On any given day almost 400,000 children in the United States are living in an out-of-home care placement due to government intervention. Federal law allows for substantial variance in state child welfare policy on a number of topics. These policy decisions, however, are understudied both in terms of the forces driving them and also the impacts the policies have on actual outcomes for children in care. Utilizing a unique panel data set comprised of thirteen child welfare policies that vary both between states and over time we examine how well redistributive theory (constituent, institutional, paternalistic and resource pressures) explains state policy decisions from 2004-2010. The results provide very little confidence that redistributive pressures are driving state variance, though there are some noteworthy patterns. Within the four categories of explanatory variables, it would seem that child welfare policies are much more sensitive to changes in the social factors associated with a paternalistic response (unmarried birth rate and program utilization) and resource pressures than to constituent or institutional characteristics. Subsequently, a series of hazard models were conducted for each possible discharge outcome, using child level data from the 2010 AFCARS foster care dataset, with primary interest in the influence of policy and state level factors. Policy-level predictors primarily had negative impacts on discharge outcomes for children. Exceptions include better outcomes for children in states with higher generosity of access, increased rates of adoption and aging out with higher ASFA timeline compliance, and more discharges to reunification and adoption with more flexible adoption policy. State level factors consistently showed strong influences on child outcomes. While increased unemployment was associated with worse child outcomes, all other state level factors considered were associated with positive discharge outcomes for children in out-of-home care. This research broadens the theoretical application of redistributive theory to a new policy arena and adds an additional layer of state level explanatory variables to the much-studied outcomes for children in out-of-home care. It establishes that children and families do not exist in a vacuum and that child welfare research must take broader state and policy factors into account for a complete picture.

This study focuses on public opinion of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). The act is a federal reform act, therefore politicians will pay attention to voters’ opinions of the law when considering if they should pass future legislation like it. Data were collected from a sample population of United States citizens by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International. People’s educational views, political views, group interests, and authoritarian views were all used to measure which groups have a positive attitude toward NCLB. Logistic regression was used to test several models to predict which groups have the strongest opinion of the law. The results indicate people’s views toward standardized testing, Republicans, and parents are the groups most likely to have a positive view of the law, followed closely by people with authoritarian attitudes.

In this thesis, I examine how claims regarding the environmental and health impacts of hydraulic fracturing or “fracking” are constructed by industry advocates who promote the practice and environmental and social justice groups who reject it. More specifically, I examine the cultural underpinnings of the debate over fracking, and the prominence of gender as a central framing device in that debate. While the controversy over fracking is often presented as scientific or technical in nature, I maintain that it is as much a culture war as it is a science war. I demonstrate this by showing how both pro-fracking and anti-fracking groups mobilize cultural symbols and identities—motherhood, environmentalism, family farming, family values, individualism, and patriotism among them—in order to persuade the public and advocate for their positions. I contend that engagement with the cultural and ideological dimensions of those debates, including their gendered dimensions, is as important as engagement with its scientific and technical dimensions. Ultimately, I argue that a greater focus on gender contributes to our understanding of environmental risk more broadly, and to the field of environmental sociology as a whole. As such, gender deserves more scholarly attention within the field than it is currently receiving.

This thesis analyzes the 18 etchings made by Pablo Picasso in his folio titled Sueño y mentira de Franco created in 1937. It examines their role in condemning Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War and how Picasso used his art to make a political statement. Additionally, the roles that humor and satire, gender, the comic strip style, and language play in the piece are discussed in regards to the effectiveness of the overall work.

Historically, child abuse and neglect (CAN) prevention efforts have focused on individuals and families, with disregard for the contexts and conditions that may underlie family challenges. There is increased recognition that efforts to support families and children must include focus on the societal level (Browne, 2014), yet few studies have examined how institutional processes influence community-based CAN prevention services. I utilized institutional ethnography to identify institutional factors that impact family well-being and CAN prevention work in Alabama. I relied on three primary forms of data: 1) focus group discussions; 2) interview discussions; and 3) analysis of key documents. Preliminary analysis indicates prevention work is diverse and occurs within a system of limited institutional and public support. I will discuss the specific institutional factors that influence child and abuse prevention work in Alabama and close with a discussion of how institutional ethnography can be used to strengthen family research and policy.

In 2004 the American Political Science Association ("APSA") published research exploring whether the rising income inequality in the United States had an effect on political equality. Although the APSA found tremendous evidence of a correlation between income and political power, the APSA nonetheless concluded that the issue could not be conclusively determined without further analysis. The intent of this thesis is to argue the position that economic inequality is heavily implicated in both political equality and equality of opportunity, and to propose a political theory that directly addresses - rather than evades - this issue. A conclusion drawn in this paper is that it is necessary in liberal capitalist environments to place constraints on individual economic liberty for the sake of maintaining some degree of economic equality. I show in this paper that this conclusion is consistent with both the liberal tradition and American political culture. This paper accepts - rather than circumvents - the fundamental principle that income inequality is inevitable in a capitalist democracy as is the ability of money to purchase positions, power and assorted privileges. Therefore, it should be the goal of social justice theory to ensure the gap between the richest and poorest be allowed to be great enough to respect individual choice and responsibility, but not great enough to dampen the opportunities available to those born into the bottom of the economic scale or to permit those born into the top of the economic ladder to exert oppressive power over the rest. In the final chapter I propose four methods of narrowing economic inequality. These include a minimum standard, minimum wage and income tax reform, a tax and cap on wealth and an absolute inheritance cap. These four methods of limiting economic inequality are directed at narrowing, if not eliminating political inequality and inequality of opportunity.

This is a descriptive study of grassroot organizations in the Black community of Portland, Oregon. The primary objective of this study is to determine whether the Black community of Portland is actively working to improve the socio-economic and political position of the Black residents of Portland, or whether it is disorganized, apathetic, and removed from the main stream of society To achieve the goals of this study, answers will be sought for the following questions: Are there grassroot organizations in the Black community of Portland, Oregon? If yes, how many are there? Who are the members? What is the nature, scope, and range of their activities? What are their accomplishments? Are leadership roles clearly defined and identifiable? What is the perception of successful leadership in the Black community?

Pfungstadt is a small German town which to date has not earned a footnote in the histories of either the Weimar Republic or the Third Reich. Based upon the efforts of men in towns like Pfungstadt (and towns which were not like Pfungstadt) the members of the Nazi party built a political structure which reached to the pinnacle upon which Adolf Hitler stood. Researching the growth of the Nazi party, the intense struggles that occurred with democratic forces, the seizure of power and the installation of a workable system of government is the problem. This thesis in no way purports to be more than a study of the history of the town of Pfungstadt between 1928 and 1935. Such a research problem demands field research. During a period of four months (September, 1971, to January, 1972) I lived in Pfungstadt. The main sources of the date which I gathered during that time were the town's newspaper, the Pfungstädter Anzeige, and the SPD newspaper, which was published in Darmstadt, the Hessischer Volksfreund. Daily accounts of the political and social events in Pfungstadt were carried in the Anzeiger; the Volksfreund contained a predominate amount of SPD party activities. Also consulted were various records from the town hall's archives. Supplementing, putting some flesh on the bones of the written records of Pfungstadt's history, were personal interviews with all of the living political leaders of the age, plus a broad cross-section of the general populace. The backbone of Pfungstadt's society was the middle class. Imbedded within that class were the seeds of Nazism. The working class was divided along political lines between the SPD (Social Democrats) and the KPD (Communists). The working class and the middle class (the bürgerlich), political competitors since the 1890's, grew wider and wider apart in political outlook with the advent of the depression in 1929. Ignoring their old association with liberalism, first a small portion, and then, by 1932, nearly the entire middle class fell into the Nazi's hands. The working class fought a double-barreled battle of its own. The KPD constantly scored the SPD for losing its “class identity” and took a sizable portion of the SPD's traditional electorate. The SPD, not desiring the radical programs of the KPD, formulated a liberal set of objectives, but was not able to stem the tide which was running for a "change." Democracy died in Pfungstadt because of the shortsighted vision of the middle class, a shortsightedness brought on by the seemingly insolvable depression. Faced with a choice, in their minds, between losing their social and political significance and voting for a change (any change) the middle class succumbed to an overwhelming political immaturity and voted for the Nazis. On March 7, 1933, with the middle class support assured, the Nazis seized power with the assistance of SA members from Darmstadt. Once in physical control of the town, a systematic series of measures assisted the Nazis in coordinating the town into their system. Everyone in Pfungstadt then was forced to pay an exorbitant price for the political blindness of the bürgerlich.

Within the past few years, France has exhibited a changing relationship in regards to its memory of its collaborationist and colonial past. The controversies of the loi du 23 février 2005 and the 2007 Guy Môquet Commemoration displayed a new openness to discuss and evaluate traumatic pasts. Public debate during the two controversies focused on the difficult process of how to incorporate these traumatic events into the national narrative. Furthermore, this process of negotiation has opened up a vibrant discussion over what parties in France possess the authority and the right to construct the nation’s history. Medical metaphors of neurosis no longer appear to fit French practices of commemoration and remembrance. The Fifth Republic’s legislative effort to dictate the content and character of France’s past encountered significant resistance from a number of historians and educators. While they stood opposed to the State’s methods, French historians and scholars came to frame their resistance to legislated history as evidence of their loyalty to republican ideals, namely those of scientific inquiry and laïcité. They too desired the creation of a shared national history, yet insisted that this history could only be formed by respecting the presence of multiple narratives. Other scholars voiced their reservations that the restoration of traumatic narratives might further social breakdown. Interestingly, these historians expressed little concern for the role of the general public in the writing of history and, at times, revealed a distinct mistrust of the public’s capacity to think historically.

Despite a century of scholarly critique, William Fielding Ogburn’s cultural lag hypothesis (CLH) endures. The inclusion of Ogburn’s hypothesis in introductory sociology textbooks, reference books, and histories of technology lends an unwarranted authority to its scientific credibility. I critically assess Ogburn’s CLH and find that it is neither scientifically nor theoretically sound. Specifically, I discover presumptions of cultural integration and normative progressivism, the fallacy of ambiguity, problems of causal explanation, operationalization, and selective bias, which renders the CLH unmeasurable, unfalsifiable, and non-replicable. Finally, I briefly discuss the implications and make suggestions for future research.