This dissertation constructs a "non-ideal theory" of justice: a systematic theory of how to respond justly to injustice. Chapter 1 argues that contemporary political philosophy lacks a non-ideal theory of justice, and defends a variation of John Rawls' famous original position - the Non-Ideal Original Position - as a method with which to construct such a theory. Finally, Chapter 1 uses the Non-Ideal Original Position to argue for a Fundamental Principle of Non-Ideal Theory: a principle that requires injustices to be dealt with in whichever way will best satisfy the preferences of all relevant individuals, provided those individuals are all rational, adequately informed, broadly moral, and accept the correct "ideal theory" of fully just conditions. Chapter 2 then argues for the Principle of Application - an epistemic principle that represents the Fundamental Principle's satisfaction conditions in terms of the aims of actual or hypothetical reformist groups. Chapters 3-5 then use these two principles to argue for substantive views regarding global/international justice. Chapter 3 argues that the two principles establish a higher-order human right for all other human rights to promoted and protected in accordance with the two principles of non-ideal theory. Chapter 4 argues that the two principles defeasibly require the international community to tolerate unjust societies, provided those societies respect the most basic rights of individuals. Finally, Chapter 5 argues that the two principles imply a duty of the international community to ameliorate severe poverty, as well as a duty to implement "fair trade" practices in international economics.

I detta examensarbete behandlas rättvisa inom bodelning inom ramen för den svenska äktenskapsbalken. Specifika frågeställningar är om bodelningen är rättvis utifrån filosoferna John Rawls och Robert Nozicks syn på rättvisa, men även lagstiftarens syn på rättvisa behandlas. Undersökningen visar att den svenska äktenskapsbalken uttrycker en mildare version av Rawls rättvisa. Rawls förespråkar en form av rättvisa där rättsstaten ska försöka utjämna olikheter mellan individer vid födsel men också ojämlikheter som kan uppstå under livets gång. Nozick förespråkar större frihet; alla ska oavsett klass, handikapp eller andra ojämlikheter, leva efter samma regler, även om detta leder till en sämre tillvaro för de som inte har samma förutsättningar. En av uppsatsens slutsatser är att Rawls hade uppskattat att den svenska bodelningen baseras på likadelningsprincipen – dvs. försöker utjämna egendomsförhållandena mellan makar vid äktenskapsskillnad – medan Nozick hade varit emot försöken att kontrollera individens fria val. Vilken syn på rättvisa lagstiftaren har utgått från för bodelning visade sig vara en svår fråga att svara på. I förarbetena till äktenskapsbalken diskuteras rättvisa betydligt mer, men inte heller här ges något konkret svar på lagstiftarens syn på rättvisa inom bodelning. Arbetet behandlar endast bodelning vid äktenskapsskillnad där båda makarna är vid liv och endast med utgångspunkt i två filosofers, Rawls och Nozicks, respektive uppfattning av rättvisa.

Dissertatio--Facultas philosophiae--Romae--Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 2005. / Bibliogr. p. 225-241.

Thesis (M.Phil.), Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2000. / Bibliography: leaves 119-124.

Zugl.: Berlin, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2009

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by David K. O'Connor for the Department of Philosophy. "April 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 333-342).

Thesis--M. Phil., University of Hong Kong, 1987.

Esta tesis doctoral explora la idea de que la razonabilidad es una virtud fundamental para que las sociedades plurales puedan convertirse en, o mantenerse como, un sistema de cooperación donde la justicia sea posible. La hipótesis central es que la razonabilidad como virtud es una manera de ser tolerante de forma solidaria, es entender al conciudadano, escucharlo, saber que juntos acordaron las reglas de cooperación y actuar y dar razones a partir de tales normas. El discurso «razonable» marcará los límites de lo tolerable y la tolerancia defenderá el espacio público donde los «razonables» pueden ser libres y resolver sus diferencias dándose razones. Aquel que es «razonable» se refrena con prudencia, escucha y coopera de acuerdo con los resultados del debate que se lleva a cabo en el seno de la vida democrática. Para mostrar lo anterior este trabajo explora la teoría liberal de Rawls, revisa sus bases kantianas y cómo es que se yergue como una alternativa al utilitarismo. Después detalla los elementos constitutivos de la teoría y cómo evolucionan a lo largo de la obra de Rawls. De todos los objetos que aquí se estudian, dos resultan fundamentales para el discurso: la «razón pública» y la «razonabilidad». Una vez esclarecidos estos y otros conceptos afines, se discute el papel de lo «razonable» en la «razón pública» a partir de las críticas que les hace Habermas. Esto sirve, por un lado, para intentar refutar las críticas y, por el otro, para profundizar en el entendimiento de la razonabilidad. Después se objetan los desencuentros de varios autores con la «neutralidad» del Estado liberal, que ellos confunden con secularismo. Mostraremos que el Estado Liberal es agnóstico. Stephen Toulmin defiende que la razón esta desequilibrada y que es importante regresarla a un estado balanceado entre lógica y retórica. Lo anterior resulta muy importante en un mundo tan incierto como el nuestro, donde la Teoría que lo explica y predice todo es imposible. Para analizar los episodios de las artes clínicas y los problemas morales, la razonabilidad y la prudencia son fundamentales y debemos volver a darles su lugar, afirma. Esto último, se muestra en este trabajo, resultará realmente útil para los defensores de ciertos derechos diferentes para personas desaventajadas. En esta tesis, además, se revisa qué hacer para contener a los «irrazonables» y evitar así que pongan en jaque la posibilidad de la justicia.Para concluir en esta tesis se vincula la razonabilidad con la tolerancia y la solidaridad. Además se revisa cómo su papel es vital para la democracia. / The present dissertation explores the idea that reasonableness is a fundamental virtue that enables plural societies to become, or stay as, a system of cooperation where justice is possible. The central hypothesis is that reasonableness as a virtue is a way of being tolerant with solidarity, to understand fellow citizens and to listen to them knowing that the rules of cooperation and conduct were agreed together. It is also to reason from those rules. «Reasonable» discourse points out the limits of what is tolerable. Tolerance defends the public space where those who are «reasonable» can be free and solve their differences giving each other reasons. Whoever is «reasonable» refrains him or herself with prudence, listens and cooperates according to the results of the debate that takes place in the heart of democratic life. To show what has been just said, this work explores Rawls's liberal theory, reviews its Kantian basis and how Rawls's theory becomes an alternative to Utilitarianism. Later, this dissertation details the constitutive elements of Rawls's theory and how these elements evolve through Rawls's work. Of all the elements that the present research studies, two become fundamental for its discourse: «public reason» and «reasonableness». Once these and some related concepts have been reviewed, it's possible to find a discussion of the role of the «reasonable» in «public reason». The discussion starts with Habermas's critique of these two concepts. This is useful, on one hand, to try to refute Habermas's critique and, on the other, because it allows to deepen the understanding of reasonableness. After this we object several misunderstandings about the neutrality of the Liberal State. We will show that the Liberal State is agnostic. Stephen Toulmin argues that reason is unbalanced and that it is important to bring it back to a state of equilibrium between Logic and Rhetoric. This will result very important in a world that is as uncertain as ours, where the Theory that explains and predicts everything is impossible. To analyze the problems of the clinic arts and those of morals, reasonableness and prudence are fundamental and we should give them back its place, Toulmin says. This idea will result very useful to the defenders of specific rights for disadvantaged people. In this dissertation we also review what to do to contain those who are unreasonable and avoid the risk that they represent for justice. To conclude, as we said, in this research we link reasonableness with tolerance and solidarity and review how their role is vital for democracy.

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In constructing and evaluating a theory of justice, it is crucial to determine the scope of justice---that is, the range of cases to which considerations of justice are appropriately applied. One important strand of contemporary political thought, best exemplified by John Rawls, argues that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, i.e., its major political and social institutions. Rawls' position has not, however, been without its share of critics. An alternative to institutional egalitarianism begins by emphasizing that the structure of institutions alone is of uncertain benefit when it comes to meeting the demands of justice. If we are truly concerned with social justice, we should be sensitive to the fact that individual choices can go a long way towards upsetting the balance of equality that justice requires. This thesis defends Rawls' focus on the basic structure against this challenge.