L’elaborato ha inteso analizzare agli aspetti processuali del riscatto agrario. La tesi affronta in prima istanza la questione attinente all’inquadramento dogmatico del riscatto, quale figura generalmente ricondotta alla categoria dei diritti potestativi, ovvero fra i meri poteri, secondo la tradizionale distinzione cara tanto agli studiosi del processo civile, quanto a quelli del diritto civile sostanziale. Identificato il riscatto quale potere, la riflessione si è concentrata sulla natura sostanziale o processuale del proprio esercizio (in parallelo con lo studio della doppia qualificazione dei diritti potestativi ad esercizio giudiziale o stragiudiziale) ed ha portato ad avvallare la prima ipotesi, sulla base di una precisa scelta discrezionale del legislatore che ha inteso tutelare in maniera peculiare il soggetto coltivatore, senza imporgli la necessità di istaurare un giudizio costitutivo al fine di ottenere la realizzazione dell’effetto traslativo del diritto di proprietà, bensì ritenendo allo scopo sufficiente la mera dichiarazione unilaterale e recettizia. La conclusione della trattazione è dedicata agli aspetti operativi del riscatto agrario, con particolare attenzione alla prassi e ai problemi applicativi che la disciplina speciale della materia pone all’interprete, specialmente riguardo alle modalità per il pagamento del prezzo c.d. di riscatto. / The paper intended to analyze the procedural aspects of agrarian rent. The thesis addresses in the first instance the question relating to the dogmatic framework of redemption, as a figure generally traced back to the category of potestative rights, or among mere powers, according to the traditional distinction dear to both civil law and civil law scholars substantial. Having identified redemption as a power, the reflection focused on the substantive or procedural nature of its exercise (in parallel with the study of the dual qualification of potestative rights for judicial or extrajudicial exercise) and led to endorse the first hypothesis, on the basis of a precise discretionary choice of the legislator who intended to protect the farmer in a particular way, without imposing on him the need to establish a constitutive judgment in order to obtain the translation effect of the property right, but considering the mere unilateral declaration. The conclusion of the discussion is dedicated to the operational aspects of agrarian rent, with particular attention to the special discipline of the subject poses to the interpreter, especially with regard to the methods for paying the so-called price of ransom.

L’évolution contemporaine du droit privé des contrats est marquée par la multiplication des hypothèses dans lesquelles l’une ou l’autre des parties dispose de la possibilité d’agir seule sur le contenu ou le sort d’un contrat définitivement formé. Par exemple, depuis 1995, il est admis que l’une des parties à un contrat-cadre puisse seule fixer le prix. De même, en cas de manquement grave de l’une des parties, l’autre peut, à ses risques et périls, procéder à la résolution du contrat. Ces deux types de prérogatives contractuelles appartiennent à une catégorie plus large que la doctrine désigne couramment sous le nom de « pouvoirs contractuels ». Or, les pouvoirs contractuels viennent perturber les règles traditionnelles du droit privé des contrats à deux égards. D’une part, les pouvoirs contractuels introduisent une logique unilatéraliste, synonyme d’inégalité, dans le contrat qui répond traditionnellement à une logique consensualiste synonyme d’égalité. D’autre part, le mécanisme des pouvoirs contractuels implique une redéfinition de la place du juge dans le contentieux contractuel puisque ce dernier ne devra plus nécessairement être saisi pour trancher les litiges entre les parties relatifs à l’exécution du contrat. Celui-ci sera saisi postérieurement à la modification des effets du contrat décidée unilatéralement, et ce, par la partie qui entend en contester la régularité. Consacrer une étude aux pouvoirs contractuels suppose donc de chercher à identifier plus précisément ce mécanisme qui vient introduire dans le contrat une logique de pouvoir qui n’est pas la sienne, puis, de tenter de définir les contours de l’intervention du juge. / The contemporary evolution of the private law of contracts is marked by the multiplication of the hypotheses in which one or other of the parties has the possibility of acting alone on the content or fate of a definitively formed contract. For example, since 1995, it has been accepted that one of the parties to a framework contract can only fix the price. Similarly, in the event of a serious breach by one of the parties, the other party may, at his own risk, proceed to the termination of the contract. These two types of contractual prerogatives belong to a broader category that the doctrine commonly refers to as "contractual powers". However, contractual powers disrupt the traditional rules of private contract law in two respects. On one hand, contractual powers introduce a unilateralist logic, synonymous with inequality, in the contract that traditionally responds to a consensualist logic synonymous with equality. On the other hand, the mechanism of contractual powers implies a redefinition of the judge's place in contractual disputes since the latter will no longer necessarily be seized to settle disputes between the parties relating to the performance of the contract. It will be seized after the modification of the effects of the contract decided unilaterally, and this, by the party who intends to contest the regularity. To devote a study to the contractual powers therefore presupposes seeking to identify more precisely this mechanism that introduces into the contract a logic of power that is not its own, and then attempts to define the contours of the judge's intervention.

L’objet de cette thèse est d’analyser ce que l’on entend par « contrat » et de préciser ce que recouvre cette notion, qui est noyée sous une montagne de doctrine. Après une exploration minutieuse de la notion, qui devra permettre de tracer ses frontières avec les institutions voisines et d’appréhender la diversité des figures contractuelles et leur typologie, il s’agira d’opérer une synthèse de ces observations. La diversification des contrats ne se traduisant pas fatalement par un émiettement de la notion, la synthèse proposée sera unitaire. Prenant appui sur les diverses acceptions de la notion de contrat retenues au fil du temps (conception volontariste, conception normativiste…), la présente thèse brossera un portrait de la notion de contrat en en proposant une analyse renouvelée, tant dans sa dimension volontariste que dans sa dimension normative. La notion de contrat apparaîtra alors, débarrassée de tout dogme idéologique, comme une combinaison complexe d’éléments subjectifs et d’éléments objectifs. / The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and clarify what is understood by the notion of “contract”, buried as it is under mountains of doctrinal writings. After a detailed exploration of the general concept, which should enable demarcation of its boundaries with related institutions and give an appreciation of the diversity of contracts and their typology, the aim is to achieve a synthesis of these observations. As the diversity of contracts should not necessarily result in fragmentation of the basic notion, the proposed synthesis will be unitary. Building on the diverse interpretations over the years of the concept of contract (autonomy of the will theory, normative theory...) this thesis, after outlining the concept of contract in both its “voluntarist” and normative aspects, will propose a renewed analysis thereof. The notion of contract will then appear as a complex combination of objective and subjective elements, free of ideological dogma.