The present dissertation evaluates the internal dynamics of a specific type of common-pool resource, an information commons. Employing a novel dataset related to more than 800,000 transactions in distinct libraries during a 10-year period (2005-2015), I address distinct questions in the fields of organizational economics, law and economics, and public economics. This dissertation contains three chapters in the format of academic papers, besides the introduction and conclusion. The second chapter evaluates the behavioral responses of library users to monetary sanctions. I exploit variation in the timing of introduction of fines in a library, as well as differences among users, in terms of fine incidence. In the case of this chapter, I report two results: first, the introduction of fines reduces users\' delays, as predicted by standard models of law enforcement. Second, when evaluating the dynamic effects of such an introduction, I uncover a result in which fines lose efficacy over time since its nominal value remains the same after instauration. The third chapter measures externalities in an information commons. I estimate the magnitude of the impacts of actions of library users who were subject to a non-monetary sanction (professors and university employees) over users who were subject to a monetary sanction (students). Additionally, I estimate peer effects among users, considering the number of items they borrow from the library. When investigating external effects, I uncover a \"crowding-out\" effect: for an additional unity in professors and employees\' counts, there is an approximate one-to-one decrease in students\' counts. In the case of peer effects, I find that a rise in the borrowings of a user\'s peer group correlates with her own borrowings, an evidence of positive peer effects. Finally, the fourth chapter explores the interplay between common-pool resources and transaction costs. In particular, I try to answer the following question: what happens when transaction costs go down in a common-pool resource setting? I exploit variation in the timing of introduction of a cost-saving technology (return boxes) and its impacts on library performance measures. Contrarily to standard arguments based on transaction costs, I find a result in which the instauration of return boxes tend, on average, to raise the probability of delays and borrowings\' effective durations. The results reported in this dissertation have important implications for theories based on common-pool resources\' management, and constitute novel empirical evidence for the areas of law and economics, public economics, and organizational economics. / A presente tese avalia a dinâmica interna de um tipo específico de recurso comum, um \"information commons\". Utilizando uma nova base de dados contendo mais de 800.000 transações ocorridas em distintas bibliotecas, ao longo de um período superior a 10 anos (2005-2015), o trabalho busca responder distintas questões relacionadas às áreas de economia das organizações, direito econômico e economia do setor público. A tese contém três capítulos, em formato de artigos, além da introdução e conclusão. O segundo capítulo da tese avalia as respostas comportamentais de usuários de uma biblioteca a sanções monetárias, ao explorar variação no timing de introdução de multas, assim como diferenças entre usuários, em termos de incidência dessas multas. No caso deste capítulo, são reportados dois resultados: em primeiro lugar, a introdução da multa tende a reduzir atrasos dos usuários, conforme previsto por modelos convencionais de cumprimento da lei. Em segundo lugar, uma análise dos efeitos dinâmicos de instauração da multa sugere que ela perde eficácia ao longo do tempo, uma vez que seu valor nominal permanece o mesmo, desde a data de instauração. O terceiro capítulo da tese apresenta estimativas das magnitudes de externalidades em um recurso comum. Neste capítulo, são estimados os impactos das ações de usuários da biblioteca sujeitos a uma sanção não-monetária (professores e funcionários) sobre usuários sujeitos a uma sanção monetária (alunos). Adicionalmente, são estimados efeitos sobre pares (peereffects), considerando o número de itens emprestados por usuários da biblioteca. A análise da magnitude de efeitos externos leva à descoberta de um efeito \"crowding-out\": para cada unidade adicional emprestada por professores e funcionários, há uma redução, na escala de um por um, nos empréstimos de estudantes. No caso de estimações de efeitos sobre pares, um aumento nos empréstimos por parte do grupo ao qual um usuário pertence é correlacionado com seus próprios empréstimos, o que constitui evidência favorável à ocorrência de efeitos positivos sobre pares, no caso. Finalmente, no quarto capítulo, explora-se a interação entre recursos comuns e custos de transação. Especificamente, busca-se responder a seguinte questão: o que ocorre quando custos de transação são reduzidos em um contexto envolvendo recursos comuns? Para tanto, explora-se a variação no timing de introdução de uma tecnologia redutora de custos de transação (caixas de devolução), assim como seus impactos sobre medidas de desempenho na biblioteca. No caso deste capítulo, tem-se um resultado onde a instauração de caixas de devolução tende, em média, a aumentar a probabilidade de atrasos entre usuários da biblioteca, assim como a duração efetiva dos empréstimos, contrariamente a argumentos baseados em custos de transação. Os resultados reportados nesta tese têm importantes implicações para teorias baseadas no gerenciamento de recursos comuns, assim como correspondem a um novo conjunto de evidências empíricas relacionadas às áreas de direito econômico, economia do setor público e economia das organizações.

Cette thèse étudie respectivement les effets des lobbies, de l'information et de la mobilité des individus sur les biens publics. Tout d'abord, nous considérons un pays composé de deux régions dont les habitants ont des préférences différentes pour les biens publics, et nous comparons les systèmes centralisé, fédéral et décentralisé en termes de bien-être agrégé du pays et de bien-être de chaque région en l'absence de lobby, en présence d'un lobby exogène, et en présence de lobbies endogènes. Nous trouvons que par rapport au cas sans lobby, la présence d'un lobby exogène (ou endogène) réduit l'avantage d'un système centralisé par rapport à un système fédéral, et celui de ce dernier par rapport à un système décentralisé en termes de bien-être agrégé du pays. Mais la présence d'un lobby exogène ou de lobbies endogènes ne change pas forcément pour les régions le système pour lequel les résidents ont un bien-être net plus élevé entre un système fédéral et un système décentralisé. Cela est dû principalement au fait que l'effet de "free riding "dans un système décentralisé ou les économies d'échelle du bien global dans un système fédéral l'emporte sur l'effet de lobbying. Ensuite, nous considérons une union fédérale et un pays en dehors de l'union qui est composé de deux régions dont les habitants ont des préférences différentes pour le bien public. Nous étudions l'intérêt des régions composantes du pays à entrer dans l'union sous l'hypothèse que ce pays est autorisé à intégrer l'union. Cette étude est faite dans un contexte où l'union ne connaît pas exactement la préférence politique moyenne des habitants du pays candidat à l'entrée. Nous démontrons d'abord que la région qui a une préférence plus élevée soutient plus facilement l'entrée de son pays dans l'union puisque les individus ayant une préférence plus élevée préfèrent un bien public plus grand. Ensuite, nous concluons que grâce à un programme révélateur complet de dépenses du lobbying du pays entrant conçu par le gouvernement central de l'union et à la connaissance commune de la capacité à s'organiser du pays, une information antérieure plus précise du gouvernement central de l'union sur la préférence moyenne des habitants du pays candidat favorise son entrée. Nous constatons par ailleurs que le pays a intérêt à entrer dans l'union pour une préférence politique moyenne des habitants de l'union d'origine plus faible qu'un certain seuil car les résidents de l'union contribuent en faveur du pays entrant. Et si cette préférence est très élevée et dépasse un certain seuil qui dépend de la qualité de la croyance antérieure du décideur, les résidents du pays candidat deviennent purs contributeurs du bien public, alors ils peuvent être découragés d'y entrer. Enfin, nous analysons l'impact de la mobilité des individus sur les politiques régionales et le bien-être du groupe majoritaire de chaque région. Nous trouvons que la mobilité ne rend pas certainement les politiques plus arrangeantes, c'est-à-dire qu'en présence de mobilité, les politiques régionales ne sont pas toujours plus proches de celles préférées par les minorités à cause des externalités entre les biens régionaux et à une fonction quadratique du coût du bien public. Nous concluons également qu'il existe un équilibre stable et unique lorsque le coût de migration des individus est dispersé. Et dans ce cas la présence de mobilité augmente le bien-être du groupe majoritaire de chaque région si les externalités sont importantes. Cela est dû au fait que la redistribution des individus entre les régions par la migration entraîne des utilités Pareto-améliorantes. Mais cette amélioration des utilités des majorités des deux régions peut défavoriser l'intégration. / This thesis surveys the impacts of lobbies, information, individual mobility upon public goods respectively. We divide the materiel into three parts. First of all, we analyze the effects of lobbies on the comparative advantage of a centralized system, a federal system or a decentralized system in a model of public-goods provisions where two regions, components of a country, differ in terms of preference of their residents for public goods and externalities between local public goods exist. We thus find an exogenous lobby or endogenous lobbies shrink the advantage of a centralized system compared to a federal system and that of a federal system compared to a decentralized system in terms of social welfare of a country, but it does not necessarily change the system a region has a better net wellness in between a federal system and a decentralized system. Then, we examine the attitudes of jurisdictions facing up to the possibility of becoming a member of a federal union when the decision-maker of the union's public goods does not know exactly the preference of the individuals in the candidate jurisdiction for public goods. In this part, we show that a region of which residents have a higher preference for public goods holds up more easily the entry of its country into the union as the residents prefer a higher public good, and a weak preference of the residents of the union encourages the candidate's entry since the residents of the union contribute for those of the entrant country. Interestingly, a more precise belief of the union's policy decision-maker over the average preference of the candidate country's residents for public goods economizes the entrant country's lobbying expenses, so encourages its entry. Finally, we consider a model of police-induced migration between two independent regions with a heterogeneous population in terms of preference for public goods and migration costs. Then, we deal with a problem of equilibrium existence. We argue that there is a stable and single equilibrium when costs of migration are sufficiently dispersed among individuals or externalities are very important. In that case, mobility of individuals is Pareto-improving targeting the ethnic majority's utility of each region. In particular, mobility does not lead necessarily to more accommodate local policies in case of independence because of externalities and a quadratic function of public goods cost.

Diploma thesis deals with the implementation of the public private partnership concept in Czech Republic. Its primary aim is to highlight risks of the PPP concept. Thesis describes theoretical and practical risks of the concept and concludes that the threat of risks is much more significant when the PPP concept is implemented in insufficiently suitable environment. In the practical part the thesis finds an answer to the question whether the PPP concept is suitable for implementation in the Czech Republic. By analyzing the legal and institutional environment and factors such as public procurement, corruption, transparency and public finances, the thesis demonstrates that under current conditions the implementation of the PPP concept is not suitable in Czech Republic. Conclusions are confirmed by analysis of PPP concept implementation. Finally, the thesis pronounces recommendations about the future application of the PPP concept in Czech Republic.

This research investigates the use of pro-social emotions to improve cooperation. In particular, it tries to reconcile the results from Noussair and Tucker (2007) and Lopez et al. (2010). To reach this goal the experiment considers different degrees of revelation: no revelation, partial and full disclosure of information. Additionally, I use different microeconometric specifications to accommodate different hypothesis about the motivation of the subjects. My results diverge from those of Lopez et al. because I find that revealing the decision of a single subject at random does not significantly increase cooperation, which is the main result of these authors. Also, my findings indicate that cooperation is triggered only when I reveal information of either 3 or all the subjects in the group, the last case being similar to the public observability of Noussair and Tucker. These authors find a non-permanent increase in contributions, so I do but using a positive framed-experiment with disclosure of additional information, the group’s earning loss. Therefore, random revelation together with the disclosure of information about subjects’ decisions appears to be a good alternative to promote cooperation in a sample pool of undergraduate students. Also, I observe a reduction in contributions over time, but in the random revelation treatment this decay by less than 40%. The most interesting result that I obtain is the evidence of altruism and positive reciprocity in the specification of Ashley et al. (2003, 2010), instead of the matching in contributions reported by these authors.

No description available.

Predicting the behavior of groups and how it emerges from the behaviours of individuals is a difficult task. Not only are individuals and their behaviors affected by the group and vice versa, but the way individuals are affected by and react to various conditions is difficult to predict due to the complex nature of human beings. However, if one could build models that sufficiently capture the behavior of individuals, it would be possible to simulate groups and make a prediction for the emergent behavior that way. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are a type of economic game that explores how individuals engage in cooperation and where different types of collective behaviors emerge. In group-based settings such as PGGs, there is a high level behavior pattern belonging to the group as a whole. In this work, we study how the group behavior emerges from the collection of behaviors belonging to individuals in the group. To this end, we create a model that predicts the emergent collective behavior in a PGG given a set of individual behaviors present within the group. We devise a classification scheme that groups individuals into a small set of phenotypes based on the behavior they exhibit in a PGG. We then create a model that simulates the long term behavior of groups playing a PGG based on the relative distribution of these phenotypes. Our simulation uses cognitive modeling with ACT-R to individually simulate each participant in a game. We find that our model is able to simulate group behavior that resembles what is seen with human participants given only the relative distribution of phenotypes. However, the model is not able to generalize to a PGG where the rules of the game are slightly changed. In modifying the distribution of phenotypes present in simulations, we found that increasing the number of cooperative individuals resulted in a stronger upward trend in group average contribution, while increasing the number of non-cooperative individuals had the opposite effect. Increasing the number of conditional cooperative individuals resulted in slowing the movement of group average contribution trend. / Att förutspå gruppers beteenden och hur dessa uppstår från individernas beteenden är svårt av flera skäl. Dels påverkar individernas beteende gruppen och vice versa, och dels är det svårt att förutspå hur individer påverkas av och reagerar på olika situationer och förhållanden på grund av människans komplexa natur. Om man kunde bygga modeller som fångar individers beteenden tillräckligt väl skulle det vara möjligt att genom simulering kunna ge förutsägelser på gruppens beteende. Public Goods Games (PGGs) är en typ av ekonomiskt spel som utforskar hur individer väljer att sammarbeta och där kollektiva beteenden kan uppstå. Inom gruppbaserade miljöer, som till exempel PGGs, finns det beteenden som tillhör gruppen i sig. I detta arbete studerar vi hur det gruppbeteendet härstammar från samlingen av individuella beteenden inom gruppen. För det skapar vi en modell som ger förutsägelser om det framväxande kollektiva beteendet i en PGG, givet kunskap om fördelningen av olika typer av individuella beteenden som finns i gruppen. För att göra detta utvecklar vi ett klassificeringssystem som grupperar individer i olika fenotyper baserat på deras uppvisade beteende i ett PGG. Vi skapar sedan en modell som simulerar detta PGG med en given grupp av individer. Våran simulering använder kognitiv modellering med ACT-R för att simulera varje enskild deltagare i ett PGG. Vi finner att vår modell simulerar gruppbeteenden som liknar det som syns med mänskliga deltagare, givet att man vet fördelningen av fenotyper i grupper. Modellen kan dock inte generalisera till ett PGG där reglerna är ändrade. När vi ändrade distributionen av fenotyper i simuleringen fann vi att ett ökat nummer av sammarbetsvilliga individer gjorde så att trenden av gruppen genomsnittliga bidrag rörde sig uppåt, medans ett ökat nummer av ej sammarbetsvilliga individer hade motsatt effekt. Då vi ökade antalet vilkorligt sammarbetsvilliga individer fann vi att det saktade ner förändringar av gruppen genomsnittliga bidrag.

<p dir="ltr">This thesis explores various dimensions of strategic communication, cooperation, and information design within economic and organizational contexts. </p><p><br></p><p dir="ltr">Chapter 2 investigates whether the Law Merchant system can enhance cooperation among agents in a repeated interaction setting and how the presence of bribery affects this dynamic. The study finds that the Honest Law Merchant system does not significantly improve cooperation compared to a baseline scenario without such an institution, while the introduction of bribery further diminishes cooperative behavior. These findings suggest that while judicial enforcement mechanisms hold promise for promoting cooperation, their effectiveness can be undermined by corrupt practices. </p><p><br></p><p dir="ltr">Chapter 3 experimentally investigates behavioral spillovers between two social dilemma type games. In our experiments, subjects play Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) and Public Goods game (PGG) simultaneously, where the opponents of the two games do not overlap. I vary the level of strategic uncertainty in PD game and test how this affects subject's contributing behavior in PGG, which is held constant across treatments. I find that behavioral spillover exists in our setting and comes in an asymmetric form. When people are in an environment where cooperation is easy to sustain in the PD game, the PGG contributions do not increase much, compared to the baseline treatment when the PGG is played alone. However, when in the setting where cooperation is difficult to sustain in the PD game, PGG contributions decrease significantly.</p><p><br></p><p dir="ltr">Chapter 4, a joint work with Xinxin Lyu, chapter extends the work from Chapter 3 by exploring the differences in between individuals and teams. The study employs the Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) model and additional team experimental treatments. Initial results show that teams exhibit higher cooperation and contribution levels compared to individuals, but these advantages diminish over time, particularly in environments with lower strategic uncertainty. The findings provide insights into group dynamics and the challenges teams face in sustaining cooperation, with significant implications for economic and organizational contexts.</p>

市場失靈往往是政府介入干預的主要理由，一般常見的干預方法為正向的誘因激勵與負向的懲罰手段。就農地而言，因其所能提供的生態或環境的功能係屬公共財性質，具有無排他性、無敵對性、聯合消費的性質，市場上缺乏私人主動提供農地環境效益的經濟誘因，使得政府基於全民福祉之理由而介入農地保護，以提升外部效益。又為防患於未然，乃訂定管制規則予以規範違規使用行為，以降低外部成本。台灣的農地管理兼採補貼給付、賦稅減免與使用管制之政策措施，其實施經年究竟有無缺失？如何加以改進？適逢台灣主管當局刻正研擬國土計畫法（草案）且需要檢視之際，益發突顯本文研究此課題之重要性。 新古典經濟學者主張以課稅的方式消弭外部成本、以給予補貼的方式鼓勵外部效益的產生；新制度經濟學者主張透過界定財產權，經由利害關係人協商，最後達到社會整體最適生產水準，兩者各有所長，於實際適用時尚須截長補短綜合考量。本文從上述理論基礎切入，採用文獻分析法與焦點人物訪談法來檢討現行農地管理機制不足之處。基於損益均衡的補貼理念，我們意圖將正向誘因、使用市場機制引進農地管理機制中，並改進以往偏重於農地違規使用負向處罰的管理方式，以期健全農地管理，落實農業永續發展目標。 關鍵字：農地管理、誘因機制、公共財、外部性 / Market failure is often the main reason of government intervention. Generally, intervention methods always include positive incentive measures and passive punishment means. From viewpoint of farmland, it serves as biological and environmental functions with the character of public goods, which possesses features of non-exclusion, non-rival and jointly-consume. However, there is lack of economic incentives to provide environmental benefits of farmland by private market, government intervene shall be needed in farmland protection on basis of entire people welfare. Besides, the land use control regulations shall be stipulated to reduce external cost. In Taiwan, incentive programs include incentive payments, tax exemption or reduction and land use control mechanism. Do these programs manipulate efficiently? If not, how to improve them in the future? Discussion of these issues shall play an important role while the draft of National Territory Planning Act is drawn up by the Planning Authority and more examinations are necessary in Taiwan. Neoclassical economists suggest that external costs can be prevented by taxation, and external benefits shall be encouraged by offering subsidy. Neo-institutional economists argue that the problem can be solved through defining property rights, and stakeholders shall negotiate with one another to achieve optimum of social production. This article bases on exploring those theories and takes positive and negative factors into account in practice. The main research methods are literature review and focal person interview to investigate insufficiency of current incentive mechanism in farmland management. Based on concept of benefit-cost equilibrium, we intend to provide positive incentives, and include market approach into incentive mechanism of farmland management and improve passive way of punishing illegal farmland use. Through formulation of these incentive tools, farmland management mechanism shall be established soundly so as to achieve the goals of agricultural sustainable development. Keywords：Farmland Management, Incentive Mechanism, Public Goods, Externality

Ce mémoire est structuré en deux parties connexes : la première tente d’établir les fondements de la justice distributive dans le contexte des changements climatiques ; la seconde analyse six principes distributifs susceptibles d’éclairer l’élaboration des politiques internationales d’atténuation de l’effet de serre : les principes d’égalité, de priorité, de contraction & convergence, du « pollueur-payeur », de responsabilité historique, et de capacité. En ce qui concerne les fondements, les paradigmes de biens publics mondiaux et de droits humains fondamentaux semblent offrir de solides assises pour comprendre le caractère obligatoire de la justice climatique. Concernant l’adoption des principes distributifs, une perspective plurielle permet d’apporter un éclairage unique sur différents aspects de la distribution des quotas d’émissions et de rendre compte avec plus de force des raisons pour lesquelles les nations désignées comme étant responsables ont le devoir moral de passer à l’action. / This dissertation is organized into two related parts : the first attempts to establish the foundations of distributive justice in the context of climate change; the second analyses six distributive principles that can enlighten international mitigation policies : the principles of equality, priority, contraction & convergence, “polluter pays”, historical accountability and capacity. As regards the foundations of distributive justice, paradigms of global public goods and basic human rights seem to provide a solid basis for understanding the binding nature of climate justice. On the adoption of distributive principles, a plural perspective can provide unique insights into different aspects of the distribution of emissions quotas and reflect more strongly the reasons why nations designated as accountable for the greenhouse effect have a moral duty to take action.

Comment établir une juste répartition de l’accès aux connaissances entre les Etats et envisager ce que pourraient être des politiques universitaires équitables, à l’échelle globale ? C’est ce qu’entend montrer ce travail qui, tout en présentant l’origine historique de la situation d’inégalités qui caractérise le monde académique contemporain, engage une réflexion sur les modalités d’application des principes usuels de la justice distributive à l’échelle globale, dans un contexte où dorénavant la croissance et les échanges se fondent sur la production de biens immatériels. En s’appuyant sur la théorie des « biens publics globaux », il est ainsi possible de redéfinir les modalités de la coopération universitaire pour la faire sortir de la logique de l’aide qui a, depuis l’époque coloniale jusqu’à nos jours, caractérisé les relations académiques internationales. / How can we establish a fair distribution of access to knowledge between the states and consider what might be fair higher education policies, on a global scale ? That is what intends to demonstrate this work, presenting the historical roots of the inequalities that characterize the contemporary academic world and initiating a reflection about the application of usual principles of distributive justice on the global scale, in a context of increasing production of intangible goods. The general theory of "global public goods" makes possible the redefinition of academic cooperation, in order to depart from the logic of assistance that, since colonial times to the present day, characterized international academic relations.