Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-05T13:21:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1612402 bytes, checksum: 7b5aa137583cdc9e127b0d2781ed81c2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-05T13:21:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1612402 bytes, checksum: 7b5aa137583cdc9e127b0d2781ed81c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-06 / The current dissertation aims to develop the study of Hegelian idea of free will, for the purpose of show that this idea is an element in which the entire sphere of law (as spirit object) develops. Our investigation will take as textual limit the moments in which the referred topic is clearly developed, namely, the works of Philosophy of Right (1821), and the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Compendium (1830), in its firs moment, the subjective spirit. Thus, one limited to analyse the dialectical progress of logical ideal, unfolding conceptually in Nature and Spirit, until to determinate as Will that, the first occurs as universal; develops then as individual free will, characterized by discretion (particular) and finally find its most concrete determination as free in and for itself (singular). / A presente dissertação tem por objetivo desenvolver o estudo da Ideia hegeliana de vontade livre, a fim de mostrar que essa ideia é o elemento no qual toda a esfera do direito (como espírito objeto) se desenvolve. Nossa investigação tomará como limite textual os momentos nos quais o referido tema é claramente desenvolvido, a saber, as obras Filosofia do Direito (1820), e a Enciclopédia das Ciências Filosóficas em Compêndio (1830), em seu primeiro momento, o espírito subjetivo. Desta forma, nos limitaremos a analisar o progresso dialético da Ideia lógica, que se desdobra conceitualmente em Natureza e em Espírito, até se determinar como Vontade que, primeiramente, dá-se como universal; desenvolve-se, em seguida, como vontade livre individual, caracterizada pelo arbítrio (particular) e, por fim, tem a sua mais concreta determinação, como livre em si e para si (singular).

Can Hegel's Philosophy of Right do without the Science of Logic?”. The question posed by this paper’s title refers to the attempts of some contemporary authors, amongst them Axel Honneth, to update the central theses of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, though precisely (and deliberately) doing so without its alleged dependence on the Science of Logic. On account of several methodological and hermeneutical reasons, it is not easy to answer this question. It is well known that Hegel emphatically asserts that both works and philosophical projects depend on each other, but there is no consensus amongst specialists on how much the Logic actually influences the Philosophy of Right and in what way it does so. On the other hand, clearly any social philosophy needs a logical theory in a broad sense, whether it may be Hegelian or not. This is even more so if the aim is to update the Hegelian construction implicit in the notion of freedom. In any case, the discussion seems to bring forth the paradox of asserting both the current relevance and the obsolescence of the Hegelian notion of freedom. / La pregunta planteada en el título de esta contribución alude a los intentos de algunos autores contemporáneos, entre ellos el de Axel Honneth, por reactualizar los planteamientos centrales de la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel, pero prescindiendo precisamente (y deliberadamente) de su supuesta dependencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica. Responder a esa pregunta no es fácil por diversas razones, metodológicas y hermenéuticas. Es sabido por cierto que Hegel sostiene enfáticamente la dependencia entre ambas obras y empresas filosóficas, pero no hay consenso entre los especialistas sobre qué peso real y de qué tipo posee la Lógica sobre la Filosofía del Derecho. De otro lado, es evidente que cualquier filosofía social requiere de una concepción lógica en sentido amplio, sea esta hegeliana o de otro tipo, más aun si lo que se pretende es actualizar la construcción hegeliana implícita en el concepto de libertad. En cualquier caso, la discusión parece mostrar un hecho paradójico que consiste en afirmar simultáneamente la actualidad y la obsolescencia de la concepción hegeliana de la libertad.

Abstract In the recent political theory it is ever more common to point out that the liberal theory has had in the modern world a respectable rival called republican theory. This study tries to support the thesis that however fundamentally their distinction be defined it has as its most important element different concepts of freedom. The liberals have so called negative concept of freedom almost without exception as the basis of their political theory whereas the republicans tend to have a different concept of freedom as that. In this study this is called autonomic freedom in its more developed version. The above thesis has been argued by comparing two central modern republicans, Rousseau and Hegel. The arguments of this study firstly show that they both have the autonomic freedom as a basis of their political theories in a much more developed and richer form than anyone else before. The arguments secondly show that their theories of the modern society on the one hand and those of political community on the other hand are very similar. The very same thing can thirdly be said of their accounts of the relationship of these conceptions. Their political theories showed a considerable amount of common features which are different from or contrary to those of liberal theories. Many of them could be connected to Rousseau’s and Hegel’s near-kindred concepts of autonomic freedom. Their characteristic differences can in many cases be accounted for to their historically different perspectives into the development of the modern society. The case in point is Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776). It is very unlikely that Rousseau even knew about it whereas studying it was very important for Hegel’s understanding of the modern society. The argumentation for the theses of the study has been based on close and detailed interpretation of the relevant texts of Rousseau and Hegel. / Tiivistelmä Viime aikoina on poliittisessa teoriassa yleistynyt käsitys, jonka mukaan liberalistisella poliittisella teoriassa on modernissa maailmassa varteenotettava kilpailija, nimittäin republikanistinen teoria. Tutkimuksessa pyritään esittämään tukea teesille, jonka mukaan liberalismin ja republikanismin eron keskeinen fundamentti tai ainakin yksi aivan keskeisimmistä on niiden erilainen vapauden käsite. Liberalistisella poliittisella teorialla on melkein poikkeuksetta nk. negatiivinen vapauden käsite perusteenaan, kun taas republikanisteilla on yleensä perusteena toisenlainen vapauskäsite, jonka kehittynyttä muotoa nimitetään tässä tutkimuksessa autonomiseksi vapaudeksi. Juuri mainittua teesiä perustellaan tutkimalla kahta keskeistä modernia republikanistia, Rousseauta ja Hegeliä. Ensin osoitetaan, että heillä on autonominen vapaus poliittisen teoriansa perusteena kehittyneemmässä ja rikkaammassa muodossa kuin kenelläkään heitä ennen. Toiseksi osoitetaan heidän poliittisia teorioitaan tutkimalla, että heidän käsityksensä modernista yhteiskunnasta ja poliittisesta yhteisöstä ovat varsin yhteneväiset. Kolmanneksi osoitetaan, että heillä on hyvin yhteneväinen käsitys myös niiden suhteesta. Heidän poliittisissa teorioissaan esiintyi runsaasti liberalistisesta teoriasta poikkeavia tai sille vastakkaisia yhteisiä piirteitä. Monet näistä voitiin asettaa tiiviiseen yhteyteen edellä mainitun heille pitkälti yhteisen vapauskäsitteen kanssa. Heidän luonteenomaiset eronsa voidaan usein yhdistää heidän historiallisesti erilaiseen perspektiiviinsä modernin yhteiskunnan kehitykseen. On esimerkiksi erittäin epätodennäköistä, että Rousseau olisi edes kuullut Adam Smithin Kansojen varallisuudesta, kun taas Hegelin teoria modernista yhteiskunnasta perustuu huomattavassa määrin tämän teoksen tutkimiseen. Tutkimuksen teesien perustelu nojaa Rousseaun ja Hegelin relevanttien tekstien yksityiskohtaiseen lähitulkintaan.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Maria Rosalia Pinfildi Gomes.pdf: 2013981 bytes, checksum: 87e09ff40b78b1c122ecd2fd1bc70789 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-01-23 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / One frequently resorts to science to legitimize the primacy attributed to Biotechnology and to the privileged protection granted to the rights of intellectual property that are conferred on it. Therewith, there is a tendency to accept, as a presupposition, that the future must and will be shaped by the biotechnological advances. Therefore, any criticism to the development of new technologies seems to constitute an opposition to the unfolding of the future and to science itself. In this dissertation we intend to inquire what values inform science, since it sets the course of this development, remaining for the global economy the role of providing the structures to its effective implementation. There seems to be a race towards the legitimization, founded on the authority and prestige of science, of the development and use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs); science, however, does not authorize such legitimization. On the contrary, the Genetically Modified Organisms which promise an agricultural revolution bear the mark of the political economy of globalization, given that its development has been taken as an objective of the global neoliberal economy, as well as a means of strengthening its structures. / Freqüentemente recorre-se à ciência para legitimar a prioridade atribuída à Biotecnologia e à proteção privilegiada concedida aos direitos de propriedade intelectual que lhe são conferidos. Com isso há uma tendência a aceitar, como pressuposto, que o futuro deverá ser, e será modelado pelos avanços biotecnológicos. Por isso, qualquer crítica ao desenvolvimento de novas tecnologias parece constituir uma oposição ao desdobrar do futuro e à própria ciência. Na presente dissertação pretende-se questionar que valores informam a ciência, já que é ela que define a rota, restando à economia global fornecer as estruturas para sua efetiva implementação. Parece estar ocorrendo uma corrida visando à legitimação do desenvolvimento e emprego de Organismos Geneticamente Modificados (OGMs) na autoridade e prestígio da ciência, contudo, a ciência não autoriza tal legitimação. Ao contrário, os Organismos Geneticamente Modificados que prometem uma revolução agrícola -, trazem a marca da economia política da globalização, haja vista que seu desenvolvimento tem sido tomado, como um objetivo da economia neoliberal global, bem como um meio de fortalecer suas estruturas.