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In this dissertation, using Jungian depth psychology, I use the dialectical structure of the human psyche as a foundation to illustrate some problems that develop when an individual identifies her or himself with the requirements of a rational organization. I argue that the unconscious side of the psyche is not acknowledged, and is in fact suppressed, by the rational form of organization. The consequences for the individual have serious side effects. Specifically, the human individuation process is obstructed and the feeling side of life is sacrificed. Basically, the rational organization represents an over assertion of the conscious attitude, that, if adhered to, may lead to an imbalance in the psyche. Consequently, a negative manifestation of the unconscious will be realized. In order to correct this situation, I contend that a more balanced form of organization is needed. A form that will allow the unconscious side of the psyche a wholesome expression. If the human individuation process is to proceed normally, the unconscious must be integrated into the conscious personality. Just what form the organization will take in order to facilitate, instead of obstructing, the individuation process cannot be determined exactly, nor predicted successfully. This is because all real change flows from deep within the unconscious through a symbol generating process, and it is not possible to formulate, rationally, a symbol through an intellectual process. It is evident, however, that the rational, masculine model of organization that heightens thinking, order, authority, objectivity, and impersonality must be mediated by a more feminine, subjective, feeling form of participative structure and process that encourages a wholistic realization of one’s personality, and a genuine opening up of feeling, both of which are prerequisites for the integration of the unconscious. / Ph. D.

The thesis questions the ways in which architecture might embody the notion of modernity in different cultures and regions yet achieve appropriateness relative to place. In the early twentieth century in the industrialized world, the issue of modernity in architecture was identified with the notions of abstraction and rationalization that colored the development of the modern movement. The second generation of the modern movement queried the roles of human experiences and urban and architectural contexts in architectural design. With the spread of the modern movement to the rest of the world, the issue of context in architecture grew stronger. Following this line of thought, this dissertation examines the tension between modernist abstractionism and urban and architectural contexts in place in which the presence and the role of local knowledge and traditions in architecture remained influential. It investigates modernity in architecture through a specific Asian reading and through an analysis of the work of Geoffrey Bawa of Sri Lanka. Selected works of Geoffrey Bawa are chosen because the significance of his oeuvre is often contested by interpreters who see it as reflecting various contemporary approaches, including regionalism and vernacularism. Thus, in an effort to refute such simplistic explanations of his work, this thesis examines selected works of Bawa, analyzing their spatial organization, formal arrangement, materials, techniques, and building details. In particular, it attempts to highlight the ways in which Bawa articulated the notions of experience and memory in his architecture. These analyses are then placed within the framework of the social and cultural situations that his architecture confronted in Sri Lanka. It is within this framework that we might determine the ways in which modernity and locality were embodied in Bawa's work. Interpretations of his work take into account the understanding of modernity as a cultural practice and an attitude. Modernity as an attitude relates to a specific modernist subject who is able to use reason for judgment in addressing context. In this dissertation, a reading on the work of Walter Benjamin on modernity, the pasts, and traditions frames this understanding of this modernist subjectivity. In architecture, modernity as an attitude means that is not a style but a way of thinking and formulating design intent. This inquiry is then used as a framework within which this dissertation will interpret the relationship between modernity and local identity. The conclusions of the dissertation contribute to an understanding of the achievement of modernity in architecture in tight relationship to context. On a more focused level, it also hopes to contribute to an appreciation of the extant works of Geoffrey Bawa, which the author of this dissertation deems exemplary of what modern architecture might achieve in Asia.

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Este trabalho discute a concepção sobre democracia presente na obra de Karl Popper, Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Haeyk e Ludwig Von Mises. A idéia principal da argumentação é que todos os autores realizam a defesa do que Popper nomeou como sociedade aberta, apesar das diferenças de abordagem teórica e de posição política existentes entre eles. No primeiro capítulo será apresentada a concepção de Popper sobre democracia destacando-se o conceito de sociedade aberta que foi cunhado pelo autor e as suas implicações nos temas que são considerados fundamentais pelo autor: a relação entre sociedade aberta e socialismo, as mudanças sociais na sociedade aberta, tradição versus revolução, burocracia e sociedade aberta. No segundo capítulo será apresentada a concepção de Schumpeter sobre democracia e será discutido quanto ela pode ser aproximada do conceito de sociedade aberta cunhado por Popper comparando-se as implicações das idéias de Schumpeter para os mesmos temas fundamentais discutidos no capítulo sobre Popper. No terceiro capítulo será seguida a mesma estrutura do segundo, só que agora em relação a Hayek e no quarto capítulo em relação a Mises. Na conclusão será avaliado o conceito de sociedade aberta agora sob a amplitude de ser um modo de reunir autores que, apesar de suas diferenças e certamente sem terem realizado qualquer orquestração maior de suas idéias políticas, podem ser tratados como formando quase que uma ?escola austríaca? de defesa de uma certa interpretação da democracia. / This thesis discusses the conception of democracy as presented in works by Karl Popper, Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises. The main point of argumentation is based on the hypothesis that, despite the differences in both theoretical approaches and political preferences, all the authors support the concept of open society coined by Popper. In the first chapter, it will be introduced the Popper\'s conception of democracy focusing on his concept of open society as well as its implications for what he considers to be fundamental themes: the relation between open society and socialism, social changes in open society, tradition versus revolution, bureaucracy and open society. In the second chapter, the conception of democracy as discussed by Schumpeter will be introduced and it will be discussed how near it becomes to Popper\'s concept of open society when we compare the implications of the ideas of Schumpeter and Popper for the same fundamental themes discussed in the previous chapter. In the third and forth chapters, it will be followed the same structure of the second one for presenting the other two authors: Hayek and von Mises. In the conclusion, it will be evaluated the concept of open society taken in a wide sense as a mode of putting together authors that, in spite of their differences and considering that they did not promote any orchestration of their political ideas, can be treated as though they were part of an \"Austrian school\" of defense of a certain interpretation of democracy.

Les études kantiennes peuvent se pencher sur l’œuvre de Kant, mais aussi sur sa réception et la manière dont le kantisme a contribué à faire surgir des réflexions philosophiques originales. Cette thèse explore cette deuxième voie, à travers le prisme particulier des circulations entre science, philosophie et épistémologie. Il s’agit de rendre compte de la manière dont des savants ont compris et utilisé Kant, au XIXe siècle en France. Ampère, Brunschvicg, Comte, Couturat, Gergonne, Lacroix, Léchalas, Littré, Milhaud, Poincaré, Renouvier, Rey, Ribot, Paul Tannery, Wronski et Wyrouboff sont quelques exemples de penseurs plus ou moins connus ayant une formation scientifique et faisant usage de Kant. Toutefois, plutôt que de proposer une suite rhapsodique d’études consacrées à ces savants, cette thèse suit les principaux réseaux de circulations des images et usages du kantisme tout au long du XIXe siècle en France. De l’Académie de Berlin aux revues francophones de la fin du siècle, une institutionnalisation des références à Kant se met progressivement en place et elle implique de nombreuses interfaces entre science, philosophie et épistémologie. Kant est utilisé notamment pour souligner l’activité du sujet dans la constitution de la connaissance et pour poser le problème épistémologique de la correspondance des représentations avec la réalité. Ainsi, le réalisme est mis en tension. Plusieurs savants s’emparent du kantisme pour construire des options philosophiques originales repensant les liens et les oppositions entre empirisme, idéalisme et scepticisme. Par exemple, un réalisme structural associé à une réflexion sur la croyance et sur les probabilités émerge dès le début du XIXe siècle. On le retrouve, sous des formes variées, chez Ampère, Cournot ou encore Tannery. Par ailleurs, le kantisme sert de creuset philosophique pour penser le fondement des sciences. La géométrie et l’arithmétique sont au centre des débats. C’est particulièrement vrai à la fin du siècle, avec la renaissance des géométries non-euclidiennes et le développement des liens entre mathématiques et logique. Ces problématiques ont des racines plus anciennes et les matrices des usages de Kant émergent dès le début du siècle. Enfin, il n’est pas rare d’observer que les savants utilisent Kant dans des analyses portant sur la mécanique rationnelle ou encore sur la cosmologie. De manière générale, la présente étude rend compte de la manière dont les références à Kant fonctionnent pour penser ces sciences. En définitive, il s’agit de manifester que Kant est un acteur français décisif de l’épistémologie et de la philosophie des sciences de tout le XIXe siècle / Kantian studies can look at Kant’s body of work, as well as the way it was received and how it has contributed to the emergence of original philosophical reflections. This thesis examines the latter path, through the peculiar prism of circulation between science, philosophy and epistemology. The goal is therefore to show how scholars understood and used Kant. Ampère, Brunschvicg, Comte, Couturat, Gergonne, Lacroix, Léchalas, Littré, Milhaud, Poincaré, Renouvier, Rey, Ribot, Paul Tannery, Wronski and Wyrouboff are but a few examples of more or less renowned thinkers with a scientific education who used Kant. However, rather than offering a litany of studies dedicated to these scholars, this thesis follows the main circulation networks of pictures and uses of Kantianism all through the XIX century in France. From the Prussian Academy of Sciences to the Francophone reviews at the end of the century, references to Kant were being more and more institutionalized, which implied many interactions between science, philosophy and epistemology. However, Kant was notably used to acknowledge the importance of the subject’s activity in constituting knowledge and to raise the epistemological issue of correspondence between representations and reality. The concept of realism was then given a bit of a stretch. Several scholars seized Kantianism to build up original philosophical options, which rethought the connections and oppositions between empiricism, idealism and skepticism. For instance, a form of structural realism associated with a reflection on belief and probabilities appeared as soon as the beginning of the XIX century. It can be found, for example, under various forms in Ampère, Cournot or even Tannery. Moreover, Kantianism was used as a philosophical melting pot to think out the founding principles of sciences. Geometry and arithmetic were at the heart of the debates. It was especially the case at the end of the century, thanks to the rebirth of Non-Euclidian geometries and the development of links between mathematics and logic. However, these problematics had roots that were older and the matrices of Kant’s uses emerged as soon as the beginning of the century. Finally, it is not uncommon to observe that scholars used Kant to think out rational mechanics or even cosmology. As such, this study reports how references to Kant worked to think out these sciences. According to these perspectives, Kant is indeed an influential actor in epistemology and philosophy of science in the XIX century in France

Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield the results the philosopher is looking for, since concepts like 'knowledge' or 'free-will' vary from culture to culture or even between persons within a culture. Finally, some philosophers argue that we should abandon the armchair program because philosophy should be an empirical enterprise continuous with the sciences. I argue that attempts to undermine intuition fail and that one can justify the evidential status of intuition in a non-question begging way. I then argue that attacks on the belief in shared concepts do not succeed because they often conflate the nature of scientific objects with those of interest to the philosopher. However, if concepts do vary from culture to culture, I show that the philosopher need not abandon the armchair. She can still do conceptual analysis but it will be only the entry point into the philosophical dialogue. I apply this approach to epistemology arguing that the central epistemic questions ought to be the existential and the normative. This approach helps to vindicate epistemic internalism.

This thesis uncovers the rational and Romantic assumptions about the relationship between objects and identity that are embedded in occupational therapy, and critiques current practice from that perspective. It is based on an initial assumption that there is in fact a relationship between people's identity and the objects they make, have, use and are associated with. This assumption is explored through an interpretive examination of the fields of literature that are commonly identified as informing occupational therapy, supplemented by selected popular literature. The exploration takes a philosophical approach, guided by notions from philosophical hermeneutics, including pre-understandings, the hermeneutic circle and fusion of horizons. The conclusion reached is that people informed by Western philosophies interpret the identity meanings of objects in both rational and Romantic ways. To inform the study, the nature of rationalism and Romanticism are then explained, and the implications of these philosophical traditions in relation to objects and identity are teased out. This interpretation is guided by a history of ideas methodology, which entails approaching historical texts from a new perspective, in this case the identity meanings of objects. Thus informed, occupational therapy literature, primarily that published in Britain between 1938 and 1962 is examined from the perspective of objects and identity. What is revealed is that rational and Romantic understandings of objects, and of patients' and their own identity are clearly discernible. Such understandings afforded early occupational therapists both ways to organise their growing knowledge of the therapeutic application of crafts and the transformative outcomes of occupational therapy intervention. Gradually however, factors both internal and external to the profession served to undermine therapists' Romanticism. Primary amongst these were World War II, which saw a redeployment of occupational therapists from mental health to physical rehabilitation settings; advances in rehabilitative medicine, which brought a reduction in secondary complications and the adoption of teamwork; and the development of new practice areas including domestic rehabilitation using gadgets to enhance function and pre-vocational rehabilitation. As a result, tensions between rational and Romantic understandings crystallised around two long-standing controversies. These were whether or not craft equipment such as weaving looms should be adapted to serve specific remedial purposes, and whether it was the process of making a crafted object or the quality of the finished product that was more important. In the event, these contested ideologies became largely irrelevant as craftwork was sidelined from mainstream practice. With it, occupational therapists' Romantic vision of transforming people's lives through creative activity also slipped away. Several reasons for this loss of one of the profession's founding philosophies are proposed. They include the substantial absence of the professions' philosophical foundations from its education, and the paucity of theory and research methodologies that might have informed the nature and process of transformative change that earlier occupational therapists had observed and reported. The thesis concludes by arguing for the importance of recovering a balance between rationalism and Romanticism. A call to action is issued, addressing change in educational practice, concerted research effort to identify and articulate transformative processes within occupational therapy, and political action focusing on the inclusion of Romantic perspectives within policy and strategic documents.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

In the first chapter, I examine the definitions and axioms in Part One of Spinoza's Ethics. From there, I discuss five interpretations of Spinoza's notion of `axiom' in order to strengthen our understanding of the role Spinoza took axioms to play in his work. In the second chapter, I move from the discussion of what an axiom is to a consideration of the precise meaning of the fourth axiom of the first part (1A4). A key move in this chapter is to show that Spinoza does not separate causation and conception. In the third chapter, I defend the truth of 1A4 by showing that it follows from the definitions of Substance and Mode. I argue that in virtue of the conclusions of the previous two chapters, the axiom can be regarded as true for its relevant magnitude (in a way akin to the 'common notions' of Euclid's Elements). / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-04 13:22:27.876