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(Un)Safe Zones: Good Intentions, Bad LogicHenson, Emma 01 January 2019 (has links)
This thesis aims to explore the disconnect between calls for safe zones as a tool of humanitarian intervention, and the dark history of safe zone failure. This thesis begins with a brief discussion of current calls for safe zones in Syria, and how a proper theoretical framework and historical understanding are needed to discuss whether or not safe zones can be successfully implemented in Syria. The following literature review discusses not only prominent academic arguments and the history of humanitarian intervention, but it suggests a framework for deconstructing case studies. This framework looks first at the interests of an intervening actor. The level of interest of that actor directly informs its willingness to overcome the challenges of safe zone implementation. The challenges of safe zone implementation are both practical and existential. If an actor’s interest in a given crisis is not great enough to make it willing to overcome these practical and existential challenges, or the actor is willing to overcome them but lacks the ability to do so, the safe zone will fail. In most cases of failed safe zones, moral hazard plays a role. Moral hazard can be evident in either the intervening actor’s decisions or the decisions of the international community to support or not support the intervention. This thesis then deconstructs three historical cases of safe zones with this method: Srebrenica in Bosnia, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Following these three case studies, this paper discusses safe zones in Syria with the help of this method and the broad historical understanding of safe zones established through the case studies. This thesis concludes with a discussion of how the analysis and available historical cases show that safe zones are dangerous tools of humanitarian intervention and should not be undertaken without adequate levels of interest and willingness to address challenges.
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Rwanda, l'Opération Turquoise et la controverse médiatique (1994-2014) : analyse des enquêtes journalistiques, des documents secret-défense et de la stratégie militaire / Rwanda, "l'Operation Turquoise " and the media controversy (1994-2014) : analysis of journalistic investigations, top-secret files and military strategyOnana, Auguste Charles 21 December 2017 (has links)
Le 22 juin 1994, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU vote la résolution 929 autorisantle déploiement d’une force multinationale humanitaire, neutre et impartiale au Rwandaayant pour mission de mettre fin aux massacres. Concrètement, c’est la France, àl’initiative de ce projet, qui va assurer le commandement de la mission dénomméeOpération Turquoise. Celle-ci se heurte à l’opposition des rebelles tutsis du FrontPatriotique Rwandais, aux réserves des organisations humanitaires mais elle reçoit lesoutien appuyé du gouvernement intérimaire rwandais hutu. L’Opération Turquoisesuscite surtout une vague d’accusations dans la presse française, le président FrançoisMitterrand et les militaires français étant accusés de « complicité de génocide », voire de« participation au génocide ». Ces accusations perdurent et reviennent régulièrementdepuis plus de vingt ans, relayées par des journalistes qui disent avoir découvert puisrévélé « l’inavouable » rôle de la France au Rwanda.Cette étude analyse les enquêtes journalistiques menées de 1994 à 2014 et lesconfronte aux documents confidentiels et secret-défense issus des archives américaines,françaises, rwandaises et onusiennes, ainsi qu’à la stratégie militaire mise en oeuvredurant l’Opération Turquoise. Elle permet ainsi d’identifier les sources sur lesquellesreposent ces accusations et d’en évaluer le bien-fondé. Ce faisant, elle met en évidence lafaçon dont la recherche s’est concentrée sur le génocide au détriment de la lutte arméeinitiée par le FPR de 1990 à juillet 1994, laissant de côté des aspects essentiels à lacompréhension de la tragédie rwandaise. / On the 22nd June 1994, the UN Security Council passes the resolution 929authorising the deployment of a multinational humanitarian, neutral and impartial force toRwanda having as its mission to put an end to the massacres. In concrete terms, it isFrance, on initiative of this project, who goes to carry out the command of the missionnamed Operation Turquoise. This comes up against the opposition of the Tutsis rebels ofthe Rwandan Patriotic Front, to the reservations of the humanitarian organisations but itreceives the backup support of the acting Rwandan Hutu government. OperationTurquoise incites above all a wave of accusations in the French press, with the PresidentFrançois Mitterand and the French military soldiers being accused of 'complicity ingenocide', even of taking part in the genocide. These accusations have endured and havebeen regularly coming back for more than twenty years, relayed by journalists who claimto have discovered then revealed the shameful role of France in RwandaThis study analyses the journalistic inquiries led from 1994 to 2014 and comparesthem with confidential secret defence documents stemming from American, French,Rwandan and UN records, as well as the military strategy put in place during OperationTurquoise. It also allows identification of the sources on which these accusations lie andevaluation of their validity. In so doing, it brings to the fore the way in which the researchhas focused on the genocide to the detriment of the armed struggle initiated by the RPFfrom 1990 to July 1994, leaving aside essential aspects in the comprehension of theRwandan tragedy.
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