In Sweden, there are both public roads and civic roads. The civic roads are managed by the people who utilize them. These roads go most through forests and farmlands but also in urban detached areas and are supposed to have a lower cost than with governmental management. Previous regulation has put out the reinvestment in the civic roads in urban areas and left them in a bad shape. I have studied an attempt to reinstall the civic road management system for such urban areas in Leksand. Based on the theory of public goods and common pool resources, I have made a Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) to see if the civic road management system will be effective in the long run compared to municipality management. I found that if it works, the civic road management system is the most effective due to the marginal excess tax burden that harms the municipality management. However, the civic road management system gives great responsibility and administration to a few people and might not work well in the long run. Instead I suggest a user-fee financing of the municipality management which is not affected by the marginal excess tax burden. / I många svenska kommuner har kvalitén på de enskilda vägarna i tätorter försämrats på grund av otydliga ansvarsförhållanden. Jag har studerat ett pågående projekt i Leksand som håller på att bilda samfällighetsföreningar som skall ansvara för de enskilda vägarna i tätort. För att bedöma om samfälld förvaltning är effektivt över tid har jag gjort en samhällsekonomisk konsekvensanalys baserad på teorin om kollektiva nyttigheter och förvaltning av gemensamma resurser. Det visade sig att samfälld förvaltning var effektivast jämfört med kommunal förvaltning, mycket beroende på marginalkostnaden för skatter överskottsbörda. Samfälld förvaltning innebär dock stort ansvar och omfattande administrativa uppgifter för ett fåtal och det är osäkert hur väl det fungerar på lång sikt. Som ett alternativ föreslår jag att finansiering med användaravgifter möjliggörs för kommunal förvaltning av enskilda vägar vilket inte påverkas av marginell överskottsbörda.

Before vaccines for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) became available, a set of infection-prevention behaviors constituted the primary means to mitigate the virus spread. Our study aimed to identify important predictors of this set of behaviors. Whereas social and health psychological theories suggest a limited set of predictors, machine-learning analyses can identify correlates from a larger pool of candidate predictors. We used random forests to rank 115 candidate correlates of infection-prevention behavior in 56,072 participants across 28 countries, administered in March to May 2020. The machine-learning model predicted 52% of the variance in infection-prevention behavior in a separate test sample—exceeding the performance of psychological models of health behavior. Results indicated the two most important predictors related to individual-level injunctive norms. Illustrating how data-driven methods can complement theory, some of the most important predictors were not derived from theories of health behavior—and some theoretically derived predictors were relatively unimportant. / New York University Abu Dhabi / Revisión por pares

Extending Brennan and Buchanan’s model of leviathan, in which rulers represent the residual claimants of constitutionally unconstrained tax revenue, this paper presents a model in which the government provides the level of public goods that maximizes its revenue surplus as a function of the cost of emigration. To the extent that emigration is impeded, government converges toward pure monopoly provision, generating monopoly rents that facilitate the rent-seeking society. In contrast with Niskanen’s model, in which governments tend to overproduce public goods, this model suggests that governments tend toward underproduction. This result undermines the notion that government must provide public goods to overcome the underproduction of private provision; in reality, government provision may be less efficient than private provision.

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The challenges faced by the global food and agriculture system in the twenty-first century are unlikely to be resolved through the implementation of neoliberal policies, most notably promoting market liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation. Many of these policies have also supported industrial agriculture, which has led to the production of many global public bads, such as significant greenhouse gas emissions and water pollution. However, industrial agriculture is not the only method of food production: sustainable agriculture is better placed to provide a wide range of global public goods (GPGs), including environmental protection and rural livelihood development, in addition to sufficient nutritious food. Therefore, there should be a move towards promoting sustainable agriculture with a focus on eradicating hunger and improving food security. The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) can play a crucial role in ensuring agriculture provides the GPGs required. FAO also produces a number of GPGs through its three main roles; measurement, convening and norms and standards setting. This thesis asks if FAO is in a position to provide a food secure world. It also asks if the organisation is in a stronger position to provide the GPGs required following its extensive recent reform. Finally, it asks if a shift in emphasis towards the provision of GPGs will offer an alternative to neoliberalism.

This dissertation consists of three essays on theoretical analysis of economic agents' decision making and incentives. Chapter 1 gives an outline of the subjects to be examined in the subsequent chapters and shows their conclusions in brief. Chapter 2 explores the decision problem of a superordinate (a principal) regarding whether to delegate its authority or right to make a decision to a subordinate (an agent) in an organization. We first study the optimal contracting problem of the superordinate that specifies the allocation of the authority and wage in a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information, focusing on two motives for delegation, "informative" and "effort-incentive-giving" delegation. Further, we suggest delegating to multiple agents as a way of addressing the asymmetric information problem within an organization, focusing on another motive for delegation, "strategic" delegation. Chapter 3 analyzes the behavior of players in a particular type of contest, called "the weakest-link contest". Unlike a usual contest in which the winning probability of a group in a contest depends on the sum of the efforts of all the players in the group, the weakest-link contest follows a different rule: the winning probability of a group is determined by the lowest effort of the players in the group. We first investigate the effort incentives of the players in the weakest-link contest, and then check whether the hungriest player in each group, who has the largest willingness to exert effort, has an incentive to incentivize the other players in his group in order to make them exert more effort. Chapter 4 examines the decision making of software programmers in the software industry between an open source software project and a commercial software project. Incorporating both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation on open source project participation into a stylized economic model based on utility theory, we study the decision problem of the programmers in the software industry and provide the rationale for open source project participation more clearly. Specifically, we examine the question of how the programmers' intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and abilities affect their project choices between an open source project and a commercial project, and effort incentives. / Ph. D.

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Yes / A central challenge in microbial community ecology is the delineation of appropriate units of biodiversity, which can be taxonomic, phylogenetic, or functional in nature. The term ‘community’ is applied ambiguously; in some cases, the term refers simply to a set of observed entities, while in other cases, it requires that these entities interact with one another. Microorganisms can rapidly gain and lose genes, potentially decoupling community roles from taxonomic and phylogenetic groupings. Trait-based approaches offer a useful alternative, but many traits can be defined based on gene functions, metabolic modules, and genomic properties, and the optimal set of traits to choose is often not obvious. An analysis that considers taxon assignment and traits in concert may be ideal, with the strengths of each approach offsetting the weaknesses of the other. Individual genes also merit consideration as entities in an ecological analysis, with characteristics such as diversity, turnover, and interactions modeled using genes rather than organisms as entities. We identify some promising avenues of research that are likely to yield a deeper understanding of microbial communities that shift from observation-based questions of ‘Who is there?’ and ‘What are they doing?’ to the mechanistically driven question of ‘How will they respond?’