The intention of campaign finance regulations was to reduce the influence of special interest groups while increasing citizen contributions. Critics have suggested an unintentional consequence of this policy of increasing bias in campaign contributions in favor of incumbents. These claims of intentional and unintentional consequences, however, have rarely been tested. My dissertation examines the intentional and unintentional consequences of campaign finance regulations in the American states. This study adopts a theoretical framework emphasizing the different effects of regulations on two distinctive types of contributors. A particularistic contributor, whose motivation is influencing policy, is likely to be affected by contribution limits. A universalistic contributor, motivated by helping his or her favorite candidates, is not likely to respond to regulations. Furthermore, the disparity of contributions is not expected to be affected by contribution limits. Two specific hypotheses reflecting the theoretical consideration are tested: 1) Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions and increase the disparity between the numbers as well as the amounts of contributions, and 2) Contribution limits do not affect the number, the amount, or the disparities of universalistic contributions. Individual contribution records on gubernatorial elections are collected from 1990 to 2000 in 42 states. After aggregating individual contribution records by state and candidate, two analyses are conducted at the state and candidate level. The results indicate that campaign finance regulations work without the unintentional consequence of providing a financial advantage to incumbents at both the state and candidate levels. Contribution limits increase the number of total contributors, reduce the number and amount of particularistic contributions, and increase the number of universalistic contributors. In addition, further analyses show a dynamic effect of contribution limits on corporations, labor unions, individuals, parties, and ideology PACs. Restrictive contribution limits reduce the number and amount of corporate contributions, but only reduce the amount of labor union contributions. On the other hand, strict contribution limits encourage individual contributions, but discourage party and ideological PAC contributions. The intentional consequence of campaign finance regulations does not result in the unintentional consequence of increasing bias in favor of incumbents. These findings suggest that current regulations that limit campaign contributions should remain in place.

利益團體影響政府政策的制定，在各國均時有所聞。本文主要探討當政府面對利益團體的政治獻金操作時，在謀求社會福利水準極大下，將如何影響污染管制政策的制定。藉由 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所建立之政治獻金模型為架構，分析利益團體如何藉由政治獻金的捐獻來達成影響政府制定最適污染管制政策的目的；並藉由此一模型分析政府如何在考量政治獻金的收入下，訂定最適污染管制政策。我們發現廠商及一般民眾所提供政治獻金的多寡及最適污染標準的高低，受到政府對全國福利水準重視的程度，及一般民眾組成利益團體的人數所影響。當一般民眾組成利益團體的人數愈多時，政府制定之最適污染標準將愈趨於嚴格，尤其全體民眾組成一共同利益團體時，最適污染標準值將與未收受政治獻金時之數值相等。然而一般而言，政府所制定最適污染標準值卻是較有利於廠商。 / This paper analyzes how the interest groups use political contributions to influence the government optimal control policy of pollution. We find that both the optimal control of the pollution and the amount of political contributions are affected by the weight that the domestic government puts on the social welfare and the population. When the weight is larger, the political contributions of interest groups will become smaller. Secondly, the more people pay attention to pollution, the more strict the optimal control of the pollution will be. Moreover, in general, the optimal control of the pollution tends to favor the manufacturer.

Workers who earn wage premiums for adverse job characteristics face a higher tax-price than peers of equal human capital working under more favorable conditions. Facing a higher cost per unit for public goods, they in turn demand a relatively small public sector. This may explain patterns of political affiliation across industries where differences in nonpecuniary aspects are often significant. I test this with county level data on fatality rates and support for the Republican candidate in the 2004 US Presidential election, finding that fatality rates remain positive and significant drivers of GOP support through various regression specifications. These results are robust to cross-sectional and panel data on individual contributions reported to the Federal Election Commission for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 US Presidential elections.

政府制訂政策時往往有許多考量，尤其是面對外人直接投資時，政府的政策規範常會因為國內發展情況不同而有所調整，本文嘗試站在政府的角度，以兩種情況討論關稅的訂定與開放外人直接投資的決策。首先，我們以Grossman ＆ Helpman (1994) 之政治獻金模型為架構，考慮兩國廠商各種遊說的情況，藉以訂出最適關稅。我們發現，政府將會選擇兩國廠商一起遊說。其次，我們考慮本國政府可以開放外國廠商進入本國直接投資，同時我們假定外國廠商擁有技術優勢，進入本國直接投資後，對本國廠商會產生一技術外溢效果 (Spillover effect)，使得本國廠商邊際生產成本下降。最後，我們比較上述兩種情況之下之政府效用大小，並發現本國政府越重視國內福利相較於政治獻金時，將會傾向開放外人直接投資。 / Since the domestic government can choose the optimal policy instrument to maximize the social welfare, this paper analyzes how a domestic government sets the policy about foreign direct investment. In the beginning, we use Grossman ＆ Helpman (1994) political contribution model to endogenize tariff policy in a duopoly composed of a domestic firm and a foreign firm, where both firms affect the domestic government’s tariff policy via their contributions. It is found that the domestic government will choose both the domestic firm and the foreign firm apply contributions. Then, we consider a spillover effect when the domestic government decides to let the foreign firm with superior technology undertake foreign direct investment. Finally, we compare the government’s utility in the two situations above and find that the domestic government tends to open FDI when it puts much weight on the social welfare.

本文採用 Grossman and Helpman (1994) 所建立的政治獻金模型為架構，來分析國內外廠商如何透過政治獻金的捐贈，以達到影響政府對於貿易管制政策中關稅或配額政策的偏好，進一步我們可得出關稅與配額等價性成立與否之結論。本文研究發現，首先，在兩國廠商皆無政治獻金遊說的情況下，關稅與配額等價性的命題不會成立。其次，在兩國廠商有政治獻金遊說的情況下，除了一個特例的情形外，本國政府均會偏好採用從量關稅政策，此時，關稅與配額等價性的命題將無法成立。 / This paper applies the original model of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and analyzes how the domestic and foreign firms may influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy via political contributions. Besides, we can examine whether the arguments for the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, may in fact hold or not given the political contributions. It is shown that in the case of no campaign contributions, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold. Furthermore, when the firms in the two countries lobby by political contributions, the domestic government will adopt a tariff policy except some special case. Then the equivalence of tariffs and quotas will not hold.