Several scholars have examined how Middle East states preserve their autocratic character. Some focus on competitive multi-party elections, which either “ease important forms of distributional conflict” (Blaydes 2011) or are pre-designed to favor incumbents (Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010). Others posit the existence of political parties, which regulate conflict and prevent elite defection (Brownlee 2007). Given the overthrow of a slew of governments during the Arab Spring, antecedent theories on authoritarian durability seem incomplete. Although prior explanations are not attenuated by recent state collapses, further research is required to explain the erstwhile success of Middle East authoritarianism. In particular, less attention is paid toward minority groups. This research design is an inductive theory-building project that seeks to explain how states manage minority groups. I investigate Coptic Church history over three presidencies: Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). Drawing from historical analyses, I argue that the Mubarak regime eased its relations with the Coptic Church as an accommodating bargain: if the church discouraged communal challenges against the state, the Mubarak regime would permit the Church to manage its cultural and religious affairs. The purpose of this research is to offer a guiding light on authoritarian regimes and minority groups. / text

The study explores Egypt’s foreign policy under President Hosni Mubarak. It focuses on the way Mubarak's regime dealt with internal and external threats to maintain security and bolster his internal hold on power. Two case studies are chosen to test the hypotheses: Egypt’s reluctance to reestablish diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Egypt’s response to the Greater Middle East Initiative proposed by the Bush administration and the series of Western efforts aimed at promoting political reform in the Middle East, in particular the measures it took to warm up its relations with Israel, including the signing of the QIZ treaty. The following arguments are made: 1- Security is central in understanding the behavior of Third World states. 2- The traditional 'balance of power' model should be substituted with the 'balance of threat' theory. 3- Faced with a combination of internal and external threats, Third World states most often tend to 'omnibalance' between both sets. 4- Foreign policy decisions in the Third World are determined by the level of internal and external threats, the availability of regional and international allies and the idiosyncrasies of leaders, their type of legitimacy and the interests of their ruling coalitions. 5- The foreign policies of Third World states, which tend to be lacking in strong institutions, democracy or national consensus and facing threats from within as well as without, are less likely to be shaped by or serve a national interest than a regime interest.

Following Tunisia, Egypt was the second Arab nation to engage in the Arab Spring, as massive civil uprisings in protest of its former repressive dictator Hosni Mubarak succeeded in toppling his regime after thirty years of rule. After seventeen months of military rule in the period following Mubarak’s fall, Mohamed Morsi, a member of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, was elected the fifth president of Egypt. Morsi is Egypt’s first civilian president. Ever since the Free Officers Revolution of 1952, Egypt has been ruled by a succession of military leaders, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. Consequently, political and economic authority has since rested in the hands of the military. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the strategic approaches undertaken by Egypt’s former leaders in an overall attempt to provide a comprehensive answer to this central question: what are President Morsi’s strategies for controlling the military in post-revolutionary Egypt? I will argue that, while Morsi has demonstrated his desire to control the armed forces through various institutional changes, his efforts have fallen short of attacking the heart of the problem, which is the deeply-rooted militaristic culture that has come to be valued and accepted by Egyptian society throughout the course of the last sixty years.

Vilka teman och argument blir centrala i det politiska talet vid en krissituation? Vilka retoriska grepp tillämpas? Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka detta genom en argumentationsanalys av Hosni Mubaraks tre sista tal som president under den arabiska våren i Egypten 2011. Tillsammans med en teoretisk utgångspunkt i propagandastudier och retorik studeras tre centrala teman i talen; ansvarsutkrävande, fredlig maktöverföring och talarens etos. För att sätta dessa teman i sitt sammanhang har demonstranternas slagord använts som utgångspunkt för att illustrera motargument. Resultatet av denna undersökning visar att beviskraften i Mubaraks argument är genomgående svag på grund av att de propagandastrategier och retoriska grepp som tillämpas inte anpassas efter situationen. / What themes and arguments gain importance in political discourse at times of crisis? What kind of rethorics are applied? This thesis aims to study these issues through an argument analysis of Hosni Mubarak's last three speeches as the president of Egypt during the Arabic Spring in 2011. With the use of a theoretical framework based in rethorics and propaganda the thesis analyzes three central themes in the speeches; the demand for accountability, the peaceful transition of power and the speaker's ethos. In order to position theses themes in the wider debate the slogans of the protesters have been used to create counter arguments. The thesis finds that the overall probative in Mubarak's theses and arguments is very weak due to lack of adaption of propaganda strategies and rethorical measures to the requirments of the situation.

In the first chapter natural, human and capital resources of Egyptian economy are characterized. In the second chapter the changes in economic policy after 1952 are described, from the era of Arabic socialism to the present period of economic transformation. The third chapter deals with the privatization process. In the fourth chapter deregulation of the economy is described, especially the land reform, the banking sector reform, monetary and fiscal policy. The fifth chapter deals with the process of opening of the econimy, thus liberalization of foreign trade and investmendd is described. The sixth and last chapter is focused on the structural changes in particular sectors of economy.

Since the dawn of industrialization, many authoritarian regimes have taken on massive public works projects which seem impressive or farfetched. Few onlookers are surprised when these projects are not completed or are completed at such a high cost that they appear to be an exercise in futility. Usually these failures are written off as dictatorial incompetence and overambition, but the initial motivations for beginning them are rarely addressed. This paper will argue that, rather than being a symptom of precipitant development or front for embezzlement, many of these projects were designed to fail because the regime received the largest benefit by starting them—not by completing them. Empirically this research will focus on the Toshka ‘New River Valley’ project in Egypt, which is Egypt’s largest development project and is designed to create a second Nile River Valley in the South and eventually be home to 20% of the Egypt’s population. In this report I explore the governments’ motivations, their intentions, the resulting symbolism and the repercussions of the Toshka project. / text

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This paper is designed to analyse the situation regarding the attempt to implement democracy in Egypt and why it failed. Theories regarding democratic transition and consolidation is acting as scientific instruments to carry out this case study. This essay directs its focus on several key factors that has contributed to the prevention of democratic reforms. The theory concerning path dependence is used to compliment the remaining theories to distinguish vital historic aspects to this issue. Key factors such as the Muslim brotherhood, the Egyptian military and regime, as well as the liberal movement is examined in this paper to illuminate their respective contribution to this situation. The conclusion of this paper focuses on the military, unwilling to surrender its power, along with the religiously fundamental brotherhood, growing rapidly. A democratic transition was in the making, only to be shut down by the military, regaining its former power. Although chaotic and military-biased reforms continued, they were far from democratic.  Because of all the key factors not sharing any political ideals, the situation has come to an abrupt halt regarding a democratisation process. The democratic ideal has become worn among the protestors and another try at a democratic transition is far from reality.

This thesis examines the reinvention of jihād ideology in twelfth‑century al‑Shām. In modern scholarship there is a tendency to speak of a revival of jihād in the twelfth century, but discussion of this revival has been dominated by study of the practice of jihād rather than of the ideology of jihād. This thesis addresses this imbalance by studying two twelfth‑century Damascene works: the Kitāb al‑jihād (Book of Jihād) of ʿAlī b. Ṭāhir al‑Sulamī (d. 500/1106), and the al‑Arbaʿūn ḥadīthan fī al‑ḥathth ʿala al‑jihād (Forty Hadiths for Inciting Jihād) of Abū al‑Qāsim Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 571/1176). Through discussion of these texts, this thesis sheds light on twelfth‑century perceptions of jihād by asking what their authors meant when they referred to jihād, and how their perceptions of jihād related to the broader Islamic discourse on jihād. A holistic approach is taken to these works; they are discussed not only in the context of the 'master narrative' of jihād, wherein juristic sources have been privileged over other non‑legal genres and corpora, but also in the context of the Sufi discourse of jihād al‑nafs, and the earliest traditions on jihād which thrived from the eighth century onwards on the Muslim‑Byzantine frontier. This thesis argues that both al‑Sulamī and Ibn ʿAsākir integrated elements from these different traditions of jihād in order to create models of jihād suited to their own political contexts, and that it is only in the context of a more nuanced appreciation of jihād ideology that their attempts can be properly understood. At the same time, this thesis argues against the model of the 'counter‑crusade', which holds that the revival of jihād began in earnest only in the middle of the twelfth century, by stressing that there was no delay between the arrival of the Franks and attempts to modify jihād ideology.