Résumé : Cette thèse s’intéresse à la question de la radicalisation violente chez les salafistes algériens. Elle tente de comprendre comment s’effectue le glissement d’un militantisme (ou d’une sympathie) en faveur d’un islam politique légal, vers un activisme clandestin versé dans l’action violente sous le seau du djihad armé. Saisir le cheminement de cette entrée en radicalité, nous amène d’abord à réfléchir sur la radicalisation de la pensée religieuse comme première étape du processus étudié. L’engagement au profit du djihad est ensuite tributaire d’une construction (ou reconstruction) identitaire fondée sur un renversement moral de l’ordre socioreligieux établi. Les représentationsqui en émanent sont le produit d’une socialisation de l’individu à une pensée radicalisée qui, lorsqu’elle est combinée à d’autres variables facilitatrices ou incitatrices, le prédispose à passer à l’acte. Ainsi, au niveau macro, les opportunités/menaces agissent comme des facteurs facilitateurs ou précipitateurs dans l’engagement armé ; la répression et la fermeture du champ politique sont à ce titre, les variables les plus redondantes dans l’explication de l’entrée en radicalité chez les salafistes algériens. Au niveau méso et micro, l’influence des réseaux préconstitués (organisations armées, réseaux de soutiens logistiques…) et des liens sociaux (amis, voisins, famille…) pèse lourdement sur le choix de l’engagement collectif et individuel. Enfin, les chocs moraux et les récits mémoriels sur la répression subie peuvent aussi nous éclairer à saisir un certain nombre de trajectoires de radicalisation violente chez les djihadistes algériens / Abstract : This thesis focuses on the issue of violent radicalization among Algerian Salafists. It tries to understand how is the shift of activism (or sympathy) for a legal political Islam to a clandestine activism poured into violent action in the bucket of armed jihad. Enter the path of the entry into radicalism, leads us first to reflect on the radicalization of religious thought as a first step in the process studied. The commitment in favor of jihad is then dependent on a construction (or reconstruction) of identity based on moral overthrow of the established socio-religious order. The representations that come in are the product of socialization of the individual to a radicalized thought which, when combined with other variables or incentive-facilitators, predisposes to pass the act. Thus, at the macro level, opportunities / threats act as facilitators factors or precipitators in the armed engagement; repression and the closure of the political field as such are the most redundant variables in explaining the entry into radicalism among Algerian Salafists. At the meso and micro level, the influence of pre-made networks (armed organizations, logistic support networks ...) and social connections (friends, neighbors, family ...) weighs heavily on the choice of the individual and collective commitment. Finally, moral shocks and stories on the memorial suffered repression may also enlighten us to enter a number of violent radicalization trajectories among Algerian jihadists.

The topic of religious radicalization in the Balkans is gaining attention among academia in recent years. However, motivational factors of radicalization in the region still remain rather under-researched. Furthermore, comprehensive research focusing particularly on the motivational factors of Islamist radicalization in the Muslim-majority countries of the Balkans - countries with a specific context and background unique in the wider Europe - hasn't been yet carried out. This paper thus elaborates on the motivational factors of radicalization in the Muslim-majority countries of the Balkans, which is Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo, by applying generally-known factors of radicalization to this specific theatre. Predominantly secondary sources as well as documents issued by the OSCE which maintains field presence in all of the abovementioned countries are utilized in order to provide a thorough overview of motivational factors of radicalization in each of the selected countries. These are discussed respectively in corresponding chapters. Individual chapters are in dialogue with each other following the same methodology and structure, focusing on similar issues. A comprehensive overview of the motivational factors of radicalization in Balkan Muslim-majority countries is thus presented. Applying the...

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Since 2014, the National Coordinator has been responsible for protecting our democracy against violent extremism in Sweden. Today, it is clear that the preventive aspect against violent extremism and radicalization cannot be adjusted only to law enforcement. On a national level, the Government has implemented a strategy against terrorism and an action plan to increase the strength of our democracy towards the threat of violent extremism. Every municipality is participating in the national work and network against violent extremism. As a part of the national action plan, the municipalities’ employees, local police, and civil society have the best opportunity to prevent violent extremism. Many municipalities have adopted a plan of actions on a local level, and the employment of local coordinators has increased. However, many of them still have much work left with the implementations, and some have not even started. This case study aims to examine how two different municipalities in Kalmar county are operating with the recommendations from the national level and how they work to prevent radicalization and violent extremism. One of the chosen municipalities has, at this moment, publicly presented a plan of action on how and which institutions should work to prevent violent extremists and the second have not. I will use the following research questions, to study how these municipalities are operating with the recommendations from a national level concerning radicalization and violent extremism. • How do the municipalities implement the strategies and policies on the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism put forward by the Swedish Government? • How do the institutions in the municipalities work with, and how do they assess their work on the prevention of radicalization and violent extremism? To reach a result and understanding of my research questions, a methodology containing an abductive case study with semi-structured interviews was made to collect current and primary information. The findings indicate that collaboration between actors in the municipalities is vital in order to strengthen the democracy and the democratic values that protect our society from violent extremism and radicalization.

abstract: Social media has become a significant aspect of American life and culture. Criminal groups including extremists of various ideological milieus have found social media useful in their recruitment efforts. Further, these online spaces allow extremists to easily interact with one another, reinforcing each other’s radical perspectives. Little research has examined social media’s role in radicalization and fewer studies have tested the differences between the radicalization processes of individuals espousing disparate ideologies. Using Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States, a data set of 804 extremist men, this study sets out to determine whether the role of social media in the radicalization process varies between Islamist and far right extremists using social learning as a theoretical framework. The results indicate no significant difference regarding the role of social media in radicalization between Islamists and far rightists. Additionally, the odds of having radical friends and family were much lower for Islamists than far rightists, suggesting only partial support for social learning theory as an explanation of radicalization. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Criminology and Criminal Justice 2019

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Almost ten years have passed since incels came on the map. Incel, a portmanteau of the words involuntary and celibate, is a motley, like-minded group of young men with the commonality that they cannot achieve a (sexual) relationship with a woman. Since 2014, more than 100 different individuals have been either killed or injured in the incel uprising against women's oppression of men. Misogyny and self-hatred permeate the incelosphere and affect their understanding of the world. From a bluepilled rejection of the truth to a blackpilled understanding of a matriarchy that can only be escaped through suicide or the extermination of women. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how responses to perceived strains are expressed in the incel forum Incels.is and how this can be seen in the light of radicalization. Based on a theoretical thematic analysis strategy, 339 collected threads from the forum form the foundation for an analysis based on a perceived strain-related radicalization framework. The framework is created based on Robert K. Merton's five responses to strains and Brian Van Brunt and Chris Taylor's Incel description of the radicalization funnel model. The study revealed that incels exhibit responses relating to four out of the five types of responses to perceived strains. The perceived responses to strains also show signs that incels on Incels.is is located throughout all eight stages of The Incel Funnel. Comments and postings have demonstrated signs of varying degrees of radicalization as responses to perceived strains. However, this study can only provide insights into the investigated part of incels.is, and not make any definitive conclusions about the members of the incelosphere as a whole.

La tesi ha un duplice obiettivo. Innanzitutto, aspira ad illustrare i cambiamenti avvenuti nella concezione di jihad tra due forme di jihadismo distinte, quella che puó essere definito “nazionale” - esemplificato dalla Ğamā’a al-Islāmiya (Gruppo Islamico) e dal Jihad al-Islāmy (Jihad Islamico) - e quello globale, esemplificato da al-Qa’ida e dalla seconda fase del pensiero e dell’azione di Ayman al-Zawahiri. Il secondo obiettivo è verificare l’ipotesi secondo la quale, a seguito dell’emersione di al-Qa’ida come attore regionale ed internazionale, un processo di de-radicalizzazione come quello attuato dai due gruppi jihadisti egiziani in esame non può più avere luogo. Fino ai tardi anni novanta del ventesimo secolo il jihad nazionale, caratterizzato da constituency uniforme per provenienza, rivendicazioni e fattori scatenanti eminentemente nazionali, nonchè da un nemico identificato nell’establishment al potere in un determinato stato, è stato la norma e non l’eccezione. “La strada per Gerusalemme doveva passare dal Cairo” e il movimento jihadista, con pochissime eccezioni, dava priorità al Nemico Vicino (i governanti arabi percepiti come corrotti ed occidentalizzati e le minoranze religiose) sul Nemico Lontano (Israele, gli Stati Uniti, i loro alleati e in generale il cosiddetto Occidente). Il lavoro si propone di dimostrare che i processi di de-radicalizzazione dei gruppi egiziani analizzati sono stati possibili proprio grazie alla dimensione nazionale della loro lotta e che, una volta che il jihad diventa globale, tali processi non sono più possibili. Con la transnazionalizzazione del jihad infatti, vengono a mancare i requisiti fondamentali di un autentico processo di de-radicalizzazione collettiva e politica, quali in particolare interessi e motivi di frustrazione unitari e comuni, un nemico comune e interno al proprio orizzonte nazionale e una leadership del gruppo nazionale, in grado di creare un terreno comune – tanto di scontro quanto di dialogo – con le istituzioni del proprio paese. / The objective of this project is twofold. First, it aims at illustrating the changes that have occurred in the conception of jihad between two distinct forms of jihadism in the MENA region, i.e. national and global jihadism. Second, it aspires to verify the research hypothesis according to which, once jihad goes global, it is no longer possible for an organic process of collective and political de-radicalization to happen, because global jihad does not possess a set of prerequisites that allow the process to occur. From a geographical perspective, Egypt will be chosen as the reference country. The national conception of jihadism will be exemplified by al-Ğamā ͑a al-Islāmiya (Islamic Group, IG) and al-Ğihād al-Islāmy (Islamic Jihad), the two major Egyptian jihadi groups of the twentieth century. Symmetrically, the so-called global jihad and the parabola of Ayman al-Zawahiri (Ayman al-Ẓawāhiri) and his thought will represent the second approach to violent jihadism. The two abovementioned groups, which were active during the last three decades of the twentieth century, constitute ideal case studies because they all performed a process of collective disengagement and de-radicalization that led them to abandon violence. Moreover, the Egyptian cases represent the most telling instances of de-radicalization because they involved comprehensive de-radicalization, i.e. successful de-radicalization processes completed on three levels: organizational, behavioral, and ideological. This is the main reason why Egypt will be preferred to disengagement processes that taken places in other countries, such as Algeria, which seems to partly lack the ideological component. At the same time, the beginning of global jihad in general and the figure of al-Zawahiri in particular will be chosen as the second basis for comparison because they represent the fundamental turning point from national to global jihadism. Indeed, until the late 1990s, when he joined Bin Laden’s World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, Zawahiri faithfully adhered to the strategic principle of making jihad against the Near Enemy and kept his focus on overthrowing the Egyptian government. He used to say that “the road to Jerusalem went first through Cairo” confirming the hypothesis that from the 1970s until the mid-1990s the jihadi movement, with few exceptions, did not pay much attention to the Far Enemy – the West and its allies - and focused on the national horizon. In this respect, the second objective of the present research is to demonstrate that, after the emergence of al-Qa‘ida as a regional and international player, a similar process of de-radicalization could no longer occur. The global project of al-Qa‘ida excludes every chance of undertaking a de-radicalization process in which a group effectively negotiates with a nation-state.

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The aim of the study has been to analyse IS-sympathizers and their commitment to the Islamic State; however, this study will not be able to establish a representative result. The study has instead made an attempt to provide knowledge about four young Swedes who chose to leave Sweden in purpose to sympathize with, and to participate in the Islamic State. By announcing the aim of the study and the complexity of the subject area, the study has a hypothesis appropriated from earlier research which has been investigating young western Muslims. Hence, three question formulations derived; the first question intends to identify the previous research within two subject areas: religious identity and radicalization. The second question intends to analyse which common aim the four IS-sympathizers had for participating with the IS. In conclusion, the third question will analyse the possibility of a correlation between previous research and the collected empirical data. The study used a qualitative content analysis which also applied a deductive approach based on theories of deprivation and radicalization. The result of this study underlines that young Muslims acquire a stronger conflict between their individual and social concept of the world in relation to youths with the major ethnic background. The Western culture is being held up as a factor for a strengthened religious identity among the young Muslims when they are constantly forced to defend their religion. It appears that with a strengthened religious identity and a weakened national identity, the four Swedish IS-sympathizers chose to participate in the fighting in Syria after observing how the Western world had a passive standpoint regarding the prevailed situation in Syria. In this way, the four IS-sympathizers fought in favour of a religious identity in a country that they previously did not acquire a national belonging to.