This study examines empirically whether ownership structure and board composition, political costs and media agenda setting, and proprietary costs influenced the related-party disclosures of Chinese listed companies during 2001 to 2005. The results indicate that ownership concentration, foreign ownership, the proportion of independent directors, firm size, media attention and growth opportunities have significantly affected related-party disclosures in China.

The object of this empirical study is to clarify, consolidate and build on various conflicting research findings on the relationships among ownership structure, corporate governance, and corporate performance using data from 149 Singapore public listed companies. This study contributes to our understanding of these relationships by examining the total continuum of ultimate ownership structures measured by control rights within a single economic and legal research context and various performance measures. Adapting the approach advocated by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), the seven governance control variables used in this study are self monitoring by the inside manager-shareholder, monitorings by outside blockholders, institutional investors, government shareholders, independent directors, market for CEO, and bank and financial institutions. This study firstly shows an interesting pattern of interrelationships among the corporate governance mechanisms which evolve so as to minimise systemic agency costs if the corporation has in place an optimal mix of the governance control mechanisms. The more general pattern of the interrelationship is that of substitution while the two special cases of complementary interdependence exist.

This study examines empirically whether ownership structure and board composition, political costs and media agenda setting, and proprietary costs influenced the related-party disclosures of Chinese listed companies during 2001 to 2005. The results indicate that ownership concentration, foreign ownership, the proportion of independent directors, firm size, media attention and growth opportunities have significantly affected related-party disclosures in China.

Sedan år 2005 måste samtliga svenska börsnoterade företag presentera sin finansiella information samtredovisningen av densamma i enlighet med standarden IFRS. Detta har resulterat i att företagsledningenssubjektiva tolkningar, något som skapat möjligheter för ledningen att påverka redovisningen. Detta kanförklaras genom Agency Theory och Positive Accounting Theory, vilka beskriver att ledningen antas ageraopportunistiskt, i syfte att maximera sin egennytta. Ledningen tenderar att manipulera företagsredovisning, varav goodwill kan användas som en resultatjusterare.Denna studie belyser hur ledningens handlingsutrymme påverkar företags redovisning av goodwill,betingat av den organisatoriska nivån. Studiens hypoteser formas utifrån organisationsnivåns olikafaktorer, vilka även testas för att se hur faktorerna påverkar företags redovisning av goodwill. För attundersöka studiens syfte används en positivistisk forskningsfilosofi och därmed kvantitativforskningsdesign, vilket präglas av en deduktiv ansats. Insamling av data har åstadkommits via företagsårsredovisningar, något som sedan sammanställts.Studiens resultat indikerar att ju högre skuldsättning och starkare ägarkoncentration, desto mindregoodwill redovisar ledningen. Har företag en låg skuldsättning och svag ägarkoncentration leder det tillökat handlingsutrymme och därmed en potentiellt högre andel redovisad goodwill.Studien bidrar till insikt kring hanteringen av goodwill och att ledningens handlingsutrymme har enpotentiell inverkan på redovisningen av goodwill. Dessutom tillför studien kunskap för vilka faktorer sompåverkar företags redovisningsval. Avslutningsvis bidrar uppsatsen till ökade möjligheter att jämförastudiens resultat med tidigare studier, vilket kan resultera i att ägarna kan få mer kännedom om hur debäst reducerar ledningens handlingsutrymme och dess opportunistiska beslut. / Since year 2005 all Swedish listed companies has to present their financials and accountingaccording to the standard IFRS. This has allowed the management to make subjectiveinterpretations, which in turn has elaborated opportunities to influence the accounting. Thosepossibilities can be explained by Agency Theory and Positive Accounting Theory, which presumethe management acting opportunistically, in order to maximize self-interest. Management tend tomanipulate companies accounting, whereof goodwill can be used as an adjuster of results.The thesis disambiguate how management discretion affect companies accounting of goodwill,contingent of the organizational level. The thesis hypothesis elaborates thru factors of theorganizational level, which are also tested in order to see how the variables affect businesscorporations accounting of goodwill. A positive research philosophy is used in order to analyze thethesis purpose. The data collection has been accomplished using the company's annual reports.The thesis results indicates that the higher debt and stronger concentration of ownership, the lessamount goodwill is accounted. If companies has a lower debt and weaker concentration ofownership, it increases management discretion and thereby a potentially higher amount of goodwill.The thesis contribute to knowledge about managing goodwill and that management discretion hasa potentially impact on the accounting of goodwill. Finally, the thesis contributes to increasedopportunities to compare the thesis results with previous studies, which may result in the ownersbeing able to get more knowledge of how they best reduce management discretion and itsopportunistically decisions.

Submitted by Diego Guinancio (dguinancio@hotmail.com) on 2010-04-12T23:26:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AVALIAÇÃO DA ESTRUTURA DE PROPRIEDADE DE UNIDADES PRISIONAIS SOB A OTICA DE CONTRATOS INCOMPLETOS.pdf: 151442 bytes, checksum: 92ff024a2f42d9b41c47d688803507f6 (MD5) / Rejected by Gisele Gammaro(gisele.gammaro@fgv.br), reason: 1) Apagar o nome do orientado na primeira página 2) Traduzir a palavra-chave para key-works no abstract. on 2010-04-14T21:32:22Z (GMT) / Submitted by Diego Guinancio (dguinancio@hotmail.com) on 2010-05-03T21:43:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 AVALIAÇÃO DA ESTRUTURA DE PROPRIEDADE DE UNIDADES PRISIONAIS SOB A OTICA DE CONTRATOS INCOMPLETOS.pdf: 151199 bytes, checksum: d9923da7e4d4e355dd9c614a23aee020 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vitor Souza(vitor.souza@fgv.br) on 2010-05-04T14:28:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 AVALIAÇÃO DA ESTRUTURA DE PROPRIEDADE DE UNIDADES PRISIONAIS SOB A OTICA DE CONTRATOS INCOMPLETOS.pdf: 151199 bytes, checksum: d9923da7e4d4e355dd9c614a23aee020 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-05-04T20:45:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AVALIAÇÃO DA ESTRUTURA DE PROPRIEDADE DE UNIDADES PRISIONAIS SOB A OTICA DE CONTRATOS INCOMPLETOS.pdf: 151199 bytes, checksum: d9923da7e4d4e355dd9c614a23aee020 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-11-27 / The motivation of this work is to answer the question: which is the best ownership structure, public or private, for the provision of prision administration service? To answer this question we will consider the impossibility of writing a complete contract for the service and the conflicting incentives of the agents. The development of this work will be realized by the construction of a functional model of the rotine of a prision which will consider the concepts of competition, information asymmetry, opportunistic behavior and electoral influence. / A motivação desta dissertação é responder a seguinte pergunta: qual a melhor estrutura de propriedade, pública ou privada, para a prestação do serviço de administração de unidades prisionais? Para responder a pergunta será considerada a impossibilidade de formular um Contrato Completo para a prestação do serviço e os incentivos conflitantes dos agentes envolvidos. O desenvolvimento do tema será realizado mediante a construção de um modelo funcional da rotina da unidade prisional que abordará os conceitos de competição, assimetria de informação, comportamento oportunista e influência eleitoral.

Studien avsåg studera Private Equity-ägda och icke Private Equity-ägda nynoteringars långsiktiga avkastning. Med hjälp av bakomliggande faktorer så som ägarstruktur, underprissättning, marknadsvärde, storlek på nynotering, ålder, bransch samt heta och kalla marknader, identifierades om det fanns skillnader och vad de i så fall kunde bero på. Vidare undersöktes om nynoteringarna var underprissatta och om underprissättningen i så fall skiljde sig mellan de två ägarstrukturerna. I denna studie tillämpades ett kvantitativt tillvägagångssätt med en deduktiv ansats för att analysera sekundärdatan som samlades in. Urvalet bestod av 43 bolag varav 25 var PE-ägda och 18 var icke PE-ägda. Sekundärdata samlades in från ett flertal olika källor däribland Nasdaq, Skatteverket, Zephyr och Finansinspektionen. PE-ägda nynoteringar presterade bättre än icke PE-ägda på lång sikt, både för Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 1 och 3 år. Samtliga nynoteringar var i genomsnitt underprissatta där PE-ägda uppvisade en högre underprissättning. Utöver resultatet att samtliga nynoteringar i genomsnitt var underprissatta, vilket var signifikant på en 0,1 procentsnivå, var ingen av skillnaderna signifikant. Slutligen uppvisade underprissättning som enda variabel en signifikant positiv påverkan på både BHAR 1 och 3 år. För BHAR 1 år visade dessutom storleken på nynoteringen och en av de fyra åldersgrupperna tio-nitton, i jämförelse med referensgruppen, en positiv signifikant påverkan. / The aim of this study was to determine whether there were any differences in the long-run performance between Private-Equity-backed and non-Private-Equity-backed IPOs. Further, the authors chose a number of variables from previous studies in order to examine whether these could explain the long-run performance of IPOs on the Swedish stock market Stockholmsbörsen. Finally, the study examined whether the IPOs was underpriced and if it differed between the two ownership structures. In this study a quantitative method with a deductive approach was used in order to analyze the collected secondary data. The study's sample consisted of 43 companies, of which 25 were Private-Equity-backed and 18 were non-Private-Equity-backed. The secondary data were collected from a variety of sources such as Nasdaq, Skatteverket, Zephyr and Finansinspektionen. Private-Equity-backed IPOs performed better than non-Private-Equity-backed IPOs in the long-run, both for BHAR 1 and 3 years. Further, all the IPOs were on average underpriced, where Private-Equity-backed showed a higher underpricing. Aside from the fact that all the IPOs were underpriced, which was significant at a 0.1 percent level, none of the differences were significant. Finally, the only variable that showed a significant positive impact on both BHAR 1 and 3 years was underpricing. For BHAR 1 year the size of the IPO and one of the four age groups 10-19, in comparison with the reference group, also showed a positive significant impact.

The literature indicates that, mainly in countries with high stock concentration, the property structure is an important internal mechanism of control of the corporate governance, with effects in the valorization and acting of the companies. In Brazil, the existent relationship among governance property-acting corporate-structure is still shown not conclusive . The present study investigates if there is relationship among property structure, financial acting and value in the non-financial Brazilian companies of capital open with actions negotiated in the Stock Exchange of São Paulo (BOVESPA), between the period of the years: 1997 to 2001 (consequences of the property structure), as well as the determinant of the concentration degree of the referred companies property (causes of the property structure). In the empiric investigation the following statistical methods were used: 1) Analysis of Parametric Variance (ANAVA); 2) Analysis of No-parametric Variance (Test of Kruskal-Wallis); and 3) Analysis of Multiple Regression through the estimators of Ordinary Least- Square (MQO) with solid mistake-patterns of the heterocedasticidade according to White (1980). Concerning the used methodology, the results indicate that the variables of property structure as defined don't exercise influence on the financial acting and value of the companies. Remain to the determinant of the property structure of capital open non-financial Brazilian companies, the results indicate that the property structure can be explained by the size of the firm, instability and regulation of the market, showing to be the last variable the main determinant of the property structure. / A literatura indica que, principalmente em países com alta concentração acionária, a estrutura de propriedade é um importante mecanismo interno de controle da governança corporativa, com efeitos na valorização e desempenho das empresas. No Brasil, a relação existente entre governança corporativa-estrutura de propriedade-desempenho mostra-se ainda inconclusiva. O presente estudo investiga se existe relação entre estrutura de propriedade, desempenho financeiro e valor das empresas brasileiras não-financeiras de capital aberto com ações negociadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BOVESPA), entre os anos de 1997 a 2001 (conseqüências da estrutura de propriedade), bem como os determinantes do grau de concentração de propriedade das referidas empresas (causas da estrutura de propriedade). Na investigação empírica foram utilizados os seguintes métodos estatísticos: 1) Análise de Variância Paramétrica (ANAVA); 2) Análise de Variância Não-Paramétrica (Teste de Kruskal-Wallis); e 3) Análise de Regressão Múltipla por meio dos estimadores de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários (MQO) com erros-padrões consistentes à heterocedasticidade conforme White (1980). Considerando-se a metodologia empregada, os resultados indicam que as variáveis de estrutura de propriedade como definidas não exercem influência sobre o desempenho financeiro e valor das empresas. Sobre aos determinantes da estrutura de propriedade das empresas brasileiras não-financeiras de capital aberto, os resultados indicam que a estrutura de propriedade pode ser explicada pelo tamanho da firma, instabilidade e regulação do mercado, mostrando ser essa última variável a principal determinante da estrutura de propriedade. / Mestre em Administração

Investimento, definido como dispêndio de capital para aumento de capacidade produtiva, é uma variável importante para compreender a estrutura e o desempenho da firma e das economias de mercado. Esta tese analisa empiricamente o comportamento do investimento no período recente por duas óticas: no nível da firma, utilizando dados de empresas brasileiras no período 2003-2013, e cross-country, empregando dados de 150 países no período 1996-2014. Após capítulo inicial de revisão das principais teorias do investimento, que dão suporte à análise empírica, a tese busca investigar, no segundo capítulo, a relação entre taxa de investimento de firmas brasileiras de capital aberto e estrutura de propriedade do capital. O modelo empírico utiliza características financeiras e de governança como variáveis explicativas, e define cinco categorias de propriedade do capital: estatal, privada, familiar, acordo entre acionistas e estrangeira. No Brasil, são usuais acordos entre acionistas nos quais há a participação do Estado, seja por meio de bancos, empresas públicas ou de fundos de pensão de seus funcionários. Os resultados sugerem que as categorias acordo entre acionistas e estrangeira apresentam relação positiva e significativa com investimento e que as firmas não sofrem restrição financeira, sendo o investimento financiado sobretudo por meio de endividamento. No terceiro capítulo, estima-se um modelo com dados cross-country, testando variáveis explicativas institucionais e socioeconômicas. As variáveis socioeconômicas referem-se à provisão de serviços públicos básicos à população, como saúde, educação e infraestrutura de comunicação e informação. São encontradas evidências de que boas instituições, sobretudo controle da corrupção, são relevantes para a taxa de investimento dos países. A oferta de serviços públicos intensivos em trabalho, como saúde e educação, também apresenta relação positiva com o investimento. Já a oferta de serviços públicos intensivos em capital parece ter um impacto negativo sobre o investimento. / Investment, defined as capital expenditure to increase productive capacity, is an important variable to understand the structure and performance of the firm and the overall economy. This dissertation focuses on investment behavior in the recent period from two perspectives: at the firm level, using data from Brazilian companies along the years 2003-2013, and cross-country, using data from 150 countries in the period of 1996-2014. After reviewing the main theories of investment in the first chapter, we investigate in chapter two the relationship between the investment rate and the structure of capital ownership of Brazilian publicly traded companies. The empirical model uses financial and governance characteristics as explanatory variables, and defines five categories of capital ownership: state, private firms, family, shareholders\' agreement and foreigners. The Brazilian state has agreements with major shareholders of many public companies wherein it holds minority equity stakes through its banks, public companies or pension funds of employees from companies it controls. We provide evidence that suggests that shareholders\' agreement and foreigners show a positive and significant relationship with investment and also that companies do not face financial constraint, being the investment financed mainly through debt. In the third chapter, we estimate a model with cross-country data, testing institutional and socioeconomic explanatory variables. Socioeconomic variables refer to the provision of basic public services to the population, such as health, education and communication and information infrastructure. We find that good institutions, especially corruption control, are pretty relevant to some countries\' investment rate. The supply of public services, such as health and education, also shows a positive relation with the investment, while the supply of capital public services seems to have a negative impact on investment.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a relação entre aspectos de governança corporativa e restrição financeira nas decisões de investimento de 500 firmas brasileiras de capital aberto no período de 1997 a 2007. Embora exista uma extensa literatura a respeito da decisão de investimento na presença da restrição financeira, estudos que relacionam este tema com aspectos de governança corporativa são ainda pouco explorados e inexistentes na literatura brasileira. Para examinar como os mecanismos de governança corporativa influenciam no grau de restrição financeira das firmas, utilizou-se do modelo probabilístico logit para dados em painel, estimado por efeito aleatório O relacionamento dos mecanismos de governança corporativa com a decisão de investimento das firmas na presença de restrição financeira foi analisado por meio de uma versão modificada do modelo acelerador do investimento, considerando três agrupamentos: índice KZ, tamanho das firmas e pagamento de dividendos. Na estimação, utilizou-se o método dos momentos generalizados (GMM) para considerar o aspecto dinâmico e corrigir o problema da endogeneidade do modelo. A análise da amostra indicou uma alta incidência da propriedade concentrada das firmas brasileiras, principalmente entre as firmas com natureza familiar. Os resultados mostraram que firmas com qualquer natureza de propriedade e controle elevam a sua probabilidade de restrição financeira quando o maior acionista último é o acionista controlador da firma, muito embora, a natureza do acionista controlador impacte a taxa de investimento das firmas de maneiras distintas. Firmas com estrutura de propriedade piramidal elevam sua probabilidade de restrição financeira. Este resultado combinado com a estimação do modelo de investimento evidencia que apenas pertencer a uma estrutura de propriedade piramidal não é suficiente para que haja transferência de recursos que aumentem os investimentos das firmas. O impacto da inserção da firma a um dos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa da BM&FBOVESPA ou ao Novo Mercado sobre a taxa de investimento está relacionado com a situação financeira da firma. O aumento nos direitos de fluxo de caixa dos maiores acionistas últimos contribui para reduzir a sensibilidade do investimento ao fluxo de caixa, sendo que, o mesmo não foi observado para o aumento nos seus direitos de voto. / This study aims to investigate the relationship between aspects of corporate governance and financial constraints on investment decisions of 500 Brazilian public traded firms over the period of 1997-2007. Although studies of financial constraints and investment decisions are extensive in literature, its relationship with aspects of governance is little explored and inexistent for Brazilian economy. To examine how aspects of corporate governance influences the likelihood of firm\'s financial constraints, it was used the logit probabilistic model to panel data estimated by random effect. The relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and investment decisions on firm\'s financial constraints was analyzed by a modified version of accelerator investment model, considering three groups: KZ index, firm\'s size and dividends payout. In the estimation, it was used the generalized moments method (GMM) to consider the dynamic aspect and to correct the endogeneity problem in the model. The sample analysis indicated a high incidence of concentrated ownership among Brazilian firms, mainly in family firms. The results showed that firms with any type of ownership and control raises their likelihood of financial constraint when the largest ultimate shareholder is the controller of the firm, although the nature of the controlling shareholder impacts investment rate of firms in different ways. Pyramidal ownership firms also raise the likelihood of financial constraint. This result combined to results of investment model evidences that only belong to pyramidal ownership structure is not sufficient to have transfer of resources that raises the firm\'s investment rate. The impact of the association of firm\'s to BM&FBOVESPA differential levels of corporate governance or to Novo Mercado on investment rate is related to financial status of the firm. The increase in cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder contributes to reduce investment-cash flow sensitivity, however, the same was not observed to the increase in voting rights.

In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with<p>indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm’s controllers.<p>Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between<p>them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this<p>influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the<p>Banzhaf index. This thesis develops models to measure the Banzhaf indices in any ownership structure (pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures). The models are then applied to real cases studies such Colruyt, Elia, Lafarge and Allianz. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished