Este trabalho discute a concepção sobre democracia presente na obra de Karl Popper, Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Haeyk e Ludwig Von Mises. A idéia principal da argumentação é que todos os autores realizam a defesa do que Popper nomeou como sociedade aberta, apesar das diferenças de abordagem teórica e de posição política existentes entre eles. No primeiro capítulo será apresentada a concepção de Popper sobre democracia destacando-se o conceito de sociedade aberta que foi cunhado pelo autor e as suas implicações nos temas que são considerados fundamentais pelo autor: a relação entre sociedade aberta e socialismo, as mudanças sociais na sociedade aberta, tradição versus revolução, burocracia e sociedade aberta. No segundo capítulo será apresentada a concepção de Schumpeter sobre democracia e será discutido quanto ela pode ser aproximada do conceito de sociedade aberta cunhado por Popper comparando-se as implicações das idéias de Schumpeter para os mesmos temas fundamentais discutidos no capítulo sobre Popper. No terceiro capítulo será seguida a mesma estrutura do segundo, só que agora em relação a Hayek e no quarto capítulo em relação a Mises. Na conclusão será avaliado o conceito de sociedade aberta agora sob a amplitude de ser um modo de reunir autores que, apesar de suas diferenças e certamente sem terem realizado qualquer orquestração maior de suas idéias políticas, podem ser tratados como formando quase que uma ?escola austríaca? de defesa de uma certa interpretação da democracia. / This thesis discusses the conception of democracy as presented in works by Karl Popper, Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von Mises. The main point of argumentation is based on the hypothesis that, despite the differences in both theoretical approaches and political preferences, all the authors support the concept of open society coined by Popper. In the first chapter, it will be introduced the Popper\'s conception of democracy focusing on his concept of open society as well as its implications for what he considers to be fundamental themes: the relation between open society and socialism, social changes in open society, tradition versus revolution, bureaucracy and open society. In the second chapter, the conception of democracy as discussed by Schumpeter will be introduced and it will be discussed how near it becomes to Popper\'s concept of open society when we compare the implications of the ideas of Schumpeter and Popper for the same fundamental themes discussed in the previous chapter. In the third and forth chapters, it will be followed the same structure of the second one for presenting the other two authors: Hayek and von Mises. In the conclusion, it will be evaluated the concept of open society taken in a wide sense as a mode of putting together authors that, in spite of their differences and considering that they did not promote any orchestration of their political ideas, can be treated as though they were part of an \"Austrian school\" of defense of a certain interpretation of democracy.

Feminist theory is a vast area of discourse and, while the differences between the many tendencies are extremely interesting, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in such an inquiry. I have chosen to conduct a critique of Habermas's theory of communicative action from a perspective informed for the most part by postmodern/poststructural feminism. I hope that my reasons for working within such a framework will become evident in the following chapters but, in my view, a postmodern/poststructural feminist perspective sharpens the critique of Habermas's theory precisely because it stands in such contrast to it. For the purposes of this thesis, my critique will focus upon Habermas's most recent work - The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (1984), and Volume II: The Critique of Functionalist Reason (1987). Other works by Habermas will not be specifically addressed although references will be made to them as necessary to clarify his positions on various issues. / Arts, Faculty of / Sociology, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The central aim of this dissertation is to inquire whether there is any one concern or end that Karl Popper regards as primary and therefore binding for all areas of human endeavor. Attention centers upon his conjecture and refutation methodology for theoretical empirical science (Chapter I), his methodologies for theoretical and technological social science (Chapter II), and his social philosophy (Chapter III). The thesis of the dissertation is that Popper does subscribe to an ultimate concern, namely, the preservation and furthering of rationalism. Furthermore, that the means Popper stipulates for the realization of this end would inhibit, or prohibit, use of his methodology for theoretical science by certain sciences. [TRUNCATED] / 2031-01-01

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I denna studie undersöks hur undervisningen om religion och vetenskap i religionskunskap 1 på gymnasiet kan vara konstruerad i klassrumspraktiken, det vill säga vad som presenteras angående förhållandet mellan religion och vetenskap, samt vad som sker i interaktionen mellan läraren och eleverna. Studien bygger på observationer av en klass och deras lärare under momentet religion och vetenskap. Observationerna har därefter analyserats med hjälp av diskursanalys. Resultatet visar två diskurser, vilka jag kallar för en sekularistisk rationell diskurs, samt en källkritisk diskurs. I den sekularistiskt rationella diskursen framgick det att relationen mellan religion och vetenskap presenterades på ett relativistiskt vis. Den relativistiska undervisningen triggade ett rationalistiskt tankesätt, vilket grundade sig i en sekularistisk syn på religion. Detta resulterade i att religionen framstod i underläge i förhållande till vetenskapen, vilket orsakade att religiösa livsåskådningar beskrevs utifrån ett ”dom”, medan sekulariserade beskrevs utifrån ”man”. I den källkritiska diskursen betonades kritiskt tänkande och källkritik, trots detta var den sekularistiskt rationella diskursen dominerande i klassrumspraktiken. Vidare visar resultatet att den sekularistiskt rationella diskursen kan undvikas om förhållandet mellan religion och vetenskap sätts i en historisk kontext, samt om undervisningen anpassas efter de kontextuella villkoren i klassen, vilket i detta fall var att eleverna hade en sekularistisk syn på religion. En annan lösning är att presentera olika perspektiv på kunskap, som till exempel ontologiska och epistemologiska ansatser, vilka följaktligen kan utmana elevernas syn på religion respektive vetenskap.

Subject description is a linguistic practice, and therefore all controlled vocabularies are built upon theories of language. However, the underlying theories are rarely discussed in greater length. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what epistemological foundations controlled vocabularies are built upon and what consequences that has for their internal structure. The main object of interest is the category. From a rationalistic point of view categories are universal and well defined. In a pragmatic point of view categories are contextual with fluid boundaries. A pragmatic point of view has been shown by Wittgenstein and Rosch to more accurately describe how language works, therefore the standpoint of this thesis is that a controlled vocabulary that takes a pragmatic approach will be a better tool for indexing and searching. The study is done in three parts. First the theoretical literature on knowledge organisation is investigated. The findings are that there is a divide among writers who take a rationalistic and pragmatic approach. Then, guidelines and principles from IFLA, LCSH, Svenska ämnesord and MeSH are examined. In all cases the rationalist view is favored but the quirks of language are handled in different ways. In IFLA's FRSAD, the writers claim to take no theoretical stance but in reality they take a rationalistic perspective. LCSH blame the inconsistencies in the system on the many people that have worked on it over a long period of time. SAO is built with LCSH as a role model and therefore have the same problems, although they have gone towards a more pragmatic approach. MeSH, however, acknowledges that language is more complicated, and the controlled vocabulary is built on a more pragmatic foundation. Lastly, examples from the controlled vocabularies are discussed. The finding is that, in practice, controlled vocabularies work in accordance with a pragmatic perspective. This is a two years master’s thesis in Library and Information Science.

Le XVIIIème siècle consacra en France la disjonction idéologique, intellectuelle et spirituelle entre la raison critique et empirique du philosophe et l’anthropologie chrétienne des défenseurs de l’orthodoxie. Toutefois, l’intuition et l’intention d’un syncrétisme humaniste aspirant à voir collaborer l’intelligence scientifique et l’intelligence de la foi survécut à la Renaissance et au Grand siècle pour soutenir la réflexion de littérateurs catholiques reconnus, les abbés Morellet, Coyer, Yvon, Bergier et Raynal. Ces théoriciens de la médiation incarnaient une frange modérée de l’apologétique catholique, une apologétique de la conciliation qui soulève maintes interrogations quant à sa nature et sa portée : parvint-elle à arrimer les valeurs chrétiennes aux idées forces des Lumières rationnelles, proposa-t-elle une voie médiane entre les partis antagonistes des « philosophes » et des « dévots » ? L’exploration analytique et la mise en perspective comparative des termes de l’alliance de la raison et de la foi révèlent une conciliation plurielle ; véritable nébuleuse idéologique élevée sur l’humanisme théologique du molinisme jésuite, elle se confronte à des difficultés externes d’ordre conjoncturel, partisanes notamment, se heurte aux antagonismes de la certitude du christianisme et du doute méthodique, se soumet aux exigences de la dualité de la « raison » - philosophique et scientifique -, mais subit également les retombées de ses propres ambiguïtés et carences conceptuelles. In fine, l’enjeu de ces ambitions syncrétiques ne repose plus tant sur le diptyque foi-raison que que sur les interactions entre le sentiment de foi, la nature et la science. / The XVIIIth century, in France, sanctioned the ideological, intellectual and spiritual separation between the critical and empirical reason of the philosopher and the christian anthropology of the orthodoxy partisans. However, intuition and intent of a humanist syncretism aiming at the collaboration of both scientific and faith intelligence lived through Renaissance and XVIIIth century, to maintain the thought of famous Catholic litterateurs, abbots Morellet, Coyer, Yvon, Bergier and Raynal. Those mediation theoreticians personified a moderated minority of catholic apologetics, an apologetic of conciliation calling to mind about its nature and its significance: did it manage to tie up the christian values to the strong ideas related to the rational Enlightenment; did it offer a medial path between the antagonistic parties of the “philosophers” and the “devout persons”? A pluralist conciliation can be revealed by analytical exploration and by putting into perspective comparatively the terms of the union between reason and faith. Deemed as a true ideological nebula rose on the theological humanism of Jesuit molinism, this conciliation was constrained by cyclical external difficulties, was torn apart between Christianity certainty and methodical doubt, was faced to the requirements of the duality of the philosophical and scientific “reason”, but was also submitted to the consequences of its own ambiguities and conceptual lacks. In fine, the stake of these syncretic ambitions lied less on the faith-reason diptych than on the harmonization of the feeling of faith, nature and science.

Robert Brandom desenvolve um racionalismo que compreende os seres racionais como usuários de conceitos e sensíveis à \"força\" das razões. Essa ideia é explorada a partir de uma noção central da obra de Wilfrid Sellars, o \"espaço lógico das razões\". Este espaço é uma estrutura conceitual, linguística e normativa através da qual os seres racionais podem aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las. Contudo, sua principal característica é a articulação inferencial, isto é, aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las são atividades que só podem ser realizadas num contexto inferencial. Esta pesquisa visa discutir e analisar esta concepção de racionalidade evidenciando a centralidade do conceito de \"inferência\". / Robert Brandom develops a rationalism that considers rational beings as concept users and sensitive to the \"force\" of reasons. This idea is explored from a central notion of Wilfrid Sellars\'s philosophical work, the \"logical space of reasons\". This space is a conceptual, linguistic and normative structure by which rational beings can apply concepts, giving reasons and justifying them. However, the main feature of logical space is the inferential articulation, i.e., applying concepts, give reasons and justify them are activities that can be performed only in inferential context. This research aims to discuss and analyze this conception of rationality emphasizing the centrality of the concept of \"inference\".

Nesta dissertação pretendo reler o debate entre Ronald Dworkin e o positivismo jurídico. Farei isto sob o prisma da filosofia analítica, especificamente, contextualizando o debate no âmbito de uma discussão travada entre três teorias semânticas específicas: a descricional, o externalismo semântico e o bi-dimensionalismo ambicioso. Há algum tempo Dworkin lançou uma crítica ao positivismo, qual seja, o positivismo jurídico pretende reduzir a forma direito de como as coisas são à conformação puramente descritiva de como o mundo é. Disse, ainda, que somente quando concebido como uma teoria semântica é que o positivismo jurídico tornar-se-ia inteligível. Os posivistas, a seu turno, argumentam que a Jurisprudência analítica é um projeto teórico pelo direito e não pelo significado do termo direito e que, portanto, deveríamos manter separados dois tipos de questionamentos: O que é direito? e O que é direito?. Se tudo correr bem, ao reler o debate entre os positivistas e Ronald Dworkin a partir do instrumental obtido no âmbito da teoria semântica, poderemos perceber que pode ser verdade que o positivismo jurídico, enquanto projeto teórico, é sobre o direito, o referente, e não sobre o direito, o termo; entretanto, a forma pela qual o positivismo concebe o questionamento O que é direito?, ele mesmo, parece acabar por qualificá-lo, num sentido não trivial, como semântico. / I intend to reread the debate between Ronald Dworkin and legal positivism. I will do that through the prism of analytic philosophy, specifically in the context of the debate between three specific semantic theories: descriptional, externalism and the ambitious bidimensionalism. Dworkin criticized legal positivism: the legal positivism aims to reduce the law-way of things to the purely descriptive form of the world. He also said that only when conceived as a semantic theory is that legal positivism would become intelligible. The posivists argue that analytical Jurisprudence is a theoretical project about law and not about the meaning of \"law\", therefore we should keep separated two types of questions: \"What is law?\" and \"What is \'law\'?\". If all goes well, when rereading the debate through the prism of the discussion in the context of semantic theories, we will realize that it may be true that legal positivism is about law, the referent, and not about \"law\". However, the way in which positivism conceives the question \"What is law?\" seems to qualify it as semantic in a nontrivial sense.