The intention of this research is to analyse the process and methodology of the Iranian negotiating style. The research is mainly premised on Putnam’s two-level game metaphor (1988) and the “ultimate decision making unit” of Hermann et al. (1987), the purpose being to identify key leadership units, individuals, and formal and informal networks in Iran. The study further takes cognisance of key elements of the Iranian national character, which naturally impacts directly on what Iran considers to be a suitable negotiating style. It provides an overview of how the 1979 revolution changed Iranian diplomacy and how it forced international political theorists to take note of the cultural-religious dimension, ignored until then as elements of international politics and theory. Two case studies, deal respectively with the US hostage crisis (1979-1981), and the Iran-E3/EU nuclear negotiations, between 2003 and 2006. The analysis shows how Iran assumed the character of a revolutionary country and how its new religiously driven diplomacy is evolving. The study finally identifies and illustrates the active deployment of Shî’a negotiation doctrine as the basis of Iranian diplomacy and the use of techniques such as taqiyyah, tanfih and khod’eh. A model for negotiations with Iran is developed using key elements of the research. AFRIKAANS : Die studie fokus op Iranese onderhandelingstyl en - metodiek. Twee teorieë, naamlik Putnam (1988) se “twee-ledige interaktiewe onderhandelingsproses” en Hermann et al. (1987) se leierskapsmodel, is gebruik om Iran se gefragmenteerde leierselite asook die staat se formele en informele netwerke wat ‘n sleutelrol vervul in onderhandeling te identifiseer. Bykomend hiertoe is ‘n analise gemaak van faktore soos kultuur en godsdiens wat onderliggend is aan Iran se “nasionale karakter” en dus ’n direkte invloed uitoefen op Iranese onderhandelingstyl. Die studie wys ook hoe die 1979 rewolusie ‘n verandering gebring het deur godsdiens en kultuur tot gelykwaardige dimensies van die internationale politiek te verhoog nadat dit voorheen heeltemal geïgnoreer is. Dit bly egter vreemd vir die Weste. Die studie slaag daarin om deur middel van twee navorsingsondersoeke rakende Iran se oorname van die VSA ambassade in Tehran tussen 1979 en 1981) en die Iran-E3/EU kernonderhandelings tussen 2003 en 2006 die fokus te plaas op die identifisering en ontwikkeling van ‘n Iranese onderhandelingstyl. Tegnieke soos taqiyyah, tanfih en khod’eh wat die basis van Iran se diplomatieke onderhandellingstyl vorm, word vervolgens bespreek terwyl ‘n model vir onderhandelinge met Iran ook ontwikkel is uit die gegewens wat verkry is uit die navorsing. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Political Sciences / unrestricted

La question des traités internationaux devant la juridiction constitutionnelle ivoirienne est une illustration du contentieux interne relatif au droit international conventionnel. Dans le cadre de ce contentieux relatif aux rapports entre le droit international et le droit interne, la juridiction constitutionnelle est amenée à se prononcer sur la constitutionnalité des traités internationaux avant leur insertion dans l’ordre juridique ivoirien. Les modalités d’introduction des traités internationaux en droit ivoirien traduisent l’option du pays en faveur de la doctrine moniste avec primauté du droit international. Les traités régulièrement ratifiés sont automatiquement incorporés au droit interne et ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois internes. Cependant, avant leur ratification, la Constitution prévoit une procédure de vérification de leur constitutionnalité. Ce contrôle préventif a pour effet d’empêcher l'entrée dans l'ordre juridique ivoirien de tout traité international contraire à la Constitution, en dehors de l’intervention du pouvoir constituant. Si le traité est déclaré contraire à la Constitution, l’autorisation de le ratifier ne peut intervenir qu’après la révision constitutionnelle. Le mécanisme de contrôle mis en place par la Constitution de 1960 et reconduit par la Constitution de 2000 actuellement en vigueur a connu une évolution notable relativement à ses conditions d’exercice. Celles-ci ont été progressivement et considérablement élargies par les textes dans le but de faciliter et favoriser le déclenchement du contrôle…. Au total, la juridiction constitutionnelle n’a pu se pencher que sur une vingtaine de traités dont elle a, tant bien que mal, apprécié la conformité à la Constitution. Dans la confrontation de la norme internationale avec la Constitution, l’attitude du juge constitutionnel, emprunte parfois d’hésitations, repose largement sur une interprétation assez libérale de l’exigence de non-contrariété qui aboutit à faciliter la participation de l’État au droit international conventionnel en général et au droit communautaire africain en particulier. En effet, jusqu’ici, l’exercice du contrôle de la constitutionnalité des traités a révélé que, loin de constituer un « frein au développement du droit international », comme aurait pu laisser présager le mécanisme du contrôle, de façon générale, celui-ci s’avère plutôt favorable à l’influence du droit international. Seul le traité de Rome portant Statut de la Cour pénale internationale a été déclaré contraire à la Constitution par le Conseil constitutionnel dans sa décision du 17 décembre 2003. La révision constitutionnelle attendue en vue de la ratification du Traité de Rome permettra d’apprécier l’exécution des décisions de contrariété rendues par l’instance constitutionnelle. / The issue of international treaties before the Ivorian constitutional court is an illustration of the internal dispute relating to international treaty law. In the framework of this dispute concerning the relationship between international law and national law, the constitutional court is asked to decide on the conformity of international treaties before their integration in the Ivorian legal order. The conditions of integration of international treaties in the Ivorian domestic law reflect the country’s option in favor of the monist doctrine with primacy of international law. Treaties duly ratified are automatically incorporated into the national law and shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament. However, before their ratification, the Constitution provides a procedure for the review of their constitutionality. The effect of this preventive review is to avoid the entry of unconstitutional international treaties into the Ivorian legal order without the decision and intervention of the constituent power. If the treaty is held not to be in conformity with the Constitution, authorization to ratify it may be given only after amending the Constitution. The mechanism of constitutional review established by the Constitution of 1960 and extended by the Constitution of 2000 (currently in force) undergone significant evolution regarding its conditions of implementation. These conditions were considerably widened in order to facilitate the release of control… In total, the constitutional court was able to look into only twenty or so treaties for which, somehow, the judge reviewed compliance with the Constitution. In the confrontation of treaties with Constitution, the attitude of the constitutional court is sometimes hesitant. Its interpretation of the requirement of non-contradiction between the treaty and the Constitution generally leads to facilitate the participation of the State to International law in general and African community law in particular. Indeed, so far, the practice of the constitutional review by the judge revealed that, the review, far from being an "obstacle to the development of international law", as could foreshadow its mechanism, is rather favorable to its development. Only the Treaty laying down the Statute of the International Criminal Court was declared not to be in conformity with the Constitution by the constitutional court in its decision of 17 December 2003. The amendment of the Constitution that is expected for the ratification of this treaty will be an opportunity to appreciate the enforcement of non-conformity decisions.

South African company law is currently the object of comprehensive review. One o f the areas under scrutiny is that of corporate governance. Control over management is vital in the interests of the company itself, its shareholders and its creditors. Effective accountability should be balanced against the need to allow those who manage a certain measure of freedom and discretion in the exercise of their function. Company directors are subject to various duties. This thesis concentrates on their fiduciary obligation. It is suggested that this sui generis obligation is owed to the company as a separate entity. Interests of other groups may sometimes merit con­ sideration. Against the background o f a com parative investigation, a "corporate opportunity" is defined as any property or economic opportunity to which the com­ pany has a claim. South African law protects a company’s claim to an opportunity if it is in the company’s line of business and if the company has justifiably been relying upon the director(s) to acquire it or to assist in its acquisition for the company. The application of established fiduciary principles suffice to resolve corporate opportunity matters. Essentially the application o f these rules amount to a determination whether the director has complied with his fundamental duty to act in the company’s best interests. There seems to be no need for a separate doctrine of corporate opportunities.' A director should only be absolved from liability on account of the company’s inability to pursue an opportunity or its rejection by the company if there was no real conflict of interest. The appropriation of corporate opportunities should not be ratifiable, both because the ratification constitutes a fraud on the minority, and because the decision to ratify cannot be regarded as being in the interests of the company. The relationship between the appropriation of corporate opportunities, misuse of confidential information and competition is investigated. These aspects fre­ quently overlap, but should be distinguished because their bases, and accordingly their appropriate remedies, may differ. Effective control may benefit by a restatement of directors’ fiduciary duties in the Companies Act. To this end certain amendments to the Act are recommended. / Mercantile Law / LLD

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Includes bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa is regarded not only as a threat to democratisation processes but also to peace, security and stability on the continent. The United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and various regional economic communities (RECs) have all sought to address this challenge, in what may be described as a trilateral linkage between the international, regional and sub-regional organisations. The unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar in 2009 led to the involvement of the UN, AU and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Although these organisations all responded to the case of Madagascar, it cannot be assumed that they all share a common understanding of and approach to unconstitutional changes of government. This study builds upon a constructivist approach to norm development, with a particular focus upon the norm life cycle. The thesis seeks to assess if a normative approach to dealing with unconstitutional changes of government has developed within the UN, AU and SADC respectively, and if so, how? Furthermore, how have these organisations responded to such a case, with a specific focus on Madagascar? Building upon these findings, the thesis aims to assess if and how a norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government has emerged, spread and become internalised within the UN, AU and SADC. The study illustrates that the norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government is particularly salient within the AU. Furthermore, and unlike many other peace and security norms, the norm condemning unconstitutional changes of government seems to have emerged from the level of the AU and impacts upwards on the UN as well as downwards on SADC. These findings imply that the AU will have a prominent role in informing the approach and response to such cases on the African continent in the future. Furthermore, the normative frameworks of the UN and SADC may be developed largely as a result of and on the basis of the principles and policies of the AU. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die herlewing van ongrondwetlike regeringsverandering in Afrika word nie net as 'n bedreiging vir die demokratiseringsprosesse beskou nie, maar ook vir vrede, veiligheid en stabiliteit op die kontinent. Die Verenigde Nasies (VN), die Afrika-Unie (AU) en verskeie streeks-ekonomiese gemeenskappe (REC's) het gepoog om hierdie uitdaging, wat beskryf kan word as ‘n driehoekskakeling tussen die internasionale, streeks- en substreek-organisasies, aan te spreek. Die ongrondwetlike regeringsverandering in Madagaskar in 2009 het gelei tot die betrokkenheid van die VN, AU en die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings gemeenskap (SAOG). Alhoewel hierdie organisasies op die Madagaskar-saak gereageer het, kan daar nie aanvaar word dat hulle ‘n gemeenskaplike begrip van en benadering tot die ongrondwetlike verandering van regering deel nie. Hierdie studie bou op 'n konstruktivisme benadering tot die ontwikkeling van norme, met 'n spesifieke fokus op die lewensiklus van ‘n norm. Die tesis poog om te bepaal of 'n konstruktivisme benadering respektiewelik binne die VN, AU en SAOG ontwikkel het rakende ongrondwetlike regeringsverandering, en indien wel, hoe? Verder, hoe het hierdie organisasies gereageer op so 'n geval, met spesifieke fokus op Madagaskar? Met hierdie bevindinge in gedagte, sal die tesis bepaal of, en hoe, 'n norm wat ongrondwetlik regeringsveranderinge veroordeel, na vore gekom het en hoe dit versprei en binne die VN, AU en SAOG geïnternaliseer is. Hierdie studie illustreer dat die norm wat ongrondwetlik regeringsveranderinge veroordeel, besonder opvallend is binne die AU. In teenstelling met ander vredes- en sekuriteits norme, blyk dit dat die norm wat ongrondwetlik regeringsveranderinge veroordeel, sy oorsprong het op AU-vlak, met opwaartse trefkrag op die VN, sowel as afwaarts op SAOG. Hierdie bevindinge impliseer dat die AU in die toekoms 'n prominente rol in die benadering tot en reaksie op derglike gevalle op die Afrika-kontinent, sal hê. Verder kan die normatiewe raamwerke van die VN en SAOG moontlik hoofsaaklik ontwikkel as gevolg van die basis van beginsels en beleid wat deur die AU neergelê word. / Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI).

The Diploma Thesis deals with the President of the Republic and his/her relation to the International Treaties, to the Negotiation, the Approval and the Ratification. The work contains both international and national perspective of the problem. The thesis is a reflection of the ongoing expert debate, to which extent has the President of the Republic the constitutional right of decision-making autonomy in the field of International Treaties of the Czech Republic. The thesis analyses the current legal situation and presents up-to-date juridical opinions together with arguments from the political science.

<p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>

No description available.

<p>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 (CISG) seeks to provide a standard uniform law for international sales contracts. This research paper analyses the rationale behind South Africa&rsquo / s delay in deciding whether to ratify the CISG, and its possible effect on trade with other nations. The CISG drafters hoped that uniformity would&nbsp / remove barriers to international sales thereby facilitating international trade. Ratification of the convention is only the beginning of uniformity / uniformity must then be extended to its application&nbsp / and interpretation. Not all countries have ratified the Convention yet they engage in international trade in goods: this state of affairs presents challenges since traders have to choose a national&nbsp / law that applies to their contract where CISG does not apply. This takes traders back to the undesirable pre-CISG era. On the other hand, those States that have ratified the convention face&nbsp / different challenges, the biggest one being a lack of uniformity in its interpretation. The problem of differing interpretations arises because some CISG Articles are vague leading to varied&nbsp / interpretations by national courts. Further, the CISG is still largely misunderstood and some traders from States that have ratified CISG exclude it from application. South Africa can only ratify an&nbsp / international instrument such as the CISG, after it has been tabled before Parliament, and debated upon in accordance with the Constitution. CISG&rsquo / s shortcomings, particularly regarding&nbsp / interpretation, make it far from certain that CISG would pass the rigorous&nbsp / legislative process. Nonetheless, the Constitution of South Africa requires the South African courts and legislature to promote principles of international law. The paper, therefore, examines, whether the Legislature has a constitutional obligation to ratify CISG. South Africa&rsquo / s membership of the WTO requires&nbsp / that it promote international trade by removing trade barriers. It is, therefore, vital for South Africa to be seen to be actively facilitating international trade. Even though the trade benefits which&nbsp / flow from ratification are not always visible in States that have ratified the CISG, there is some doubt whether South Africa can sustain its trade relations without ratifying the CISG. The paper shows that the formation&nbsp / of contracts under the South African common law is very similar to formation as set out under Part II of the CISG and if the CISG were to be adopted in South Africa, no major changes would be&nbsp / needed in this regard. International commercial&nbsp / principles as an alternative to the CISG still require a domestic law to govern the contract and would, therefore, leave South African traders in the&nbsp / same position they are in currently, where their trading relations are often governed by foreign laws. Ratifying CISG would certainly simplify contract negotiations particularly with regard to&nbsp / governing law provisions. Overall the advantages of ratification for South Africa far outweigh the shortcomings of the CISG, and ratification will assist in ensuring that South African traders get an&nbsp / opportunity to enter the international trade arena on an equal platform with traders from other nations. </p>

South African company law is currently the object of comprehensive review. One o f the areas under scrutiny is that of corporate governance. Control over management is vital in the interests of the company itself, its shareholders and its creditors. Effective accountability should be balanced against the need to allow those who manage a certain measure of freedom and discretion in the exercise of their function. Company directors are subject to various duties. This thesis concentrates on their fiduciary obligation. It is suggested that this sui generis obligation is owed to the company as a separate entity. Interests of other groups may sometimes merit con­ sideration. Against the background o f a com parative investigation, a "corporate opportunity" is defined as any property or economic opportunity to which the com­ pany has a claim. South African law protects a company’s claim to an opportunity if it is in the company’s line of business and if the company has justifiably been relying upon the director(s) to acquire it or to assist in its acquisition for the company. The application of established fiduciary principles suffice to resolve corporate opportunity matters. Essentially the application o f these rules amount to a determination whether the director has complied with his fundamental duty to act in the company’s best interests. There seems to be no need for a separate doctrine of corporate opportunities.' A director should only be absolved from liability on account of the company’s inability to pursue an opportunity or its rejection by the company if there was no real conflict of interest. The appropriation of corporate opportunities should not be ratifiable, both because the ratification constitutes a fraud on the minority, and because the decision to ratify cannot be regarded as being in the interests of the company. The relationship between the appropriation of corporate opportunities, misuse of confidential information and competition is investigated. These aspects fre­ quently overlap, but should be distinguished because their bases, and accordingly their appropriate remedies, may differ. Effective control may benefit by a restatement of directors’ fiduciary duties in the Companies Act. To this end certain amendments to the Act are recommended. / Mercantile Law / LLD

This article reflects on the treaty-making power of the Congress and the President of the Republic in light of the Peruvian domestic law and International Law (particularly within the framework of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties) taking into account the discussions that arose betweenthe legislative and the executive powers regarding the ratification of the Extradition Treaty between Peru and France of 2016. The domestic law applicable to the conclusion of a treaty in Peru establishes that the President of the Republic is the only one who has the power to express the consent of the State to be bound by a treaty through ratification, which has internationallegal effects. The Congress has the power to approve treaties whose provisions are related to topics listed in Article 56 of 1993 Peruvian Constitution. The Congress’ legislative approval implies a parliamentary control regarding the acts of the President. However, Congress cannot compel the President to ratify a treaty (as it was discussed regarding the Extradition Treaty between Peru andFrance) neither issue the ratification. / Este artículo reflexiona en torno a las atribuciones para celebrar tratados que tienen el Congreso y el Presidente de la República a la luz del derecho interno peruano y del Derecho Internacional (en especial, de la Convención de Viena de 1969 sobre Derecho de los Tratados), teniendo en cuenta las discusiones que surgieron entre el Poder Legislativo y el Poder Ejecutivo con respecto a la ratificación del Tratado de Extradición entre la República de Perú y la República Francesa de 2016. Las normas internas aplicables a la celebración de tratados en el Perú establecen que el Presidente de la República es el único que está facultado para expresar el consentimiento del Estado en obligarse por un tratado al ratificarlo, lo cual tiene efectos jurídicos internacionales. La atribución del Congreso de aprobar los tratados cuyas materias están previstas en el artículo 56 de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993 implica el control parlamentario a los actos del Presidente. No obstante, el Congreso no puede obligar al Presidente de la República a ratificar un tratado (como se discutió con relación al Tratado de Extradición entre la República de Perú y la República Francesa) ni es competente para emitir una ratificación.