In advanced industrial economies where, increasingly, intellectual assets are the principal source of value, productivity, and growth, strong intellectual property rights (IPRs)—conferred by patents, copyrights, and penalties for misappropriation of trade secrets—are an important inducement to invention and investment. For this reason, the extension and strengthening of IPRs in the United States and elsewhere in the past twenty-five years were appropriate and probably necessary. It may be that in some respects those processes should proceed further. On the other hand, there is growing friction over the assertion and exercise of some IPRs, particular patents, and claims that in some circumstances they may be discouraging research, its communication, and use. The question arises whether in some respects the strengthening and extension have proceeded too far. It is well known that the use of, reliance upon, and effects of patent protections vary across industries and technologies, but until recently there has been remarkably little empirical research documenting these differences. Fortunately, this is beginning to change, and the effects of some of the policy changes in the 1980s and 1990s are beginning to be investigated. Some evidence suggests that the effort to strengthen patent rights has indeed increased their importance and may have contributed to the growth of industrial R&D funding. On the other hand, recent survey evidence indicates that U.S. manufacturing firms in most industries rely more heavily on trade secrecy, lead time, and other technological protections to recoup their R&D investments than they do on legal mechanisms such as patents. This thesis examines the effects that a stronger, broader patent regime is having on today's industries. The main issues that emerge are those of patent quality and scope, as caused by problems with patent administration and litigation. Various solutions to these problems are then investigated, and recommendations made for future reform. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

<div>This dissertation studies how patents are monetized via legal actions without practicing the technology and the implications to firms. In recent years, scholars in other fields have extensively studied patent monetization and litigation regime, given the importance of technological innovation and commercialization to the strategy field, strategy scholars have been underrepresented on the topic of patent litigation and monetization. In this dissertation, I develop a theory on how heterogeneity in firms' business models monetizing resources determine firms' heterogeneity in valuation and acquisition of resources. Using a context of patents, we study two primary business models monetizing patents, namely, the practicing monetization and litigating monetization, which differ fundamentally in their value appropriation mechanisms. On the one hand, the value appropriation mechanism for practicing monetization relies on the value created by the firm's deployment of the patented technology in the product market, and from the restraint of rivalry via excluding competitors from accessing the patented technology. On the other hand, litigating monetization depends on the strength of legal actions and the ability to collect payments from target firms to the patent-owning firm, in forms such as settlement fees and damages awarded by the court. The theorization reclarifies the two types of patent heterogeneity: innovativeness and exclusivity, and theorize that differences in patents' innovativeness and exclusivity lead to differences in the expected profit from practicing and litigating monetization, thus leading to a difference in optimal monetization strategy and firms' different preferences for resource acquisition.</div><div><br></div><div>In Essay 1, we develop the aforementioned theory of patent monetization using formal models to understand the relationships among firms' business models, patent characteristics, and the optimal monetization strategy. We show the situations where litigating monetization can prevail and be the method that maximizes patents' value. We further predict that compared to patents that are practiced to produce products or services, patents monetized in a litigating manner are ones that are relatively less technologically innovative. Then, in Essay 2, I use the patent monetization context to investigate how firms' business models affect their resource acquisition behavior in the factor market, i.e., the market of patents. Exploiting recent institutional changes such as the enactment of the American Invents Act (AIA) that asymmetrically influenced different business models, I show that firms specialize in litigating monetization disproportionately acquire highly cited but old patents and patents that were litigated before. Then Essay 3, rooted in the literature that patents are essential signals from entrepreneurial firms to investors, I examine how disputes in patents in the form of litigations affect entrepreneurial firms' obtaining of external financing. </div><div><br></div>

In writing this dissertation, the aim is to investigate the patentability of computer software - whether it is possible and legally advisable to make way for software patents in South Africa. This is an uncertain and highly debated area in our law. Ultimately, this study is aimed at checking the validity of proposed arguments and suggestions emanating from within the computer software patent debate itself. The Patents Act 57 of 1978 only excludes the patenting of computer software ?as such?. As a result, it is left open for interpretation what it is that the legislature meant by the phrase ?as such? and whether indeed computer software can be patented, since we lack case-law to clarify this point of law. Presently, there are arguments that software patents may possibly fall in line with the required growth and development for our country?s economy. The debate also revolves around the issue whether patents are better suited as legal protection for computer software in contrast to the protection offered under the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. This study will therefore be carried out with an aim to determine and recommend the suitable direction which our law should follow in order to have a competitive stance and facilitate economic growth for our country, specifically in the computer software industry. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2016. / Mercantile Law / LLM / Unrestricted

This thesis studies how small Swedish firms used their patents between 1998 to 2016. We also examine the association between used and unused patents and their characteristics such as technological class, family size, inventors, claims, grant and authority. Research data are collected from both databases (PATLINK, Serrano, and PATSTAT) and survey. We found that 79% of patents are used in small Swedish companies and family size is associated with patent use. In small Swedish companies, the increase in patent family size will decrease the frequency of use.

This dissertation explores the influence of corporate venture capital (CVC) on the innovation of startups. Applying the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and propensity score matching approach to the CVC investment data on China’s listed companies, we document that the CVC investment can determine the innovation level of startups.For further insight, invention patents and utility patents will be considered, in addition to a separate examination of the number of patent applications and patent grants. It is found that CVC participation, the number of CVC syndicate investors, and the level of CVC involvement, all have significantly positive effects on the total patent applications, total patent grants, utility patent applications, and utility patent grants in those listed startups after four years of their Initial Public Offering. However, CVC investments have no significant influence on the number of invention patent applications and patent grants. This result indicates that the influence of CVC investments on the innovation level of startups is still in the preliminary stage, and CVC investments only slightly affect the development of more challenging invention patents. / Business Administration/Finance

No description available.

The dissertation consists of three chapters examining U.S. public firms' innovation and patenting activities and their relationship with patent policy and economic growth. In the first chapter, I empirically study the effect of patent publications on firm-level innovation and patenting. Previous works have studied the effect of patent monopoly rights and knowledge disclosure on innovations. The proposed chapter supplements these studies by analyzing the disincentive effect of patent publications on firm innovations through costly knowledge disclosure. Exploiting the American Inventors’ Protection Act of 1999 as a natural experiment that shortened the time it took for patents to get published, I show the negative effect of earlier patent publications on manufacturing firms' patenting and innovation activities. The benchmark analysis shows that the average decline of 10 months in patent publication lag resulted in 13 percentage points lower firm-level patent growth rate during 2001-2005. In the second chapter, I build an endogenous growth model with a patent system. By modeling patenting decisions endogenously, I also introduce patent protection and information disclosure mechanisms through patents. Traditional innovation and growth models assume that innovators patent whenever they innovate and consider patenting and innovating as the same. However, this assumption is no longer innocuous if patenting has an implicit cost to the innovator e.g., the cost of disclosing valuable information. Therefore, to analyze the impact of the patent system’s disclosure mechanism on firm innovation, one must at a minimum work with a model distinguishing between the two concepts. Using my model, I show that a higher patent disclosure policy reduces firm patenting intensity as firms strategically opt out of patenting. In the absence of patents, there is less knowledge diffusion in the economy, which leads to less industry competition and growth. The third chapter studies the effect of firms' ability to build on their previous innovation on firm growth. While innovating, firms can either develop fully novel exploratory ideas or exploit their existing ideas. Using firm patent data, I document that U.S. manufacturing firms' innovation became more exploitative and that their patent growth rate simultaneously declined after 2000. To rationalize these changes in firm innovation, I build a firm-level endogenous growth model with both initial exploratory and subsequent exploitative innovations. Estimating my model using 1990-2000 microdata, I show that a decline in the usefulness of exploratory innovations as a foundation for future exploitation can match a shift in the composition of innovation we saw over this period, resulting in a 0.8 percentage point decline in firm average growth and a 9% decline in firm market value post-2000.

This dissertation is a collection of essays on intellectual property rights and optimal product selection when innovation occurs sequentially. One of the highlights of this dissertation has been to show the possibility of full rent extraction by the patent holder when uncertainty in litigation is taken into consideration. The result of the theoretical model has practical policy implication regarding the design of an optimal patent system. The other highlight of this dissertation is to show the coexistence of maximal and minimal product differentiation in a sequentially growing market. This result sheds light on the simulation of a multi-dimensional product space. Brief Summaries of Chapters: Chapter 1 presents a survey of the historical, legal, and economic aspects of patents. The emphasis in this survey is to recognize the crucial elements in the current patent law practice and to initiate research projects thereof. Chapter 2 considers a model of sequential innovation in which patent infringement occurs and the outcome of litigation is uncertain. By recognizing the "diminishing returns to litigation" exhibited in the winning probability distribution function for the plaintiff, it is shown that a basic researcher holding a patent is able to extract all the profit facilitated by the basic innovation. More intriguingly, under rather general circumstances, broader patent breadth may diminish the patent holder's incentive to innovate. Chapter 3 extends the previous model to include a rule on the reasonable royalty to determine the damage award. In addition to the full rent extraction results, the extended model further reveals that the second innovator has incentive to "invent around" with close imitation or "invent enough" with a much improved product. Comparative statics with respect to parameters of litigation cost and granted patent breadth are performed. Among other things, it is demonstrated that an increase in patent breadth, and an increase of litigation costs may neutralize each other. Chapter 4 analyzes a model of two-dimensional product differentiation in which sequential entry occurs and the potential entrant outperforms the incumbent in innovating a new dimension. For a three-stage entry-variety-price duopoly, a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is obtained and fully characterized. Most importantly, the entrant will completely utilize its capacity to innovate and achieve the principle of maximum differentiation with respect to the innovated variety. However, it is shown that with a sequentially growing product space, firms will not choose extreme opposite positions in all dimensions in order to soften price competition; the principle of minimum differentiation persists with respect to the traditional variety. / Ph. D.

專利權人在權利保護期間享有法律保障之排他性，而智慧財產權之制度設置，必須兼顧個人權利與社會公益，藉由保護權利人進而促進社會公益，但專利權制度中，專利權濫用之現象，對於專利發展中國家而言，尤其是外國專利強權企業利用專利奪取私益已達浮濫程度，造成私益與公益之間的矛盾與衝突，因此專利公益訴訟是平衡兩者之利益的一個手段。而因專利要件審查難以完善，造成許多具有無效事由的專利被授予專利權，這些專利權的存在侵害公眾利益甚鉅，中國大陸的對策為：提起專利公益訴訟使瑕疵專利無效，鼓勵任意第三人對專利之有效性提出挑戰，請求專利管理機關重新進行專利有效性的審查，維護公眾的合法利益；本文比較我國目前具有瑕疵之專利權，仍由民間企業基於非公共利益之商業利益考量而提出專利舉發，分析兩岸的制度及案例，檢視我國專利公益訴訟提出之可能，期使舉發專利無效之制度得以更臻健全。 / The purpose of the study was to analyze the public interest with regards to patent litigation cases in China. Public interest litigation is litigation for the protection of the public interest. Patentees have the exclusive right to prevent others from exploiting the invention without the patentees' consent during the legal protection. However, intellectual property rights are set up to protect not only rights of patentee but also that of social welfare. To reconcile the contradictions between private interest and public welfare, the study focuses on the phenomenon of abuse of patents discussed in the patent systems and the merits of public interest in patent litigation. Furthermore, the study examines China public interest patent litigation to invalidate defected patent system and encourage any third party to challenge the validity of the patent. Under the comparative legal study approach, the study can provide different perspective for our legal system to improve more beneficially our Patent law system.

專利權融資、專利權入股及專利訴訟皆為現今相當重要的專利運用方式。專利權價值辨識為企業多項活動進行之基礎，舉凡如專利權融資承貸額、專利權入股金額及專利訴訟等，皆須先對專利權價值做認定，才有下一步行動之可能。 專利權在不同的運用方式下應有不同的價值，然而現今鑑價方法中並未探討不同運用情境下專利之價值，將專利權價值視為單一，以致於在實際運用上遭到限制。本研究的目的為探討前述三種運用情境下，影響專利權價值的因子。 本研究將分析專利鑑價利害關係人在評估專利權價值時的認知重點，以探討專利運用情境是否會影響專利權價值因子之項目及其優先順序?特別是在專利權融資及專利權入股的情境下，主理人(銀行、創投業者等)與代理人(鑑價機構)不同立場的角色差別對專利權價值衡量觀點會有何不同? 因此，本研究擬就下列問題進行討論： 問題一：現行鑑價相關理論衡量專利權價值之原理及限制為何? 問題二：在專利權融資、入股及訴訟的情境下，有哪些較重要因子影響其專利價值實現? 問題三：當專利運用情境不同時，其價值因子是否有所不同? 問題四：承三，若有影響，其重要性程度優先順序有何不同? 問題五：現今鑑價機構在融資、入股情境下，在專利權價值衡量看法上與主理人有何差異? 並提出建議為何? 最後，本研究得到下列結論： 1、 現有之相關鑑價方法未能真確評鑑出專利權價值之主要原因，部分係未考量專利權之運用情境，而傾向於給予專利權單一價值所致。專利權之價值衡量重點應與運用情境有相當大的關係，三種情境下變數及參數估計應有不同的觀點。進行專利權鑑價時，如果能加以了解個別運作情境下專利價值之衡量重點，搭配現今既有之鑑價理論，較能反應出不同運用情境下專利權之價值，讓專利鑑價發揮實益。 2、 在專利權與商品間的關係複雜，層次甚多，吾人整理融資、入股及訴訟的過程中的主要影響因子，共有18項重要因子影響其價值實現，可分為六大構面。(詳細因子，請見內文) 3、 在專利權融資、入股及訴訟情境下，其必要考量之價值因子不同，且其重要性程度優先順序亦不同。 (1) 專利權融資之必要考量因子依序為：「事業化潛力、收益及風險」、「產權狀態」、「法律地位穩固程度」、「該技術對該產品的關鍵程度」、「技術實力及未來經濟年限長短」、「在企業中之定位」及「技術的完成度」。主要係基於授信5P中之客戶還款能力、擔保品處分及還款意願的考量。 (2) 專利權入股之必要考量因子依序為：「事業化潛力、收益及風險」、「該技術對該產品的關鍵程度」、「法律地位穩固程度」及「技術實力及未來經濟年限長短」。較著重於技術及商品化收益。 (3) 提起專利權訴訟之必要考量因子依序為：「Claims是否能排除競爭者」、「該技術對該產品的關鍵程度」。較著重於法律上勝訴的難易度及該專利權對商品的關鍵性。 (4) 「技術對該產品的關鍵程度」為各情境下之共通因子 。 4、 在融資、入股情下，鑑價機構對專利價值因子之認知與主理機構(銀行、創投業者等)不同。因此在鑑價之前應特別針對這些不同點加以溝通，較能幫助主理人與智財服務業間在價值認定上達成共識。 (1) 融資情境下「該專利權在融資企業中之定位」，主理人給予相當高的重視，認為企業越重視該專利權，越能提高其還款意願，然而鑑價機構對其評價較低。「Claims是否能排除競爭者」及「受侵權時，採取法律行為的難度」兩法律構面因子，主理人對其重視程度明顯較代理人為高，因為銀行所握有的擔保品係專利權之權利質權，若侵權者能輕易by pass，則對該專利權之價值將有大幅影響，此部分尚未明顯成為鑑價機構之考量。 (2) 入股情境下，「法律地位穩固程度」與「受侵權時，採取法律行為的難度」等法律構面的因子，鑑價機構對其關注程度明顯較主理人為低，而「產權狀態」因子亦為鑑價機構與主理人有明顯差異之因子。 / Patent-based financing, patent-based investing and patent litigation are the important applications of patents. Patent valuation is usually the first step of corporate activities, in order to proceed the activities like buying stocks by patents. The value of patents will be different under the diverse conditions of applications. However, the concept is neglected in the patent valuation process. It still emphasizes on single value pursuit. This results in the limited effects in the end. This research focuses on the effects of different patent application types, by analyzing the points of view of related parties when valuing patents. Therefore, the objects of the research were to answer the questions as the follows: 1、 What are the theorem and limitation of existing patent valuation？ 2、 Will different applications affect value factors? 3、 What are the different key factors of value under patent-based financing, patent-based investing and patent litigation？ 4、 Following the question 3, what is the difference of key factors’ importance? 5、 What is the difference of views between principal and valuation agents under patent-based financing and patent-based investing? At last, the research concluded that: 1、 Patent application types do really affect patent value. There should be different parameters and variables under the three application types. 2、 There are 18 key factors, constructed to 6 angles, affecting patent valuation. The 18 key factors are listed in the text. 3、 Patent application types do affect value factors, in constitute of essential factors and the priority of these essential factors. The differences are listed in the text. 4、 The different standpoints do affect the results of patent valuation. There are differences of views between principal and valuation agents under patent-based financing and patent-based investing. The differences are listed in the text.