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On Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against NaturalismMashburn, Emmett Frank 01 August 2010 (has links)
Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) begins with the following simple idea: the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms due to adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs. If this notion is even possibly true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not veridical and that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are merely evolutionarily advantageous).
Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition of what one is trying to prove). The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this, realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties, and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in naturalism). So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e., irrational) position. It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical naturalism.
Plantinga’s argument is not a globally skeptical one. His ultimate goal is to persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism instead. EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism.
In this paper, I attempt to: (1) explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement; (2) examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN (along with some of Plantinga’s responses); (3) put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form; (4) comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing the premises, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of EAAN; and, (5) conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.
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Relatives et complétives du nom en français et en coréenKim, Bo-Kyung Creissels, Denis. January 2001 (has links)
Thèse de doctorat : Science du langage : Lyon 2 : 2001. / Titre provenant de l'écran-titre. Bibliogr.
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Non-propositional intentionalityGrzankowski, Alex Paul 29 November 2010 (has links)
We often want to explain and predict behavior, both our own and that of others. For various reasons we want to know not only why (in the sense of etiology) someone is doing what he is, but we also have interests in understanding the agent's reasons for which he is acting as he is. Though not uncontroversial, it is common to cite intentional states when offering such explanations. Most philosophers take certain intentional states to be the causes of our actions and to play a role in accounting for the reasons for which one acts. Additionally, most theorists who adopt such a line take the relevant intentional states to be propositional attitudes, most commonly beliefs and desires (or other pro attitudes which relate one to a proposition). In many of our explanations, we do indeed cite beliefs and desires, but we also cite many other psychological states that aren't obviously beliefs or desires. In fact, some of the relevant psychological states don't even appear to be propositional attitudes. In this paper I pursue two lines of questioning, one about the explanations of action and one about intentionality. First, what role is played by these apparently non-propositional attitudes? Such attitudes turn up in Davidson's locus classicus and can be found in the most recent work on action as well, but explications are sparse. Second, are these attitudes in fact non-propositional? Despite appearances to the contrary, one might argue that such states are to be, in some way or other, assimilated to the more familiar propositional attitudes. I resist this line in the second chapter. / text
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Privatizing Education with the Public's Purse: An Analysis of the 2012 Georgia Constitutional Amendment on Charter SchoolsLa Plant, Kristina 10 May 2014 (has links)
Charter schools have recently become a hot topic of debate in the United States. For parents who cannot afford private schooling or moving to another school district, charter schools seem to be an attractive option. These schools, which are often argued to outperform traditional schools, offer an alternative path to public education which allows teachers more flexibility to employ innovative strategies in the classroom. In order to expedite the creation of such schools, Republicans in the Georgia General Assembly called for the amending of the Georgia Constitution which would allow the state to approve charters by circumventing the publicly elected local school board. This study analyzes the more recent political history of the Commission, the debate surrounding the amendment, and ultimately the vote itself for Amendment 1.
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The failures of peace the search for a negotiated peace during the First World War /Forster, Kent, January 1941 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1941. / Published also by the American Council on Public Affairs as Studies in foreign affairs. Includes bibliographical references (p. 153-159).
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Pyrrhonian and Naturalistic Themes in the Final Writings of WittgensteinBhattacharjee, Indrani 01 February 2011 (has links)
The following inquiry pursues two interlinked aims. The first is to understand Wittgenstein's idea of non-foundational certainty in the context of a reading of On Certainty that emphasizes its Pyrrhonian elements. The second is to read Wittgenstein's remarks on idealism/radical skepticism in On Certainty in parallel with the discussion of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations in order to demonstrate an underlying similarity of philosophical concerns and methods. I argue that for the later Wittgenstein, what is held certain in a given context of inquiry or action is a locally transcendental condition of the inquiry or action in question. In On Certainty, Wittgenstein's analysis of the difference between knowledge and certainty forms the basis of his critique of both Moore's "Proof" and radical skepticism. This critique takes the shape of rejection of a presupposition shared by both parties, and utilizes what I identify as a Pyrrhonian-style argument against opposed dogmatic views. Wittgenstein's method in this text involves describing epistemic language-games. I demonstrate that this is consistent with the rejection of epistemological theorizing, arguing that a Wittgensteinian "picture" is not a theory, but an impressionistic description that accomplishes two things: (i) throwing into relief problems with dogmatic theories and their presuppositions, and (ii) describing the provenance of linguistic and epistemic practices in terms of norms grounded in convention. Convention, in turn, is not arbitrary, but grounded in the biological and social natures of human beings--in what Wittgenstein calls forms of life. Thus there is a kind of naturalism in the work of the later Wittgenstein. It is a naturalism that comes neatly dovetailed with Pyrrhonism--a combination of strategies traceable to Hume's work in the Treatise. I read Hume as someone who develops the Pyrrhonian method to include philosophy done "in a careless manner," and argue that Wittgenstein adopts a similar method in his later works. Finally, I explain the deference to convention in the work of both Hume and Wittgenstein by reference to a passage in Sextus' Outlines, on which I provide a gloss in the final chapter of this work.
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Nezávislost elementárních vět u raného Wittgensteina / The (in)depence of elementary propositions in early WittgensteinFořtová, Zuzana January 2012 (has links)
In my Master's thesis, I focus on the problem of dependence and independence of elementary propositions in the Tractatus and Some Remarks on Logical Form. The main issue I wish to analyze in my investigation is the question of whether the independence of elementary propositions (asserted in the Tractatus) is necessary for the maintenance of Tractarian truth-functional analysis of propositions. The motivation behind this is the fact that, in the SRLF, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects, after precise argumentation, the independence of elementary propositions concerning characteristics allowing gradation. After analyzing the essential arguments and precise rendering of independence of elementary propositions in the Tractatus and considering arguments for their dependence in the SRLF, I argue that (based on my analysis of both works) the mutual dependence of some elementary propositions is not problematic for Tractarian truth-functional analysis.
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A relação entre o principio de razão suficiente e o principio da contradição em Leibniz / The relationship between the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of contradiction in LeibnizMariana Magalhães Ribeiro da Cruz 25 April 2013 (has links)
De acordo com Leibniz, nossos raciocínios estão fundados em dois grandes princípios, o Princípio de Razão Suficiente e o Princípio de Contradição. Apesar da reconhecida relevância de tais princípios para sua filosofia, muitas são as interpretações sobre o real papel que eles desempenham dentro dela e sobre a relação deles entre si. Nosso estudo pauta-se não só pela interpretação de Leibniz como pela visão de alguns de seus comentadores, especialmente três deles: Russell, Couturat e Deleuze. Iremos pesquisar, entre outras coisas, se tais princípios são independentes um do outro; se são aplicáveis a todo tipo de verdade; se o Princípio de Perfeição é uma particularização do Princípio de Razão Suficiente ou se é irredutível a ele; e se as verdades da razão são regidas pelo Princípio de Contradição e as verdades de fato são regidas pelo Princípio de Razão Suficiente. A articulação entre tais princípios remete a um terceiro ponto: a concepção da verdade como inclusão do conceito do predicado no sujeito, tema este que iremos analisar com base nos diferentes pontos de vista acerca das proposições essenciais e existenciais. Em relação a esta última, investigaremos se representam ou não uma exceção ao caráter analítico de todas as proposições verdadeiras. / According to Leibniz, our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Despite the recognized relevance of these principles to his philosophy, there are many interpretations about the real role they play inside this and about their relationship with each other. Our study is oriented not only by the Leibniz interpretation, but also by the vision of some of his commentators, especially three of them: Russell, Couturat and Deleuze. We will search, among other things, if those principles are independent of each other; if they are applicable to all kinds of true; if the Principle of Perfection is a particularization of the Principle of Sufficient Reason or if it is irreducible to it; and if the truths of reason are headed by the Principle of Contradiction and if the truths of fact are headed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The articulation of these principles brings us to a third point: the conception of truth as the inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the subject, which we will analyse based on the different points of view about the essential and existential propositions. With regard to the last one, we will investigate if they represent or not an exception to the analytical character of all truth propositions.
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A relação entre o principio de razão suficiente e o principio da contradição em Leibniz / The relationship between the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of contradiction in LeibnizMariana Magalhães Ribeiro da Cruz 25 April 2013 (has links)
De acordo com Leibniz, nossos raciocínios estão fundados em dois grandes princípios, o Princípio de Razão Suficiente e o Princípio de Contradição. Apesar da reconhecida relevância de tais princípios para sua filosofia, muitas são as interpretações sobre o real papel que eles desempenham dentro dela e sobre a relação deles entre si. Nosso estudo pauta-se não só pela interpretação de Leibniz como pela visão de alguns de seus comentadores, especialmente três deles: Russell, Couturat e Deleuze. Iremos pesquisar, entre outras coisas, se tais princípios são independentes um do outro; se são aplicáveis a todo tipo de verdade; se o Princípio de Perfeição é uma particularização do Princípio de Razão Suficiente ou se é irredutível a ele; e se as verdades da razão são regidas pelo Princípio de Contradição e as verdades de fato são regidas pelo Princípio de Razão Suficiente. A articulação entre tais princípios remete a um terceiro ponto: a concepção da verdade como inclusão do conceito do predicado no sujeito, tema este que iremos analisar com base nos diferentes pontos de vista acerca das proposições essenciais e existenciais. Em relação a esta última, investigaremos se representam ou não uma exceção ao caráter analítico de todas as proposições verdadeiras. / According to Leibniz, our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, the Principle of Contradiction and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Despite the recognized relevance of these principles to his philosophy, there are many interpretations about the real role they play inside this and about their relationship with each other. Our study is oriented not only by the Leibniz interpretation, but also by the vision of some of his commentators, especially three of them: Russell, Couturat and Deleuze. We will search, among other things, if those principles are independent of each other; if they are applicable to all kinds of true; if the Principle of Perfection is a particularization of the Principle of Sufficient Reason or if it is irreducible to it; and if the truths of reason are headed by the Principle of Contradiction and if the truths of fact are headed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The articulation of these principles brings us to a third point: the conception of truth as the inclusion of the concept of the predicate in the subject, which we will analyse based on the different points of view about the essential and existential propositions. With regard to the last one, we will investigate if they represent or not an exception to the analytical character of all truth propositions.
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Employer branding: Hur ska företag inom stål- och metallindustrin attrahera samt behålla kompetent personal : En kvalitativ studie om vad arbetare och studenter inom stål- och metallindustrin prioriterar hos en attraktiv arbetsgivareWernqvist, Felix, Gabrielsson, Carl January 2023 (has links)
Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att identifiera vilka Employer valuepropositions som anställda inom stål- och metallindustrin samtpotentiella arbetstagare anser vara viktigast hos en attraktivarbetsgivare. Detta för att ge företagen inom branschen bättre underlagför hur de blir mer framgångsrika med sin Employer branding Metod: Resultatet av studien analyserades med hjälp av en tematisk analys föratt identifiera och analysera fem olika dimensioner. Dessa femdimensioner grundar sig dels i tidigare forskning. Dels frånrespondenternas svar som inhämtas med hjälp av semistruktureradeintervjuer. Eftersom en abduktiv ansats har använts är detta möjligteftersom författarna kan gå fram och tillbaka mellan teori och empiri.De semistrukturerade intervjuerna genomfördes på 22respondenter,varav 18 av dessa respondenter arbetar på Åkers Sweden.Resterande 4 respondenter är studenter som potentiellt kommer attsöka jobb inom stål- och metallindustrin Slutsats: Resultatet visar på att en arbetsgivare måste kunna erbjuda ett paket avflera olika Employer value proposition för att uppfattas som enattraktiv arbetsgivare. De Employer value propositions somrespondenterna prioriterade främst är den sociala dimensionen samtutvecklingsdimensionen. För att Åkers Sweden ska kunna locka samtbehålla kompetent personal gäller det att kommunicera två olikabudskap. Ett internt och ett externt budskap. / Purpose: The purpose with this study is to identify which Employer valuepropositions that workers within the steel- and metal industry andpotential employees consider to be most important with an attractiveemployer. This is to give the companies in the industry a better basisfor how they can be more successful with their Employer branding Method:The results of the study were analyzed using thematic analysis toidentify and analyze five different dimensions. These five dimensionswere derived from both previous research and the responses ofparticipants gathered through semi-structured interviews. An abductiveapproach was used, the authors were able to move back and forthbetween theory and empirical data. The semi-structured interviewswere conducted with 22 respondents. 18 of these respondents are fromÅkers Sweden, while the remaining 4 respondents are students who arepotentially seeking employment within the steel- and metal industry Conclusion:The results indicate that an employer must be able to offer a packageof various Employer value propositions in order to be perceived as anattractive employer. The most essential Employer value propositionsaccording to the respondents are the social dimension along with thedevelopment dimension. For Åkers Sweden to attract and keepcompetent personnel, it is crucial to communicate two differentmessages: an internal message and an external message.
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