification of the prima facie moral things that we do, not the moral beliefs that we have. I take as my starting point that morality is, essentially, a set of practices in which all persons, in virtue of their being persons, participate. I argue that skillful practitioners of these various practices should be understood as moral authorities, and that the appeal to a moral authority for the purpose of one's justifying one's moral doings is necessarily justified for the appealer whenever she is practicing the same practice as the moral authority. This theory holds that moral authorities, so circumscribed, are Authoritative Exemplars, and as the appeal to their authority is necessarily justified they are able to provide a foundation for practical moral justifications, and thus rebutting the objection that all such justifications will run to regress. Among other things this account allows us to interpret the "Why be moral?" question as a question asking for more than can be had posed from a position of misunderstanding the nature of morality and practical moral justification. We cannot answer the "Why be moral?" question any more than we can answer the "Why be human?" question. / Master of Arts / In moral philosophy, the study of questions and puzzles arising in broadly moral thought, one of the perennial questions is “Why be moral?” Since the time of Plato, various philosophers have given very different answers to this question. These answers range from “It is in your best interests to be moral” to “It would be irrational for you not to be moral” to “If you have to ask then we cannot convince you that you should be moral.” The most recent thought on this question has taken it to be a very important one; a question that must be answered if moral practice is to retain its sense and relevance to our lives. The question, in more precise terms, is taken to be a demand for a justification of the demands that morality places upon us all. Moreover, this demand for <i>justification</i> is taken to require not just some answer, but an answer that <i>any</i> person must accept. In this paper I argue that the question is simply a bad question, because what morality <i>is</i> is not a theoretical system of principles which we may or may not act in accordance with. Morality is something that we <i>do</i>; it is something that we all do and we cannot stop doing it. To justify <i>what we do</i>, I argue that we may appeal to moral authorities which can rightly serve as our exemplars, as moral authorities are those persons who are skilled at doing what we are doing.

Numerous studies show biblicist Christianity, religiosity, and conservative political identity are strong predictors of Americans holding skeptical attitudes toward publicly controversial aspects of science, such as human evolution. We show that Christian nationalism—meaning the desire to see particularistic and exclusivist versions of Christian symbols, values, and policies enshrined as the established religion of the United States—is a strong and consistent predictor of Americans’ attitudes about science above and beyond other religious and political characteristics. Further, a majority of the overall effect of political ideology on skepticism about the moral authority of science is mediated through Christian nationalism, indicating that political conservatives are more likely to be concerned with particular aspects of science primarily because they are more likely to be Christian nationalists. Likewise, substantial proportions of the well‐documented associations between religiosity and biblical “literalism” with views of science are mediated through Christian nationalism. Because Christian nationalism seeks to establish a particular and exclusivist vision of Christianity as the dominant moral order, adherents feel threatened by challenges to the epistemic authority undergirding that order, including by aspects of science perceived as challenging the supremacy of biblicist authority.

Advance directives are instructions given by patients – or potential patients – specifying what actions ought to be taken for their health in the event that they are no longer capable to make decisions due to illness or incapacity. Over the last decades, there has been a rising tide in favour of advance directives: not only is the use of such directives recommended by most medical and advisory bodies, they are also gaining increasing legal recognition in many parts of the world. This book, however, takes as its point of departure one of the most commonly discussed medical-ethical arguments against granting advance directives moral force: the Objection from Personal Identity. The adherers of this objection basically asserts that when there is lacking psychological continuity between the person who formulated the advance directive and the later patient to whom it supposedly applies, this seriously threatens the directive’s moral authority. And, further, that this is so because lacking sufficient psychological continuity implies that the author of the advance directive is numerically distinct from the later patient. Although this argument has some initial appeal, most philosophers in the advance directives debate maintain that the Objection from Personal Identity fails, but suggest different reasons as to why. Whereas some argue that the objection has no force because it rests on faulty beliefs about personal identity, others argue that we ought to grant advance directives moral authority even if the author and the later patient are numerically distinct beings. This book investigates some of the most influential of these arguments and reaches the conclusion that the Objection from Personal Identity has more to it than is usually recognized in the medical-ethical debate. Lacking sufficient psychological continuity between author and later patient, it is concluded, does threaten the moral authority of the advance directive.

abstract: Several Islamic organizations have experience major changes in their theological frames and political identities away from fundamentalist and revivalist theological orientation to one that embraces a progressive Islamic theology that synthesizes these norms with classical Islamic teachings. What are the factors that explain these theological changes? What are the causal mechanisms that help to promote them? Using the moral authority leadership theory, I argue that Islamic groups would be able to change their theological frames and political identities if the changes are promoted by religious leaders with 'moral authority' status, who are using both ideational and instrumental strategies to reconstruct the theological frames of their organizations. In addition to moral authority leadership, intermediary variables that also affect the likelihood of a theological change within Islamic groups are the institutional culture of the organization - the degree of tolerance for non-Islamic theological teachings - and the relationship between the Islamic group and the state. This study is a comparative historical analysis of two Indonesian Islamic groups: the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah. It finds that the NU was able to successfully change its theological positions due to the presence of a charismatic moral authority leader, the tolerant institutional culture within the organization, and the ability of the organization to ally with the Suharto regime, allowing the reform to be institutionalized with little intervention from the regime. On the other hand, theological reform within the Muhammadiyah was not successful due to the lack of a leader with moral authority status who could have led the reforms within the organization, as well as to the dominance of a revivalist institutional culture that does not tolerate any challenges to their interpretation of Islamic theology. The analysis makes theoretical contributions on the role of religious leadership within Islamic movements and the likelihood of Islamic groups to adopt liberal political norms such as democracy, religion-state separation, and tolerance toward religious minorities. It identifies the mechanisms in which theological change within Islamic group become possible. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Political Science 2012

The liberalization of attitudes toward homosexuality in the United States over the past 30 years is well documented. Despite these changes, substantial resistance to equality for gay men and lesbians remains. Previous studies indicate that beliefs about the etiology of homosexuality are central to this discussion. Those who believe homosexuality is innate are more favorable, while those who believe it is the result of a choice are more negative. Moreover, experimental research indicates that those with negative views actually become more opposed when a natural explanation is proposed. This study highlights the importance of perceived sources of epistemic and moral authority for understanding views of homosexuality. Using stances on culturally controversial issues involving “science and religion” as indicators of where individuals place authority, we outline the connection between perceptions of moral authority and attributions about homosexuality. Analyses of a national survey of American adults show that, net of controls, one’s stance on moral authority is the strongest predictor of attributions about whether homosexuality is chosen or innate.

Progressive religious leaders are playing an increasingly important role in the effort to combat climate change. Through a combination of unstructured in-depth interviews and primary source analysis, this thesis highlights nine U.S. religious leaders from various denominations of Christianity, Judaism and Islam who are actively involved in working on climate issues. Drawing on literature in social movement theory, I explore how clergy are uniquely influential in climate issues because of the organizational advantage and moral authority they hold through their positions as religious leaders, granting them the ability to highlight social justice implications of climate change with distinctive legitimacy. Clergy engage in climate issues through a number of tactics and myriad activities spanning three domains: their congregations, the climate movement, and policy circles. While religious leaders are imbued with moral authority that allows them to speak powerfully on the social justice implications of climate change, they are also limited in a number of ways precisely because they are working within a religious context.

軟權力等同一國之「吸引力」，Joseph S. Nye, Jr.解釋這種吸引力作為無形的概念，當雙方共用「共通價值」或責任義務，並使他方支持或願意為這些價值努力時，則謂軟權力發揮了作用。Nye更進一步談到，一國外交政策可透過合法性（legitimacy）與道德權威（moral authority）來展現軟權力，合法性意指為制度，而道德權威為一國外交手段與風格予以人的觀感。本文以Nye提出的軟權力定義，並從外交政策的角度研究冷戰後中國對東協如何運用軟權力、其目的為何、細節性的實踐內涵、以及中國軟權力得到怎樣的回饋與效果。 事實上，中國對軟權力的定義受到冷戰時期與東協交往經驗影響，與Nye的定義有所出入。中國認為即使拉攏東協的手段多偏向物質性的貿易投資、金援等合作方式，但是「互利」既為中國與東協雙方皆提倡的「共通價值」，則今日東協的民調或官員呈現的好感，亦可謂中國對東協運用之軟權力發生了作用。尤其中國在冷戰後江澤民、胡錦濤兩位領導人對東協積極提倡「新安全觀」、「和諧世界」等政策，呈現了中國展現其軟權力以追求崛起目標的戰略意圖，並且在國際組織的參與、國際法與聯合聲明的簽訂、公共與公民外交、東亞金融風暴等東協政經危機應對上給予東協即時的支持與協助，令東協與中國於冷戰後呈現未曾的友好關係，中國對東協運用軟權力其努力與成果可見一般。 然而中國對東協這樣仍深度建立在物質往來的軟權力，其未來發展亦受到本文從Nye提出無形的軟權力觀點進行檢視。本文提出中國軟權力應摒棄軟權力全然建立在硬權力之上的謬思，加強與東協的理念對話，並進一步發展一套能為國際社會廣泛認同之政治價值或規範，以此中國對東協軟權力或中國整體的軟權力才有化停滯為前進的動力。 / Soft Power is an attractive power of one state. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. explains the attraction as an invisible concept which makes both sides enjoy the “shared value,” and push one party to go along with the other’s purpose, then, the soft power is functional. Moreover, soft power can perform through its benign foreign policies when they seen as legitimate and having moral authority. Legitimacy means the institutions, and moral authority indicates the impression stirred by the tactics or the styles of foreign policies. This study adopts Nye’s soft power hypothesis as a framework to research the way China operates its soft power toward ASEAN, and the ultimate goal and effects it hopes to reach. In fact, China’s soft power is affected by the experiences engaging with ASEAN during the Cold War. China manipulates its practical trades, functional aids, and investments, and it also uses the mutual benefits as a token to form the “shared value” with ASEAN, that time, the soft power works automatically. Still other relevant evidences present as announcement from China’s leaders toward ASEAN, memberships in international organizations, obedience to international laws, aids on public and civil diplomacy, and well-known help to 1997 East Asia financial storm, etc. All of these proper supports lead to ASEAN’s appreciation, and reflect china’s soft power has gained the harvest. Even though China’s soft power toward ASEAN makes its own sense by now, in the long run, China’s soft power may sap due to its deviation from Nye’s definition. This study concludes that China should banish the fallacy which soft power completely roots in the foundation of hard power, and should improve the communication with ASEAN, then should develop its universal political values confirmed by the international society at last. Only in that approach can transform its soft power into a whole new tool, and can step forward to the next era.