This thesis offers an explanatory account of my living theory of educational leadership in fostering and sustaining student and young adult leadership processes in educational and community settings. Grounded in my research to address my concern for the marginalisation and voicelessness of young people in schools and within their local communities, I explain how I have developed educational processes to help them to develop their leadership abilities and provided them with opportunities to express these abilities in contributing to a good social order in educational and community settings.

Thesis advisor: Jeffery Bloechl / This dissertation articulates Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of nature in relation to the existential condition of "natality," as defined by Arendt. Where Heidegger emphasizes mortality in his post-metaphysical ontology, these investigations follow Merleau-Ponty and Arendt who emphasize that humans are not only mortals but "natals," beings who begin. The project has a twofold aim: 1. to present an exegesis of Merleau-Ponty's oeuvre with a special emphasis on the Nature Courses and 2. to sketch out a natal ontology in its own right. This ontology depends on Merleau-Ponty's methodological advancement beyond genetic phenomenology to generative and "poetic" phenomenology, a practice that incorporates historicity and expressivity. He offers a critique of science, particularly of evolutionary biology, that is shown to be relevant in a contemporary context. His natal ontology co-emerges with an ethical standpoint; he shows that a natural prereflective relation to a plurality of others, rather than only a single other, fundamentally conditions human existence. In a natal ontology, knowledge depends on being born with others, through a co-naissance of one's worldly situation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This thesis focuses on Hannah Arendt’s theory of natality, which is identified with the event of birth into a pre-existing human world. Arendt names natality the “ontological root” of political action and of human freedom, and yet, as critics of Arendt’s political writings have pointed out, this notion of identifying freedom with birth is somewhat perplexing. I return to Arendt’s phenomenological analysis of active human life in The Human Condition, focusing on the significance of natality as the disclosure of a unique “who” within a specific relational web. From there, I trace the distinct threats to natality, speech-action, and worldly relations posed by the political philosophical tradition, on the one hand, and by the modern biopolitical “rise of the social” on the other. Drawing connections between Arendt’s theory of the social and Michel Foucault’s work on the biopolitical management of populations, my thesis defends Arendt’s contentious distinction between social and political life; the Arendtian social, I argue, can fruitfully be read as biopolitical. / Graduate

This thesis explores the themes of forgiveness and cosmopolitanism through the prism of ‘care' – a term which is used here in reference to Hannah Arendt's notion of ‘care for the world'. It presents both a theory of a ‘caring forgiveness' and a ‘caring cosmopolitanism,' two world-centric theories of political action conceptualized from a reconsideration of Jacques Derrida's and Arendt's respective bodies of thought. Additionally, this thesis illustrates how a caring forgiveness and cosmopolitanism are practices that introduce new beginnings into the public realm of the political, effectively allowing people(s) to negotiate the temporal gap between past and future by facilitating their nonviolent and non-instrumental transition through time. Although there is a tendency in (global) politics to react violently as a means of re-establishing hierarchical dynamics of power in the (international) political arena, a caring forgiveness and cosmopolitanism are two forms of praxis which cultivate new action instead of perpetuating – in an automatic manner – pernicious cycles of violence. Accordingly, forgiveness and cosmopolitanism are worldly practices that can be said to care for the doing of political action in a manner that does not merely react to past occurrences of (violent) wrongdoing. This thesis consequently demonstrates how forgiveness and cosmopolitanism ‘care for the world' by ensuring that political actors continue to possess the capacity to initiate new action(s) and to develop freely new plot lines in the ever unfolding meta-narrative of human history.

Within the text of The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt circumscribes the concept of natality in ways that tend to conflate its biological, historical, institutional and phenomenological dimensions. This dissertation seeks to clarify this concept and the conceptual territory that surrounds it. Specifically, it is argued that Arendt’s construction of the concept of natality is inherently dual. Each person is delivered into a worldly environment through her primary, biological birth. As soon as she is born, she begins to be conditioned to the accepted normative standards of her community. A gap necessarily exists, however, between the person she is socio-culturally conditioned to be, and who she is explicitly, uniquely and authentically. When deeds and words are employed in service of revealing someone’s individual identity or essence, and thereby showing her to be more than simply a mirror of her cultural conditioning, it heralds a second birth, one which is existential instead of biological. According to Arendt, this existential natality must take place in the presence of other existential agents, and also may be witnessed by a spectator who then seeks to express the significance of what has occurred to those removed from the original event either by space and/or time. This expression takes the form of artifactual objects, including works of art, architectural monuments and various forms of narratives. Arendt’s theory concerning the creation of these objects contains two major problems that are critically addressed within this project. The first problem concerns the spectator’s capacity for making judgments. Works written after The Human Condition are shown to demonstrate Arendt’s attempts to address this issue. The second problem concerns the way in which Arendt portrays the issue of embodiment. This issue must be reconciled both by appealing to work from within her canon, as well as through the introduction of recent scholarship from the field of social cognition. The project concludes with the presentation of a concrete, historical example intended to be illustrative of the preceding theoretical material.

Thesis advisor: Rodrigo Chacon / Thesis advisor: Susan Shell / In this thesis, I will explore the natural tension that exists between philosophy and politics; theory and practice, and thought and action, especially as manifest in contemporary society. In order to investigate this tension, I will use a lens presented by Hannah Arendt and her writings, in particular the Human Condition and the Jewish Writings . I will use these works to illustrate Arendt's own conflict between the role of politics and philosophy in human affairs as experienced in her transition from a political journalist to a political theorist. I will argue that a comparison of these works shows Arendt's struggle with the tension between philosophy and politics; thought and action, and theory and practice. A comparison of these works also illustrates Arendt's paradoxical conclusion of the Human Condition: that in times of unprecedented crisis, although theory and philosophy are precisely what are necessary to prevent further destruction and tragedy, they unfortunately become superfluous, and then immediate (even if groundless) action becomes necessarily the only human capacity that can "save" the world. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

The Naga women in North East India suffer in silence because of the unjust practices of child-birthing in their patriarchal culture, which privileges the birth of sons over daughters. Naga theology narrates suffering largely through Jesus' redemptive suffering on the cross, and Naga Christian women embrace this narrative, seeing in Jesus' suffering both a vision of Jesus as a friend who understands their pain and as a call to share in his suffering. Contemporary theologians have approached the symbol of the Christian cross in order to interpret it anew in light of marginalized communities. This dissertation examines Christology through the lens of the experiences of Naga women. It takes the issue of child-birthing practices within Naga culture as a starting point for re-reading the Christian cross by drawing on the theological writings of Jürgen Moltmann, Serene Jones, Rita Nakashima Brock, and Wonhee Anne Joh. This work turns to the theme of 'natality' in the work of feminist theologian and philosopher of religion, Grace Jantzen. Rooting Naga Christology in the concept of natality, it focuses on three dimensions of the life-bearing work of Jesus: embrace, respect, and nourishment. The central thesis is that a theology focused on natality provides not only a way to affirm the birth of girls in the Naga context, but it also provides a way to re-narrate the story of the cross in Naga Christian theology. In chapters one and two, this dissertation outlines the problem of child-birthing via the term `mascu-surrogacy.' The birthing mother becomes the surrogate for the male who seeks his progeny through dominating the female body. These chapters highlight the poetry and stories of Naga women, ancient and modern, to express the situation of Naga women; they also identify the centrality of the story of Jesus for Naga Christians. Chapters three and four turn to the contemporary theologies of the cross with the question of child-birthing in mind. Chapter five examines Grace Jantzen's philosophy of natality. The final chapter develops three aspects of a life-affirming Christology, based in the work of Mary Elizabeth Moore and concludes by reimagining the practice of the Eucharist for Naga women.

Natality characteristics were calculated for 3 regions in the southern Appalachians (Ridge and Valley, Alleghany Plateau, and Ohio River Valley). I report data collected in the first 2 years of a long term (> 6 years) study conducted by the Appalachian Cooperative Grouse Research Project (ACGRP). Nesting rate, pooled over all regions, was 83.6% in 1997 and 79.7% in 1998. In the 2-year period, the Alleghany Plateau reported the highest nesting rate (97.6%) while the Ohio River Valley reported the lowest rate (54.2%). Overall hen success rates were 81.5% in 1997 and 56.9% in 1998. Yearling hen success rates were as high or higher than adults. Adult hen success was 85.7% in 1997 and 48.5% in 1998; yearling hen success was 86.7% in 1997 and 82.3% in 1998. Additionally, I found a lower renest rate (8% over 2 years) in the southern Appalachians than previous studies have reported. The mean first-nest clutch size in the southern Appalachian region was considerably lower (9.5, years and regions pooled) than that reported for other portions of ruffed grouse range. Recommendations are given on how ACGRP natality data collection may be improved in upcoming years. Ruffed grouse chick survival estimates were calculated from data collected in the first 2 years of a long term ACGRP study as well as data collected separate from ACGRP protocol. First-week chick survival estimates ranged from 0.18 to 0.32 in 1997 and 0.45 to 0.48 in 1998. Late brood season survivorship values (0.11-0.13 at week 5, 0.07 at week 10) were considerably lower in the southern Appalachians than those reported from more northern portions of ruffed grouse range. Additionally, the mean number of chicks per brood in July was lower in the southern Appalachians than that reported in the Great Lakes region during July and August. Recommendations are given on how ACGRP chick count data collection may be improved in upcoming years. I compared micro-habitat characteristics at known brood locations with randomly selected locations to determine which characteristics are selected by ruffed grouse hens and broods in the southern Appalachians. In the first half of the brood season (weeks 1-6) hens and broods selected sites with tall, complete, vegetative ground cover. Additionally, broods selected forested sites with a well-developed canopy, rather than areas affected by large canopy gaps or openings. Higher ground cover at brood sites may have been due to a lack of midstory structure. The abundance of arthropods, fruit, and forage at brood flush sites was higher during the first few weeks of the brood season; this was possibly due to flush sites being located in open, mid-age or mature forest. Several authors have speculated that as the chicks' diet shifts from primarily arthropods to fruit and forage at approximately 3 weeks of age, the habitat selected by hens and their broods may change to accommodate this dietary shift. In my study, a change in habitat selection did not occur between weeks 3 and 4 as expected but after week 6 and may indicate the chicks' dietary shift occurs later than some have predicted. / Master of Science

Neste trabalho sustento a tese de que a concepção de liberdade no pensamento de Hannah Arendt inclui três dimensões: a dimensão política, em que a liberdade é atualizada na ação; a dimensão ontológica, em que a natalidade é considerada a fonte das atividades humanas livres; a dimensão interior ou mental, em que a liberdade é a característica fundamental das atividades do pensar e do querer. Essas três dimensões são entrelaçadas por uma noção comum: a capacidade humana de dar início a algo novo. Arendt elege a liberdade como tema fundamental de seu pensamento desde o seu turn para a política até seus últimos escritos. Sustento que a noção de liberdade é o fio condutor que perpassa todos os seus trabalhos sobre as atividades humanas e sobre a condição humana. Intérpretes de Arendt ressaltam a centralidade da liberdade no seu pensamento político, mas não mostram como a condição da liberdade é atualizada em todas suas dimensões porque reduzem a liberdade à dimensão política (Kateb e Dana Villa), não tratam do pensar e do querer, que são atividades da dimensão interior (Passerin D‟Entreves), enunciam a relação da capacidade de iniciar com as atividades humanas de forma ambígua (Kohn), adotam um conceito de liberdade que não rende a noção comum de liberdade que Arendt usa para descrever as atividades humanas (Young-Bruhel). Por distinguir três dimensões da liberdade e por indicar a noção comum a todas elas, estabeleço um modo de compreensão da liberdade de Arendt que visa desvelar uma concepção de liberdade que articula suas descrições das atividades das faculdades humanas com suas reflexões sobre a condição humana. O trabalho foi estruturado para tratar de cada uma das dimensões da liberdade. Começa com as origens do pensamento político arendtiano no confronto crítico com a filosofia existencial e na discussão da Questão Judaica; mostra a aniquilação da liberdade pelo governo totalitário, e apresenta cada uma das dimensões da liberdade, primeiramente, considerando as dimensões política e ontológica da ação, da revolução e da natalidade, concluindo com a análise da dimensão interior da liberdade, apresentando as atividades da mente: o querer e o pensar. / In this work, I support the thesis there are three dimensions in Arendt‟s conception of freedom: the political dimension, in which freedom is actualized in action; the ontological dimension, in which natality is considered as the source of free human activities; the inner or mental dimension, in which freedom is the fundamental characteristic of the activities of thinking and willing. These three dimensions are intertwined by a common notion: the human capacity to initiate something new. Arendt chose freedom as the fundamental theme of her thinking from her turn to politics to her later writings. I maintain that the notion of freedom is the guiding thread that pervades all his works on human activities and on the human condition. Arendt's interpreters emphasize the centrality of freedom in her political philosophy, but they do not show how the human condition of freedom is actualized in all dimensions of freedom, because they reduce freedom to the political dimension (Kateb and Dana Villa), do not deal with thinking and willing which of the mental dimension of freedom (Passerin D'Entreves), enunciate the relation of the ability to begin with human activities in an ambiguous way (Kohn), adopt a concept of freedom that does not yield the common notion of freedom that Arendt uses to describe human activities (Young -Bruhel). By distinguishing the three dimensions of freedom and by pointing out the notion common to all of them, I establish a way of understanding Arendt's freedom, which seeks to unveil his conception of freedom, and which emphasizes the anthropological trait of her descriptions of the activities of human faculties and her reflections on the human condition. This work was structured to deal with each of the dimensions of freedom. It begins with the origins of Arendtian political thought in the critical confrontation with existential philosophy and in the discussion of the Jewish Question, shows the annihilation of freedom by totalitarian government, and presents each of the dimensions of freedom, first considering the political and ontological dimensions of action, revolution and natality and concluding with the analysis of the inner dimension of freedom, presenting the activities of willing and thinking.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-07-03T16:39:48Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Kherlley Caxias Batista Barbosa.pdf: 1459187 bytes, checksum: 32d5466364ee1d88c9fcadce5dbad0b8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-03T16:39:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Kherlley Caxias Batista Barbosa.pdf: 1459187 bytes, checksum: 32d5466364ee1d88c9fcadce5dbad0b8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-27 / Nenhuma / Neste trabalho sustento a tese de que a concepção de liberdade no pensamento de Hannah Arendt inclui três dimensões: a dimensão política, em que a liberdade é atualizada na ação; a dimensão ontológica, em que a natalidade é considerada a fonte das atividades humanas livres; a dimensão interior ou mental, em que a liberdade é a característica fundamental das atividades do pensar e do querer. Essas três dimensões são entrelaçadas por uma noção comum: a capacidade humana de dar início a algo novo. Arendt elege a liberdade como tema fundamental de seu pensamento desde o seu turn para a política até seus últimos escritos. Sustento que a noção de liberdade é o fio condutor que perpassa todos os seus trabalhos sobre as atividades humanas e sobre a condição humana. Intérpretes de Arendt ressaltam a centralidade da liberdade no seu pensamento político, mas não mostram como a condição da liberdade é atualizada em todas suas dimensões porque reduzem a liberdade à dimensão política (Kateb e Dana Villa), não tratam do pensar e do querer, que são atividades da dimensão interior (Passerin D‟Entreves), enunciam a relação da capacidade de iniciar com as atividades humanas de forma ambígua (Kohn), adotam um conceito de liberdade que não rende a noção comum de liberdade que Arendt usa para descrever as atividades humanas (Young-Bruhel). Por distinguir três dimensões da liberdade e por indicar a noção comum a todas elas, estabeleço um modo de compreensão da liberdade de Arendt que visa desvelar uma concepção de liberdade que articula suas descrições das atividades das faculdades humanas com suas reflexões sobre a condição humana. O trabalho foi estruturado para tratar de cada uma das dimensões da liberdade. Começa com as origens do pensamento político arendtiano no confronto crítico com a filosofia existencial e na discussão da Questão Judaica; mostra a aniquilação da liberdade pelo governo totalitário, e apresenta cada uma das dimensões da liberdade, primeiramente, considerando as dimensões política e ontológica da ação, da revolução e da natalidade, concluindo com a análise da dimensão interior da liberdade, apresentando as atividades da mente: o querer e o pensar. / In this work, I support the thesis there are three dimensions in Arendt‟s conception of freedom: the political dimension, in which freedom is actualized in action; the ontological dimension, in which natality is considered as the source of free human activities; the inner or mental dimension, in which freedom is the fundamental characteristic of the activities of thinking and willing. These three dimensions are intertwined by a common notion: the human capacity to initiate something new. Arendt chose freedom as the fundamental theme of her thinking from her turn to politics to her later writings. I maintain that the notion of freedom is the guiding thread that pervades all his works on human activities and on the human condition. Arendt's interpreters emphasize the centrality of freedom in her political philosophy, but they do not show how the human condition of freedom is actualized in all dimensions of freedom, because they reduce freedom to the political dimension (Kateb and Dana Villa), do not deal with thinking and willing which of the mental dimension of freedom (Passerin D'Entreves), enunciate the relation of the ability to begin with human activities in an ambiguous way (Kohn), adopt a concept of freedom that does not yield the common notion of freedom that Arendt uses to describe human activities (Young -Bruhel). By distinguishing the three dimensions of freedom and by pointing out the notion common to all of them, I establish a way of understanding Arendt's freedom, which seeks to unveil his conception of freedom, and which emphasizes the anthropological trait of her descriptions of the activities of human faculties and her reflections on the human condition. This work was structured to deal with each of the dimensions of freedom. It begins with the origins of Arendtian political thought in the critical confrontation with existential philosophy and in the discussion of the Jewish Question, shows the annihilation of freedom by totalitarian government, and presents each of the dimensions of freedom, first considering the political and ontological dimensions of action, revolution and natality and concluding with the analysis of the inner dimension of freedom, presenting the activities of willing and thinking.