NATO as an institution always kept the interest on many theorist and researchers. NATO enlargement as a process has become subject of analysis, especially after the Cold War. This is because, the existence of the NATO Alliance before this period was only seen as a creation balancing the Soviet Threat. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, NATO transformed itself gradually. Since, the Soviet threat in not present any more, the researchers were and still are analyzing the NATO enlargement in terms what is the current threat that makes these countries willing to become part of NATO, and what is NATO interest in further enlarging. The concerns have been raised in some studies, but no one seems to have solved the puzzle. In this article I would make and analysis and try to explain this concerns. This would be done by analyzing and comparing the countries that had been admitted until know. Based on the indicators revealed by the analysis, alternative explanations based on the realism and neo- liberal institutionalism would be provided. I conclude that NATO is still a complex process that should be further analyzed in order the process to be clear. But as interesting points revealed in this study are that NATO enlargement is not based only on the criteria and requirements that the aspirant countries should fulfill. Aside form these requirements, the relations on the bilateral level, and the events and the relations on the international level seem to have a huge influence on the NATO enlargement.

Alliances continue to remain fundamental at the core of international politics. How states make their alliance choices is important for international order and security. The end of the Cold War brought ethnic conflicts and political instabilities in the Balkan region. Based on its size and geographical configuration, Romania again confronted its history in the alliance dilemma of whether to "balance" against threatening states or to "bandwagon" with the states that posed the greatest threats in order to appease their power. Stephen M. Walt (1987) predicted that in a case like that of Romania, the statesmen would most likely choose to bandwagon because of two motives: (i) for "defensive" purposes in order to maintain its independence in the face of a potential threat and (ii) for "offensive" reasons in order to acquire territory. After reviewing Romanian historical records on alliances since 1878, the evidence is compelling that the case of Romania conforms to Walt's (1987) theory only to the extent that "balancing is not universal." Thus, it depends on which perspective balancing or bandwagoning is considered from in forming alliances. Romania either formed alliances to balance threats, or allied with the threat. Territorial security was one of the most recurrent motives prevalent in Romanian historical records that prompted Romania to form alliances. As expected, Walt's (1987) last three factors did not provide a great explanation for Romanian alliances. Modest support was found for ideological solidarity,but little for economic ideology and transnational political penetration. / Master of Arts

The debate concerning if Sweden should move closer to NATO or even apply for membership is not entirely new. Due to Russia´s annexation of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine in the spring of 2014, and due to Russians violations of national territory, Swedish political actors have discussed the NATO membership energetically. The purpose of this essay is to map out the Swedish debate about NATO membership. By applying a Pro-Contra analysis this essay will also examine arguments from the swedish parties, members of parliament, debaters, researchers and former Secretary of State. Furthermore, the arguments will also be analyzed through theories of realism and liberalism. The debate for a NATO membership shows that arguments are based on a combination of both realism and liberalism, although there are more arguments influenced by liberalism. The arguments against a NATO membership are mainly characterized by realism rather than liberalism.

The subject of the dissertation thesis focuses on relations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia in their post-9/11/2001 phase. The theoretical framework is provided by the realist school of thought with a special focus on the "defensive" strand of that school. The thesis has two main goals: the primary goal tests a validity of a statement "Confrontational aspects of the NATO -- Russia relations prohibit any significant mutually beneficial cooperation between the NATO and Russia", the secondary goal aims to create a robust body of primary-source information (with 31 December 2007 deadline). Confrontational aspects of the NATO -- Russia relations have been analyzed in the basic conceptual documents of both Russia and the NATO with following conclusions: (1.) Russia does not accept certain characteristics of NATO, (2.) NATO is not prepared to change these characteristics to meet Russia's objections. But as shown in the thesis, these conclusions do not prevent either side to state a conceptual preparedness to an interest-based cooperation. The other important aspect -- conventional and nuclear weapons balance -- has been analyzed in depth from both the static and dynamic point of view. The positive impetus generated through a rhetorical action immediately after the 11 September 2001 resulted in the creation of the NATO -- Russia Council (NRC). In comparison to the previous phase of the NATO -- Russia relations, the NRC comprises both evolution (prioritization of the content) and revolution (rejection of the previous form). But the positive impetus seems to be failing to generate concrete joint political or practical cooperative actions. Nevertheless, examples can be found of mutually beneficial cooperation between the NATO and Russia: operation Active Endeavor, search and rescue at the sea, project for fight against Afghan drugs, Cooperative Airspace Initiative. These examples do falsify the statement as defined under the primary goal of the thesis. As for a possible future development of the NATO -- Russia relations, the thesis concludes: (1.) No further upgrade of form is to be expected over a longer term, (2.) NRC is and will be and an import forum for a political dialogue, (3.) Mutually-beneficial cooperation will probably materialize through smaller-scale projects, (4.) Freezing of relations cannot be excluded, when an important political signal is to be sent, (5.) In spite of the Russia's denouncement of new military installation in Europe the fact is that the European perimeter is and will be for Russia far more secure and predictable than her Southern and South-Easter perimeter.

Univ., Diss.--Saarbrücken, 2002.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 set Europe in sorrow, distress, and emergency. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is something Sweden has refrained from joining due to the country’s neutral stance. However, despite Sweden's long-standing neutrality of over 200 years, it was abandoned within only weeks. The short timeframe of decision-making raised questions about the level of rationality in the decision of the Swedish NATO application. Scholars and researchers have through different methods and theories attempted to explain this unpredictable shift, but still, the process appears to lack a clearly defined rationale. This case study seeks to understand the decision-making process of the government in times of crisis, examining how the rationality of such decisions may have been compromised by analyzing secondary data. The aim is to address the research gap, concerning the rapid and framed process for Sweden to join NATO. Analyzing the decision through the lens of Bounded Rationality Theory, applying variables such as (1) time pressure, (2) cognition, and (3) access to information (Simon, 1947), the possibility arises to shred light on the factors contributing to Bounded Rationality in the Swedish NATO process. These aspects were all present in the Swedish NATO process. In combination with characteristics of a government in crisis (Boin, Hart, Stern & Sundelius, 2005), one can to a great extent understand the significant shift in stance towards NATO membership, given that governments tend to act differently when being subject to a crisis. It can be concluded that rationality was significantly bounded by limited access to information, to some extent by the ability to process information, and comprehensively by the constraints of time pressure. The Swedish NATO process, consisting of a government amid a crisis, was subject to and exemplifies Bounded Rationality in decision-making.

Zugl.: Marburg, Univ., Diss., 2008. / Résumé en anglais. Ed. commerciale de la thèse de Marburg, 2008. Bibliogr.

This comparative case study examines alliance memberships’ impact on two states’ strategic culture. It focuses on changes in Danish and Norwegian strategic culture during 2008-2012, examining if and how NATO membership and specifically NATO's 2010 strategic concept impacted potential changes in the states’ strategic culture. The dependent variable, strategic culture, is broken down into three sub-beliefs used to identify relevant content in the analysed material. Using national defence white papers published before and after the strategic concept as material, a qualitative content analysis is then conducted to identify changes to the sub- beliefs before and after the release of the strategic concept. The sub-beliefs are also used to analyse the 2010 strategic concept to identify themes, which are then compared to changes in strategic culture found before and after the release of the concept. The analysis found that after the release of the concept all three of the Norwegian sub-beliefs changed in several ways that were consistent with the main themes identified in the concept, as well as using the concept as justification for changes and prioritisations in policies. Based on this the thesis makes the claim that the strategic concept likely impacted Norwegian strategic culture in several ways. While Danish sub-beliefs did change in some areas that were consistent with themes in the strategic concept, the changes were not conclusive enough to make the claim that the strategic concept had any meaningful impact on Danish strategic culture.

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The debate in progress in 2015 in Sweden is very much about whether Swedish neutrality shall be retained or replaced by a NATO membership. In 1948-49 there was a similar debate at the highest level in Sweden, whether the country should join in a Nordic alliance with Norway and Denmark, or whether they would join the western Atlantic Alliance. The study analyses the debate of the topic in parliament by a given school analysis via political actors representing all parliamentary parties. The parliamentary parties at the time, the Social Democrats, the Agrarian Party, the parliamentary Conservatives, the Liberal Party and the Swedish Communist Party. The Schools were divided by 1948 and 1949, and have but a slight difference. In 1948 there was three schools of thought where the first one was pro-Soviet Union and neutrality, one that was pro US West and for Nordic alliance, but against NATO and the last one was against the Soviet Union, the Nordic alliance and for a discussion concerning NATO. The difference in 1949 was that one school of thought came about as clearly argued for NATO. Events like the Berlin blockade and the Prague coup influenced public opinion and thus the Parliament. The debate in parliament was relatively abundant but with clear dividing lines of which the Social Democrats held the majority and chose the Swedish neutrality when the negotiations with Norway, Denmark fell through.