The present work is intended as a survey of events and conditions in Tennessee during the decade from 1860 to 1870 when the entire nation was torn by sectional strife, racial antagonism, and economic and social disorder. The writer can make no pretension of having made a comprehensive or exhaustive study of the sources. That would involve a paper far beyond the scope of the present study. At best I have only scratched the surface; merely opened avenues for future study.

This work is an attempt to tell, and in some measure interpret, the story of the relief phase of the New Deal in Kentucky. In a work of this length, the writer encountered difficulty in giving justice to the various agencies in operation.

The most contentious issues of our day often have to do with political and social rights as opposed to economic rights. Through the lens of property rights I investigate whether this dichotomy existed at the time of the American founding. First, I examine the state constitutions and identify three clauses, common to the documents, which protect property rights. I examine their historical basis and reveal their connection to English common law and Locke, primarily. Then, I discuss the personal views of Madison and Jefferson to gain insight into the personal thoughts of two of the most influential Founders. Finally, I examine the actual protections for property rights found in the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Ultimately, I conclude that the Founders saw property rights as deserving of no less protection than social and political rights. Our modern political arena thus has a blind spot when it comes to economic rights. Understanding, at the very least, this part of our nation’s original history is useful for American policymakers, advocates, and citizens of any political stripe.

This study will use Pelhisson’s account of the Toulouse inquisition of 1230-1238 as a case study into the causes of the inquisition, the mindset of the Dominicans who carried it out, and the institutionalization of the inquisition process.

This thesis examines the historical progression of social and political transitions in late Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, seeking to establish the development of Putinism in an historical context and assert a definition of Putinism as a governing philosophy which exploits the rhetoric of democracy and civil society to conceal authoritarian practices. Analysis begins with Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘moral position’ as the basis of the Gorbachev reforms and the conceptual introduction of democratic and market mechanics, followed by the rejection of the Soviet system and the mixed legacy of shock therapy under Boris Yeltsin, culminating in the ultimate ascendancy of Vladimir Putin as a response to the perceived loss of national status and social dislocation resulting from the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras. Ultimately, it is asserted that Putinism is ideologically grounded in Chekism, fundamentally anti-democratic and inherently kleptocratic, seeking to maintain power and perpetuate a sistema centered on the Kremlin. Through vertical centralization of the state, the development of alternative mechanisms of governance, domination of political discourse, development of a personality cult, state sponsored redefinition of Russian identity and the encouragement of exceptionalist and neo-imperialist policies.

Much of the discussion of German National Socialism has historically focused on of Adolf Hitler as the architect of the Nazi state. While recognizing Hitler’s central role in the development of National Socialism, this thesis contends that he was not a lone actor. Much of the ideological and structural development National Socialism was driven by senior individuals within the party who were able to leverage their influence to institutionalize personal variants of National Socialism within broader party ideology. To explore the role of other ideologues in the development of Nazi ideology, this thesis examines how Hitler’s leadership style perpetuated factionalism, how when and by whom central elements of Nazi ideology were introduced, as well the ideological sources from which these concepts were adapted. After the party’s ultimate rise to power Hitler, always centrally positioned, eliminated internal competition and institutionalized his own variant of National Socialism whilst co-opting the concepts and structures developed by other ideologues that offered useful tools to pursue his goals. Through this analysis, this thesis seeks to demonstrate how the foundational elements of National Socialism took form, even before the party achieved power, and how these elements were subsequently utilized to consolidate Nazi control over the German state. Above all else, this thesis sheds much-needed light on the pivotal role of individuals and the conflict between them that engineered the cataclysm of the Third Reich.

One of the most significant events in the Cold War-dominated years of the 1950's and early1960's was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It not only has been reputed by most authorities as a major turning point in the Soviet Union-American struggle, but it dramatically illustrated the critical dimension of thermo-nuclear weapons in international relations. In addition, and of particular interest to one directly involved, it showed that firmness in policy and proper application of military power are key factors in obtaining favorable and peaceful settlements of international disputes.

The essential objective of this study was to reveal the degree to which one man, Nicholas Muraviev, was instrumental in bringing about Russia's annexation of The Amur basin, as well as the territory that became the Maritime Province of Siberia. Introductory chapters provide: a) a background summary of Muraviev's education and of his career prior to his service in Siberia and b) a brief historical survey of the area in which his achievements raised Russia to the position of a Far Eastern Power. The main body of the study comprises an analytical narrative of Muraviev's activities during the decade that culminated in the Chinese capitulation at Aigun in 1858. Closing chapters explain the factors that turned the newly acquired territories into a burden for the Russian Government until it decided to build the trans-Siberian railway, and set forth some conclusions regarding the historical significance of Muraviev's role as Russia's pro-consul in Eastern Siberia. Extensive use was made of the prime single source of information on Muraviev's life, Ivan Barsukov's Graf N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, po ego pismam, ofitsialnym dokumentam, razskazam sovremmenikov it pechatnym istochnikam (materialy d1ia biografii). Also of significant assistance was the bibliography contained in J. L. Sullivan's doctoral dissertation, Count N. N. Muraviev-Amurskii, a full-scale biography. Sullivan's dissertation preceded two important works bearing on the Muraviev period in Siberia and drawn on extensively in the present study; R. K. I. Quested's The Expansion of Russia in East Asia, 1858-1860, and P. I. Kabanov's Amurskii Vopross. Among other particularly valuable sources was P. V. Schumacher's long article, K istorii priobretenia Amurai. Snoshenias Kitaem s 1848 po 1860 g.” contained in Russki Arkhiv, which, together with Russkaia Starina and Krasny Arkhiv, also contain numerous other documents, memoirs and contemporary accounts that were consulted. Of signal value, too, among the special studies, surveys and reference works consulted was the introductory chapter of Andrew Malozemoff's " Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881-1904. A complete selected bibliography is included. The research undertaken for this study has led to the conclusion that had it not been for Muraviev's imagination and ingenuity, his willingness, on occasion, to flout authority and his dedication and extraordinary stamina, the annexation to Eastern Siberia of almost 400,000 square miles of territory might never have taken place. Muraviev was sometimes impatient, perhaps sometimes insufficiently impressed by broader politico-military considerations that dictated what he regarded as an inexcusably over-cautious attitude toward Russo-Chinese relations in St. Petersburg. He also tended to exaggerate the immediate benefits that would accrue to Russia once she acted boldly on the Amur. Yet the salient fact remains that it was the intensity with which he pursued his idee fixe, both with words and actions, the years of his methodical preparation, with minimal support from the Russian Government, that made it possible for that Government to nullify the Treaty of Nerchinsk and to extend the Russian Empire's realms on the Pacific's shores down to the Korean frontier. It took important external factors, such as the Crimean War, and the resulting replacement of Muraviev's nemesis, Nesselrode, and his clique, with more capable and far sighted officials, to bring Muraviev's plans to fruition. But to say this is simply to say that the authorities in St. Petersburg, viewing the confluence of events on the international scene, finally recognized that in Muraviev they had the right man at the right place at the right time.

The Italian Communist Party (PCI) emerged from the chaos of the Italian defeat in 1943 as a powerful and cohesive movement. Based upon organizational development throughout the years of Fascist rule in Italy, plus a combination of vigorous partisan activities and a willingness to compromise politically in exchange for governmental participation, the PCI showed promise for achieving economic and social change in Italy. Conservative countermeasures and Allied pressures, however, diminished the Communist advantage until, by 1947, the Party was no longer represented in the postwar government. The success apparent in the economic arena due to the Christian Democrat's program initiated in their monocolore government of 1947 and an East-West demarcation internationally, with the Soviets gaining control in Eastern Europe, created for the general elections of April, 1948 an atmosphere ripe for Christian Democrat exploitation. The election was disastrous for the PCI; the combined Communist-Socialist ticket drew slightly in excess of four million votes, one million fewer than the coalition had gathered in the 1946 elections.

This thesis on the Grand Remonstrance represents an attempt to deal with the central question of Stuart Historiography, the question which asks "What were the causes of the English Civil War, and why did it occur when it did?" The question of causation is fundamental to an understanding of the early 17th century, and it has created considerable controversy among successive generations of historians. The central issue in question is whether the English Civil War was caused by a long term revolution in English society, generated by substantial changes in socio-economic conditions, or whether, in fact, it was caused by a fundamental breakdown in the working relationship between a particular monarch and a particular representative body. The choice of the Grand Remonstrance as the subject of the thesis was made after considerable study in the period led me to believe that the latter theory was correct, and furthermore, that a careful study of the Grand Remonstrance, and its relationship to the Long Parlament would provide important evidence to support that hypothesis. I realized when I made the decision that I had chosen a piece of parliamentary reform that spanned, in its development, a full year of parliamentary history, and that I had, therefore, committed myself to a study of rather sizable proportions, both chronologically and topically. Nonetheless, I have tried to limit the study to the history of the Remonstrance itself, and to the issues which directly influenced its development, and which clearly reflected the political conditions prevailing in England immediately prior to the Civil War.