Examination of empirical research confirmed that climate change is a complex problem of anthropological origin and revealed the need for a management framework to facilitate strategic decisions aimed at mitigating a rise in global temperatures of 2-°C linked to irresponsible and unsustainable business practices. The purpose of this simulation study was to develop a management framework of resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptive-capacity (RRSA) for organizations viewed as complex systems to address the current unsustainable state. As such, the evolutionary-RRSA prisoner's dilemma (PD) simulation was developed using an evolutionary game theory approach to agent based modeling and simulation, to generate data. Regression analyses tested the relationships between organizational resilience (x1), robustness (x2), and sustainability (x3) as independent variables, and the dependent variable of adaptive capacity (y) for cooperative and defective strategies. The findings were that complex nonlinear relationships exist between resilience, robustness, sustainability, and adaptive-capacity, which is sensitive to initial conditions and may emerge and evolve from combinations of cooperative and defective decisions within the evolutionary RRSA PD management tool. This study resulted in the RRSA management framework, a cyclical 4-phased approach, which may be used by climate governance leaders, negotiators, and policy-makers to facilitate strategy to move global climate change policy forward by guiding bottom-up consumption and production of GHGs, thereby improving adaptive-capacity, while mitigating an increase in global temperatures of 2-°C, which in turn would improve global socio-economic conditions.

Au niveau interpersonnel, la psychopathie implique un manque de considération d’autrui pouvant se manifester par la tromperie, la manipulation et l’exploitation. La présente thèse a investigué la relation entre les caractéristiques psychopathiques d'individus non incarcérés et la tendance à coopérer dans un jeu du dilemme du prisonnier itératif. Un total de 85 hommes ont été recrutés via une annonce qui ciblait des traits de personnalité correspondant à des caractéristiques psychopathiques exprimées de façon non péjorative. Plusieurs méthodes ont été employées pour rejoindre les participants : 46 ont participés en personne après avoir répondu à une invitation affichée dans un journal local ainsi que sur des babillards à proximité d'une université; 39 ont complété l'étude sur Internet après avoir été recrutés via un site web de petites annonces. Chaque participant a répondu à un questionnaire incluant l’Échelle Auto-rapportée de Psychopathie (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) et l’Échelle Auto-rapportée des Indicateurs de Psychopathie de l’Enfance et de l’Adolescence (Seto, Khattar, Lalumière, & Quinsey, 1997). Ils ont également complété une simulation informatique du dilemme du prisonnier itératif comprenant 90 essais. La simulation informatique utilisée pour évaluer les participants en personne ainsi que la version accessible par Internet ont été conçues et programmées spécifiquement pour la présente thèse. La simulation informatique incluait trois stratégies souvent associées au dilemme du prisonnier itératif : donnant-donnant, donnant-donnant-généreux et gagne/reste-perd/change. Les analyses préliminaires ont montré que les participants vus en personne et ceux rejoints par Internet ne différaient pas en termes de variables sociodémographiques, des caractéristiques psychopathiques, de la désirabilité sociale et des réponses au dilemme du prisonnier. Une régression multiple standard a indiqué que les mesures psychopathiques ne pouvaient pas prédire le nombre total de choix coopératifs dans le jeu. Par contre, une corrélation négative a été trouvée entre les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives de la psychopathie et la coopération dans le premier tiers du jeu. De plus, les participants qui présentaient davantage de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives avaient plus souvent réussi à exploiter l'ordinateur en dénonçant alors que la simulation informatique coopérait. Des analyses multi-niveaux ont exploré la contribution de variables au niveau de la décision et au niveau de l'individu dans la prédiction du choix de coopérer ou de dénoncer lors de chaque essai du jeu; les interactions entre ces variables ont aussi été considérées. Les résultats ont montré que les variables au niveau de la décision influençaient généralement plus fortement les chances de coopérer que les variables au niveau de l'individu. Parmi les mesures de la psychopathie, seulement les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives ont montré une association significative avec les chances de coopérer; les interactions avec le premier choix effectué dans le jeu et le premier tiers du jeu étaient significatives. Ainsi, si un participant avait coopéré au premier essai, la présence de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives était associée à une diminution de ses chances de coopérer par la suite. Aussi, durant les 30 premiers essais du jeu, la présence de caractéristiques psychopathiques interpersonnelles et affectives était associée à une diminution des chances de coopérer. La stratégie adoptée par la simulation informatique n'avait pas d'influence sur le lien entre les caractéristiques psychopathiques et la probabilité de coopérer. Toutefois, le fait de jouer contre donnant-donnant était associé à de plus fortes chances de coopérer d'un essai à l'autre pour l'ensemble des participants. Globalement, les résultats suggèrent que les hommes non incarcérés présentant des caractéristiques psychopathiques ne seraient pas nécessairement portés à choisir systématiquement la non-coopération. En fait, les caractéristiques interpersonnelles et affectives de la psychopathie ont semblé se traduire par une tendance à faire bonne impression au départ, tenter rapidement d'exploiter autrui en dénonçant, puis finir par coopérer. Cette tendance comportementale est discutée, ainsi que la pertinence d'utiliser le dilemme du prisonnier itératif et les analyses multi-niveaux pour étudier le comportement interpersonnel des psychopathes. / Interpersonally, psychopathy involves a lack of consideration for others that can translate into deception, manipulation, and exploitation. The current thesis investigated the relationship between the psychopathic characteristics of non incarcerated men and the tendency to cooperate while playing an iterative version of the prisoner's dilemma game. A total of 85 men were recruited through advertisements that targeted personality traits corresponding to psychopathic characteristics formulated in a way that was not pejorative. A variety of methods was used to reach participants; 46 were tested in person after they replied to an invitation that appeared in a local journal as well as on bulletin boards close to a university; 39 participated via the Internet after they were recruited through a classified advertising website. Each participant completed a questionnaire including the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995) and the Childhood and Adolescent Taxon Scale - Self-Report (Seto, Khattar, Lalumière, & Quinsey, 1997). They also played in a computer simulation of the iterative prisoner's dilemma lasting 90 trials. Both the computer simulation used to test participants in person and the Internet version were designed and programmed specifically for the present thesis. The computer simulation included three strategies often associated with the iterative prisoner's dilemma: tit-for-tat, generous-tit-for-tat, and win/stay-lose/shift. Preliminary analyses showed that participants tested in person and via the Internet did not differ in terms of sociodemographic variables, psychopathic characteristics, social desirability, or responses to the prisoner's dilemma. A standard multiple regression indicated that psychopathic measures could not predict the total number of cooperative choices in the prisoner's dilemma game. However, there was a negative correlation between interpersonal and affective characteristics of psychopathy and cooperation in the first third of the prisoner's dilemma game. Furthermore, participants showing more interpersonal and affective psychopathic characteristics tended to exploit the computer more often by defecting while the computer simulation cooperated. Multilevel analyses were used to explore the contribution of decision-level and individual-level variables to predict the choice to cooperate or to defect on each trial of the game; interactions between these variables were also considered. The results showed that variables at the decision level were generally associated with stronger odds of cooperating than individual-level variables. Among psychopathic measures, only the interpersonal and affective characteristics showed a significant association with the odds of cooperating; interactions with the first choice in the game and the first third of the game were significant. That is, if participants cooperated in the first trial, higher interpersonal and affective psychopathic characteristics were associated with decreased odds of cooperating. Also, during the first 30 trials of the game, participants with higher interpersonal and affective psychopathic characteristics were significantly more likely to defect. The type of strategy used by the computer simulation did not have an influence on the relationship between psychopathic characteristics and a participant's probability to cooperate. However, playing against tit-for-tat was associated with increased odds of cooperating from one trial to the next for all participants. Overall, the results suggest that non incarcerated men with psychopathic characteristics might not systematically choose to defect. Instead, the interpersonal and affective psychopathic characteristics appeared as a tendency to cooperate initially, then rapidly attempt to exploit by defecting, and finally cooperate. This behavioral pattern is discussed as well as the relevance of using the iterative prisoner's dilemma game and multilevel analyses to study interpersonal behavior in psychopaths.

Complexity underlying life is largely governed by the dynamics of interaction within and between living and nonliving entities. Evolutionary strategy games are extensively used in modelling and understanding complex behaviors in a wide range of fields including theoretical biology, social interactions, economics, politics, defense and security. Strategy games are said to distill the key elements of interactions be- tween real-world entities and organizations - one of the challenges lies in determining the mapping of complex real life situation dynamics to that of a certain game. That leads us to the two major research questions outlined below. In this thesis, we are taking evolutionary games a step further to investigate the interplay between local and global dynamics, where local dynamics are repre- sented by locally pairwise interactions among the population's players governed by the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. To represent the global dynamics, two main modelling ideas are proposed, in the first model; a mixed evolutionary game is in- troduced where players are competing globally on the population level in a minority game. The interplay between local and global dynamics in this model represents the interplay between different scopes of competition between the same players. Sec- ondly, we introduce a model for studying the effect of sharing global information concerning a population of players, shedding light on how global information can alter the emerging dynamics of local interactions. Furthermore, the thesis addresses the question of whether games - with different dynamics - have unique signatures (footprints) that can be used in recognizing and differentiating among them, and whether these footprints are consistent along the evolutionary path of these games. We show here that by building winning networks between players, and determining network motifs of these winning networks, we can obtain motifs' counts signals that are sufficient to categorize and recognize the game's utility matrix used by the players. We also demonstrate that these footprints - motifs' counts - are consistent along the evolutionary path of the games, due to a hyper-cyclic behavior that exists between strategies. Finally, we show that this approach is capable of identifying whether a certain population is driven by local dynamics or both local and global dynamics using the proposed mixed game.

Cross selling is the practice of selling additional products to an existing customer. It has the potential to boost revenues and can be beneficial for both the company and the customer. For many multi-divisional companies with product or service oriented organizational structures the attempt to realize the benefits of cross selling generates incentive problems. In this thesis, three problems spread over three business levels are identified. Firstly, management needs to (financially) motivate business units in fostering their cross selling efforts. Secondly, in order to make cross selling happen, business units need to cooperate and to exchange product-related information. Finally, in order to increase their short-term benefits business units might act opportunistically by selling products or services of other business units without paying attention to adding value for their customers. These incentive problems are theoretically examined by applying principal-agent theory and the theory of repeated games. Our findings suggest that an optimized incentive structure is required to make both the business units and the management better off. The thesis also analyses the circumstances and necessary prerequisites under which cross selling initiatives are beneficial for all involved parties. Apart from that cross selling sometimes may turn out to be non-beneficial. In addition to the elaborations above, risks and hazards of cross selling are presented in detail and applied for the extension of the underlying model. Bottom line, the work underlines that cross selling is to be realized holistically to ensure durable success. (author's abstract)

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions les effets d'un environnement stochastique et de l'utilisation d'une stratégie d'opting-out sur l'évolution de la coopération dans les jeux évolutionnaires. La thèse contient 8 articles, dont 6 sont déjà publiés dans des revues avec comité de lecture. Outre l'introduction, la thèse est divisée en deux parties, la partie 1 composée de 5 articles et la partie 2 de 3 articles. La partie 1 étudie l'impact de gains randomisés dans les jeux évolutionnaires. L'article 1 introduit les concepts de stabilité pour les jeux avec matrice de paiement aléatoire 2x2 dans des populations infinies avec des générations discrètes sans chevauchement dans un environnement stochastique. On y donne les conditions pour qu'un équilibre, sur la frontière ou à l'intérieur du simplexe des fréquences des stratégies, soit stochastiquement localement stable ou instable. L'article 2 étend les résultats de l'article 1 au cas où la valeur sélective est une fonction exponentielle du gain attendu suite à des interactions aléatoires par paires et montre que, de manière inattendue, le bruit aléatoire environnemental peut rompre un cycle périodique et favoriser la stabilité d'un équilibre intérieur. L'article 3 discute des effets de la sélection faible. Alors que les conditions de stabilité dans un environnement aléatoire reviennent aux conditions du cas déterministe lorsque l'intensité de la sélection diminue, les fluctuations aléatoires des gains peuvent accélérer la vitesse de convergence vers un équilibre stable sous une sélection plus faible. L'article 4 applique la théorie de la stabilité évolutive stochastique à un jeu randomisé de dilemme du prisonnier. On y montre que l'augmentation de la variance des gains de défection est propice à l'évolution de la coopération. L'article 5 étudie les jeux matriciels randomisés dans des populations finies et donne les conditions pour que la sélection favorise l'évolution de la coopération dans le contexte du jeu randomisé de dilemme du prisonnier. La partie 2 considère un jeu répété de dilemme du prisonnier dans le cas où un comportement d'opting-out est adopté par chaque joueur dans les interactions par paires. L'article 6 étudie la dynamique évolutive de la coopération et de la défection dans ce contexte et montre une possible coexistence à long terme, en supposant une population infinie et un équilibre rapide (en fait, instantané) dans les fréquences des paires. L'article 7 rapporte des résultats expérimentaux avec 264 étudiants universitaires utilisant la stratégie d'opting-out qui soutiennent la prédiction théorique d'une coexistence à long terme de coopération et de défection. L'article 8 étend l'analyse du modèle avec la stratégie d'opting-out au cas d'une population finie et fournit une preuve rigoureuse des deux échelles de temps pour les fréquences de coopération et de défection d'une part et les fréquences de paires de stratégies d'autre part. / In this thesis, we study the effects of a stochastic environment and the use of an opting-out strategy on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games. The thesis contains 8 articles, among which 6 are already published in peer-reviewed journals. Apart from the introduction, the thesis is divided into two parts, Part 1 made with 5 articles and Part 2 with 3 articles. Part 1 studies randomized payoffs in evolutionary games. Article 1 introduces stability concepts for 2x2 matrix games in infinite populations undergoing discrete, non-overlapping generations in a stochastic environment and gives conditions for an equilibrium, either on the boundary or in the interior of the simplex of all strategy frequencies, to be stochastically locally stable or unstable. Article 2 extends the results of Article 1 to the case where fitness is an exponential function of expected payoff in random pairwise interactions and shows that, unexpectedly, environmental random noise can break a periodic cycle and promote stability of an interior equilibrium. Article 3 discusses the effects of weak selection. While stability conditions in a random environment return to conditions in the deterministic case as selection intensity diminishes, random fluctuations in payoffs can accelerate the speed of convergence toward a stable equilibrium under weaker selection. Article 4 applies stochastic evolutionary stability theory to a randomized Prisoner's dilemma game and shows that increasing the variance in payoffs for defection is conducive to the evolution of cooperation. Article 5 studies randomized matrix games in finite populations and gives conditions for selection to favor the evolution of cooperation in the context of a randomized Prisoner's dilemma. Part 2 considers a repeated Prisoner's dilemma game with an opting-out behavior adopted by every player in pairwise interactions. Article 6 studies the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and defection in this context and shows possible long-term coexistence, assuming an infinite population and fast (actually, instantaneous) equilibrium in the pair frequencies. Article 7 reports experimental results with 264 university students using the opting-out strategy that support the theoretical prediction of a long-term coexistence of cooperation and defection. Article 8 extends the analysis of the model with the opting-out strategy to the case of a finite population and provides a rigorous proof of the two-time scales for the frequencies of cooperation and defection on one hand and the frequencies of strategy pairs on the other.

O presente trabalho se propõe a compreender a variabilidade cultural humana em relação à organização da família por meio das teorias darwinianas da seleção natural e da seleção sexual, e se encontra baseado em evidências vindas da comparação de dados etnográficos. Pretende-se demonstrar que existe uma alteração marcante no comportamento de todos os envolvidos nas relações familiares quando mudam as regras de herança. Essas alterações assim ocorrem porque as regras de herança direcionam o Investimento Parental Masculino (MPI), ora ao sobrinho, ora ao filho. A hipótese apresentada é a de que a variação do MPI modifica de maneira compreensível e previsível as relações familiares em organizações matrilineares e patrilineares. A prova da hipótese será feita por meio da aplicação do método intercultural com pesquisa etnográfica nos bancos de dados do HRAF, e utilizando-se da amostra PSF. Os resultados do presente trabalho indicarão que em sociedades em que o tio tem uma relação afetuosa com seu sobrinho, o marido espanca a mulher; e quando o pai se relaciona de maneira indulgente e amigável com seu filho, irmãos e irmãs se evitam, alinhando esses fatos de maneira que possam ser coerentemente entendidos com a teoria sociobiológica. A riqueza cultural, o sem número de costumes, as tradições, os tabus, as normas explícitas ou ocultas, os aparatos de coerção de toda sorte, as regras sobre herança, casamento, dote, preço da noiva, divisão de trabalho, enfim, todas as regras observadas em todos os agrupamentos humanos podem ser explicadas à luz das seguintes teorias: a) da “seleção de consangüíneos" (Hamilton, 1963), b) do “altruísmo recíproco" (Trivers, 1971), c) do “investimento parental e seleção sexual" (Trivers, 1972), e d) do “conflito entre prole e parentais" (Trivers, 1974). / The present work proposes to account for cultural variability in connection to human family organization, through Darwin’s theories of natural selection and sexual selection. It is also founded on evidence based on the comparison of ethnographic data of diverse human societies. It intends to demonstrate that there is a significant alteration in the behavior of family members when the rules of inheritance of wealth change. These alterations are triggered because the rules of inheritance dictate the MPI – Male Parental Investment – sometimes in the nephew and sometimes in the son. The hypothesis is that this variation in MPI (male investment in either the nephew or the son) modifies family relations in matrilineal and patrilineal organizations in a predictable manner. The role played by MPI in determining family tensions will be shown by applying cross cultural analysis to the data obtained from HRAF (Human Relations Area Files), using PSF (Probability Sample Files). The results of the present work show that societies in which the uncle’s relation with his nephew is affectionate, the husband beats the wife; on the other hand, when the father’s relation with his son is indulgent and friendly, brother and sister avoid each other. This variability of behavior can be coherently explained by sociobiological theory. Cultural wealth: the innumerable customs, the traditions, the taboos, the manifest and hidden norms, the apparatus of coercion, the rules of inheritance, marriage, dowry, bride price, the division of labor, in short, all the rules observed in all human groups can be explained in the light of the following theories: a) ‘kinship selection’ (Hamilton, 1963); b) ‘reciprocal altruism’ (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1981); c) ‘parental investment and sexual selection’ (Trivers, 1972); and d) ‘parentoffspring conflict’ (Trivers, 1974).

O dilema do prisioneiro é geralmente visto como o ponto de partida para entender o problema da cooperação. Em comparação com o dilema do prisioneiro discreto e iterado, poucos estudos existem sobre o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado. A maioria dos trabalhos que investigaram o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado concentrou-se no período de 1990 a 2000, não obtendo resultados conclusivos sobre a melhor estratégia a ser adotada neste tipo de jogo. Duas estratégias diferentes se destacam neste tipo de dilema. A primeira é a estratégia RTS (Raise-the-Stakes) de Roberts e Sherrat (1998) que testa o terreno antes de aumentar os investimentos na relação. A segunda deriva do modelo LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl e Nowak (1999a). Esta última estratégia estando em equilíbrio de Nash cooperativo apresenta três características: (i) generosidade, i.e., investir o máximo possível no início da relação de cooperação; (ii) otimismo, i.e., contar com o melhor cenário para as próximas rodadas, e (iii) intransigência. Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo principal contrapor as estratégias RTS e LRS num dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado, na presença e ausência de ruído, com jogadas simultâneas e alternadas e para diferentes valores do parâmetro w (probabilidade de interagir novamente). Restringimos a nossa análise a um conjunto de seis estratégias: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS e RTSM. O método utilizado foi o da simulação baseada em agente (ABM) no formato de torneios, semelhante ao de Axelrod (2006), Roberts & Sherratt (1998), Nowak & Sigmund (1992) e Nowak & Sigmund (1993). Utilizamos o software Netlogo e documentamos todo o processo da concepção e construção do modelo por meio da ferramenta TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). Os resultados mostram que as estratégias mais cooperativas são mais favorecidas quando o jogo consiste em jogadas alternadas ao invés de simultâneas. A estratégia RTS teve melhor desempenho em jogos simultâneos para valores intermediários de w, na presença ou ausência de ruído. Por sua vez, a estratégia LRS teve melhor desempenho nos jogos simultâneos, na presença ou ausência de ruído, ou alternados e na presença de ruído, em ambos os casos para valores grandes de w / The prisoner\'s dilemma is generally seen as the starting point for understanding the problem of cooperation. In comparison with the discreet and iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, few studies exist on the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma. Most of the works that have investigated the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma has concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000, not getting conclusive results on the best strategy to be adopted in this type of game. Two different strategies stand out in this kind of dilemma. The first is the RTS strategy (Raise-the-Stakes) of Roberts and Sherrat (1998) that tests the ground before increasing investment in the relationship. The second is the model deriva LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl and Nowak (1999a). This last strategy being in Nash equilibrium cooperative presents three characteristics: (i) generosity, i.e., investing as much as possible at the beginning of the cooperation relationship; (ii) optimism, i.e., rely on the best scenario for the next rounds, and (iii) intransigence. This research has as main goal to reconcile opposing RTS strategies and LRS in a continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, in the presence and absence of noise, with simultaneous moves and alternate and for different values of the parameter w (probability of interacting again). We restrict our analysis to a set of six strategies: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS and RTSM (halfway between RTS and LRS). The method used was the agent-based simulation (ABM) in tournament format, similar to that of Axelrod (2006), Roberts (1998), Sherratt & Nowak & Sigmund (1992) and Nowak & Sigmund (1993). We use the NetLogo software and document the whole process of design and construction of the tool model TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). The results show that most strategies are more favoured unions when the game consists of alternating plays rather than simultaneous. The RTS strategy had better performance in simultaneous games for intermediate values of w, in the presence or absence of noise. In turn, the IRS strategy had better performance when simultaneous games, in the presence or absence of noise, or switched, and in the presence of noise, in both cases, for large values of w

O dilema do prisioneiro é geralmente visto como o ponto de partida para entender o problema da cooperação. Em comparação com o dilema do prisioneiro discreto e iterado, poucos estudos existem sobre o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado. A maioria dos trabalhos que investigaram o dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado concentrou-se no período de 1990 a 2000, não obtendo resultados conclusivos sobre a melhor estratégia a ser adotada neste tipo de jogo. Duas estratégias diferentes se destacam neste tipo de dilema. A primeira é a estratégia RTS (Raise-the-Stakes) de Roberts e Sherrat (1998) que testa o terreno antes de aumentar os investimentos na relação. A segunda deriva do modelo LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl e Nowak (1999a). Esta última estratégia estando em equilíbrio de Nash cooperativo apresenta três características: (i) generosidade, i.e., investir o máximo possível no início da relação de cooperação; (ii) otimismo, i.e., contar com o melhor cenário para as próximas rodadas, e (iii) intransigência. Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo principal contrapor as estratégias RTS e LRS num dilema do prisioneiro contínuo e iterado, na presença e ausência de ruído, com jogadas simultâneas e alternadas e para diferentes valores do parâmetro w (probabilidade de interagir novamente). Restringimos a nossa análise a um conjunto de seis estratégias: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS e RTSM. O método utilizado foi o da simulação baseada em agente (ABM) no formato de torneios, semelhante ao de Axelrod (2006), Roberts & Sherratt (1998), Nowak & Sigmund (1992) e Nowak & Sigmund (1993). Utilizamos o software Netlogo e documentamos todo o processo da concepção e construção do modelo por meio da ferramenta TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). Os resultados mostram que as estratégias mais cooperativas são mais favorecidas quando o jogo consiste em jogadas alternadas ao invés de simultâneas. A estratégia RTS teve melhor desempenho em jogos simultâneos para valores intermediários de w, na presença ou ausência de ruído. Por sua vez, a estratégia LRS teve melhor desempenho nos jogos simultâneos, na presença ou ausência de ruído, ou alternados e na presença de ruído, em ambos os casos para valores grandes de w / The prisoner\'s dilemma is generally seen as the starting point for understanding the problem of cooperation. In comparison with the discreet and iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, few studies exist on the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma. Most of the works that have investigated the continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma has concentrated in the period from 1990 to 2000, not getting conclusive results on the best strategy to be adopted in this type of game. Two different strategies stand out in this kind of dilemma. The first is the RTS strategy (Raise-the-Stakes) of Roberts and Sherrat (1998) that tests the ground before increasing investment in the relationship. The second is the model deriva LRS (Linear Reactive Strategies) de Wahl and Nowak (1999a). This last strategy being in Nash equilibrium cooperative presents three characteristics: (i) generosity, i.e., investing as much as possible at the beginning of the cooperation relationship; (ii) optimism, i.e., rely on the best scenario for the next rounds, and (iii) intransigence. This research has as main goal to reconcile opposing RTS strategies and LRS in a continuous iterated prisoner\'s dilemma, in the presence and absence of noise, with simultaneous moves and alternate and for different values of the parameter w (probability of interacting again). We restrict our analysis to a set of six strategies: ALLC, ALLD, TFT, RTS, LRS and RTSM (halfway between RTS and LRS). The method used was the agent-based simulation (ABM) in tournament format, similar to that of Axelrod (2006), Roberts (1998), Sherratt & Nowak & Sigmund (1992) and Nowak & Sigmund (1993). We use the NetLogo software and document the whole process of design and construction of the tool model TRACE (TRAnsparent and Comprehensive model Evaludation). The results show that most strategies are more favoured unions when the game consists of alternating plays rather than simultaneous. The RTS strategy had better performance in simultaneous games for intermediate values of w, in the presence or absence of noise. In turn, the IRS strategy had better performance when simultaneous games, in the presence or absence of noise, or switched, and in the presence of noise, in both cases, for large values of w

O presente trabalho se propõe a compreender a variabilidade cultural humana em relação à organização da família por meio das teorias darwinianas da seleção natural e da seleção sexual, e se encontra baseado em evidências vindas da comparação de dados etnográficos. Pretende-se demonstrar que existe uma alteração marcante no comportamento de todos os envolvidos nas relações familiares quando mudam as regras de herança. Essas alterações assim ocorrem porque as regras de herança direcionam o Investimento Parental Masculino (MPI), ora ao sobrinho, ora ao filho. A hipótese apresentada é a de que a variação do MPI modifica de maneira compreensível e previsível as relações familiares em organizações matrilineares e patrilineares. A prova da hipótese será feita por meio da aplicação do método intercultural com pesquisa etnográfica nos bancos de dados do HRAF, e utilizando-se da amostra PSF. Os resultados do presente trabalho indicarão que em sociedades em que o tio tem uma relação afetuosa com seu sobrinho, o marido espanca a mulher; e quando o pai se relaciona de maneira indulgente e amigável com seu filho, irmãos e irmãs se evitam, alinhando esses fatos de maneira que possam ser coerentemente entendidos com a teoria sociobiológica. A riqueza cultural, o sem número de costumes, as tradições, os tabus, as normas explícitas ou ocultas, os aparatos de coerção de toda sorte, as regras sobre herança, casamento, dote, preço da noiva, divisão de trabalho, enfim, todas as regras observadas em todos os agrupamentos humanos podem ser explicadas à luz das seguintes teorias: a) da “seleção de consangüíneos” (Hamilton, 1963), b) do “altruísmo recíproco” (Trivers, 1971), c) do “investimento parental e seleção sexual” (Trivers, 1972), e d) do “conflito entre prole e parentais” (Trivers, 1974). / The present work proposes to account for cultural variability in connection to human family organization, through Darwin’s theories of natural selection and sexual selection. It is also founded on evidence based on the comparison of ethnographic data of diverse human societies. It intends to demonstrate that there is a significant alteration in the behavior of family members when the rules of inheritance of wealth change. These alterations are triggered because the rules of inheritance dictate the MPI – Male Parental Investment – sometimes in the nephew and sometimes in the son. The hypothesis is that this variation in MPI (male investment in either the nephew or the son) modifies family relations in matrilineal and patrilineal organizations in a predictable manner. The role played by MPI in determining family tensions will be shown by applying cross cultural analysis to the data obtained from HRAF (Human Relations Area Files), using PSF (Probability Sample Files). The results of the present work show that societies in which the uncle’s relation with his nephew is affectionate, the husband beats the wife; on the other hand, when the father’s relation with his son is indulgent and friendly, brother and sister avoid each other. This variability of behavior can be coherently explained by sociobiological theory. Cultural wealth: the innumerable customs, the traditions, the taboos, the manifest and hidden norms, the apparatus of coercion, the rules of inheritance, marriage, dowry, bride price, the division of labor, in short, all the rules observed in all human groups can be explained in the light of the following theories: a) ‘kinship selection’ (Hamilton, 1963); b) ‘reciprocal altruism’ (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1981); c) ‘parental investment and sexual selection’ (Trivers, 1972); and d) ‘parentoffspring conflict’ (Trivers, 1974).

In this thesis, we present some new results in distribution theory for both discrete and continuous random variables, together with their motivating applications. We start with some results about the Multivariate Gaussian Distribution and its characterization as a maximizer of the Strichartz Estimates. Then, we present some characterizations of discrete and continuous distributions through ideas coming from optimal transportation. After this, we pass to the Simpson's Paradox and see that it is ubiquitous and it appears in Quantum Mechanics as well. We conclude with a group of results about discrete and continuous distributions invariant under symmetries, in particular invariant under the groups $A_1$, an elliptical version of $O(n)$ and $\mathbb{T}^n$. As mentioned, all the results proved in this thesis are motivated by their applications in different research areas. The applications will be thoroughly discussed. We have tried to keep each chapter self-contained and recalled results from other chapters when needed. The following is a more precise summary of the results discussed in each chapter. In chapter \ref{chapter 2}, we discuss a variational characterization of the Multivariate Normal distribution (MVN) as a maximizer of the Strichartz Estimates. Strichartz Estimates appear as a fundamental tool in the proof of wellposedness results for dispersive PDEs. With respect to the characterization of the MVN distribution as a maximizer of the entropy functional, the characterization as a maximizer of the Strichartz Estimate does not require the constraint of fixed variance. In this chapter, we compute the precise optimal constant for the whole range of Strichartz admissible exponents, discuss the connection of this problem to Restriction Theorems in Fourier analysis and give some statistical properties of the family of Gaussian Distributions which maximize the Strichartz estimates, such as Fisher Information, Index of Dispersion and Stochastic Ordering. We conclude this chapter presenting an optimization algorithm to compute numerically the maximizers. Chapter \ref{chapter 3} is devoted to the characterization of distributions by means of techniques from Optimal Transportation and the Monge-Amp\`{e}re equation. We give emphasis to methods to do statistical inference for distributions that do not possess good regularity, decay or integrability properties. For example, distributions which do not admit a finite expected value, such as the Cauchy distribution. The main tool used here is a modified version of the characteristic function (a particular case of the Fourier Transform). An important motivation to develop these tools come from Big Data analysis and in particular the Consensus Monte Carlo Algorithm. In chapter \ref{chapter 4}, we study the \emph{Simpson's Paradox}. The \emph{Simpson's Paradox} is the phenomenon that appears in some datasets, where subgroups with a common trend (say, all negative trend) show the reverse trend when they are aggregated (say, positive trend). Even if this issue has an elementary mathematical explanation, the statistical implications are deep. Basic examples appear in arithmetic, geometry, linear algebra, statistics, game theory, sociology (e.g. gender bias in the graduate school admission process) and so on and so forth. In our new results, we prove the occurrence of the \emph{Simpson's Paradox} in Quantum Mechanics. In particular, we prove that the \emph{Simpson's Paradox} occurs for solutions of the \emph{Quantum Harmonic Oscillator} both in the stationary case and in the non-stationary case. We prove that the phenomenon is not isolated and that it appears (asymptotically) in the context of the \emph{Nonlinear Schr\"{o}dinger Equation} as well. The likelihood of the \emph{Simpson's Paradox} in Quantum Mechanics and the physical implications are also discussed. Chapter \ref{chapter 5} contains some new results about distributions with symmetries. We first discuss a result on symmetric order statistics. We prove that the symmetry of any of the order statistics is equivalent to the symmetry of the underlying distribution. Then, we characterize elliptical distributions through group invariance and give some properties. Finally, we study geometric probability distributions on the torus with applications to molecular biology. In particular, we introduce a new family of distributions generated through stereographic projection, give several properties of them and compare them with the Von-Mises distribution and its multivariate extensions. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)