Cette thèse porte sur l’opinion publique et la démocratie. Elle s’intéresse particulièrement aux Guatémaltèques et à leur faible propension à appuyer la démocratie et certains des principes associés à celle-ci. Entre des explications qui associent ce comportement à un artéfact et à une culture autoritaire, des éléments contextuels et d’importantes nuances prévalent. Ce travail montre qu’il est nécessaire de traiter l’appui à la démocratie comme un objet multiface et malléable. En puisant dans les théories des perspectives et des bifurcations, un instrument d’analyse est élaboré sous le libellé de « temps court de l’appui à la démocratie ». Ce dernier nous permet de comprendre pourquoi, en période de crise politique, les points de vue sur la démocratie sont susceptibles d’évoluer. Sensibles aux circonstances extraordinaires, les opinions peuvent aussi, dans des périodes plus calmes, connaître une certaine stabilité. Les théories de l’ambivalence permettent d’élaborer un deuxième instrument, le « temps long de l’appui à la démocratie », qui aide à expliquer pourquoi les sondés offrent souvent des réponses « contradictoires » en matière de droits et de libertés. Aussi ambivalents que les autres Centraméricains, les Guatémaltèques se démarquent cependant par une forte tendance à esquiver les questions de sondage, à s’opposer aux droits des gens qui critiquent le gouvernement et à évaluer négativement le travail des institutions. Ces caractéristiques mettent en lumière des tensions entre les demandes et l’évaluation de l’offre en démocratie que font les citoyens. Cette thèse débute en étudiant les dimensions de la culture politique guatémaltèque et en proposant une typologie des indicateurs employés dans les grandes enquêtes internationales. / This thesis deals with public opinion and democracy. It mainly focuses on Guatemalans and on their weak propensity to support democracy and some of its dimensions. Between explanations that tie this behaviour to an artifact and to a culture of authoritarianism, contextual factors and important nuances can be found. We thus argue that it is advisable to deal with support for democracy as a multifaceted and malleable object. Drawing from perspectives and bifurcation theories, we develop an analytical instrument that we refer to as the "short-run of support for democracy". The latter allows us to understand why and how, in times of crisis, citizens’ viewpoints on democracy can easily become volatile. The fact that opinions are sensitive to extraordinary circumstances does not prevent them, under usual circumstances, from being relatively stable. Building on theories on ambivalence, we elaborate another instrument, the "long-run of support for democracy", which allows us to explain why survey respondents often give "contradictory" answers to questions dealing with rights and freedoms. While as ambivalent as other Central Americans, Guatemalans stand apart for their likelihood to avoid certain survey questions, to prefer limiting the rights of people who criticize the government, and to be particularly distrustful of state institutions. As background to those opinions and other paradoxical attitudes, we highlight existing tensions between citizens’ demands and their evaluation of the offer in democracy. This thesis first examines the various dimensions of the Guatemalan political culture and proposes a typology of indicators used in international barometer surveys.

Les « années 1968 » ne virent pas seulement l’émergence d’une jeunesse radicale, mais une politisation sans précédent de l’ensemble d’une génération. Aux États-Unis comme en Europe, des jeunes de gauche comme de droite s’engagèrent massivement en politique, faisant des partis et de leurs organisations de jeunesse les premiers bénéficiaires de cette politisation des jeunes. L’étude des principales organisations de jeunesse politiques en RFA (Junge Union, Jungsozialisten) et en France (MJCF, UJP) met en évidence la mutation profonde de la culture politique que suscita cet afflux de jeunes entre 1966 et 1974. Avant même le mouvement étudiant, un nouveau modèle d’organisation fondé sur l’autonomie des jeunes se diffusa dans le cadre du processus de naissance des partis d’électeurs. Au lendemain de « 68 », les organisations se forgèrent une nouvelle identité autour d’un positionnement progressiste reposant sur la foi en un changement social imminent. Cherchant à mobiliser massivement les jeunes, elles transformèrent leur vie interne à travers l’accroissement du rôle de la base, la démocratisation et la rationalisation de leur fonctionnement, l’essor du militantisme actif et de la propagande. L’ascension politique exceptionnelle que connurent par la suite leurs cadres fit des organisations de jeunesse l’une des principales filières d’accès à la politique. Ainsi, à travers l’ensemble des changements qu’elle suscita dans l’engagement militant, la culture politique et le fonctionnement de la démocratie, cette génération fut, par excellence, une génération politique. / The « 1968s » witnessed not only the emergence of a radical youth, but also an unprecedented politicization of a whole generation. In the United States as in Europe, young people on the left and the right became massively involved in politics, making the political parties and their youth organizations the first beneficiaries of the youth’s politicization. The study of the main political youth organizations in West Germany (Junge Union, Jungsozialisten) and in France (MJCF, UJP) highlights the deep transformation of the political culture sparked off by this influx of young members between 1966 and 1974. Even before the student movement, a new model of organization based on more autonomy developed along with the rise of “catch-all-parties”. After “68”, the organizations forged a new identity by taking a progressive stand, proclaiming their faith in the imminence of a social change. Attempting to mobilize massively the youth, they transformed their internal organization increasing the role of the activist base, accelerating the democratization and the rationalization of their functioning, developing the militancy and the propaganda. The exceptional political rise of their leaders made the youth organizations a major pathway to a political career. Thus, by initiating radical changes in the organization of activism, in the political culture and in the management of the democracy, this generation was par excellence a political generation.

The thesis examines the practice of corruption in the Palestinian Authority (PA) from the period of its establishment until the death of Arafat. Palestinian elite formation from the late Ottoman period until the establishment of the PA was assessed in order to identify the elites that came into power in the PA and the political cultures they came to espouse. The two primary elite groups’ (Outsider elites and Insider counter-elites) conflicting political cultures were assessed in how they influenced the decision making process, the construction, and exhibited institutional behaviour of the PA. With the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) on the 13th of September, 1993 between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Government of Israel it established the Palestinian Authority as the government in transition for the Palestinians. The agreements conferred the governing power and leadership role to the PLO Outsider elites (under Arafat). Due to the secret nature and asymmetrical power relation by which the negotiations and agreements were conducted and signed between the PLO Outsider leadership and the Government of Israel, which excluded inputs from Palestinian Insider elites, the culminating PA structure came to exhibit institutional weakness with certain neo-patrimonial behaviour. The political framework by which the Oslo Accords constructed the PA and influenced by international actors warranted institutional-weakness. Moreover, as external actors’ demands for the PA to deal with the declining Peace Process, and address political and security issues increased, PA corruption behaviour became more apparent and proliferated which became indicative of its fundamental problem in that it lacked statehood, lacked authority and legitimacy, and thus resorted to neo-patrimonial and repressive methods to govern. This neo-patrimonial political culture of Arafat and his governing Outsider elites used corruption as a PA political tool for survival thus suppressing a nascent democratic political culture of the Insiders and consequently led to an institutionalisation of corruption in the PA.

La tesi analizza il contemporaneo declino elettorale del Partito Laburista israeliano in relazione agli eventi storici, ai cambiamenti sociali e demografici che hanno portato ad un effettivo cambiamento del sistema politico. In particolar modo la ricerca si sofferma sulla lettura dei risultati elettorali, cercando di sottolineare come le dinamiche sopra indicate abbiano influenzato i trend elettorali e l'offerta politica del partito stesso. Fino a giungere agli anni Novanta, passaggio fondamentale in cui cogliere le ragioni per le quali il Partito Laburista sembra tutt'ora non riuscire invertire il trend negativo degli ultimi quindici anni. / This thesis analyzes the contemporary electoral decline of the Israeli Labor Party in relation to historical events, social and demographic changes that have led to an effective change in the Israeli political system. In particular, the research focuses on the electoral results, trying to underline how the dynamics indicated above have influenced the electoral trends and the political offer of the party itself. The Nineties represent a fundamental passage in which it is possibleto understand the reasons why the Labor Party seems unable, still today, to reverse the negative trend of the last fifteen years.

Du 11 septembre aux extraterrestres, des camps de concentration américains à l'assassinat de Kennedy, cette thèse a pour objectif d'éclairer sous un angle sociopolitique les fondements, les mécanismes et les enjeux de la pensée conspirationniste aux États-Unis depuis la révolution jusqu'à nos jours. S'il ne s'agit pas de dresser un catalogue exhaustif de toutes les théories du complot en vogue, le but demeure de démontrer que le conspirationnisme est un véritable fait social aux États-Unis, un élément de culture politique et populaire. Cette thèse se propose alors d'étudier les rouages et les origines du conspirationnisme sous trois aspects différents et complémentaires qui forment un triangle. D'abord, sous l'angle factuel, c'est-à-dire en étudiant les thèses du complot relatives à un événement extraordinaire (9/11, assassinat de JFK, etc.). Ensuite, sous l'angle des acteurs du conspirationnisme : les leaders conspirationnistes (LaRouche, Icke, etc.), les citoyens enquêteurs et les boucs-émissaires (communistes, juifs, illuminatis, etc.). Enfin, sous l'angle culturel en mettant en perspective le conspirationnisme avec la culture américaine : l'anti-étatisme, la présence de mafias ou encore le cinéma de masse. / From 9/11 to UFOs, from American concentration camps to the Kennedy's assassination, this dissertation aims to enlighten, through a sociopolitical analysis, the grounds, the mechanics and the goals of the conspiratorial thought in the United States since the Revolution. Even Though it is no question to draw an exhaustive catalog of each and every conspiracy theory, I would stress that conspiracism is part of the American political and popular culture. Then, this dissertation studies the origins and the developments of conspiracism through three complementary focuses. First, a factual approach which dwells on specific conspiracy theories such as the 9/11 attacks or the assassination of Kennedy. Secondly, I will come on the actors of conspiracism : the conspiracist leaders (LaRouche, Icke) the citizens sleuths and the scapegoats (Communists, Jews, Illuminatis). Finally, under a cultural angle, I will outlook conspiracism and the American culture of anti-statism, the presence of mafias or the role of mass-medias.

O tema desta dissertação é o patrimonialismo como um estilo político ainda atuante nos dias de hoje. Sob o ponto de vista da cultura política, o patrimonialismo pode ser entendido como um tipo de comportamento que deriva de crenças e valores tradicionais cultivados na história brasileira. Além da sua sobrevivência por meio da cultura, é argumentado que a ideologia do Estado autoritário também seja um meio sustentador e disseminador do fenômeno. O estilo político patrimonialista é caracterizado pelo poder arbitrário legitimado por uma tradição em tratar a coisa pública como privada. Sustenta e é sustentado pela cooptação política e pelas relações clientelistas e assimétricas entre os atores políticos. Esse comportamento antirrepublicano e antidemocrático é composto por uma lógica corrupta em sua essência podendo ser um estimulador da desmobilização social (que culmina na baixa participação política) e da reduzida qualidade democrática em nosso país. O objetivo é apontar alguns vínculos teóricos entre patrimonialismo, cultura política, ideologia do Estado autoritário, participação política e qualidade democrática. / The theme of this dissertation is the patrimonialism as a current political style. According to the theory of political culture, patrimonialism can be understood as a type of behavior that derives from traditional beliefs and values maintained alive during Brazilian history. Besides its survival through culture, it is argumented that the ideology of the authoritarian State is another way of sustaining and disseminating the behavior. The patrimonialist political style is characterized by the arbitrary power legitimated by a tradition used to treat the public as a private matter. It sustains and is sustained by political co-option and by client-based and asymmetric political relationships. This anti republican and antidemocratic behavior carries within a corrupt logic that can stimulate social demobilization (which results in low political participation) and the reduced democratic quality of Brazil. The objective is to point a few theoretical ties between patrimonialism, political culture, ideology of the authoritarian State, political participation and the quality of democracy.

Diploma thesis "Interest Groups, lobbying and it's regulation in the Czech Republic" deals with the phenomenon of lobbying and it's role in democratic political processes. First part of this thesis is aimed at political theories of interest groups, various definitions of lobbying and methods of regulating lobbyists. The second part containes a comparison of lobbying regulations in various western states. The third part containes an analysis of the present state of lobbying regulation in the Czech Republic. In the final fourth part, certain methods of lobbying regulation are proposed to take place in the Czech Republic and scrutinized for compliance with the oppinion of Czech political elites and professional lobbyists.

Barack Obama's administration inherited one of the most severe economic crises in the history of the United States, which severely undermined the American public's confidence in the country's political and economic future. Declining trust in the federal government and its handling of the economic recession gave rise to two influential movements, the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street, which were thoroughly critical of the country's leadership. Both movements made use of a strong populist rhetoric and mobilized masses by denouncing the political and financial elites, calling for returning control over the country's fate into the hands of ordinary citizens. My master's thesis is an analysis of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street that focuses on the ideology and goals that drove these popular movements, as well as highlights the most crucial commonalities and differences between them. I argue in favor of interpreting the ideologies behind the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street as two distinct types of populism, in addition to which I emphasize the different degree of outside support the two movements enjoyed during their rise to prominence. To determine how influential the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street became during Barack Obama's presidency, I also study their relationship with the political...

This thesis handles with the events concerning the school law amendment from 1883. It is well known that it was considerably controversial as well as regressive school policy in the Austrian Empire. This policy was aggressively fought over. One of the most prominent characters of the fights was František Tilšer - the only czech member of parliament that didn't vote for the reform. He became the target of incendiary press campaign. This thesis will briefly introduce the legislative developments of school law since the beginning of compulsory school attendance up until the aforementioned amendment. The core of this work lies in analysis of the given problematics in Czech and German period press. The text analysis deals with papers that present wide range of opinions: Národní listy, Politik, Bohemia and Čech. The thesis is thus a probe of political culture of the second part of the 19. century in the Habsburg monarchy as well. KEYWORDS 1883 school amendment, Národní listy, Politik, František Tilšer, political culture, history of education

Ce travail reconstitue les mécanismes humoristiques propres à la concurrence politique des époques tardo-républicaine et impériale, dans le but de montrer les adaptations du risum mouere aux changements politiques et sociaux intervenus durant cette période. Il s’agit de dépasser une lecture théorique centrée sur le rire de l’homo urbanus et du bon orateur proposée par Cicéron et Quintilien pour lui préférer une lecture historicisée et combinatoire, considérant les orateurs, les traits d’esprit, les auditoires et les causes politiques comme un tout à l’agencement variable de ce que les Modernes nomment l’« humour politique ». Scrutant les divers contextes politiques de cet humour (les procès, le Sénat, les contiones, le Forum, la campagne militaire ou encore la rue), la recherche souligne également le passage, selon des rythmes syncopés résultant d’un repli de la causticité aristocratique face à César mais qui perdure à l’époque triumvirale, d’un « faire rire » frontal articulé autour du succès oratoire vers un humour fondé sur l’anonymat des correspondances, des graffitis ou des chants du triomphe. La dernière partie du travail, centrée sur le premier siècle du Principat, part de l’opposition établie par des sources pro-sénatoriales entre les « bons princes » et les « tyrans » pour mieux montrer que, ne se limitant pas à refuser ou à accepter le rire politique selon son degré de dangerosité pour leur autorité politique, les princes utilisèrent également le rire à leur profit, entretenant par là une « inaccessible accessibilité » au fondement du charisme impérial, permettant l’aboutissement de la « Révolution romaine ». / This work explores the links between risum mouere and Roman political competition from the two last centuries of the Republic to the beginnings of the Principate. It is necessary to go beyond a critical discussion of the influential theories of the good orator and homo urbanus (mostly conceptualized by Cicero and Quintilian) and instead to adopt a historicizing and complex reading of the phenomenon, conceiving political humor as an ever-changing object shaped by orators, jokes, audiences, and political struggles. In order to understand its role in the roman city, political humor thus needs to be considered as a contextualized whole. The first part of the dissertation considers risum mouere in the context of trials, in the Senate, on the Forum, in the street or at war. Each of these case studies reveals a type of political humor that is freely and openly used in public life. The second part tries to determine what impact Caesar’s rise and the triumvirs had on political competition and, at the same time, on the possibilities of using political humor in the city. This section sheds light on the multiple ways in which the aristocrats and people of Rome continued to mock the powerful (Caesar, Antony and Octavian) by using more discreet channels (correspondence, graffiti, triumphal songs), and how these enabled them to keep expressing strong political opposition, which was otherwise dangerous to address in broad daylight. The third and last part focuses on the first century A.D. and discusses the opposition elaborated by ancient authors between the “good prince”, who was naturally comfortable with political humor, and the repressive “tyrant”. A critical study of the literary documentation shows that every Princeps tended to discourage political humor when it meant an effective danger for the imperial authority, but also that emperors knew how to use laughter and humor to create a form of “inapproachable approachability” which constituted a foundation of imperial charisma and strengthened the new regime, born from the “Roman revolution”.