Sammanfattning Det här arbetet utgör en studie av Piagets och Vygotskijs teorier om kunskapsutveckling hos individen. Piagets och Vygotskij teorier har i flertalet andra texter presenterats som varandras motsatser. I stället för att skapa ett huvudsakligt motsatsförhållande har den här studien försökt att om inte kombinera så åtminstone relatera Piagets och Vygotskijs teorier på området. Vygotskij har fokuserat på processer runt den lärande människan, men inte uteslutande. Piaget har fokuserat på processer inuti den lärande människan, men inte uteslutande. Studien har försökt skapa ett rum runt författarna, genom ett urval av deras texter, där texterna kan relateras till varandra. Det här rummet avspeglar ett försök till att återföra tolkningar av texterna till texternas ursprungliga sammanhang. Hos Piaget finns synen på att all kunskap är evigt föränderlig och omformbar. Om Vygotskijs syn på lärandet placeras i sitt sammanhang av dialektik, framgår det att lärandet hos individen har en del i så väl reproduktion som produktion. Här blir också Vygotskijs syn på människans kreativitet och fantasi betydelsefull i förståelsen av lärandet. Det här kan relateras till Piagets konstruktivistiska syn på lärandet, där lärandet gestaltar sig som att förstå genom att upptäcka och skapa egna samband. KEYWORDS: Piaget, Vygotskij, Kunskap, Förståelse, Dialektik. / Abstract This work constitutes a study of the respective theories concerning the individual growth and development of knowledge according to Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky. Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s respective views have in other works been interpreted mostly as being each others opposites. Rather than opposing the two, this study has tried to combine the two or at least relate the two to each other in looking at the construction or development of knowledge of the individual. Vygotsky on the one hand, in analysing the growth of knowledge, concentrates on the processes in the surroundings of the individual, but not exclusively. Piaget on the other hand in analysing the growth of knowledge looks at what goes on inside the individual, but not exclusively. This works has tried to focus on certain elements that would recreate some pieces of the original context for Piaget’s and Vygotsky’s respective work on the subject. In looking at Piaget’s views it becomes clear that all knowledge is in a state of perpetual evolution. By placing Vygotsky’s view on learning and the growth of knowledge of the individual within an original context of dialectics, it becomes clear that learning has two distinctive properties that cannot be overlooked: Learning is a process of production and reproduction. Here, Vygotsky’s views on the roles played by creativity and imagination within human thinking become important elements of understanding the process of learning. This can be related to Piaget’s constructivist view, that learning takes place within a process of discovery and invention. KEYWORDS: Piaget, Vygotsky, Knowledge, Understanding, Dialectics,

Detta examensarbete behandlar rollspel som undervisningsmetod inom historia på gymnasiet. Syftet var att undersöka hur denna undervisningsmetod stämmer in på pedagogiska teorier, samt vilket utrymme den har inom styrdokumenten Lpf 94 och kursplanen. De teorier som analyserades är de som representeras av Dewey, Piaget och Vygotskij. Läroplanen och kursplanen för historia A analyserades med hjälp av Blooms kunskapstaxonomi. Resultatet visar att rollspel i vissa delar passar in i pedagogiska teorier. Ingen av de för denna undersökning aktuella teorierna stämde helt in på rollspel som undervisningsmetod. Dock finns det element i teorierna som gör det. Rollspel kan skilja sig åt till form och innehåll. Därav presenteras inga generella resultat. De för denna uppsats aktuella rollspelen syftar i första hand till stegen knowedge, comprehension och application i Blooms taxonomi. Stegen högre upp kan eftersträvas beroende på hur spelet är utformat.

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This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

Behaviourists and Logical Positivists commendably set out to purge prejudiced arguments from science, but where it is obvious that there remains some sort of "ghost" in their rational "machine", it is self-defeating simply to ignore its existence. Freaud, Piaget, and the ethologists have made some progress in grasping this nettle -- moving towards a material explanation of the "other-worldly" properties of the individual -- but their models of the individual remain nebulously structured in their basic elements. Consequently such theories remain disturbingly controversial, and circumscribed in their applicability. [#] The present work accordingly sets out to bridge this gap by postulating plausible functions for existing micro-structure which could account both for observed behavioural phenomena, and for many of the existing vaguer theoretical constructs. Part A develops such an explanation for Piagetian constructs, while Part B fills in some of the technical details concerning quantitative problems of signal generation, transmission, and selective reception. [#] Part C applies these notions to other non-Piagetian descriptions and interpretations of psychological phenomena, thereby offering an integration and reconciliation of various schools of theory. (Major areas considered include Ashby's "homeostat" approach, biological self-organization, sleep-modes and dreaming, Freudian theories of neuroses, and various theories concerning psychosis). The basic theory itself is meanwhile developed in much greater detail. [#] A recurring theme throughout the work is the notion that knowledge-acquisition by any independent system depends not only on "external" interaction with the "real" world, but also on an active seeking for internal consistency within the resulting "internal" model. This concept is crucial to the study in two ways:- (i) The operation of the brain-systems being considered, and (ii) As a guuide to the methodology of the present study itself -- in an area where experimental data is uncomfortably sparse, and likely to remain so.

Thesis (M. Ed.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Education, 1994? / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 443-467).

Research paper (M.A.) -- Cardinal Stritch College -- Milwaukee, 1972. / A research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Education (Reading Specialist). Includes bibliographical references (p. 35-39).

Proefschrift--Sociale wetenschappen--Groningen, 1981. / Bibliogr. p. 379-413. Résumés en anglais et néerlandais.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1981.