Våren 2019 inkom det motioner till Svenska Riksdagen angående förslag gällande införandet av lagstiftning om obligatorisk vaccination. Utifrån detta kommer uppsatsen genom en fiktiv argumentationsanalys behandla ämnet ur ett rättighetsperspektiv, med fokus på tre rättigheter; rätten till hälsa, rätten till kroppslig integritet samt rätten till utbildning. Argumenten i de två olika kapitlen utgår från svensk lagstiftning samt internationella fördrag, såsom mänskliga rättigheter och Europeiska unionens stadgar. Uppsatsen besvarar även i argumentationen frågeställningar om varför obligatorisk vaccination bör vara en mänsklig skyldighet enligt rätten till hälsa samt vilka mänskliga rättigheter en lagstiftning om obligatorisk vaccination bryter mot. Syftet med uppsatsen är att nå fram till ett översiktligt svar gällande om individuell rätt, såsom kroppslig integritet och utbildning eller allmän folkhälsa bör prioriteras i frågan. Detta undersöks även med hjälp av Marion Youngs teori om den sociala förbindelsens ansvarsmodell, som syftar till att vi är moraliska aktörer som har en moralisk skyldighet till alla människor att minimera lidande. Slutsatserna i uppsatsens sista del visar att uppsatsens tes motbevisas genom argumentationen.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, European states have taken numerous measures to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. Several states have introduced various forms of compulsory vaccination against COVID-19. While vaccines are one of the most effective tools for protecting people against COVID-19, it raises the question to which extent states may justifiably make vaccination schemes compulsory in the pursuit of public health. This paper, therefore, analyses the compatibility between compulsory vaccination and the right to respect for private life as set out in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the ECHR). As of today, the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has not decided whether vaccine mandates are compatible with the right to respect for private life.  An interference in the right to respect for private life must be in accordance with the law and fulfil one of the legitimate aims that are set out in Article 8.2 of the ECHR. An interference also needs to be necessary in a democratic society in order to achieve that legitimate aim. The protection of health as well as the protection of the rights and freedoms of others are two of the legitimate aims stipulated in Article 8 of the ECHR that are relevant in relation to the introduction of compulsory vaccination in society. In assessing whether an interference is necessary in a democratic society, the states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. However, their assessment remains subject to review by the ECtHR. The principle of proportionality is an important part in assessing whether the interference has been necessary in a democratic society or not. The interference in question must remain proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In this paper, the compatibility between compulsory COVID-19 vaccination and the right to respect for private life is examined primarily by analysing prior case law of the ECtHR concerning vaccination and other medical interventions. This paper concludes that the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when assessing the necessity of introducing compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations, mainly because of the lack of European consensus regarding such vaccination schemes. Furthermore, it is concluded that compulsory COVID-19 vaccinations can be compatible with the right to respect for private life as set out in Article 8 of the ECHR, provided that the vaccines are considered safe and efficient by the research community, the vaccines used are monitored and the vaccine mandate is only indirectly imposed by sanctions of a protective nature. In addition, necessary precautions must be taken by prior assessment of potential contraindications and there must exist a possibility to receive compensation as a result of potential injuries caused by the vaccine.