The aim of this thesis is to describe and defend ‘The Constraint-Based View’, which is a particular conception of the nature of, and relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theories of justice. Traditionally, ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘full compliance’, while non-ideal theory is characterised by the assumption of ‘partial compliance’. In other words, ideal theories assume that those for whom the theory is meant to apply will be entirely willing and able to comply with the theory’s requirements, while non-ideal theories do not. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, I describe and assess this original conception as well as several alternative accounts of ideal and non-ideal theory, in order to offer a broad survey of the existing literature, and to identify the various ways that these conceptions fail to capture fully the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory. In Chapter 2, I draw a distinction between two different approaches to theorising about justice. ‘Axiological’ or ‘A-Type’ approaches are characterised by the fact that they include almost no assumptions as inputs to the theory, and that they are not intended to provide action-guiding recommendations as part of the outputs of the theory. In contrast, ‘Practical’ or ‘P-Type’ approaches include additional assumptions as part of their inputs and are intended to form part of a process that ultimately produces action-guiding recommendations. In Chapter 3, I describe and defend my preferred conception of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory – the ‘Constraint-Based View’ (CBV). According to the CBV, there is a spectrum of theoretical approaches that can be more or less ideal, depending on the extent to which they include ‘soft constraints’ as part of the inputs to the theory. Soft constraints are facts about the world that can be changed, in contrast to hard constraints, which are facts about the world that cannot. I argue that this way of thinking about the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory is more useful than the alternative conceptions considered in Chapter 1. In Chapter 4, I examine the roles that feasibility considerations should play in ideal and non-ideal theory, from the perspective of the CBV and in Chapter 5, I explain the implications of adopting the CBV for what I call ‘transitional theory’, which is concerned with the transition from the status quo towards a more ideal state of affairs. In Chapter 6, I offer an example of the CBV in action, by considering its implications for the debate over duties of justice towards future generations.

In this thesis, I argue that David Hume’s political philosophy is centrally focused on the prospect of social reform. The conception of justice and politics he develops out of his theories of virtue and moral psychology stresses the pervasive effects of institutions on individuals’ abilities to live decent lives and provides criteria for determining the relative success of such institutions. While Hume’s political philosophy has been interpreted as justifying a society’s status quo, I demonstrate that the principles of merit, need, and equality—commonly considered core principles of social justice—each play a vital role in his view of what constitutes a healthy, stable society. In particular, I contend that Hume’s emphasis on institutions guaranteeing equal protection of basic rights, the role of the common good in the moral justification of political institutions, and the material and social circumstances of equality that make the institution of justice possible, suggest that social reform is a central concern of his theory of justice and politics.

G.A. Cohen argues that John Rawls' method of political philosophy--in particular his sensitivity to the facts of human nature--leads him inexorably to producing a nonideal conception of justice. In this thesis I defend Rawls against this accusation by demonstrating that the facts of human nature that he shows deference towards are a product of the "free development" of his ideal conception of the person. The result is that Rawls' conception of justice has the power and status that Rawls affords it, and that Cohen's critique fails to cause internal damage to Rawls' theory. My thesis is thus what the subtitle says it is: an essay in defence of John Rawls' deference to "human nature" from the "concessionary criticism" of G.A. Cohen.

The notions of “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” have become widely accepted in political philosophy. Recently, several philosophers’ have urged that ideal theory systematically produces practically irrelevant theories. Such philosophers argue that political philosophy ought move away from ideal theory in order to make the discipline more germane to the unjust real world. Call this tactic of eliminating ideal theory “Strategy.” In this paper, I argue that political philosophy would do well to abandon the ideal/nonideal distinction. Though the use of INID is widespread, philosophers do not have one uniform way of drawing the distinction; of the several common ways of drawing the distinction, none is categorical. As a consequence of this ambiguity, the role that INID plays in our political philosophical theorizing has become pernicious.

In his liberal theory of justice, John Rawls stipulates that the principles of justice selected will be generally complied with. This assumption of full compliance is characteristic of what Rawls calls “ideal theory,” i.e., a theory that seeks to formulate and justify ideal principles of justice. David Schmidtz contends that the full compliance assumption undermines the practical relevance of ideal theory. I argue that Schmidtz’s criticisms of full compliance do not succeed. Understanding why his arguments fail requires an examination of both Schmidtz’s and Rawls’s views of the nature of justice and the function of political philosophy. I explain why full compliance can plausibly be assumed in Rawls’s ideal theory given the conception of justice he employs, and articulate the problem Schmidtz’s argument faces if it relies on his view of the role of political philosophy.

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Dans ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons sur le débat entre théorie idéale et théorie non idéale. Il s’agit d’un débat qui a déjà fait couler beaucoup d’encre et auquel s’ajoutent constamment de nouveaux auteurs. L’un des auteurs ayant retenu notre attention est Charles Mills. Nous pensons qu’il a apporté plusieurs contributions intéressantes aux débats méthodologiques entourant le rapport entre théorie idéale et théorie non idéale. Nous nous pencherons plus précisément sur les critiques de Mills en ce qui concerne la méthodologie élaborée par Rawls et sur leurs conséquences politiques. En mettant en relation les critiques de Mills, non seulement avec les idées de Rawls, mais aussi avec les débats contemporains, nous observerons comment ses critiques et ses propositions répondent à certaines problématiques observées lorsque nous tentons d’élaborer des politiques publiques à partir de la théorie idéale. / In this thesis we will examine the debate between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. This is a debate that has already been much discussed, but new authors are constantly adding new arguments and new approaches. One of the authors who caught our attention is Charles Mills. We believe that he has made several interesting contributions to debates surrounding the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory and specifically on the methodological aspect. In this study, we will focus on Mills criticisms of the methodology developed by Rawls and the political consequences of these problems. By relating Mills criticism not only to Rawls ideas, but also to contemporary debates, we will observe how his criticisms and his propositions answer certain problems that we can observe when we try to think of concrete actions from the ideal theory.

Ce mémoire de maitrise propose de faire une analyse féministe du concept de droit de la femme tel qu’il est conçu dans les théories des droits humains. Le paradigme libéral en théorie des droits humains sera critiqué parce qu’il contient des idéalisations inégalitaires. Cela mènera à aborder la question sous l’angle de droits humains spécifiques aux femmes. Cette investigation commencera par l’examen de la possibilité théorique de produire une théorie des droits de la femme plausible. L’importance de tenir compte des conditions non idéales du monde sera soulignée. Puis, une argumentation en faveur de droits socioéconomiques spécifiques sera faite. Enfin, cela mènera à une défense de l’approche des capabilités de Martha Nussbaum pour la protection des intérêts particuliers des femmes. / The purpose of this master thesis is to analyze the concept of women’s rights as human rights from a feminist perspective. The liberal paradigm of human rights theory will be criticised because it leads to idealizations that contribute to gender inequalities. We will address the issue by considering women’s rights as specific human rights. This inquiry will start with the possibility to produce a plausible theoretical account of women’s rights. In order to do this, non-ideal conditions will be emphasized. We will then defend social and economic rights as means to protect women’s interests. Lastly, we will favour Nussbaum’s capabilities approach as a theory able to protect the specific interests of women.

John Rawls conceives society as a cooperation system. To govern this system, he developed the theory of justice as fairness (JAF). His theory, from its emergence in the early 1970s to the present, has been commonly associated with public policies called affirmative action (AFs). Despite this association, there are two relevant situations that deserve analysis and lead us to our research problem: Rawls never wrote directly about affirmative action, despite the large extent of his work; and there are arguments supporting the incompatibility between the JAF and the AFs. In view of that, this paper deals with the following problem: is there incompatibility between the theory of justice as fairness and affirmative action? Our hypotheses are: (i) that affirmative action is not provided for in the JAF and, in general, cannot be simply derived from that theory; and (ii) that, despite this, there is no incompatibility between the JAF and the AFs. The broader objective of this paper, besides the specific objective of responding to the research problem, will be to demonstrate that there is no room for simplistic associations between the JAF and the AFs, as there are relevant arguments that must be faced by those who wish to study the subject - either to defend the AFs or not - especially those arguments concerning Rawls's distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. In the first chapter, basic concepts will be presented for the general understanding of the theory of justice as fairness. In the second chapter, after exposing the concept and taxonomy of affirmative action, some of Rawls's arguments that found JAF's two principles of justice will be analyzed in order to verify if such arguments present any incompatibility with affirmative action. Next, an analysis of the validity of some objections made by Robert Taylor in the paper Rawlsian Affirmative Action will be done, where Taylor argues that certain categories of affirmative action are incompatible with the JAF in the scenarios of ideal theory and non-ideal theory. Ultimately, conclusions will be drawn, in the sense that: (i) affirmative action is not foreseen in the JAF and cannot be simply derived from it; (ii) that the arguments of possible incompatibility analyzed here are invalid; and (iii) that, apart from the existence of other arguments not studied here, such public policies are not incompatible with the theory of justice as fairness. / John Rawls concebe a sociedade como um sistema de cooperação. Para reger esse sistema, desenvolveu a teoria da justiça como equidade (TJE). Sua teoria, do surgimento no início da década de 1970 até hoje em dia, tem sido comumente associada às políticas públicas denominadas ações afirmativas (AFs). Apesar dessa associação, há duas situações relevantes que merecem análise e nos levam ao nosso problema de pesquisa: Rawls nunca escreveu sobre ações afirmativas diretamente, apesar da grande extensão de sua obra; e existem argumentos sustentando a incompatibilidade entre a TJE e as AFs. Diante disso, o presente trabalho enfrentará o seguinte problema: existe incompatibilidade entre a teoria da justiça como equidade e as ações afirmativas? Nossas hipóteses são: (i) que as ações afirmativas não estão previstas na TJE e, em geral, não podem ser simplesmente derivadas daquela teoria; e (ii) que, apesar disso, não há incompatibilidade entre a TJE e as AFs. O objetivo mais amplo do trabalho, para além do objetivo específico de responder ao problema de pesquisa, será demonstrar que não há espaço para associações paroquiais entre a TJE e as AFs, pois há argumentos relevantes que devem ser enfrentados por quem pretender estudar o tema – seja para defender as AFs ou não –, sobretudo aqueles argumentos relativos à distinção de Rawls entre teoria ideal e teoria não-ideal. No primeiro capítulo, serão apresentados conceitos básicos para a compreensão geral da teoria da justiça como equidade. No segundo capítulo, após expor conceito e taxonomia das ações afirmativas, serão analisados alguns dos argumentos de Rawls que fundamentam os dois princípios de justiça da TJE, para verificar se tais argumentos apresentam alguma incompatibilidade com as ações afirmativas, e a seguir será analisada a validade de algumas objeções feitas por Robert Taylor no artigo Ações Afirmativas Rawlsianas, sustentando que determinadas categorias de ações afirmativas são incompatíveis com a TJE, nos cenários da teoria ideal e da teoria não-ideal. Ao final, serão expostas conclusões, no sentido de que: (i) as ações afirmativas não estão previstas na TJE e não podem ser simplesmente derivadas dela; (ii) que os argumentos de possível incompatibilidade, aqui analisados, são inválidos; e (iii) que, ressalvada a existência de outros argumentos aqui não estudados, tais políticas públicas não são incompatíveis com a teoria da justiça como equidade.

Ce mémoire propose d’analyser la place de la réflexion utopique au sein de la philosophie politique. En tant qu’idéal permettant de porter un regard critique sur la société ainsi qu’une mise en lumière des perspectives de transformation de celle-ci, l’utopie est un concept pertinent pour la réflexion politique. L’utilisation de l’utopie selon ces termes est toutefois critiquée. Pour justifier la réactualisation de l’utopie, nous analysons deux critiques qui ont été formulées à son égard avant de proposer une reconceptualisation de celle-ci. Le premier chapitre traite de la critique concernant l’incapacité de la réflexion idéale à être appliquée dans le monde. Nous mobilisons les apports théoriques du débat entre la théorie idéale et non idéale afin d’y répondre. Cette discussion nous fournit une meilleure compréhension du concept de faisabilité ainsi que de la capacité de la théorie idéale à guider l’action. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’autoritarisme inhérent aux idéaux utopiques. L’utopie serait la recherche d’un idéal de perfection absolue qui doit être imposé par la violence. Cette critique est partiellement répondue par des exemples d’utopies ne se conformant pas à cette définition. Le troisième chapitre propose de repenser le concept d’utopie. L’utopie réaliste de Rawls est analysée, mais elle s’avère inadéquate pour notre propos. Notre attention est tournée vers les perspectives de Böker et McKenna nous permettant de jeter les bases d’une nouvelle conception de l’utopie. Nous terminons par un retour positif sur notre question principale : l’utopie doit être réactualisée dans la philosophie politique comme une dimension essentielle. / The purpose of this master’s is to analyze the role of utopian thinking within political philosophy. Utopia, being an ideal used to criticize and transform present society is a useful concept for political thought. However, using utopia in these terms is criticized. To justify reintroducing this concept within political philosophy, we analyze two criticisms against utopia before reconceptualizing our main concept. The first chapter deals with the inability of ideal thought to address real world issues. To respond to this criticism, we analyze the recent debate between ideal and non-ideal theory. This discussion provides us with a renewed understanding of the role of feasibility and action-guiding in ideal theory. The second chapter deals with the authoritarian character of utopian ideals. Within this perspective, utopia is a pursuit of social perfection which can only be enforced through violence. This criticism is partially responded with examples of utopia which do not conform with this definition. The third chapter proposes to rethink the concept of utopia. The first perspective to be analyzed is Rawls’s realist utopia, but it does not adequately reintroduce utopian thought within political philosophy. In turn, the theories of Böker and McKenna enable us to think of utopia in a more open and dynamic perspective. To finish this master’s, we return to our first inquiry. Not only does utopia has a role within political philosophy, it should be seen as an essential part.