Enligt svensk lagstiftning måste aktiebolag ha en styrelse. Dock skiljer det sig på vilket sätt styrelsen involveras i företags strategiska arbete och hur företagsägare förhåller sig till dess funktion. I små och medelstora företag fyller styrelsen sällan någon reell funktion. När företaget växer blir det dock svårt för en person att ensam klara av att styra och kontrollera bolaget, vilket leder till ett ökat behov av en arbetande styrelse. Tidigare forskning visar att företagsägarens personliga mål ofta avgör den strategiska riktningen i små och medelstora företag. För att kunna bemöta de krav som existerar, behöver därför företagsägaren förstå styrelsens roll och nyttan av strategiskt arbete. Syftet med studien är att utifrån ett företagsekonomiskt perspektiv bidra med kunskap om styrelsearbete i små och medelstora företag, samt att undersöka vilka attityder företagsägare i dessa företag har till styrelsens funktion. Studiens empiri har inhämtats från en kvalitativ datainsamling, i form av semistrukturerade intervjuer med fyra företagsägare ur tre olika små och medelstora företag. Den teoretiska referensramen berör ämnet bolagsstyrning och de aspekter som anses vara viktiga för ett framgångsrikt styrelsearbete. Studien kommer fram till att kunskapen vad gäller styrelsearbete är relativt låg hos företagsägare i små och medelstora företag, vilket gör att styrelsen inte används på ett effektivt sätt. Kunskapsnivån hos företagsägaren styr också huruvida styrelsen anses som viktig i det egna företaget, samt hur styrelsen arbetar. En annan slutsats som dras är att företagsägarens personliga mål påverkar dennes attityd till styrelsen. Om de personliga målen innefattar tillväxt, har företagsägaren en mer positiv attityd till en arbetande styrelse. Vidare ökar en positiv inställning till en arbetande styrelse sannolikheten att företagsägaren även har en positiv attityd till externa styrelseledamöter. / According to Swedish law, limited companies must have a board. However, it differs in the extent to which the board is involved in a company´s strategic work and how business owners relate to its function. In small and medium-sized enterprises, the board seldom fills any real function. As the company grows, it becomes difficult for one person alone to manage and control the company, leading to an increasing need for a working board. Previous research shows that business owner's personal goals often determine the strategic direction of small and medium-sized enterprises. In order to meet existing demands, business owners need to understand the board´s role and the benefits of strategic work. The purpose of the study is, from a business perspective, to contribute knowledge about board work in small and medium-sized enterprises and to examine the business owners' attitudes toward the functioning of the board. The study's empirical data has been collected from a qualitative data collection, in the form of semi-structured interviews with four business owners from three different small and medium-sized enterprises. The theoretical framework involves the subject corporate governance and the aspects that are considered important for a successful board work. The study concludes that awareness regarding board work, is relatively low among business owners of small and medium-sized enterprises, which means that the board is not being used effectively. The level of knowledge of the business owner also controls whether the board is considered as important in their own company, and how the board works. Another conclusion drawn is that the business owner's personal goals affect his attitude towards the board. If personal goals include growth, the business owner has a more positive attitude towards a working board. Furthermore, a positive attitude towards a working board increases the probability that the business owner also has a positive attitude towards outside directors in the board.

This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate the value of multiple directorships. In the first chapter, I focus on potential tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of multiple directorships held by outside directors and attempt to determine how firm characteristics affect such tradeoffs. It is widely believed that outside directors of a firm play important functions of monitoring and advising. As a result, the basic hypothesis of the first essay is that multiple directorships by outside directors can have different implications for firms that have different levels of monitoring and advising needs. Consistent with this hypothesis, the evidence suggests that firm performance is positively associated with multiple directorships for firms with high growth opportunities and low agency conflicts. Such firms would benefit more from better advising while not suffering much from less monitoring. Likewise, firm performance is negatively associated with multiple directorships for firms with low growth opportunities and high agency conflicts. In the second essay, I examine how multiple directorships held by outside directors affect shareholder wealth during acquisitions. The evidence indicates that not all busy outside directors have the same effect and some types of busy outside directors may benefit the firms.

In Sweden all limited liability companies are required to have a board of directors. The board of directors’ task is to manage the business of the firm, but in recent years boards have been subjected to critical review in the media, questioning the tasks and structure of the board. Further, there are differences in the regulations regarding limited liability companies, depending on whether they are private or public companies. Moreover, a majority of the research within the area of corporate governance has been conducted on public companies. However, corporate governance in small and medium sized enterprises (SME) has in the last 30 years become a field of interest. Several scholars and doctorates have used different board roles to explain e.g. the tasks, demographics, and financial performance. The board roles are mainly derived from the agency-, resource dependence-, and stewardship theory. Many papers have come to the conclusion that a board of directors who performs their task, and/or have a certain board demography is beneficial to the firm. Hence, the board and its activity is of importance, however, a general image is conveyed that boards in SMEs rarely are active, but rather are seen as a necessary mean in order to have a firm. Due to this, the research question in this thesis is: What motivates small and medium sized firms to have an active board and are boards in Norr- and Västerbotten active? The criteria for having an active board has been derived from antecedent research and are further recommendations from StyrelseAkademien. Three different board roles have been used with the purpose of explaining the motivation behind having an active board. Further, this thesis has had a quantitative method, and in order to gather data a survey was sent out to board members in Norr- and Västerbotten. The results show that the motivation behind having an active board cannot be explained through the roles network and service of the board. The control role could partly explain the motivation behind having an active board of directors in SMEs in Norr- and Västerbotten, having a negative relationship to board activity. Moreover, due to the opposing results in terms of whether or not boards are active, an unambiguous answer could not be found. However, 49.1 percent of the sample is considered to be active. Lastly, the finding support that in order to have an active board, the firm must recognize a need to include outside directors.

Bakgrund: Behovet av bolagsstyrning är stort för mindre familjeföretag, då det kan hjälpa dem att hantera deras komplexa omvärld. Framförallt är det styrelsen som har en viktig roll när det gäller bolagsstyrning i familjeföretag. Ett aktivt styrelsearbete är viktigt för att de ska kunna stå sig i den ökande globala konkurrensen. En extern styrelseledamot kan bidra till ett aktivt och effektivt styrelsearbete och därmed ge företaget konkurrensfördelar. Det finns dock vissa problem förknippade med tillsättandet av externa styrelseledamöter som kan påverka valet att ta in utomstående i styrelsen. Därmed väcks frågan; vad är det egentligen som påverkar ett litet familjeföretags beslut att tillsätta en extern styrelseledamot? Syfte: Studiens syfte är attförklara varför små familjeägda aktiebolag väljer att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter. Metod: Studiens syfte har besvarats genom en kvalitativ metod med en deduktiv ansats. Empiriskt material har samlats in genom djupgående intervjuer med representanter för tre små familjeägda aktiebolag, varav två av företagen har tillsatt en extern styrelseledamot medan ett företag inte tillsatt en extern styrelseledamot. Slutsats: Studien visar att tillsättandet av externa styrelseledamöter drivs av behovet av en extern styrelseledamot. Behovet, i sin tur, påverkas av ägarfamiljens komplexitet och företagets komplexitet. Desto större komplexitet, desto större är behovet av externa styrelseledamöter. Har företaget däremot en utvecklad struktur så minskas behovet. En annan slutsats som dragits från studien är att det krävs ett initiativ utifrån för att små familjeföretag ska ta beslut om ett tillsättande av en extern styrelseledamot. Dessutom visar studien att familjeföretag söker att förstärka deras styrelses servande roll, genom att tillsätta externa styrelseledamöter. / Background: The need for corporate governance in small family businesses is large since it helps the companies to handle their complex environment. The board of directors has a prominent role of corporate governance in family businesses, where an active board is important for the businesses in order for them to meet the increasing global competition. An outside director can contribute to a more active and efficient board work and thereby give the business competitive advantages. However, there are some problems associated with the appointment of outside directors that can affect the choice of bringing an outsider to the board. Consequently, raises the question; what really affects the decision to appoint an outside director in a small family business? Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explain why small family owned limited companies choose to appoint outside directors. Method: In order to fulfillthe purpose of the study a qualitative method with a deductive approach hasbeen used. Empirical data was collected trough profound interviews withrepresentatives of three small family businesses, out of which two has outside directors while one business has not appointed an outside director. Conclusion: The study shows that the appointment of outside directors is driven by the need for an outside director. The need is affected by the level of family complexity and business complexity. A high level of complexity equals a large need for outside directors. The need will diminish if the business has a well developed structure. Another conclusion is that it takes initiative from outside the company for them to take a decision to appoint an outside director. Furthermore, the study shows that family businesses want to improve the service role of the board by appointing an outside director.

Submitted by Samy Sznajder Mesnik (samy.mesnik@gmail.com) on 2018-05-16T23:57:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-05-17T00:07:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-05-17T15:45:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-17T15:45:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Samy Sznajder Mesnik_Mestrado.pdf: 4205097 bytes, checksum: 382f5d3a94efeaf4a136f038f83d8fac (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-07 / A importância do cumprimento de regras de governança corporativa pelas empresas é um assunto recorrente em trabalhos acadêmicos em muitos países devido ao interesse do assunto por gestores, investidores, reguladores, entre outros agentes. Apesar do monitoramento sobre o cumprimento das normas e regulações impostas pelos níveis de governança corporativa, não encontram-se muitas métricas de eficiência ou controle a respeito do resultado destas ações. Entre algumas das práticas de governança corporativa no Brasil, está a presença obrigatória de pelo menos 20% de conselheiros independentes na composição do conselho de administração das empresas de capital aberto listadas no Nível II e Novo Mercado na bolsa de valores brasileira (B3). Muitos artigos abordam as contribuições ou implicações, em termos qualitativos, da presença destes agentes no conselho de administração. Por um lado, os conselheiros independentes podem exercer o papel de fiscalizar, discutir a visão de longo prazo ou representar acionistas minoritários. Por outro lado, a diversidade levada ao conselho de administração pode reduzir a concisão ou o consenso sobre as decisões deliberadas. Este trabalho propõe uma análise quantitativa a partir de modelos econométricos para constatar a relação da presença de conselheiros independentes e da quantidade de membros no conselho de administração com o desempenho financeiro das empresas no Brasil no período de 2010 a 2016. O trabalho contribui com a literatura para atualização do tema avaliado e apresenta uma conclusão convergente entre as análises univariadas e multivariadas. / The importance of corporate governance rules and its application is a recurrent subject in academic work in many countries due to its significance to managers, investors and regulators, among other agents. Beyond regulations to control whether companies are in agreement with the regulations imposed by the levels of corporate governance, there are not many published metrics regarding the efficiency of these norms. One of the corporate governance practices in Brazil is the mandatory presence of at least 20% of independent directors in the composition of the board of directors of public companies listed on Level II and Novo Mercado on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3). Many articles address the contributions or qualitative implications of the presence of these agents on the board. On the one hand, independent directors can play the role of overseeing, discussing the long-term vision or representing minority shareholders. On the other hand, diversity brought to the board of directors can reduce conciseness or consensus over deliberate decisions. This article proposes a quantitative analysis with econometric models to validate any relation between the presence of independent directors, the number of members in the board of directors and the financial performance of companies in Brazil between 2010 and 2016. This article contributes to the related literature with an update about the subject and presents a convergent conclusion amid the univariate and multivariate analyzes.