Le Corbusier tente de ramener l’architecture à l’utilité et de créer une esthétique de pureté en parfaite harmonie avec celle-ci. Or s’il est conduit à s’opposer à tout excès et à économiser l’espace, ses choix esthétiques semblent mal répondre à cet impératif. Un seul superflu demeure un tabou chez lui: l’ornement. Le refus de cet ajout constitue ainsi un angle pour la compréhension du caractère de ses œuvres. Une enquête sur les causes de ce rejet mène à la conclusion que l’architecture nouvelle doit avoir comme principes l’esprit puriste, l’esprit scientifique déterministe et l’esprit individualiste. Pourtant, en même temps qu’elle les incarne, elle les enfreint systématiquement jusqu’à un certain point en vue de l’obtention des effets artistiques. De cette transgression de l’interdit résultent la réintroduction du superflu, une esthétique mi-authentique mi-inauthentique, et la qualification de l’espace de création corbuséen par la « parergonalité sans parergon ». Comme l’utilité ramenée en soi implique l’économie du temps, l’examen porte aussi sur les expériences temporelles que permet l’architecture nouvelle. Il montre qu’avec la « parergonalité sans parergon », celle-ci fait éprouver la décroissance du temps, sa suspension, son enchevêtrement avec l’objet, l’éternel présent présentiste, la logique de l’accroissement sous la logique de la réduction, des vécus semblables aux troubles de l’insomnie, etc. En même temps, cette architecture se remet en question, ouvrant ainsi d’autres historicités à l’art de bâtir et à l’homme, dont l’économie de l’espace ne valorise que le comportement corporel / Le Corbusier intends to bring architecture back to the utility and to create an aesthetics of purity in perfect harmony with this latter one. Yet if he is led to oppose all excess and to economize the space, his aesthetic choises do not seem to well respond to this imperative. One single surplus remains a taboo to him: the ornament. The opposition to this addition becomes then an angle for understanding the characteristic of his works. A conclusion of the inquiry into causes of this rejection is that the new architecture must hold the purist spirit, the scientific determinist spirit and the individualist spirit as principles. However, while embodying them actually, at the same time it infringes them systematically to a certain degree in order to create artistic effects. The outcomes of this transgression of the inhibited are the reintroduction of the surplus, a half authentic, half inauthentic aesthetics, and the characterization of Le Corbusier’s space of creation by “parergonality without parergon”. Since the utility brought back to itself implying the economy of time, we proceed as well to examine the temporal experiences made possible by the new architecture, and demonstrate that by means of the “parergonality without parergon”, it brings forth experiences like diminution of the time, its suspension, its entanglement with the object, the presentist eternal present, the logic of the increase under the logic of the reduction, effects similar to insomnia disorders, etc. Meanwhile, this architecture calls itself in question, opening then different historicities to architecture and to human being of which the economy of space values only the corporal movement

De l'ornement architectural à l'ornement liturgique, de l'ornement langagier à l'encadrement du tableau, de l'ornement musical au tatouage, les formes variés de l'ornement témoignent d'un champ d'application illimité qui couvre tous les domaines de l'art. Si chez Kant l'ornement offre un exemple typique de beauté libre, la philosophie et la théorie de l'art lui attribuent souvent un contenu moral ou symbolique l'associant tantôt à la convenance tantôt à la dégénérescence. En tant que forme primitive d'expression artistique il est rattaché aux arts premiers et à la production artisanale, aux antipodes de la véritable création artistique tout autant que du dessin industriel ou architectural. Sa dimension cosmique, d'autre part, fait que des artistes et des historiens le mettent au centre de leur conception de l'art, le considérant comme la manifestation principale du « vouloir artistique » ou une expression privilégiée de l'impulsion artistique vers l'abstraction. Si la spécificité de l'ornement consiste en son caractère accessoire qui lui assigne un statut ontologique particulier entre l'ergon et le parergon le rendant synonyme de « style », sa transversalité met en question les hiérarchies issues de la théorie de la mimesis et brouille les limites entre art et décoration, majeur et mineur, d'autant plus que les notions dérivées de l'« ornemental » ou du « décoratif » dépassent le domaine des arts appliqués et s'emploient pour designer la forme ou la fonction d’œuvres d'art. À ce titre l'étude des différents aspects de l'ornement et des réponses théoriques qu'il a suscitées, renouvelle la réflexion sur le statut de l'art et sa relation avec la vie. / From architectural decoration to liturgical ornament, from rhetorical ornament to painting frames, from musical ornament to tattoo, the various forms of ornament testify to an unlimited scope that covers all artistic and cultural fields. Despite its being considered, from a kantian point of view, as an example of free beauty, philosophy and theory of art often attribute a moral or symbolic content to ornament, associating it to either convenience or degeneracy. As a primitive form of artistic expression, ornament is related to tribal art and to craft rather than true artistic creation or modern design. Its cosmic dimension, however, leads some artists and historians regard it as the basis for their conception of art, as the chief manifestation of the “will to art”, or as a primary expression of the artistic impulse that leads to abstraction. Since its specific character consists in that of an accessory, ornament receives an intermediate ontological status between the ergon and the parergon. Its transversality challenges the hierarchy of art forms and genres which is based on the theories of mimesis, and blurs the boundaries between art and decoration, high and low, since the derived terms of "ornamental" or "decorative" apply not only to decorative arts but also to the style and the function of art works. The study of the different aspects of ornament and of the theoretical responses it raised, contributes to regarding our understanding of the status of art and its relation to life.

The aesthetic autonomy of dance is a blank spot in the history of aesthetics. In this study, dance is used as an umbrella for both visual art performance, live art and choreography. Different from these other notions, dance appears in early historical writings and enables a coherent reading of the history of this specific artform, where the embodiment of the artwork is central.        Starting from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement, in which this study unravels why dance has been given such a limited attention in the history of aesthetics. Departing from this ignorance of the artform and the lack of theories of aesthetic autonomy when it comes to dance ever since, the study proposes that the aesthetic autonomy of dance could be understood through the notion of parergon. The word is initially found in the Critique of Judgement, where Kant uses parergon to describe the infrastructural framework upon which both the piece of art and the judgment relies. With the help of Jacques Derrida’s reading of the Critique of Judgement through parergon, the notion is understood with a double meaning: as both the frame ot the artwork and the work behind the piece of art. Derrida doesn’t either mention ”dance” in his rewriting of Kant’s work, why this essay applies the parergon upon the only art form where the working body embodies the work of art: dance. For dance, the work behind the piece and the piece itself, is the same. Through this understanding of parergon, the aesthetic autonomy of dance is can be understood as the frame at work.       With references from a western history of arts and aesthetics, the study works through literature on dance from the 16th century until today. This enables a timeline from the inauguration of the first royal ballet academies, to the enlightenment, through modernity up until postmodernity, is read. Such a consistent reading of the history of dance is still rare, but the main reason for the study is not to sketch a new history, but rather to, through its history, establish an understanding of the aesthetic autonomy of dance.       Through examples from philosophy, literature, art history, dance history and art criticism, the development of dance as an autonomous artwork is contextualized. Arriving at the 20th and the 21st century, three specific artworks are analysed through available documentations, writings and conversations. Through the three notions hetero-affection, immanent critique and indexical dialectics, the aesthetic autonomy of dance is written through an understanding of its dialectical negation as its positive matter; the frame (at work). This understanding is applied to the three modern and post-modern examples of dance, where the frame at work is autonomously unworked and re-worked.

This project argues for an elevation and a greater understanding of the importance of framing in theatre. In this respect, the study follows on from Derrida's famous deconstruction of Kant's parergon (frame) in his Critique of Judgement. Derrida's work exposes what he sees as a complicit desire to &qout;limit" the frame to the role of "decorative adjunct". Finding the frame to be "undecidable", Derrida asserts that the frame actively affects the work inside and the space outside while answering a "lack" within the work. Utilising Derrida's work on the parergon as a starting point, this study represents an attempt to formulate a theory of the frame for theatre asserting that the frame provides a prospective key towards understanding persistent "problems" within theatre studies. These include the complicated onstage/offstage and spectator/actor dialectics as well as the point where "reality" ends and theatre begins and also issues of agreed interpretation. Ultimately the thesis posits that theatre is in itself a parergon which virtualises the space in which it installs itself - a finding that goes some way to explaining and/or accommodating these "problems". The research methodology involves a detailed study of literature encompassing framing and related theories drawn from a diverse array of paradigms. A working theory of the theatre frame, along with a series of analogous approaches is developed and further examined through application to a variety of theatre performances. This thesis offers a theory of the theatre frame and a variety of framing research approaches that function to bridge the gap between the traditionally partitioned areas of performance analysis and reception studies. It also adds to our understanding of the frame and the theatre art form itself.

'Institutional critique' is a term that refers to a range of diverse artistic practices and discourses that emerged at the end of the 1960s and that continue in the present. In spite of their differences, they all share a concern with the institutional conditioning of artists and artworks. Various historicizations of institutional critique (Alberro and Stimson, 2009; Raunig and Ray, 2009; Welchman, 2006) concur that one could distinguish two 'phases': artists of the 1960s and 1970s allegedly investigated the possibilities of an escape towards an 'outside' of the art institution, whereas those of the 1990s analysed the ways in which the artistic subject reproduced the structures of the art institution. Since the beginning of the 2000s various artists and authors have revisited the histories and legacies of institutional critique. This growing interest was triggered by the perceived intensification of a process that began at the end of the 1960s; it refers to the recuperation and neutralization of artistic types of critique by what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) have called the 'new spirit' of capitalism. In this context, the Austrian philosopher Gerald Raunig and the members of the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies have proposed the hypothesis that 'a new phase' of institutional critique was to emerge. However, this proposition was based less on empirical evidence, than on a 'political and theoretical necessity to be found in the logic of institutional critique' (Raunig, 2009, 3). This thesis is a response to this set of circumstances. By asking 'what are the conditions and possibilities of institutional critique?' it investigates the categories of institutional critique's logic. My main argument is that a 'phase change' of institutional critique could and should be understood through the apparatus of Derridean deconstruction. This implies a criticism of the idea that one needs to escape the art institution in order to respond to urgencies stemming from the social, economic, and political realms (Truth Is Concrete Platform, 2012). At the same time, I will also refute the idea that institutional critique is trapped in the art institution (Fraser, 2009a). Institutional critique works on the remainder and rest that necessarily escapes the instituting will and intention of defining and describing in an exhaustive manner the whatness of what (art) is (Boltanski, 2011). I show that between critique and the art institution there is an irreducible relation of symbiosis and cohabitation, and that the deconstructive logic of institutional critique allows it to be both partner and adversary, at the same time, of the art institution.