The intent of this thesis is to catalogue and seek to understand why we desire what we desire and how this desire is transcribed onto the landscape. Applying this knowledge can be used to assist landscape architects through the design process by understanding the complex systems that interact to define I and We. Questions of concern to this thesis can be summarized as; • Is the theory that our desires affect the designs of landscape architects tenable? • Can this theory be implemented? • And, if so, to what degree?

The intent of this thesis is to catalogue and seek to understand why we desire what we desire and how this desire is transcribed onto the landscape. Applying this knowledge can be used to assist landscape architects through the design process by understanding the complex systems that interact to define I and We. Questions of concern to this thesis can be summarized as; • Is the theory that our desires affect the designs of landscape architects tenable? • Can this theory be implemented? • And, if so, to what degree?

In this thesis I compare Pierre Leroux, a French utopian socialist (1797 – 1871), with Feodor Dostoevsky, the well-known Orthodox Russian novelist (1821 – 1881). I argue that both authors reacted against what they considered to be the dissolution of the social order, brought about by the increasing nineteenth-century bourgeois individualism. On the other hand, they reacted as well against the opposite phenomenon, the idea of a universal socialist state, which was, in fact, according to them, the outcome of bourgeois individualism. My purpose is to bring close and to compare Leroux’s republican socialism with Dostoevsky’s Christian socialism, and to explore to what extent the two authors give similar answers to a common problem. In order to better explain their thought, I divide my thesis into three chapters. The first analyzes and compares Leroux’s and Dostoevsky’s critiques of individualism. If Leroux reaches the conclusion that the ultimate expression of individualism is Malthusianism, Dostoevsky argues that individualism ends in nihilism. The second chapter analyzes the type of socialism against which Leroux and Dostoevsky reacted, as well as the critiques of the two authors. I argue here that Saint-Simonian socialism – the main object of Leroux’s critique – and the socialism of the Grand Inquisitor – a Dostoevskyan character – are the expression of a certain utopian thought which considers the requirement for freedom incompatible with the requirement for unity. In the last chapter, I analyze the ideas of community of Leroux and of Dostoevsky, which are centered on philia, in the case of the former, and on agape, in the case of the latter. Philia and respectively agape are the expression of organic social relations, through which the two requirements, of freedom and unity, are made compatible, and which create unity in multiplicity. Their ideas of community appear as active utopias, grounded on the life of relation in a spontaneous, organic community.

Dans cette thèse de pensée politique, nous chercherons à renouer avec l’idéalité du projet politique moderne en pensant le lien qu’entretiennent amour et politique dans le cadre ce celui-ci. Au niveau du mouvement de la pensée politique, les modernes ont eu tendance à légitimer l’action politique à l’aune de cette norme transcendante qu’est la Raison. L’action politique était alors orientée vers une forme d’utopie. Or, avec le passage de la modernité à la postmodernité, le politique tend à être désormais orienté par une forme de rationalité technique fétichisée. Il est donc question pour nous de renouer avec la mission originelle de la pensée politique qui est de penser les finalités de l’être humain. Pour ce faire, nous allons examiner la nécessaire relation entre amour et politique. Trois penseurs politiques du 20e siècle, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil et Denis de Rougemont, nous aideront à penser le lien entre amour et politique renouer avec l’idéalité moderne. Arendt nous permettra de penser l’amour comme un rapport à l’autre et au monde, qui est une condition de la pluralité. Weil nous permettra de penser l’amour comme une médiation qui institue une forme de subjectivité orientée vers un ailleurs transcendant. Quant à Rougemont, il nous permettra de penser l’amour comme un élément d’une une commune mesure moderne. Nous verrons que la rationalité technique à elle seule ne peut pas guider le politique, qu’elle doit aussi prendre en considération l’amour pour penser des normes définissant le commun. Nous verrons aussi que l’idéalité moderne est intimement liée à une conception de l’amour qui suppose une prise de distance.

Plato’s Socrates is famous for claiming that “I know one thing: That I know nothing” (see e.g. Ap. 21d and Meno 81d). There is one subject that Socrates repeatedly claims to have expertise in, however: ta erôtika (see e.g. Symp. 198d1). Socrates also refers to this expertise as his erôtikê technê (Phdr. 257a7–8), which may be translated as “erotic expertise”. In this dissertation, I investigate Socrates’ erotic expertise: what kind of expertise is it, what is it constituted by, where is it put into practice, and how is it practiced? I argue that the purposes this expertise serve are, to a significant extent, educational in nature. After first having clarified the dissertation’s topic and aim, as well as my methodological approach, I present an initial account of erôs and Socrates’ erotic expertise. While discussing what constitutes Socrates’ erotic expertise, I account for two erotic educational methods: midwifery and matchmaking. I further argue that these methods tend to be accompanied by two psychological techniques, namely charming and shaming. I argue that these methods and techniques are systematically applied by Socrates when he puts his erotic expertise into practice. In the dissertation, three dialogues where Socrates practices his erotic expertise are scrutinized: Lysis, Charmides, and Alcibiades I. I focus on Socrates’ encounters with the eponymous youths of the dialogues, and each dialogue is devoted a chapter of its own. I show how these dialogues are erotically charged, and also how Socrates in these dialogues demonstrates his erotic expertise. I argue that Socrates’ expertise on erôs plays an essential role in his attempts to engage the three youths in the processes of self-cultivation, learning, and the very practice of philosophy. In the final chapter of the dissertation I turn to some questions that arise in light of my readings, and summarize the results of my investigation.

Dès l’époque archaïque, les Grecs combattirent en Thrace contre mais aussi aux côtés des guerriers de la région, tandis que les Thraces, recrutés par les armées extérieures, guerroyaient, de plus en plus nombreux, sur les divers champs de bataille du monde grec. Au cours de la période hellénistique, l'intégration des Thraces aux armées grecques est telle que leur nom en vient à désigner un type de troupes, armées à la légère. Elle est le fruit d'un long processus, marqué par l’importance des relations personnelles nouées entre aristocraties guerrières grecques et thraces, depuis l’épopée homérique jusqu’à la disparition du royaume de Macédoine.La politique thrace de Philippe II est réinterprétée : la notion de conquête, évoquée par les Anciens comme les Modernes, ne peut rendre compte de la réalité des rapports entretenus avec les Thraces. Les relations établies avec les chefs des peuples guerriers de la région firent figure de modèle pour ses successeurs jusqu'au dernier roi de Macédoine. La pacification que cette politique a entraînée comme les recrutements massifs qu’elle permit contribuèrent, pour une très large part, aux succès d’Alexandre le Grand en Asie. L’étude des rapports diplomatiques et guerriers entre Grecs et Thraces s’impose finalement comme le meilleur angle d’étude pour appréhender à la fois les mécanismes de l’intégration de la Thrace à l’histoire du monde grec, et l’histoire propre de cette région à travers l’évolution de ses structures sociales, politiques et militaires. Il conduit en particulier à réinterpréter l’histoire du royaume odryse et à redéfinir ses limites géographiques. / From the Archaic period, the Greeks fought in Thrace against but also at the sides of the warriors of the region, while the Thracians, recruited by foreign armies, were increasingly waging war on the various battlefields of the Greek world. During the Hellenistic period, the integration of the Thracians warriors within Greek armies is such that their name has come to designate a lightly-armed type of troops. It is the result of a long process, underlining the importance of the personal relationships established between Greek and Thracian aristocracies. The literary sources provide such examples of philia allowing various forms of military cooperation from the Homeric epic to the reign of the last Antigonids, albeit these examples often get overlooked by Modern historians. The reign of Philip II saw an intensification and remarkable geographical extension of this phenomenon. His Thracian policy, presented in a misleading manner by some ancient texts and misunderstood by the Moderns, must be reinterpreted. Innovative in many ways, it was one of his highest priorities and was a model for his successors until the last kings of Macedonia. The success of his Thracian policy can be observed in its achievements : the pacification of the region, and the massive recruitment of Thracian warriors, that contributed to a very large extent to the successes of Alexander the Great in Asia.The thesis finally offers a reappraisal of the history and geographical limits of the Odrysian Kingdom, through a study of the tribal and warlike structures in Thrace.

Over the course of four sections this PhD examines the ways in which the Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean philosophers portray bodily activity. In particular, it argues that their claims regarding bodies' natural tendency to preserve themselves, and seek out the goods capable of promoting their well-being, came to influence Hobbes's and Spinoza's later accounts of natural, animal and social behaviour. The first section presents the ancient accounts of natural and animal bodily tendencies and explores the specific ways in which the Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean views on animal desires came to complement and diverge from each other. After investigating the perceived links between natural philosophy, psychology and ethics, the section proceeds to consider how the ancients used this 'unified' view of nature to guide their accounts of the soul's primary appetites and desires. Also examined is the extent to which civil society is portrayed as a means of securing the individual against others, and how Aristotelian philia, Theophrastian oikeiotês and Stoic oikeiōsis came to stand in opposition to the fear-driven and compact-based accounts of social formation favoured by the Epicureans. The second section considers how the ancient accounts of impulsive behaviour and social formation were received and diffused via new editions of ancient texts, eclectic readings of Aristotle, and the attempts of Neostoic and Neoepicurean authors to update and systematise those philosophies from the late sixteenth century onwards. The particular treatments of Hellenistic thought by authors such as Justus Lipsius, Hugo Grotius and Pierre Gassendi are considered in detail and are placed within the context of the growing trend to use Stoic and Epicurean thought to replace the authority of Aristotle in the areas of science, psychology, and politics. The final two sections are devoted respectively to considering the ways in which Hobbes and Spinoza encountered the Hellenistic accounts of bodies and demonstrating how these earlier accounts came to feature in each of their own discussions of bodily tendencies. Engaging with a wide range of their texts, each section develops the many nuances and contours that emerged as both writers developed and fine-tuned their accounts of bodily actions. This reveals the many ways in which the ancient accounts of self-preservation helped to unify large aspects of Hobbes's and Spinoza's own philosophical corpus, while equally showing how a well-developed account of bodily tendencies might challenge the scholastic worldview and expand further the boundaries of the so-called 'New Science'.