The environmental uncertainty of federal politics and acquisition outsourcing in competitive markets requires an adaptive decision-analysis structure. Practitioners oriented toward exclusively static methods face severe challenges in understanding qualitative aspects of organizational governance. The purpose of this grounded theory study was to examine and understand behavioral relationship attributes within intuitive, choice, judgment, or preference decision-making processes. The problem addressed in this study was the detrimental effects of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), compulsory citizenship behavior (CCB), and social exchange theory (SET) on the acquisition management relationship The OCB, CCB, SET dictates that sound business development, relationship acumen, emotional intelligence and perceptiveness transcend pure numerical quantification. Exhibition of relationship-based attributes influence and drive long-term contractual relationships and the sustainability of business organizations. The data collected included historical data and survey responses. Approximately 34,000 acquisition professionals comprised the population-sampling frame. The study sample consisted of 378 survey responses that yielded 294 qualifying respondents with 94 disqualifications that produced a 78% response rate. The Carnegie-Mellon behavioral survey guidelines underpinned questionnaire construction and affirmation of themes. Strauss and Corbin grounded theory and theme generation addressed behavioral decision making under the additive model that inform the development of an organizational social operations and business framework that accounts for intuitive judgment. The study may contribute to positive social change by orienting managers toward behavioral decision making, ensuring responsiveness to the public and federal governance

Submitted by Morgana Silva (morgana_linhares@yahoo.com.br) on 2016-09-12T19:23:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1217949 bytes, checksum: 50d8c19cb9000d43bfb8578579579cbb (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-12T19:23:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1217949 bytes, checksum: 50d8c19cb9000d43bfb8578579579cbb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-06-03 / The contamination of the economies' public management by both political and partisan interests and the manifestation of economic cycles induced by electoral calendar has been the target of several studies both national and international. The aim of this work is to verify if there are empirical evidences of political-business cycles for the state governments of Brazil, being analyzed the fiscal policy and electoral results in the period from 1995 to 2013. Pursuit up to investigate if state government manipulates public spending as a way of showing competence to voters for with this to expand the electoral winning chances of the current ruler or political party. Secondarily will be verified if public spending is affected by ideological-partisan reasons. Was used as theoretical mark the proposed postulates by the Theory of Political Economic Cycles proposed fundamentally by Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1990), Hibbs (1977) and Alesina (1987). The fundamental basis of the theoretical foundation used is the linking of economic policies and its results in electoral interests and political power projects. Econometric estimates were realized using panel data, in an attempt of verify if there was manipulation of fiscal instruments in electoral periods as prescribed by opportunistic theoretical models. The results showed the presence of PBC in public spending at state level in Brazil, following, in general terms, assumptions outlined by opportunistic model. The public spending is increased at election years in compared to the others years of the mandate, confirming the adopted hypothesis. The presence of electoral calendar influence in the evolution of public spending was observed in a stronger way in some specific expenditure functions, which are, capital expenditures, investments, works and urbanism. Was observed that there is no important difference that distinguishes ideological parties in fiscal policy in Brazilian’s states. The conclusion is that the realization of public spending of the states in Brazil is affected by electoral calendar, oscillating cyclically according foreseen in the theory of Political Business Cycles. Such behavior occurs indistinctly between governments, independently of the ideological-partisan group or its rulers. / A contaminação da gestão das economias por interesses políticos e partidários e a manifestação de ciclos econômicos induzidos pelo calendário eleitoral vem sendo alvo de variados estudos nacionais e internacionais. O objetivo deste trabalho é verificar se existem evidências empíricas de Ciclos Político-Econômicos para os governos estaduais do Brasil, analisando-se as políticas fiscais e os resultados eleitorais no período de 1995 a 2013. Busca-se averiguar se os governos estaduais manipulam os gastos públicos como medida de sinalizar competência diante dos eleitores para com isso ampliar as chances de vitória eleitoral do governante/partido no poder. Secundariamente será verificado se os gastos são afetados por razões ideológico-partidárias. Foi utilizado como referencial teórico os postulados propostos na Teoria de Ciclos Políticos Econômicos assentados fundamentalmente por Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff (1990), Hibbs (1977) e Alesina (1987). A base fundamental do referencial teórico utilizado é a vinculação das políticas econômicas e seus conseqüentes resultados a interesses eleitorais e de projetos de poder político. Foram realizadas estimações econométricas utilizando-se Dados em Painel, na tentativa de verificar se houve manipulações dos instrumentos fiscais em períodos eleitorais, conforme prescrito pelos Modelos Teóricos Oportunistas. Os resultados evidenciaram a presença de CPE nos gastos públicos a nível estadual no Brasil, seguindo, em termos gerais, os pressupostos delineados pelo modelo oportunista. Os gastos públicos são ampliados nos anos eleitorais em comparação com os demais anos dos mandatos, confirmando-se a hipótese adotada. A presença da influência do calendário eleitoral na evolução dos gastos públicos foi observada de forma mais contundente em algumas funções despesas específicas, quais sejam, despesas de capital, investimentos, obras e urbanismo. Observou-se que não há uma diferença importante que distinga grupos ideológicos na política fiscal dos Estados no Brasil. A conclusão é de que a realização dos gastos públicos estaduais no Brasil é afetada pelo calendário eleitoral, oscilando de maneira cíclica conforme previsto na teoria dos Ciclos Políticos Econômicos. Tal comportamento ocorre de forma indistinta entre os governos, independentemente do grupo ideológico-partidário em que estejam inseridos os seus governantes.

The aim of the thesis is to find possible connections between the financial results of public budgets and the course of the political cycle in the Czech Republic. The analysis for the period of 1993 - 2010 focuses initially on the development of the overall deficit; subsequently the development of selected items of public revenues and expenditures is investigated. A fundamental part of the work is the separation of the cyclical deficit, arising from fluctuations in economic activity and the structural deficit, which is produced through specific measures of government fiscal policy. The results of the analysis indicate that with the approaching elections, there was a greater release of the fiscal policy. During the second half of the electoral cycles have also been reported higher structural deficits. However, the differences are not high enough to be considered as statistically significant.

The thesis is focused on development of public finance in the Czech Republic between years 1993 and 2010. The crucial aim is to find out possible connections between increasing government deficits and the effort of politicians to be re-elected through higher government spending prior to an election. The analysis is mainly based on state and public budgets especially their annual changes in structure and basic components. I divide the cyclical and structural deficit and examine the influence of economic policy to its creation. In thesis is also described the general theory of public finance, issue of fiscal imbalance, public choice theory and its theory of political business cycle. The fiscal policy is carefully analyzed in recent electoral cycles in context of the economic and political development. The results of the analysis indicate that significant part of public debt has been created because of populist reasons especially in the period of economic expansion.

鄉鎮市公所是我國政治體制最基層之地方自治團體，與民眾第一線接觸之政府層級。其所擁有之財政預算權是重要權力之一，但隨著民主政治的邁進，形成以選票為導向之地方自治。行政首長背負著選票與連任壓力，為實現其選舉支票或取悅選民，或許會產生以有限之資源實現其無限之願景，漠視其財政責任。 本文以台北縣之29個鄉鎮市公所，取用自89年至97年之預算資料，以單變數檢定之實證分析加以探討地方選舉對地方政府預算分配的影響，作為地方政府治理之參考依據。 實證結果顯示，台北縣29個鄉鎮市公所的預算分配於選舉年時整體預算規模並未大幅增加，但某些政事別支出卻明顯高於非選舉年。表示為刺激選情、替選舉加温，會有以加重某些政事別支出而排擠某些資本門建設經費之政策操作。 當只考慮政黨因素時，分立政府之總歲出較一致政府明顯偏高，顯示在分立政府之府會關係下，為化解僵局、使政策推動順遂，在雙方妥協、談判下，有不斷增加各部門預算的現象。 當選舉因素與政黨因素同時考量時，分立政府與一致政府之預算分配並無太明顯差異，在總預算規模不擴增情況下，以調動資本門經費用以增加可刺激選情之經常門經費，並以增加交通支出之資本門經費以突顯其建設地方、促進經濟發展之政績。 關鍵詞：預算分配、分配理論、政治景氣循環 / This paper analyzes the impact of election and government structure factors on municipal budget behavior. For the purpose of empirical analysis, we have obtained 29 townships of Taipei County during a nine-year period from 2000 to 2009, with Univariate tests for each selective budget expenditure variable affect by selective political factor. Empirical evidence is found no significant influence in the local budget to manipulate the economy at election year. When consider the political party factor, the divided government is significantly higher total expenditure than unified government. When consider both election and political party factor, budget distribution has no significant difference between divided government and unified government. The total budget scale does not increase but transfer capital expenditure to general expenditure and increase the capital expenditure of traffic topic for stand out political achievements to construct the place and promote the economic development. Keyword：Budget Distribution, Distribution Theories, Political Business Cycle

The aim of the thesis is to examine possible connections between economic results of public budgets, especially the most important part-state budget, and the course of the political cycle in Czech republic between years 1993 and 2015. The theoretical part is based on the Public choice theory, Theory of public finance and Political-business cycle theory. The practital part focuses on analysis of political situation in each political cycle and then on association with public and state budgets revenues and expenditures, their growth rate and the business cycle. Results of the analysis show that deficits of state budget are predominantly structural based. Moreover, a tendency to influence election results through released fiscal policy is also noticeable in some political cycles, which is consistent with the political-business cycle theory.

The present thesis is concerned with the existence of political cycles in European Union member states between 1990 and 2013. These cycles are of two types: political business cycles and political budget cycles. The analysis was performed by means of the fixed effects method (using first differences) along with a visual analysis of data. The results obtained from three types of data sets show that two years before elections, inflation grows at 0.47%, unemployment rate at 0.5%, and structural balance at 0.8%. One of the data sets reveals that structural balance is reduced by 0.39% in election years. The visual analysis clearly demonstrates that there exist political business cycles in Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden. Political budget cycles have been proven to exist in Belgium, France, Cyprus, Malta, Germany, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.

Submitted by David Mendes Fabri (davidfabri@gmail.com) on 2015-12-09T11:56:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 FABRI_CicloEleitoralPBF_v11_final.pdf: 1636325 bytes, checksum: a86e5739755f168f966a159c2e015e65 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2015-12-15T17:36:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 FABRI_CicloEleitoralPBF_v11_final.pdf: 1636325 bytes, checksum: a86e5739755f168f966a159c2e015e65 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-01-13T10:51:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 FABRI_CicloEleitoralPBF_v11_final.pdf: 1636325 bytes, checksum: a86e5739755f168f966a159c2e015e65 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-13T10:51:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FABRI_CicloEleitoralPBF_v11_final.pdf: 1636325 bytes, checksum: a86e5739755f168f966a159c2e015e65 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-12-02 / From the dissemination of knowledge about economic voting in the political environment, the increase in real income created by Bolsa Família could create incentives for governments to increase the value of transfers or a broader basis of registered families in order to increase their chances of re-election. The hypothesis tested in this study was that the government influences the costs of the Bolsa Família and increase abnormally in preelection periods. To test this hypothesis, the time series of monthly expenses with the program and the number of beneficiary families have been used since January 2004 to December 2014. For this statistical models were used to identify whether these expenses abnormally increase in periods preceding elections, controlled for other factors that may influence program spending, such as National GDP, Income and Expenses of the National Treasury, Inflation and Unemployment taxes. The results suggest the occurrence of electoral cycles in the presidential election, in which there is an acceleration in the number of families enrolled in the Bolsa Família in the three months prior to the campaign with the increase of program´s costs in the same period, but there is no reduction in the number of families enrolled after the elections and, finally, that there are no effects in the period of the local elections. / A partir da disseminação do conhecimento sobre voto econômico no meio político, o incremento da renda real criado pelo Bolsa Família pode criar incentivos para que os governantes aumentem o valor dos repasses ou ampliem a base de famílias cadastradas com intuito de aumentar suas chances de reeleição. A hipótese testada nesse trabalho foi de que o governo influencia os gastos do Programa Bolsa Família e os aumentam anormalmente em períodos pré-eleitorais. Para testar essa hipótese, foram usadas as séries temporais de gastos mensais com o programa e de número de famílias beneficiárias desde janeiro de 2004 até dezembro de 2014. Para isso foram utilizados modelos estatísticos para identificar se estes gastos aumentam anormalmente em períodos que antecedem eleições, controlados por outros fatores que podem influenciar os gastos do programa, tais como PIB Nacional, Receitas e Despesas do Tesouro Nacional, Inflação e Desemprego. Os resultados sugerem a ocorrência de ciclos eleitorais nas eleições presidenciais, nos quais há uma aceleração no número de famílias inscritas no Bolsa Família nos três meses anteriores à campanha com a consequente aceleração dos gastos do programa no mesmo período, porém não há redução no número de famílias inscritas após as eleições e, por fim, que não existem efeitos no período das eleições locais.