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I samband med att Afghanistan själva skall ta över säkerhetsansvaret i landet från 2015 kommer en stor del av framgången bero på den afghanska arméns (ANA) förmåga och färdigheter. Avseende dess kapacitet att klara av denna uppgift har det framförts tvivel. Mot bakgrund av detta kommer den afghanska arméns krigföringsförmåga i nutid att undersökas i denna uppsats i syfte att kartlägga eventuella förtjänster samt brister som i sin tur kanske kan ge en fingervisning om framtiden.   Metoden utgörs av en fallstudie av (ANA) där ett analysverktyg skapas med hjälp av J.F.C Fullers teorier om krigföringsförmåga han framför i sin bok ”The Foundations of the Science of War” och specifikt det han benämner som the threefold order. Krigföringsförmågan delas i sin tur in i fysiska, konceptuella och moraliska faktorer.   Med hjälp av detta analysverktyg sorterar jag undersökningsmaterialet, som framförallt utgörs av rapporter från det amerikanska försvarsdepartementet och kongressen, med hjälp av kvalitativ textanalys.   Avslutningsvis besvaras den övergripande frågeställningen genom en analys av det insamlade undersökningsmaterialet och en avslutande diskussion.   Det övergripande resultatet är att ANA har gjort stora framsteg under de senaste åren men att den samlade krigföringsförmågan bedöms som låg. Inom de fysiska faktorerna är det framförallt den låga krigsdugligheten bland fältförbanden samt inom flygvapnet och stödfunktionerna som drar ner betyget. Inom de konceptuella är det bristen på utbildare, den svaga rekryteringen och utbildningen av underofficerare och olika traditioner inom officerskåren. Det som är sämst är de moraliska faktorerna där framförallt etniska problem och nepotism bidrar till splittring inom armén.

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A República Democrática do Congo tem sofrido, no período pós-Guerra Fria, os momentos mais trágicos de sua história. O país foi palco da Primeira Guerra do Congo e da Segunda Guerra do Congo – esta também chamada de "Guerra Mundial Africana", por ser o conflito armado que mais matou desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial (3,8 milhões de pessoas). Contudo, mesmo após o fim formal das conflagrações em 2003, o país vive um "estado de violência", no qual mais de 1,6 milhão de pessoas morreram e outras centenas de milhares estão deslocadas internamente, refugiadas ou têm sido vítimas de violência sexual. Destarte, a pergunta que a pesquisa procura responder é “por que, mesmo após a paz formal, o estado de violência permanece na República Democrática do Congo (RDC)?” O argumento aqui sugerido é que a guerra continua na RDC, pois não houve a definição militar do conflito, primeiro passo no processo de construção do Estado. Há a permanência de grupos armados que atuam contra as populações civis e o governo central, e em locais onde o aparelho coercitivo do Estado é ineficiente ou mesmo inexistente. Esta realidade se relaciona com o processo histórico de construção do Estado do Congo, bem como com a forma de resolução da Guerra Mundial Africana mediante mecanismos de paz negociada, ou power-sharing. O primeiro capítulo do trabalho trata de problemas teórico-conceituais sobre a relação entre guerra e Estado na África Subsaariana e no Congo. Os capítulos subseqüentes tratam sobre a relação entre guerra e construção do Estado no Congo pós-independência, estudando três guerras principais ocorridas no país e as suas relações com o processo de construção do Estado. A pesquisa sugere que a adoção de uma Reforma do Setor de Segurança voltada à construção do exército nacional pode trazer os benefícios da definição militar do conflito para os mecanismos de paz negociada. Como contribuição adicional o exército nacional pode gerar meios não-militares de definir o conflito, incentivando a formação da burocracia e da economia nacionais. / The Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered, in the post-Cold War era, the most tragic moments in its history. The country was the place of the First Congo War and Second Congo War – this one also called "African World War" because it is the armed conflict that killed more since the Second World War (3.8 million people). However, even after the formal end of the conflagrations in 2003, the country is experiencing a "state violence", in which more than 1.6 million people died and hundreds of thousands are internally displaced, refugees or have been victims of sexual violence . Thus, the question that the research seeks to answer is "why, even after the formal peace, the state of violence remains in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)?" The argument suggested here is that the war continues in the DRC, since there was the definition of military conflict, the first step in the process of nation building. There is the persistence of armed groups against civilians and the central government, and in places where the coercive apparatus of the state is inefficient or nonexistent. This reality relates to the historical process of state building of the Congo, as well as the resolution of the African World War through mechanisms of negotiated peace, or power-sharing. The first chapter of this dissertation deals with theoretical and conceptual issues about the relationship between war and state in sub-Saharan Africa and the Congo. Subsequent chapters deal with the relationship between war and state building in post-independence Congo, studying three major wars occurred in the country and its relations with the process of state-building. The research suggests that the adoption of a Security Sector Reform focused on building the national army can bring the benefits of military conflict resolution mechanisms for negotiated peace. As an additional contribution, the national army can generate non-military means of defining the conflict, encouraging the formation of the bureaucracy and the national economy.

A República Democrática do Congo tem sofrido, no período pós-Guerra Fria, os momentos mais trágicos de sua história. O país foi palco da Primeira Guerra do Congo e da Segunda Guerra do Congo – esta também chamada de "Guerra Mundial Africana", por ser o conflito armado que mais matou desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial (3,8 milhões de pessoas). Contudo, mesmo após o fim formal das conflagrações em 2003, o país vive um "estado de violência", no qual mais de 1,6 milhão de pessoas morreram e outras centenas de milhares estão deslocadas internamente, refugiadas ou têm sido vítimas de violência sexual. Destarte, a pergunta que a pesquisa procura responder é “por que, mesmo após a paz formal, o estado de violência permanece na República Democrática do Congo (RDC)?” O argumento aqui sugerido é que a guerra continua na RDC, pois não houve a definição militar do conflito, primeiro passo no processo de construção do Estado. Há a permanência de grupos armados que atuam contra as populações civis e o governo central, e em locais onde o aparelho coercitivo do Estado é ineficiente ou mesmo inexistente. Esta realidade se relaciona com o processo histórico de construção do Estado do Congo, bem como com a forma de resolução da Guerra Mundial Africana mediante mecanismos de paz negociada, ou power-sharing. O primeiro capítulo do trabalho trata de problemas teórico-conceituais sobre a relação entre guerra e Estado na África Subsaariana e no Congo. Os capítulos subseqüentes tratam sobre a relação entre guerra e construção do Estado no Congo pós-independência, estudando três guerras principais ocorridas no país e as suas relações com o processo de construção do Estado. A pesquisa sugere que a adoção de uma Reforma do Setor de Segurança voltada à construção do exército nacional pode trazer os benefícios da definição militar do conflito para os mecanismos de paz negociada. Como contribuição adicional o exército nacional pode gerar meios não-militares de definir o conflito, incentivando a formação da burocracia e da economia nacionais. / The Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered, in the post-Cold War era, the most tragic moments in its history. The country was the place of the First Congo War and Second Congo War – this one also called "African World War" because it is the armed conflict that killed more since the Second World War (3.8 million people). However, even after the formal end of the conflagrations in 2003, the country is experiencing a "state violence", in which more than 1.6 million people died and hundreds of thousands are internally displaced, refugees or have been victims of sexual violence . Thus, the question that the research seeks to answer is "why, even after the formal peace, the state of violence remains in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)?" The argument suggested here is that the war continues in the DRC, since there was the definition of military conflict, the first step in the process of nation building. There is the persistence of armed groups against civilians and the central government, and in places where the coercive apparatus of the state is inefficient or nonexistent. This reality relates to the historical process of state building of the Congo, as well as the resolution of the African World War through mechanisms of negotiated peace, or power-sharing. The first chapter of this dissertation deals with theoretical and conceptual issues about the relationship between war and state in sub-Saharan Africa and the Congo. Subsequent chapters deal with the relationship between war and state building in post-independence Congo, studying three major wars occurred in the country and its relations with the process of state-building. The research suggests that the adoption of a Security Sector Reform focused on building the national army can bring the benefits of military conflict resolution mechanisms for negotiated peace. As an additional contribution, the national army can generate non-military means of defining the conflict, encouraging the formation of the bureaucracy and the national economy.

A República Democrática do Congo tem sofrido, no período pós-Guerra Fria, os momentos mais trágicos de sua história. O país foi palco da Primeira Guerra do Congo e da Segunda Guerra do Congo – esta também chamada de "Guerra Mundial Africana", por ser o conflito armado que mais matou desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial (3,8 milhões de pessoas). Contudo, mesmo após o fim formal das conflagrações em 2003, o país vive um "estado de violência", no qual mais de 1,6 milhão de pessoas morreram e outras centenas de milhares estão deslocadas internamente, refugiadas ou têm sido vítimas de violência sexual. Destarte, a pergunta que a pesquisa procura responder é “por que, mesmo após a paz formal, o estado de violência permanece na República Democrática do Congo (RDC)?” O argumento aqui sugerido é que a guerra continua na RDC, pois não houve a definição militar do conflito, primeiro passo no processo de construção do Estado. Há a permanência de grupos armados que atuam contra as populações civis e o governo central, e em locais onde o aparelho coercitivo do Estado é ineficiente ou mesmo inexistente. Esta realidade se relaciona com o processo histórico de construção do Estado do Congo, bem como com a forma de resolução da Guerra Mundial Africana mediante mecanismos de paz negociada, ou power-sharing. O primeiro capítulo do trabalho trata de problemas teórico-conceituais sobre a relação entre guerra e Estado na África Subsaariana e no Congo. Os capítulos subseqüentes tratam sobre a relação entre guerra e construção do Estado no Congo pós-independência, estudando três guerras principais ocorridas no país e as suas relações com o processo de construção do Estado. A pesquisa sugere que a adoção de uma Reforma do Setor de Segurança voltada à construção do exército nacional pode trazer os benefícios da definição militar do conflito para os mecanismos de paz negociada. Como contribuição adicional o exército nacional pode gerar meios não-militares de definir o conflito, incentivando a formação da burocracia e da economia nacionais. / The Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered, in the post-Cold War era, the most tragic moments in its history. The country was the place of the First Congo War and Second Congo War – this one also called "African World War" because it is the armed conflict that killed more since the Second World War (3.8 million people). However, even after the formal end of the conflagrations in 2003, the country is experiencing a "state violence", in which more than 1.6 million people died and hundreds of thousands are internally displaced, refugees or have been victims of sexual violence . Thus, the question that the research seeks to answer is "why, even after the formal peace, the state of violence remains in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)?" The argument suggested here is that the war continues in the DRC, since there was the definition of military conflict, the first step in the process of nation building. There is the persistence of armed groups against civilians and the central government, and in places where the coercive apparatus of the state is inefficient or nonexistent. This reality relates to the historical process of state building of the Congo, as well as the resolution of the African World War through mechanisms of negotiated peace, or power-sharing. The first chapter of this dissertation deals with theoretical and conceptual issues about the relationship between war and state in sub-Saharan Africa and the Congo. Subsequent chapters deal with the relationship between war and state building in post-independence Congo, studying three major wars occurred in the country and its relations with the process of state-building. The research suggests that the adoption of a Security Sector Reform focused on building the national army can bring the benefits of military conflict resolution mechanisms for negotiated peace. As an additional contribution, the national army can generate non-military means of defining the conflict, encouraging the formation of the bureaucracy and the national economy.

Cette recherche doctorale en histoire immédiate, s'inscrit dans une réflexion plus large sur l'étude de nouveaux conflits, la culture et l'emploi des forces armées françaises sur le terrain, en prenant l'exemple de son engagement en Afghanistan. Elle porte particulièrement sur l'emploi de l'arme du génie dont nous postulons à la grande importance de ses savoir-faire sur le terrain, en situation de contre-insurrection. / This doctoral research takes part on the study of the new conflicts, by taking the example of the French engineers in Afghanistan. We postulate for the big importance of these combat support units in situation of counterinsurgency.

La nature du rôle joué par les institutions militaires dans les États démocratiques se diffère de celui joué dans les États en développement et/ou en période de transition politique. Dans le premier cas, les institutions militaires ont un rôle professionnel qui consiste à protéger l'État contre toute agression extérieure. Alors qu'au cas second, l'institution militaire dépasse ses taches professionnelles jusqu'à l'intervention sur la scène politique via le pouvoir militaire direct ou indirect. Prenant en considération le fait que l'institution militaire dans la deuxième catégorie des pays, n'a pas toujours confiance en le régime démocratique, - souvent considéré comme une menace à la sécurité nationale-, l'exigence de la démocratie reste donc en report permanent. Le débat académique autour de la relation la démocratie et l'arrivée des militaires au pouvoir s'accroît depuis le déclenchement des révolutions du printemps arabe, bien que la question de la transition-même a été au centre des recherches politiques depuis la seconde moitié des années 60-70. Les peuples sont à la recherche des régimes démocratiques basés sur la loi, la citoyenneté le respect des libertés et des droits de l'homme et qui mènent des politiques de développement au profit des niveaux pauvres avant les autres riches. Cependant, un nouveau problème est apparu ; trouver une formule approprié pour la place de l'Armée dans les nouveaux régimes démocratiques. Comment contrôler le rôle croissant de l'institution militaire sans exposer l'État au danger de la division interne ni de l'agression venant de l'extérieur ? Cette recherche se focalise sur les relations civilo-militaires en Libye ainsi que le rôle de l'institution militaire dans les transitions politiques qu'a connues le pays depuis son indépendance, ainsi que les facteurs historique, économiques, géopolitiques et sociaux, qui ont parfumé ces relations par la particularité libyenne. De plus, depuis 2014, durant le dialogue national libyen entre les parties hostiles, la question de l'institution militaire a posé de réels obstacles devant un consensus national, parce que les partie étaient, et le sont toujours, divisé autour de l'article 8, concernant l'Armée dans le projet signé du consensus. Dans ce cadre, le problématique de l'étude tourne autour une interrogation générale ; dans quelle mesure l'institution militaire peut-elle permettre ou contribuer à une transition vers un régime démocratique basé sur le pluralisme et non le tribalisme ni l en Libye ? / The nature of the role played by military institutions in democratic states differs from that one played in developing States and / or those in times of political transition. In the first case, military institutions have a professional role of protecting the state against external aggression. Whereas in the second case, the military institution goes beyond its professional tasks until intervention on the political scene via direct or indirect military power. Taking into account the fact that the military institution in the second category of countries does not always trust the democratic regime, often considered as a threat to national security, the requirement of democracy therefore remains in permanent postponement. The academic debate on the relationship between democracy and the arrival of the military in power has increased since the start of the Arab Spring revolutions, although the question of transition itself has been at the center of political research since the the 1960s and 70s. People are seeking democratic regimes based on law, citizenship, respect for human rights and freedoms, and pursuing development policies to benefit the poor before the other rich. However, a new problem arose; How to find a suitable formula for the place of the Army in the new democratic regimes. How can we control the growing role of the military institution without exposing the State to the danger of internal division or aggression from outside? This research focuses on civil-military relations in Libya and the role of the military institution in the political transitions that the country has undergone since independence, as well as the historical, economic, geopolitical and social factors that have perfumed these relations by the Libyan peculiarity. Moreover, since 2014, during the Libyan national dialogue between hostile parties, the question of the military institution posed real obstacles to a national consensus, because the parties were, and still are, divided around the article 8, concerning the Army in the signed draft of the consensus. In this context, the problem of study revolves around a general question; to what extent can the military institution allow or contribute to a transition to a democratic regime based on pluralism and not tribalism or Libya ?

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.

This dissertation is a focused analysis of the origins, organization, training, politics, and combat capability of the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) from 1954 to 1963, the leading military instrument in the national counterinsurgency plan of the government of the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). Other military and paramilitary forces that complemented the army in the ground war included the Viet Nam Marine Corps (VNMC), the Civil Guard (CG), the Self-Defense Corps (SDC) and the Civil Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) which was composed mainly of the indigenous populations in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. At sea and in the air, the Viet Nam Air Force (VNAF) and the Viet Nam Navy (VNN) provided additional layers of tactical, strategic and logistical support to the military and paramilitary forces. Together, these forces formed the Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces (RVNAF) designed to counter the communist insurgency plaguing the RVN. This thesis argues the following. First, the origin of the ARVN was rooted in the French Indochina War (1946-1954). Second, the ARVN was an amalgamation of political and military forces born from a revolution that encompassed three overlapping wars: a war of independence between the Vietnamese and the French; a civil war between the Vietnamese of diverse social and political backgrounds; and a proxy war as global superpowers and regional powers backed their own Vietnamese allies who, in turn, exploited their foreign supporters for their own purposes. Lastly, the ARVN failed not because it was organized, equipped, and trained for conventional instead of counterinsurgency warfare. Rather, it failed to assess, adjust, and adapt its strategy and tactics quickly enough to meet the war’s changing circumstances. The ARVN’s slowness to react resulted from its own institutional weaknesses, military and political problems that were beyond its control, and the powerful and dangerous enemies it faced. The People’s Army of Viet Nam (PAVN) and the People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) were formidable adversaries. Not duplicated in any other post-colonial Third World country and led by an experienced and politically tested leadership, the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (DRVN) and the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Viet Nam (NFLSVN) exploited RVN failures effectively. Hypothetically, there was no guarantee that had the US dispatched land forces into Cambodia and Laos or invaded North Vietnam that the DRVN and NFLSVN would have quit attacking the RVN. The French Far East Expeditionary Corps (FFEEC)’ occupation of the Red River Delta did not bring peace to Cochinchina, only a military stalemate between it and the Vietnamese Liberation Army (VLA). Worse yet, a US invasion potentially would have unnerved the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which might have sent the PLAF to fight the US in Vietnam as it had in Korea. Inevitably, such unilateral military action would certainly provoke fierce criticism and opposition amongst the American public at home and allies abroad. At best, the war’s expansion might have bought a little more time for the RVN but it could never guarantee South Vietnam’s survival. Ultimately, RVN’s seemingly endless political, military, and social problems had to be resolved by South Vietnam’s political leaders, military commanders, and people but only in the absence of constant PAVN and PLAF attempts to destroy whatever minimal progress RVN made politically, militarily, and socially. The RVN was plagued by many problems and the DRVN and NFLSVN, unquestionably, were amongst those problems.