Pricing in the market is the most sensitive part of trade. It is through pricing where the buyers are able to acquire goods and it is through it also that the sellers get their profit. Pricing of commodities can be said to be the lifeline of trade and also the lifeline of competition. Competition law, in addition to other factors such as quality of goods and their availability, also deal with the issue of pricing of goods. It is touted that competition law has a strong inclination to supervise pricing of commodities and how the conduct of market players influence pricing of goods. Competition law does this by making the market as competitive as possible in order to prevent any firm from dictating prices. It short, it strives to make the firms in the market to be price takers and not price setters as a way of reigning in on high prices in the market. However, in certain circumstances the competition laws become unable to supervise the market. In times such as those, the governments have been forced to intervene through other laws and policies in order to protect the market from possible abuse. This study looked at government intervention in the market through price control legislation. Price control legislation is a legislation that gives the government powers to artificially set prices of commodities. This is done in those dire circumstances where the market out of unforeseeable circumstances, is unable to be competitive. Examples of such instances include national crises, innovations and legal huddles. Price control legislations unlike the traditional competition laws are not created to promote competition per se. They are created on the back of competitive conduct to provide a safety net to consumers from exploitative activities of producers in instances where the influence of competition laws is ineffective. Price control legislations are there to make sure that when all competition laws and interventions are unable to protect consumers from the condition of the market and the exploitative actions of the producers, then there are certain laws created as a safety net to the consumers. Price control is used to mitigate the circumstances that make it impossible for the market through competition to control pricing of commodities. Currently, price control is becoming a prevalent way oftarning prices in many jurisdictions. A policy used in the medieval times in simple markets, with little or no inclination towards the market, has now become more imposing even in the most sophisticated markets. Price controls in areas like Canada and the European Union are being used together with competition laws to cater for areas where the governments feel that the market is not competitive enough and competition laws are not effective. In other areas such as Zimbabwe, it is being abused for political purposes to influence prices against a competitive market and the competition laws. What is clear and true is that price control having both an immediate impact and being effective, is one mechanism that has far reaching and substantial effects on the competitiveness in the market. With its target being the most sensitive area of trade, this makes it a very important policy issue that competition lawyers should not ignore. Price control ability of superseding the market mechanism of supply and demand, to impose prices and the way it is implemented gives it the power to reduce and even kill competition in a particular market. That is why it is imperative to understand this safety net as competition lawyers in order to know whether it is needed and if so how we can limit its negative effects in the market.

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Thesis (M.B.A.)--Boston University

Esta dissertação consiste em um estudo de caso sobre a regulação jurídica e econômica do mercado de medicamentos realizada pela Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos (CMED). Esse órgão regulador foi criado pela Lei 10.742/03, com a finalidade de promover a assistência farmacêutica à população, por meio de mecanismos que estimulem a oferta de medicamentos e a competitividade no setor. A natureza da regulação empreendida pela CMED é eminentemente social e se justifica como forma de impulsionar o acesso a medicamentos no Brasil, no que diz respeito à aquisição de produtos pelos particulares no varejo e às compras públicas. Por meio do emprego de técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas de pesquisa, este trabalho avaliou a efetividade da atividade regulatória da CMED, considerando como efetividade a capacidade dessa política em promover o acesso a medicamentos, tal como preceitua a Lei 10.742/03. Para tanto, foram realizadas entrevistas com especialistas no assunto e membros do órgão regulador, bem como a análise de dados sobre a evolução dos preços dos medicamentos, desde a criação da CMED, em 2003. Em plano adicional, foram estudadas as dificuldades e gargalos de implementação da política de regulação do mercado farmacêutico pela CMED. Uma série de problemas foram constatados, principalmente, no tocante à aplicação do coeficiente de adequação de preços às compras públicas e a mecanismos de transparência, participação e accountability relativos à atividade regulatória. Por fim, uma vez identificados os problemas, foram aventadas possíveis soluções que passam pela necessidade de modificação da Lei 10.742/03, que traça as diretrizes regulatórias. / This is a case study about the pharmaceutical market regulation accomplished by the Pharmaceutical Market Regulation Chamber (CMED). This institution was created by the Law n. 10.742/03, with the objective to promote pharmaceutical assistance to Brazilian population through instruments able to stimulate supply of drugs and sector competition. The nature of the regulation practiced by CMED is mainly social and it is justified to promote access to drugs in Brazil, regarding product acquisition in retail and public acquisition. Through qualitative and quantitative research techniques the purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of this regulatory policy of CMED, considering effectiveness as the ability to promote access to drugs, as determined by the Law 10.742/03. In order to accomplish this objective specialists and members of the regulation chamber were interviewed. Moreover, data regarding the evolution of drug prices since CMED was created were analyzed. In addition, difficulties and problems related to implementation of the regulatory policy were identified, specially in regards to the implementation of the coeficiente de adequação de preços to public acquisition of drugs. Problems connected to instruments responsible for transparency, participation and accountability were also diagnosed. Finally, once detected the problems, solutions were considered and they imply change in the Law 10.742/03, which guides the regulatory process.

Esta dissertação consiste em um estudo de caso sobre a regulação jurídica e econômica do mercado de medicamentos realizada pela Câmara de Regulação do Mercado de Medicamentos (CMED). Esse órgão regulador foi criado pela Lei 10.742/03, com a finalidade de promover a assistência farmacêutica à população, por meio de mecanismos que estimulem a oferta de medicamentos e a competitividade no setor. A natureza da regulação empreendida pela CMED é eminentemente social e se justifica como forma de impulsionar o acesso a medicamentos no Brasil, no que diz respeito à aquisição de produtos pelos particulares no varejo e às compras públicas. Por meio do emprego de técnicas qualitativas e quantitativas de pesquisa, este trabalho avaliou a efetividade da atividade regulatória da CMED, considerando como efetividade a capacidade dessa política em promover o acesso a medicamentos, tal como preceitua a Lei 10.742/03. Para tanto, foram realizadas entrevistas com especialistas no assunto e membros do órgão regulador, bem como a análise de dados sobre a evolução dos preços dos medicamentos, desde a criação da CMED, em 2003. Em plano adicional, foram estudadas as dificuldades e gargalos de implementação da política de regulação do mercado farmacêutico pela CMED. Uma série de problemas foram constatados, principalmente, no tocante à aplicação do coeficiente de adequação de preços às compras públicas e a mecanismos de transparência, participação e accountability relativos à atividade regulatória. Por fim, uma vez identificados os problemas, foram aventadas possíveis soluções que passam pela necessidade de modificação da Lei 10.742/03, que traça as diretrizes regulatórias. / This is a case study about the pharmaceutical market regulation accomplished by the Pharmaceutical Market Regulation Chamber (CMED). This institution was created by the Law n. 10.742/03, with the objective to promote pharmaceutical assistance to Brazilian population through instruments able to stimulate supply of drugs and sector competition. The nature of the regulation practiced by CMED is mainly social and it is justified to promote access to drugs in Brazil, regarding product acquisition in retail and public acquisition. Through qualitative and quantitative research techniques the purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of this regulatory policy of CMED, considering effectiveness as the ability to promote access to drugs, as determined by the Law 10.742/03. In order to accomplish this objective specialists and members of the regulation chamber were interviewed. Moreover, data regarding the evolution of drug prices since CMED was created were analyzed. In addition, difficulties and problems related to implementation of the regulatory policy were identified, specially in regards to the implementation of the coeficiente de adequação de preços to public acquisition of drugs. Problems connected to instruments responsible for transparency, participation and accountability were also diagnosed. Finally, once detected the problems, solutions were considered and they imply change in the Law 10.742/03, which guides the regulatory process.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIR - Rodrigo Alberto Correia da Silva.pdf: 4444932 bytes, checksum: 6f16b8615d1a99cef06dba990b82fded (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-11-30 / The access to health products and services is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution of 1988, that allows its supplying for both State and private initiative. Contrary to the constitutional determination we face a social crises once it is note everyone that have access to medicines and health plans that make accessible health treatments. The supply of those utilities by the State is much inferior of the need of the many miserable people that lives in Brazil. The work analyses the medicines and health plans price control that takes place in Brazil by the Medicines Chamber and by the National Supplementary Health Agency respecting the Brazilian economic order system created by the Federal Constitution of 1988 with the targets of population access increasing also mandatory according to the Federal Constitution of 1988. The Constitutionality analyses of those price controls is done through the study of the national legal system the economic analyzes of those markets and the relation between those two aspects of the study object. The work development includes the debate about public services and the State powers over the private renders of those services by permission or concession and the difference between them and the private agents that renders services non privative to the State. At the end the micro-economic aspects of the medicines and health plans are analyzed to understand the impacts and limits of the State Regulation on those and the of the price control mechanisms used today. The conclusion of the work is for the unconstitutionality of the prices control by offending the free competition and free initiative principles, among others, and by being useless to fulfill the constitutional task for the State Regulation that is the increasing of the population acess to those prod ucts and services / O acesso aos produtos e serviços de saúde é garantido pela Constituição Federal de 1988, que dispõe que estes serão fornecidos tanto pelo Estado quanto pela iniciativa privada. Todavia, a despeito da determinação constitucional, temos uma crise social, pois nem todas as pessoas têm acesso aos medicamentos e planos de saúde que viabilizem tratamentos de saúde, cujo fornecimento pelo Estado é muito menos abrangente do que o necessário às hordas de miseráveis que vivem no Brasil. O trabalho analisa o controle de preços de medicamentos e de planos de saúde realizados no Brasil, respectivamente pela Câmara de Medicamentos e pela Agência Nacional de Saúde Suplementar, em face da sistemática da ordem econômica brasileira, colocada pela Constituição Federal de 1988, bem como, pelos objetivos de ampliação de acesso a produtos e serviços de saúde também impostos pela Constituição Federal de 1988. A análise de constitucionalidade dos mencionados controles de preços é realizada por meio do estudo do sistema jurídico nacional, da avaliação econômica dos mercados em questão e da inter-relação entre esses dois aspectos do objeto estudado. Ao longo do trabalho se discorre sobre os serviços públicos e os poderes do Estado em relação aos prestadores privados destes serviços sejam concessionários ou permissionários dos serviços públicos e os diferencia dos agentes privados que prestam serviços não privativos do estado. Por fim são analisados aspectos microeconômicos dos mercados de medicamentos e planos de saúde para entender o impacto e os limites da regulação estatal destes e dos mecanismos de controle de preços ali empregados. A conclusão considera o controle de preços inconstitucional, por ferir os princípios da livre concorrência e da livre-iniciativa, entre outros, e por sua ineficácia comprovada para atingir a finalidade constitucional da regulamentação estatal que é a ampliação de acesso da população a esses produtos e serviços

Vietnam und Thailand sind zwei der führenden Exporteure für Reis. Zurzeit hat die staatliche Preispolitik den stärksten und meisten Einfluss auf die vietnamesische Branche für Reis. Es beschränkt die Exportmenge, um die Menge für den nationalen Nahrungsmittelbedarf sicherzustellen. Diese Regulierung hält die vietnamesische Produktion unter ihrem vollständigen potenzial, im Vergleich zu der Reisproduktion in Thailand, zurück. Viele Experten unterstellen, dass Vietnam mehr Aufmerksamkeit der nationalen Strategie zur Ernährungssicherung schenkt als es notwendig wäre. Das verursacht Marktverzerrung und schwächt den landeseigenen Reisexport im Vergleich zu Thailand. Um die Auswirkungen der staatlichen Preispolitik mit einer quantitativen Methode zu untersuchen, wird über ein Gleichgewichtsmodell drei verschiedenen Szenarien eruiert: (1)Die Regulierungsrichtlinie für Reispreise wird wöchentlich aktualisiert; (2)Die Regulierungsrichtlinie für Reispreise wird monatlich angepasst; (3)Die Regulierungsrichtlinie für Reispreise wird quartalsweise überabeitet. Basierend aus den Produktionsdaten, dem Konsum, inländischen Preis, Transportkosten, der Elastizität der Nachfrage und der Angebotsfunktion der vietnamesischen und thailändischen Reisbranche zeigt dieses Modell Resultat: Mit kleinen Anpassungen in der Preispolitik wächst der Wettbewerb in Bezug auf der vietnamesischen Exportmenge auf dem internationalen Markt ohne negative Auswirkungen auf die Ziele der nationalen Ernährungssicherung. Nicht-Reisbauern werden in eine nachteilige Position gestellt aufgrund von höheren Preisen auf dem inländischen Markt. Jedoch Bevölkerung, welche Reisbauern sind, werden von den höheren Handelsmengen, den steigenden Umsätzen und ebenfalls von dem steigenden Nettoeinkommen der Reisexporteure profitieren. Deshalb empfehlen wir nicht die staatliche Preispolitik regelmäßig zu überarbeiten, um das Ziel einer besseren Wetbewerbsfähigkeit von Vietnam zu erreichen / Vietnam and Thailand are the top two rice exporters who contribute more than 50 per cent of market shares in the international market. Therefore, any changes in their rice policies have a strong influence on the world market. Currently, one of the strongest and most often impacts on the Vietnamese rice industry is the Price Controls Policy that regulates the competition in rice market. It restricts the export amount in order to ensure national food security. This policy keeps Vietnamese rice production under its full potential compared with the rice industry in Thailand. Many experts suggest that Vietnam pays more attention on national food security than necessary. This causes market distortion and weakens the country’s competitiveness with Thailand. In order to examine the effects of the Price Controls Policy with a quantitative method, we build and run a spatial equilibrium model with 3 different scenarios: (1) Price Controls Policy updated every week; (2) Price Controls Policy updated every month; (3) Price Controls Policy updated quarterly. Base on the available data of production, consumption, domestic price, transportation cost and elasticities of demand and supply function of Vietnamese and Thai rice industry, the model shows the following result. With less changes in the Price Control policy, the competitiveness in terms of export quantity of the Vietnamese rice on international markets rises without having negative effects on the national food security goal. Non-rice farmers will be in disadvantage position due to higher domestic prices for rice, but the majority of the population who are rice farmers, accounting for more than 70 per cent of the population, will benefit from the higher volume and turnover of rice export, and so the net social revenue will increase also. Therefore, we highly recommend that the Price Controls Policy should not be revised on regular to serve the purpose of achieving better competitiveness of Vietnamese rice