No description available.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-157). Also available in print.

Robert Brandom desenvolve um racionalismo que compreende os seres racionais como usuários de conceitos e sensíveis à \"força\" das razões. Essa ideia é explorada a partir de uma noção central da obra de Wilfrid Sellars, o \"espaço lógico das razões\". Este espaço é uma estrutura conceitual, linguística e normativa através da qual os seres racionais podem aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las. Contudo, sua principal característica é a articulação inferencial, isto é, aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las são atividades que só podem ser realizadas num contexto inferencial. Esta pesquisa visa discutir e analisar esta concepção de racionalidade evidenciando a centralidade do conceito de \"inferência\". / Robert Brandom develops a rationalism that considers rational beings as concept users and sensitive to the \"force\" of reasons. This idea is explored from a central notion of Wilfrid Sellars\'s philosophical work, the \"logical space of reasons\". This space is a conceptual, linguistic and normative structure by which rational beings can apply concepts, giving reasons and justifying them. However, the main feature of logical space is the inferential articulation, i.e., applying concepts, give reasons and justify them are activities that can be performed only in inferential context. This research aims to discuss and analyze this conception of rationality emphasizing the centrality of the concept of \"inference\".

Robert Brandom desenvolve um racionalismo que compreende os seres racionais como usuários de conceitos e sensíveis à \"força\" das razões. Essa ideia é explorada a partir de uma noção central da obra de Wilfrid Sellars, o \"espaço lógico das razões\". Este espaço é uma estrutura conceitual, linguística e normativa através da qual os seres racionais podem aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las. Contudo, sua principal característica é a articulação inferencial, isto é, aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las são atividades que só podem ser realizadas num contexto inferencial. Esta pesquisa visa discutir e analisar esta concepção de racionalidade evidenciando a centralidade do conceito de \"inferência\". / Robert Brandom develops a rationalism that considers rational beings as concept users and sensitive to the \"force\" of reasons. This idea is explored from a central notion of Wilfrid Sellars\'s philosophical work, the \"logical space of reasons\". This space is a conceptual, linguistic and normative structure by which rational beings can apply concepts, giving reasons and justifying them. However, the main feature of logical space is the inferential articulation, i.e., applying concepts, give reasons and justify them are activities that can be performed only in inferential context. This research aims to discuss and analyze this conception of rationality emphasizing the centrality of the concept of \"inference\".

This dissertation is an exposition and critique of Robert Brandom's theory of discursive objectivity. It discusses this theory both within the context of Brandom's own systematic philosophical project and, in turn, within the ideas and questions characteristic of the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition in German philosophy. It is argued that Brandom's attempt to articulate a theory of the objectivity of discursive norms (and hence also of the content of discursive attitudes) resembles J.G. Fichte's development of themes central to Kant's philosophy. This "Fichtean" approach to the problem of objectivity is then compared and contrasted to that of G.W.F. Hegel. Though Brandom, Fichte and Hegel share the desire to derive an account of the conditions of objectivity from the social character is discursive practices, Hegel offers a version of this project that differs with respect to the nature of self-consciousness, sociality and truth. It is then argued that Brandom's theory suffers significant internal inconsistencies that could be avoided by adopting a more "Hegelian" approach to these three themes. More specifically, Brandom's own project requires that he recognize the necessity and irreducibility of firstperson and second-person discursive attitudes, as well as that he recognize the role of "I-We" social practices for discursive objectivity. Furthermore, he must include in his explanations some form of natural teleology and hence he must abandon his deflationary approach to semantic explanation. However, Brandom's methodological and metaphysical commitments prevent him from doing so.

This project offers an articulation of rationality in terms of normativity—that what it means to be acting rationally, in thought or in deed, can be understood via a notion of being bound or obliged to certain behaviors given a prior structure that delimits what is rational to assert in a discourse or perform in a society. In the explicit articulation of the role of norms in limning rationality, this project also emphasizes the opportunity and obligation to self-critically assess the value of the metalinguistic and metapractical standards that license rational assertions and behaviors. After an introduction, section 2 examines the role of rational constraint in Kant’s account of representation, concluding that the transcendental story his philosophy leaves us with impels us to look for an immanent socio-linguistic account of the normativity that obliges us to think and behave in certain ways, rather than lodging the force of normativity in transcendentality. Section 3 then examines Robert Brandom’s inferential semantics by addressing prominent responses to Brandom’s program, making explicit two ways in which normativity operates in inferentialism—one at the level of objectlanguage in the articulation of the propositional commitments and entitlements that specify propositional content, the other at the level of the metalinguistic appraisal of the standards that drive object-language inferentialism. Section 4 turns to the theoretical status of normativity and its role in practical behavior, where it is argued that a notion of normativity can underpin a theory of intentional states. Examining positions on naturalism, the author proposes that a causal account of intentionality, made explicit by the prescriptive nature of the theory advanced, provides a naturalist view of normativity for which norms are in explanations of social states as laws are in explanations of physical states. Hence the obligation to self-critically reflect on and revise the norms that delimit ethical behavior in social systems is understood as commensurate with the obligation to self-critically reflect on and revise the norms that delimit warranted assertions in epistemic discourse. The conclusion offers some remarks on the prospects for rational revision in both a discipline’s discourse and a society’s standards of behavior.

Robert Brandom has provided what is probably one of the best worked out accounts of how the meanings of linguistic expressions are determined by how they are used—in particular, used in inferences. There are three different types of inferential relations in terms of which Brandom gives his account: commitment-preserving, entitlement-preserving, and incompatibility relations. Brandom also recognizes that most of the reasoning we engage in is defeasible (or deductively inconclusive). For example, the inference from ‘Tweety is a bird’ to ‘Tweety can fly’ is defeasible, because it can be defeated if there is stronger overriding reason to deny that ‘Tweety can fly’—such as Tweety’s being a penguin. Surprisingly, Brandom’s three types of inferential relations are inadequate for describing defeasible inference. In my dissertation I explain how the problem arises—it’s actually two problems—and I propose a solution that is consistent with Brandom’s overall approach. The first problem is that although Brandom's account does explain how someone can lose entitlement to a claim by committing themselves to some other claim, as in the Tweety example, it doesn’t allow subsequent recovery of entitlement to that claim by the addition of yet further information—say, that Tweety is a penguin with a jetpack. Once defeated (by some information), an inference stays defeated, on Brandom's account. The second problem is that of interpretation: when should we interpret someone as committed to the propriety of an inference that is defeasible? Brandom's account of what it is to endorse an inferential relation has no room for the important distinction between endorsing an inference in a context in which it happens to be defeated, and not endorsing it at all. In the latter portion of this dissertation I propose various modifications to Brandom’s account that will allow it overcome these problems. I solve the first problem by modifying Brandom’s account of how someone is obliged to update their beliefs in light of the inferential relations they endorse. I solve the second problem by modifying Brandom’s account of when we can appropriately interpret someone as endorsing particular inferential relations.

Chaque activité humaine nécessite d’avoir sa propre méthode pour obtenir un résultat concret et satisfaisant. C’est ainsi le cas pour la philosophie, une discipline qui compte 2500 d’histoire et dont la méthode est alors délimitée par les philosophes et les autres personnes. Quelle est donc cette méthode philosophique? Il existe plusieurs réponses. Cette thèse va donc tenter de répondre à cette question en introduisant un projet de méthode philosophique dénommée « Conceptual Tuning » [l’accord conceptuel]. Les boxeurs ne se préoccupent généralement pas de la question conceptuelle « Qu’est-ce que la boxe? ». De même les biologistes se posent à peine la question de savoir « Qu’est-ce que la biologie ». Pour eux, ce genre de questions sont extérieures à leur discipline. Cependant pour la philosophie, la question de la nature de la philosophie est une question bien interne à cette discipline. La conscience de soi est une condition sine quo non pour « faire de la philosophie ».Puisque la philosophie possède une si longue histoire et tant de traditions diverses et variées, on présuppose donc qu’il existe de très nombreuses méthodes pour « faire de la philosophie ». Ma thèse tentera donc de contribuer à cette discussion portant sur la méthodologie philosophique en proposant une méthode que j’appellerai « Conceptual Tuning ». Cet accord conceptuel sera principalement développé à partir de la méthode « Conceptual Engineering » déjà utilisée dans la philosophie depuis, dont les défenseurs s’efforcent d’améliorer nos concepts tels que « personne », « libéral », « science ». Cette thèse présentera ainsi six versions de « Conceptual Engineering », à savoir le « Conceptual Engineering » de Cappelen, la Méthode d’Explication de Carnap, le Révisionnisme Moral de Zagzebski, la Guerre Lexique de Ludlow, la Négociation Métalinguistique de Plunkett et l’Approche d’Amélioration de Haslanger. Ces six approches estiment déjà que nos concepts pourraient être défectueux, et c’est la tâche du philosophe de les « réparer ». Alors que la plupart des approches de « Conceptual Engineering » ne font que se concentrer étroitement sur la perspective de « réparation », cette thèse soutiendra que l’accord conceptuel exige que l’attention soit plutôt portée sur une perspective « expressive ». En d’autres termes, il faudrait employer cette méthode dans un cadre général de la pratique consistant à demander et à donner des raisons. Cette thèse soutiendra également que d’autres méthodes philosophiques importantes telles que la méthode de Brandomian, la philosophie du langage ordinaire et l’analyse conceptuelle traditionnelle peuvent être bien incorporées dans le projet d’accord conceptuel. Ainsi, au lieu d’être en opposition, ces méthodes sont en fait conformes à l’accord conceptuel ces méthodes s’intègrent parfaitement à l’accord conceptuel. / Different human practices require various methods to carry them out successfully. Philosophy, an activity with 2500 years of history, must also have its own method, which demarcates a philosopher from a lay person. This thesis embarks on a project of philosophical method—conceptual tuning. How to do philosophy belongs to the category of metaphilosophy or philosophy of philosophy. Boxers usually do not care about the conceptual question ‘What is boxing?’ and biologists barely ask ‘What is Biology?’. For them, this kind of question is a higher order question which concerns the nature of the thing in itself. It is an external question for most disciplines. But for philosophy, the question concerning the nature of philosophy is an internal question. Self-awareness is a sine qua non of doing philosophy.With such a long history and so many traditions, the method of doing philosophy must be miscellaneous. My thesis attempts to contribute to the discussion of philosophical methodology by proposing a method I shall call conceptual tuning. Conceptual tuning is grounded in the philosophical method of conceptual engineering, advocates of which endeavor to improve our concepts. According to the method of conceptual engineering, philosophical problems stem from defects in our understanding of concepts, and it is the philosopher’s task to fix them. While most conceptual engineering approaches only narrowly focus on the perspective of ‘repairing’ or ‘fixing’, conceptual tuning calls for attention to the ‘expressive’ perspective. In other words, we should put this method in the broad framework of the practice of asking for and giving reasons. In this thesis, I also attempt to explain some previous conceptual methods under the title of conceptual tuning, such as Brandomian method, ordinary language philosophy, and the traditional conceptual analyses.

Cette thèse présente une conception de la rationalité qui évite les idéalisations des capacités cognitives des agents logiques, typiques des conceptions statiques de la rationalité axiomatique dans laquelle un agent n'est rationnel que dans la mesure où il ne se contredit pas et ce, peu importe les capacités cognitives qui lui sont allouées par les axiomes qui énoncent les normes auxquelles il doit se conformer pour être considéré rationnel (comme dans la théorie de la décision « standard » et les systèmes de preuve hilbertien). Afin d'obvier à ces idéalisations, je suggère d'utiliser l'approche dialogique de la logique (Lorenzen) dans la mesure où elle permet de délaisser la logique classique au profit d'une logique plus « faible » et de déployer une conception alternative de la rationalité « non monotone », c'est-à-dire « non cumulative » et dynamique. Dans ce contexte, je discute de la possibilité de procéder à une radicalisation des conditions d'assertabilité de la théorie anti-réaliste de la signification de Dummett qui prenne mieux en compte les actes judicatifs réellement à la portée des agents logique ainsi que les conséquences de cette radicalisation sur le choix de la logique. Sur cette base, je défends une conception de la rationalité des agents en termes de leurs capacités réelles, et non idéalisées, à justifier leurs assertions dans un cadre dialogique. Je suggère finalement de regarder du côté de la théorie de la rationalité « Socratique » de Sellars-Brandom que je compare à l'approche pragmatique de Lorenzen, car toutes les deux visent à rendre explicite ce qui est implicite dans nos jeux de langage, c'est-à-dire d'être capable de justifier ce que nous assertons. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Philosophie, Logique, Rationalité, Inférence, Épistémologie

This thesis is a detailed examination of the logico-semantic system propounded by the English philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (c.1287 – c.1347). It provides a reinterpretation of Ockham's account of mental content and mental-language semantics, as well as of his theory of consequential goodness. It does so from the standpoint of an inferentialist theory of meaning, in rejection of previous attempts made from the standpoint of internalist and externalist theories of mental content. Chapter 1 ('The Scientic Status of Logic') provides an account of Ockham's understanding of logic as a rational, practical, ostensive science. Chapter 2 ('The Received Interpretation') presents and casts doubt upon the arguments put forward by the defenders of both externalist and internalist construals of Ockham's semantic theory. Chapter 3 ('An Inferentialist Construal') presents the central tenets of a inferentialist theory of meaning. In order to show how Ockham's system can be understood within such a semantic paradigm, we will have to set out at least three things. First, Chapter 4 ('Ockham's Propositionalism') argues that the mature Ockham actually embraced a propositionalist theory of meaning. Second, Chapter 5 ('Obligationes and the Normativity of Asserting') seeks to prove that such a theory of meaning can only be properly understood against the normative background provided by his theory of obligationes. Finally, Chapter 6 ('Consequences') argues that Ockham's theory of consequential goodness is materialist, not formalist. That is to say, that the goodness of a certain kind of consequence ultimately depends upon the meaning of its propositional parts, rather than upon its structure. It is then shown that all remaining kinds of consequences (syllogisms included) are to understood with respect to these material inferences. The main sources of this research are Ockham's Ordinatio, his Summa logicae, and his Quodlibeta septem. As regards the inferentialist theory of meaning, Robert Brandom's Making it Explicit (1994) and Wilfrid Sellars 'Inference and Meaning' (1953) were essential to this research.