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Liberalism and the worst-result principle preventing tyranny, protecting civil liberty /Delmas, Candice. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Title from title screen. Andrew Altman, committee chair; Christie Hartley, Peter Lindsay, committee members. Electronic text (88 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed May 2, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 80-88).
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Controle judicial das decisões dos Tribunais de Contas como hipótese de inelegibilidadeSilva, André Garcia Xerez January 2014 (has links)
SILVA, André Garcia Xerez. Controle judicial das decisões dos Tribunais de Contas como hipótese de inelegibilidade. 2014. 171 f.: Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito, Fortaleza-CE, 2014. / Submitted by Natália Maia Sousa (natalia_maia@ufc.br) on 2015-06-11T14:08:03Z
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Previous issue date: 2014 / This work aims to study the limits of control by Electoral Justice about the decisions of the Courts of Accounts in the judgment of public accounts in order to declare the ineligibility of candidates for elective office. The Complementary Law n. 135/2010 (“Clean Record Law”) gave new text to the hypothesis of ineligibility established under art. 1, I “g”, of Complementary Law n. 64/90, so it‟s necessary to delineate clear parameters to guide the electoral jurisdiction without violating the constitutionally guaranteed powers to the Courts of Accounts. The first chapter examines the role of the Courts of Accounts in the institutional arrangement delimited by the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and the legal nature of its decisions about the supervision of public spending by managers in exercising public functions, especially regarding his relationship with the judicial function. In the next chapter, it is problematized the ineligibility described in art. 1º, I “g”, of LC n. 64/90, with the new text given by LC nº. 135/2010, as a restriction of the fundamental political right to dispute an election, covering the essential requirements for its characterization: reject accounts, unappealable decision, detection of incurable irregularity that characterizes intentional act of administrative improbity and absence of suspensive court decision. Finally, in the third chapter, it is sought to establish the limits of judicial review of the Electoral Justice about the decisions handed by the Courts of Accounts in order to enact the ineligibility of candidates for elective office, for the purpose of to seek a correct application of art. 1º, I, “g”, of LC nº. 64/90 in the current democratic context, from the study of topics such as administrative and judicial discretion, indeterminate juridical concepts, philosophical thought of Spinoza and its impact on the democratic system as a background to the problem of the limits of this kind of judicial review. / Este trabalho visa a estudar os limites do controle da Justiça Eleitoral sobre as decisões dos Tribunais de Contas no julgamento de contas públicas a fim de declarar a inelegibilidade de candidatos a cargos eletivos. A Lei Complementar nº. 135/2010 (Lei da “Ficha Limpa”) deu nova redação à hipótese de inelegibilidade prevista no art. 1º, I, “g”, da Lei Complementar nº. 64/90, de modo que é preciso delinear parâmetros claros que norteiem a jurisdição eleitoral sem desrespeitar as competências constitucionalmente asseguradas às Cortes de Contas. No primeiro capítulo, examina-se o papel dos Tribunais de Contas no arranjo institucional delimitado pela Constituição Brasileira de 1988 e a natureza jurídica de suas decisões no que se refere à fiscalização de gastos públicos pelos gestores em exercício de funções públicas, especialmente a respeito de sua relação com a função jurisdicional. No capítulo seguinte, problematiza-se a inelegibilidade estabelecida no art. 1º, I, “g”, da LC nº. 64/90, com a nova redação dada pela LC nº. 135/2010, enquanto restrição ao direito fundamental político de disputar um pleito, percorrendo os requisitos indispensáveis à sua configuração: rejeição de contas, irrecorribilidade da decisão, detecção de irregularidade insanável, sua caracterização como ato doloso de improbidade administrativa e a inexistência de provimento judicial suspensivo. Enfim, no terceiro capítulo, procura-se estabelecer os limites do controle da Justiça Eleitoral sobre as decisões proferidas pelos Tribunais de Contas com o objetivo de decretar a inelegibilidade de candidatos a cargos eletivos, a fim de se buscar uma correta aplicação do art. 1º, I, “g”, da LC nº. 64/90 no atual contexto democrático, a partir do estudo de temas como discricionariedade administrativa e judicial, conceitos jurídicos indeterminados, o pensamento filosófico de Espinosa e sua a repercussão no regime democrático como pano de fundo ao problema dos limites desta espécie de controle judicial.
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Regulation and trade in development : explaining productivity at the firm level / Règlement et commerce dans le développement : explication de productivité au niveau de l'entrepriseDougherty, Sean Michael 11 April 2013 (has links)
Les institutions et leurs règles sous-jacentes sont essentielles pour le développement économique, car elles fournissent un cadre pour le bon fonctionnement des marchés. Cependant, les différents types de réglementations et même les cadres institutionnels peuvent avoir des effets très différents sur les résultats au niveau de l'entreprise ou de l'individu. Cette dissertation examine l'effet de plusieurs types de règlementations et d'institutions sur la productivité et des mesures apparentées à celle-ci. Le premier chapitre examine l'effet de la concurrence internationale et des barrières compétitives intérieures sur la croissance de la productivité au niveau de l'entreprise dans les pays de l'OCDE. Une interaction étroite est observée entre la pénétration des importations et les obstacles à l'entrée d'origine nationale, conditionnelle à la distance où se trouve une entreprise par rapport à la frontière technologique. Le deuxième chapitre examine les effets de la réforme du marché du travail dans les usines situées dans les différents états de l'Inde. Un effet positif de la réforme du marché du travail est observé sur la croissance de productivité au niveau de l'entreprise dans les industries à forte intensité de main-d'œuvre et les industries volatiles. Le troisième chapitre se concentre sur les exportateurs indiens qui ont profité de la libéralisation des capitaux pour investir à l'étranger et cherchent à savoir s'ils ont profité grâce à l'apprentissage par la pratique. Après avoir fait correspondre ces entreprises avec des entreprises semblables mais qui n'ont pas investi à l'étranger, le chapitre montre que la productivité n'a pas été stimulée, bien que les entreprises aient vraiment gagné en termes de taille globale grâce à l'accès au marché. Le quatrième chapitre explore comment la qualité du système juridique dans les différents États du Mexique a eu un impact sur la taille des entreprises. Les états pourvus de meilleures institutions juridiques apparaissent comme ayant des entreprises avec un capital plus grand, plus intense et étant plus productives. / Institutions, and their underlying rules, are essential for economic development, in that they provide a framework for markets to operate. However, different types of regulatory roles and even institutional settings may have very different effects on outcomes at the firm or individual level. This dissertation examines the effect of several types of rules and institutions on productivity and related measures. The first chapter examines the effect of international competition and domestic competitive barriers on firm-level productivity growth in the OECD. A close interaction is observed between import penetration and domestic barriers to entry, conditional on a firm's distance to the technological frontier. The second chapter examines the effects of labor market reform on plants in different Indian states. A positive effect of labor market reform is found on plant-level productivity growth in labor-intensive and volatile industries. The third chapter looks at Indian exporters who took advantage of capital account liberalization to invest abroad, and explores whether they gained through learning-by-doing. After matching these firms with similar firms that did not invest abroad, the chapter finds that productivity was not boosted, though firms did gain in terms of their overall size through market access. The fourth chapter explores how the legal system in different Mexican states has impacted the size of firms through heightened capital intensity. States with higher quality legal institutions are found to have systematically larger and more productive firms.
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Direito e técnica: uma investigação acerca da conjunção entre os fenômenos técnico e jurídico no pensamento de Martin Heidegger / Droit et téchnique: une ênquete sur le problème de la téchnique en face du droit et de léthique dans la philosophie de Martin HeideggerSergio Tonetti Felicori 30 May 2012 (has links)
Le présent travail est consacré à une enquête sur le problème de la téchnique, comme pensée par Heidegger, mais ici étudié en liaison avec le droit et l\'éthique. Basé sur cette question nucléaire posée par Heidegger sur l\'essence de la téchnique et le danger que la technologie moderne pose à l\'essence de l\'humanité, l\'étude aborde dès la signification originale des idées grecques de la physis et la technè, en passant par l\'opinion de certains des plus connus étudiants du phénomène téchnique, en particulier en ce qui concerne le caractère individuel et systématique de la téchnique, jusqu\'à l\'examen de cet espace où la technique rencontre le droit de façon si problématique. Dans cet espace, on peut commencer à vérifier le problème juridique du soin juridique, un concept dérivé de l\'ontologie fondamentale, et, peu après, la technique juridique aussi bien que un concept singulier de sentence juridique comme produit révélateur de la verité du droit. Dans la dernière partie, On spécule librement autour de l\'attitude de l\'homme qui persiste dans la téchnique, même quand elle devient inconfortable et dangereuse, et conduit à des possibilités ultimes de pré-réalisation. En laissant au jugement du monde et de l\'histoire la possibilité téchnique la plus extreme et la plus néfaste, l\'attitude de lhomme doit se tourner vers la technique elle-même comme un instrument pour parvenir au bon et au juste tout en prenant comme premisses l\'épuisement du savoir téchnique et l\'acceptation du mal inhérent à elle, afin de vraiment protéger l\'humanité contre une connaissance partiellement compris et, par conséquent, que partiellement sous contrôle humain. / O presente trabalho dedica-se à investigação do problema da técnica, tal como pensado por Heidegger, mas aqui investigado na sua conjunção com o direito e a ética. Partindo dessa questão nuclear posta por Heidegger acerca da essência da técnica e do perigo que a técnica moderna representa para a essência da humanidade. O estudo aborda desde o sentido original das ideias gregas de physis e de techné, passando pela opinião de alguns dos mais conhecidos estudiosos do fenômeno técnico, especialmente no que se refere ao caráter autônomo e sistemático da técnica, até o exame daquele espaço de conjunção onde o direito encontra a técnica de forma problemática. Neste espaço, pode-se verificar de início a questão do cuidado jurídico, conceito derivado da ontologia fundamental, e, logo em seguida, da técnica jurídica e de um conceito singular de sentença jurídica como produto revelador da verdade do direito. Na última parte, especula-se livremente sobre a atitude do homem que persiste na técnica, mesmo quando esta se torna incômoda e perigosa, e a leva às últimas possibilidades de pré-realização. Deixando, assim, ao julgamento do mundo e da história a possibilidade técnica mais extrema e mais nefasta, a atitude humana deve voltar-se para a própria técnica como instrumento de realização do bom e do justo tomando como premissas o exaurimento da ténica como saber e a aceitação do mal que lhe é inerente, a fim de realmente proteger a humanidade de um saber apenas parcialmente compreendido e, portanto, apenas parcialmente sob o domínio humano.
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Liberdade e decisão judicial: a autoridade da vontade como instrumento legitimador das razões jurídicasCARVALHO, João Claudio Carneiro de January 2005 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2005 / Esta dissertação tem como pano de fundo a crise das funções públicas estatais,
notadamente a crise de credibilidade que atravessa o Poder Judiciário brasileiro, constada
em meio ao crescimento de caminhos alternativos para solução de conflitos, como o
pluralismo de jurisdição, a mediação e a arbitragem. As decisões oriundas do poder
judiciário vêm sendo apresentadas como estratégias de manutenção de poder, fazendo jus
às convicções pessoais do julgador. O direito, não aquele idealizado pelas escolas
dogmáticas, perdeu seu referencial teórico, realizando-se casuisticamente através de
sentenças que julgam instintivamente, a pretexto de uma justiça ou moral, guiada pelo
subjetivismo. Com efeito, o discurso oficial encontra base em elementos não dogmáticos
que conduzem a tomada de decisão, muito embora o julgador apresente uma homilia
ornada, fruto da utilização de ferramentas retóricas, sonegando as premissas de onde
partiu. A crítica que se faz ao formalismo é devida à característica que possui de
conseguir, através de fórmulas engendradas, esconder as vicissitudes de um decisão.
Utilizando a técnica conhecida como análise de discurso, a dissertação decompôs a
decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que denegou pedidos de intervenção federal por
descumprimento de ordem judicial, tendo sido verificados inúmeros artifícios retóricos
que servem à manipulação das razões jurídicas e aos exercícios argumentativos, criando a
ilusão de certeza em meio a insegurança e incerteza
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A judicialização do impeachment: um estudo sobre a hermenêutica constitucional na jurisprudência política do Supremo Tribunal Federal de Collor a DilmaVasconcelos, Marta Suzana Lopes January 2016 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2016 / A tese sustenta que o Supremo Tribunal Federal ao promover o julgamento do “Caso Collor”
- Mandado de Segurança nº 21.564 –DF- 1992 e do “Caso Dilma” – ADPF nº 378-DF- 2015,
regulamentou o procedimento do impeachment, realizando uma filtragem constitucional da
Lei nº 1.079/50, através de uma interpretação ativa e criativa, que modificou substancialmente
os papéis constitucionais da Câmara dos Deputados e do Senado Federal, alterando o sentido
e o alcance dos artigos 51, I, e 52, I, da Constituição Federal de 1988. Observa-se que no
primeiro julgamento a Corte começou a construir o rito do processo. No segundo a Corte
optou por uma intervenção mais drástica e profunda, fixando as “regras do jogo”, com o
suprimento das omissões inconstitucionais, avançando em questões interna corporis da
competência exclusiva do Poder Legislativo.
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A efetivação judicial dos direitos sociais inscritos na Constituição Da República Federativa do BrasilARAUJO, Luiz Henrique Diniz 19 February 2013 (has links)
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Previous issue date: 2013-02-19 / O trabalho estuda os direitos sociais inscritos na Constituição da República
Federativa do Brasil, a sua imediata aplicabilidade e efetivação judicial. Começa
abordando a formação do Estado Constitucional e a Constitucionalização dos Direitos
Sociais. Estuda, em seguida, sob a ótica da hermenêutica constitucional, a ponderação
de princípios, o mínimo existencial e a dignidade da pessoa humana, para demonstrar
que esses direitos são judicializáveis. O estudo também analisa a questão da efetivação
judicial em relação à separação de poderes, bem como ao custo dos direitos e à reserva
do possível. Nos dois últimos capítulos, analisa a jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal
Federal em relação ao tema, bem como os instrumentos processuais que dizem mais
diretamente com a efetivação judicial desses direitos: o mandado de segurança e o
mandado de injunção.
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Die interpretasie van fundamentele aansprake in 'n heterogene samelewingBoshoff, Anél 27 August 2012 (has links)
LL.D. / My dissertation expounds the difficulty of interpreting fundamental claims - as found in a justiciable constitution - in circumstances of social diversity. The basic premise is that successful interpretation depends on the open acknowledgement of the fact of diversity (and its accompanying problems) and a willingness to critically re-evaluate traditional definitions and existing theories of interpretation. In the Introduction I argue that the established conception of social/cultural identity as being stable and isolated, should be replaced by the idea that identity is overlapping, shifting and internally negotiated. Such a conception would create the forum for constitutional . dialogue leading to a temporal and conditional agreement about meaning. I also argue for a more inclusive understanding of the term "interpretation" - analogous to the much broader act of "translating". In chapter two I contend that so-called "monism" - the viewpoint that there is a single correct answer to every problem of interpretation - is an impossible and harmful ideal, undermining the contextuality of interpretation in a diverse society. I discuss the two theories traditionally used by South African courts to ensure "objective/correct" interpretation - literalism and subjectivism - to illustrate the -- unfeasibility of monism. Hart's analytical jurisprudence, in spite of its acceptance of the linguistic contextuality of the law, still postulates so-called "easy cases" where legal meaning can be found instead of negotiated. Finally, I argue that Dworkin's expansive theory of legal constructivism - construing an allperspicacious judge finding the "one correct answer" in the "seamless web of the law" - is both morally unacceptable and practically impossible in a diverse society such as ours. Chapter three explores the hermeneutic dialogue - as expounded by Gadamer - as a more realistic way of perceiving constitutional interpretation in a diverse society. The different social and historical contexts (or "horizons") of the participants - and of the text they interpret- are seen as inescapable and indeed necessary for understanding. Each participant must, however, be prepared to reconsider his/her own pre-conceptions in the light of alternative points of view. I illustrate Gadamer's dilemma of avoiding both extreme context-bound subjectivism and extreme context-free objectivism by discussing two of his critics: Habermas and his theory of "critical hermeneutics" and the ethnocentrism of Rorty. I argue that, in spite of severe problems - specifically the danger of participants destroying the process by way of male fide inputs and of the domination of the dialogue (and of the forum) by established groups - the hermeneutic dialogue remains the only possible way of accommodating diversity in the process of constitutional interpretation. In chapter four I examine three sceptical theories in order to mitigate the (unwarranted?) optimism required by philosophical hermeneutics. Both legal realism and the CLS movement made a valuable contribution to maintain a vigilant and critical attitude towards the reality of the judicial process and to expose the undermining influences of existing social structures and institutionalised practises on this process. Deconstruction, on the other hand, points to the possibility of broadening the interpretive forum by including hitherto non-privileged points of view. I conclude with Caputo's plea for facing the difficult - but not impossible - task of acknowledging diversity within the broad "interpretive community" while maintaining a critical or reflexive attitude towards the process, the other(s) and oneself.
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Who interprets the constitution: A descriptive and normative discourse on the Ethiopian approach to constitutional reviewFisseha, Yonatan Tesfaye January 2005 (has links)
Magister Legum - LLM / This study explored the process of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review in Ethiopia and determined the role of the courts. It examined the different suggestions made by different authors and officials regarding the respective role and function of the courts and the House of Federation in interpreting the constitution and exercising the power of constitutional review. It also seeked to inquire the counter-majoritarian problem which focused on the relationship between judicial review and democracy. The thesis also inquired into the legitimacy of the Ethiopian approach to constitutional review. In this regard it seeked to determine whether the approach represents and adequate response to the counter-majoritarian problem. It also seeked to determine whether Ethiopia has adopted an institution that is well suited, competent and impartial to discharge the task of constitutional interpretation and constitutional review. / South Africa
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Understanding judicial reasoning : a conception and rationale for law-related educationCase, Roland January 1989 (has links)
The topic of judicial reasoning has been largely excluded from high school law and social studies curricula despite widespread ignorance and misunderstanding among Canadians of the reasoning judges are expected to employ in applying the law. The two biggest obstacles to its inclusion are: (1) insufficient appreciation among educators of the importance of public understanding of judicial reasoning, and (2) a lack of consensus about the nature of judicial reasoning. Accordingly, the major thrusts of this dissertation are to justify why judicial reasoning ought to be part of basic civic education and to articulate a defensible conception of judicial reasoning for educators' use in law-related and public legal education programs.
Defensible criteria for theorizing about judicial reasoning are explained and justified by considering different types of theorizing about social practices. Three basic types of theories are identified - formal, causal and ethical theories. It is suggested that the relevant type of theory of judicial reasoning, what I call a formal theory, involves explication of what informed practitioners would accept as the standards operating within their system. This account of theorizing about social practices is defended against objections implied by a rival account of theorizing presented by Dworkin. Dworkin's explication is rejected on the grounds that it conflates a
distinction between theories that faithfully represent the standards of proper judicial practice and theories whose account of judicial standards is controlled by instrumental purposes.
Building on Hart's conception of law as a union of primary and secondary rules, an account of judicial reasoning is developed in terms of three types of second-order rules. These rules of application, which establish standards for applying the law in particular cases, include rules for determining the legal validity of arguments for a decision, for setting the relative weight of legal arguments, and for verifying the conclusions attributed to a legal argument. Rules of application are organized into three dominant modes or forms of reasoning: (1) reasoning from interpretive guidelines, which refers to a constellation of second-order rules that govern application of law by determining a law's meaning; (2) reasoning from prior cases, which deals with rules governing application of law in light of previous judicial decisions; and (3) reasoning from principle, which involves rules for assessing the implications of potential judicial decisions in light of other legal standards. Specific judicial decisions and general judicial practices are explicated in terms of these modes of reasoning. This account of judicial reasoning is defended against a number of objections, including challenges posed by the principal rival conception of reasoning about the law - an account of judicial reasoning offered by Dworkin.
Teaching high school students about the modes of judicial reasoning is justified because greater public understanding of judicial reasoning is required to combat widespread, potentially damaging, misperceptions of judicial practices. The key elements comprising an adequate lay understanding of judicial reasoning are outlined. / Education, Faculty of / Curriculum and Pedagogy (EDCP), Department of / Graduate
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