In late Spring of 1969, shortly before the Oregon Legislative Session adjourned, House Bill No. 1302 as amended passed the last legislative hurdle and was signed by the Governor. The new statute recognized steelhead trout as a game fish and provided for an incidental catch of these fish by the commercial fishery. HB 1302 was a turning point in a century of conflict over anadromous fish of the Columbia River. The bill served as an armistice in a long sports-commercial steelhead conflict by providing some protection for these fish from commercial fishing. However the bill held off a major shift in the sports-commercial balance of power for only five years. The "final" victory went to the sports fishermen in 1974--the voters approved Ballot Measure No. 15 which banned steelhead from sale. Although the sportsmen finally won the steelhead battle, they may have lost the war. Unless the erosion of fish runs caused primarily by dams is checked the fishery may disappear. Chapter I gives an overview of HB 130 and discusses the significance of the Columbia River anadromous fishery to Oregon. Chapter II is a history of the Columbia River fishery and traces the conflict between the various fishing interest groups. Chapter III details the causes of the conflict and describes the relationship between dams and declining runs of fish. Chapter IV discusses the Legislative passage of HB 1302. Chapter V discusses lobbying and pressure group activities concerning HB 1302. Chapter VI chronicles events subsequent to passage of HB 1302. Chapter VII contains summary and concluding remarks.

In the twentieth century the debate over the ideological origins of the founding period and early republic has resulted in a polarization of historical interpretations. Recently, the conflict has centered on historians who use either the liberal or classical republican paradigms to explain these eras. Scholars of the founding period have argued for the dominance of one political ideology or the other in the thought of important figures of this time. Unfortunately, this struggle has led to a narrow interpretation of arguably the greatest thinker in American History, James Madison. To the contrary, I hold Madison's thought was influenced by both liberal and classical republican ideas, and in this thesis I explore that interpretation.

This thesis examines the nature and impact of the Reagan administration’s self-described projection of “peace through strength.” It argues that Reagan’s defense spending surge, “Star Wars” (SDI) missile shield policy, and 1983 invasion of Grenada gave the president confidence and political cover that allowed him to withdraw U.S. Marines from Beirut in early 1984. Analysts and commentators focus on his muscular power projection like defense spending, SDI, and the invasion of Grenada, but in practice Reagan exercised a high level of restraint in troop deployment. These projections of power and the avoidance of protracted war in Lebanon gave Reagan further confidence and cover to pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, against the protestations of anti-Soviet hardliners. Although Reagan supporters have credited the administration with either frightening or bankrupting the Soviets into disarmament, these policies—particularly his military restraint in Lebanon—did more to bring Reagan himself to the negotiation table. These power projection measures contributed to a “peace through strength” narrative embraced by much of Reagan’s domestic audience, allowing him to fend off accusations of Munich-style appeasement. While the defense spending surge helped give Reagan the confidence to ink an arms control agreement, the buildup created nonlinear consequences that will outlive arms control treaties.

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This paper contributes to the current debate on the democratic impact of US military intervention in the post-Cold War era through a comparative study of two interventions in Haiti in 1994 and 2004. Due to a lack of significant academic work on Haitian democratisation, theory could not be found to sufficiently define Haiti as a political entity. Therefore, the state is defined through the concept of plutocratic democracy; a form of sub-tier democracy. Using this concept, an analytical framework is created to measure the impact of US military intervention in the 1994 and 2004 cases studies. Through a comparison of both cases, it is deduced that US military intervention stunts Haitian democratisation because a large proportion of US political actors support the informal plutocracy in Haiti at the behest of democracy. The claims of this study are supported by an extensive literature review, as well as media sources, official reports and communications from relevant actors.

This thesis is a narrative history of the major groups and individuals on the Australian extreme right since 1950. It assesses their genesis, growth, successes and failures as well as their origins in regard to Australia’s domestic situation and international influences. Various arguments are put forward: groups that emerged in the post World War 2 period are different than preceding groups; the Social Credit movement is in decline; the ideas of neo-Nazi and fascist groups, while powerful, are generally no longer viable; anti-immigration and racial nationalist groups were an attempt to forge an indigenous movement; the role of individual activists are an important element in extreme right political activity; the Confederate Action Party was destroyed by internecine fighting; the Citizens Electoral Council is representative of a movement with the potential to promote dissent in society and may become one of the more important groups of the extreme right; Pauline Hanson’s movement eventually proved damaging to the extreme right. It is concluded that the extreme right has exerted a significant negative influence over Australian society, influencing both national and international trends / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The title of this work is “Indivisible and Inseparable” the motto of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This motto is just one of many ways in the Austro-Hungarian Empire fought against the centrifugal forces seeking to destroy it. I argue here that the historic theory of decline and fall is misguided as a model for understanding the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and question its usefulness when applied to other nation states and empires as well. I suggest that the Austro-Hungarian military, specifically its condition prior to the First World War, is an ideal lens for exploring the dissolution of the Empire at the end of the war in 1918. The Austro-Hungarian military was composed of over 10 different nationalities at a time of surging nationalism, and was the single most important institution charged with the preservation of the Empire. This unique linkage with the state of the Empire as a whole renders the military, in particular the Common Army, extremely useful for examining this issue. I will discuss the structure of the military, its response to the problems posed by nationalism, and contemporary public views about the military within the Empire.

Most contemporary scholarship on Mexican history separates the years 1808-1824 into two distinct processes; Mexican independence and the formation of a new Mexican state. This thesis provides a new synthesis of the two processes of independence and state formation in Mexico. Covering events chronologically from 1808-1824, this thesis argues that the formation of a federal republic in Mexico was no accident, but that it was inevitable. The incessant conflict between insurgent and royalist factions decentralized politics in New Spain from 1810-1820 and weakened the authority of the government in Mexico City. This decentralized arena allowed many political actors of all castes, individuals and groups, to claim political authority on a local level. The only way for Mexico City to forge a new nation after 1820 was to recognize these newly established provincial interests. This thesis uses the failed attempt by Agustin de Iturbide to centralize government following independence as further corroboration that Mexico's War for Independence had established permanent federalist impulses within the country, which would eventually culminate in the creation of a federal republic in 1824.

This paper examines contemporary American politics through the lens of The Federalist Papers, focusing on two specific issues: factionalism as addressed in Federalist Papers 9-10 and taxation, the subject of Federalist Papers 30-36.

The aim of this thesis is to establish the political, economic, and military history of Samos over a millennium, from the first arrival of colonists in the Minoan and Mykenaian Ages to the submission of Samos to imperial Athens in 439 B.C. There is little evidence available for the earlier part of this period. And such later traditions about the Ionian Migration as there are have come under severe attack by modern writers, both in detail and on general grounds of chronology. But there are striking instances of the accurate preservation of information going back at least as far, notably in the case of Mopsos of Kolophon, now confirmed even as to date by Hittite records and by the bilingual inscription of Karatepe. Consequently, it is reasonable to take the traditional narrative as a basis, and see whether it receives confirmation from other sources, chiefly archaeological. Apart from the autochthonous Lelegian king Ankaios, we read in ancient writers of several different immigrant groups in the island: fugitives from Krete in the time of Minos, on their way to found Miletos; 'Aiolians' from Lesbos, sent to found a cleruchy some time before the Trojan War; 'Karians' under Tembrion; 'Ionians' from Epidauros under the leadership of Prokles. Prokles' son Leogoros became involved in war against Androklos, founder of Ephesos and one of the Neleid leaders of the general Ionian Migration. This fact enables us to fix the traditional date of Prokles' arrival in Samos to c. 1125, since the Migration took place four generations after the Sack of Troy, which should be dated, following Herodotos and with archaeological confirmation, to c. 1240. The archaeological remains in Samos agree with these traditions. At Tigani there is Minoan pottery contemporary with - or even slightly earlier than - that from the settlements at Miletos. Gradually this gave way to Mykenaian styles, until the Kretan element had quite disappeared. By the time of the Trojan War, however, the Greek element had left Tigani, no doubt replaced by Tembrion's 'Karians'. When the next Greek pottery appears it is LH III C and Sub-mykenaian, not at Tigani but at the Heraion. It may be, therefore, that of the two settlements under Tembrion and Prokles mentioned by the Etymologicon Magnum Tigani is Astypalaia, the Heraion Chesia. In the course of the Ionian Migration, the new Samians sided with the natives against the Neleids, and for a while the island was conquered and held by Androklos. The Samians went into exile for ten years, some traditionally to Anaia and others to Samothrake. There is evidence that a third group sailed further, and founded Kelenderis in Kilikia: the name of this Samian colony occurs in the Karatepe inscription, invoking Ba'al KRNTRS; and since Samian interest in the orient was not resumed until half a century after that inscription was set up, the Greek place-name would seem to have been given before the Dark Age. Names in -nd- of course are as commonly Anatolian as Greek. But there is only one other Kelenderis, and that near Epidauros, serving to confirm that the Samians did indeed come from the eastern Argolid. There is other evidence in support of this tradition (which can be traced as far back as Herodotos in an explicit form), notably the fact that the eponymous hero of the Samian colony Perinthos (602 B.C.) was an Epidaurian and companion of Orestes. For more than three hundred years, c. 1100-750, we are virtually without evidence for Samian history. We must infer from the names of tribes and months that the traditions of Neleid Ionia were assimilated during this period, and it is probable that Samos received Neleid kings. Otherwise there is only the small but steady sequence of pottery and primitive architecture at the Heraion to assure us of the continuity of the islands's habitation. Recorded history reopens in the second half of the eighth century, when we find the self-conscious Ionians destroying the Karian-infiltrated town of Melie. It seems that Samos and Priene made the attach, against the vain resistance of Miletos, itself part Karian, and Kolophon, Melie's metropolis. The victors parcelled out the territory between them, Priens taking Melie itself, Samos the coastal strip northwards from there to Ephesos. The precise border of the two parcels was to be a matter of recurrent dispute between Samos and Priene. It was about the same time that these Ionian alliances were swept into the wider struggle which grew from the agrarian dispute of Chalkis and Eretria over Lelanton. Samos fought on the side of Chalkis, and at the same time helped Sparta against Messenia and received help from Corinth, while Miletos sent aid to Eretria and may have opposed Sparta on behalf of Messenia. The literary tradition of the alliances has archaeological support. Samos shared in the Athenian disaster at Aigina c. 700, and, like Athens, spent much of the first half of the seventh century in reconstruction. This century was politically and economically the age of the Geomoroi, certain defined artistocratic families said to have held their lands ever since the original settlement. Their period of rule marked the avoidance of warfare in favour of commercial expansion overseas. In the first half of the century they had inaugurated large-scale trade with the Near-Eastern kingdoms and with Kypros. In the second half they were the first to find a new source of silver and tin at Tartessos, Cadiz (638 B.C.). Some time previously Samians had become active in Egypt: first mercenaries in the service of Psamatik I; later, after the establishment of Milesian Naukratis c. 650, merchants who secured a special place in the treaty-port. After a short interlude of tyranny, the Geomoroi founded a group of colonies in Propontis, of which the most notable was Perinthos (602. B.C.). Ensuing warfare with Megara, Lesbos, and Priene, weakened the oligarchy and led to the rise of a short-lived democracy, followed by tyranny under Syloson I c. 590. Five years later he was able to make an alliance with Miletos, now entering two generations of stasis and glad even of so unlikely an ally as Samos. Priene was defeated at last, and a new division made of the lands of the Mykale peninsula. Syloson was succeeded by a relative, perhaps a nephew, Polykrates I, whose existence, hitherto unsuspected by modern writers, is argued from literary and archaeological evidence. Under him Samos reached the peak of her prosperity basing megaloprepeia at home upon increased trade abroad. It was this tyrant who reformed the whole basis of Samian agriculture, fostered industry (notably the cosmetic trade), and embarked on the programme of public works which so thrilled Herodotos. He gained an empire among the coastal towns of Ionia and ruled the islands as far as Delos, enjoying the powerful alliance of Sparta and Lydia. Yet when Kyros conquered Lydia, Polykrates rejoiced; for Phokaia was destroyed, and she was Samos' strongest commercial rival, having seized the monopoly of the Tartessian trade. Polykrates was confident that the shipless Persians would leave him alone. In this he was mistaken, and after a raid in which the Heraion was burned down and a cemetery desecrated, the tyranny fell and was replaced by an oligarchy friendly to Persia c. 540. In 533 Polykrates II made himself tyrant and resumed his father's independent policies. For eight years he enforced a rigid military austerity to equal that of Sparta, and defied the Persians. But by 525 it had become clear that the Persians must in the end conquer, and Polykrates deserted his Egyptian allies, following the Kypriote example in going over to the Persian side. The significance of his famous thalassocracy was that his fleet held the balance between the navies of Egypt and Persian Phoinikia. It was probably this that persuaded the Spartans to attempt to unseat him after his defection.