Thèse (Ph. D.)--Université Laval, 2004. / Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 12 juillet 2005). Bibliogr.

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o papel da religião em sociedades democráticas liberais. Inicialmente, descrevo os principais elementos das teorias exclusivas e inclusivas da religião. Os argumentos de tais teorias dizem respeito à (in)validez da justificação de razões religiosas para leis estatais de caráter coercitivo. Após apresentar estas linhas gerais, trago ao debate duas posições liberais a respeito da tolerância religiosa: primeiro, a de Ronald Dworkin, depois a de John Rawls com o intuito de defender uma concepção liberal igualitária de tolerância religiosa. Embora Rawls esteja normalmente situado entre os teóricos ditos exclusivistas, pretendo lançar mão de alguns elementos de sua teoria que sugerem, no entanto, a presença de uma certa visão inclusiva em seu argumento, ou ao menos uma visão menos restritiva de sua ideia / ideal de razão pública. Por fim, avalio os limites da teoria normativa rawlsiana ante as formulações de Jürgen Habermas a respeito dos desafios que a religião suscita em sociedades pós-seculares. / This work has the main goal of analyzing the role of religion in liberal democratic societies. First, I describe the main tenets of the exclusive and inclusive theories of religion. These theories concern the (in) validity of religious reasons to justify state laws of a coercive nature. After presenting the general outlines of the debate, I discuss how two different liberal theories, the Ronald Dworkins normative framework and then the rawlsian one, are both able to offer a liberal-egalitarian defense for a conception of religious tolerance. Although normally located among theories called exclusive I intend to use some elements of John Rawls theory that suggest, nonetheless, the presence of a certain inclusive vision in his argument, or at least a less restrictive view of his idea/ideal of public reason. Finally, I take up Jürgen Habermas assumptions on the place of religion in post-secular societies in order to test some normative limits which the theory of John Rawls must face.

O presente estudo tem como objetivo a análise da questão da igualdade no acesso ao cargo público sob a perspectiva da teoria da justiça de John Rawls, com o propósito de verificar se as ações afirmativas de reserva de vagas em concursos públicos são justas de acordo com a referida teoria. Trata-se de pesquisa teórica que se desdobra em quatro fases. Na primeira, analisa-se a teoria da justiça de Rawls no tocante a seus elementos centrais e às ideias políticas que podem tê-la influenciado. Na segunda, analisam-se modelos de Estado e de administração pública como um modo de subsidiar as discussões relacionadas ao cargo público. Na terceira, busca-se discutir o acesso ao cargo público mediante concurso público e sua relação com os princípios da justiça de Rawls. Na quarta, passa-se à análise da conformidade das ações afirmativas com a teoria da justiça e à análise da reserva de vagas (cotas) para negros em concursos públicos federais no Brasil. Considera-se, ao final, que as cotas, na maior parte dos casos, violam a igualdade equitativa de oportunidades segundo a perspectiva da teoria da justiça de Rawls. / The present study aims to analyze the matter of equality in the access to public office under the perspective of John Rawls theory of justice, with the intention of verifying if job reservation affirmative actions in public civil service examinations are fair according to the above mentioned theory. It is a theoretical research which unfolds in four phases. In the first one, Rawls theory of justice is analyzed regarding its central elements and the political ideas that might have influenced it. In the second one, state and public administration models are analyzed as a way of subsidizing the discussions related to public office. In the third one, it tries to discuss the access to public offices by means of public civil service examinations and their relation to Rawls principles of justice. In the fourth one, the conformity of affirmative actions with the theory of justice and the reservation for blacks (quotas) in federal civil service examinations in Brazil are analyzed. It is considered, in the end , that quotas, in most cases ,do violate fair equality of opportunity according to the perspective of Rawls theory of justice.

Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2005. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-68).

The  well  known  conference  of  Paul  Ricœur ‘Love and Justice’, pronounced when he received Leopold Lucas award in 1989, shows a dialectical tension between those two notions, and searches deeper in the philosophical –and even theological– basis that reveals love as rectification and safeguard of justice; without love, justice would be cruel, utilitarian and, paradoxically, unfair, remembering us the old Roman adage: summum ius, summa iniuria”. Moreover, Levinas, in his Talmudic Lesson on Justice”, compiled after in New Talmudic Readings, presents a less intuitive position, but no less interesting: justice is the place of forgiveness and love, it becomes humane everything it touches, and that’s why it doesn’t need correction; a justice that needed love, had maybe never been true justice. Here lies a critic that complements and improves both, the theory exposed by Paul Ricœur and its Rawlsian basis. / La célebre conferencia ‘Amor y justicia’ pronunciada por Paul Ricœur cuando se le dio el premio Leopold Lucas en 1989, muestra una tensión dialéctica entre  esas  dos  nociones  y  profundiza  las  bases  filosóficas  e  incluso  teológicas que  revelan  al  amor  como  rectificación  y  hasta  salvaguarda  de  la  justicia;  sin aquél,  esta  sería  cruel,  utilitaria  y,  paradójicamente,  injusta,  recordándonos  el viejo adagio romano summum ius, summa iniuria”. Por otra parte, Levinas en su Lección talmúdica sobre la justicia”, compendiada después en Nuevas lecturas talmúdicas, presenta una tesis menos intuitiva pero no menos interesante: la justicia es la sede del perdón y del amor, ella vuelve humano todo lo que toca, por eso no necesita corrección; una justicia que precisara del amor tal vez nunca ha sido verdadera justicia. Aquí radica una crítica que complementa y perfecciona tanto a la teoría de la justicia expuesta por Paul Ricœur como a sus bases rawlsianas.

Si l’étude de la mouvance dite « communautarienne » semble si digne d’attention, c’est précisément parce que ses arguments ne sont pas avancés au nom de communautés closes et régressives mais au nom de la démocratie elle-même. Le « communautarisme philosophique » qui nous intéresse ici se distingue radicalement d’une vision ethnique ou holistique du lien politique. De façon synthétique, l’argument communautarien soutient la priorité du bien sur le juste (right), priorité au double sens d’un primat politique et d’une antériorité morale et culturelle, c’est-à-dire du contenu du bien sur les procédures garantissant l’équité. Inversement, pour les « libéraux », la priorité du juste sur le bien signifie que les droits individuels ne peuvent pas être sacrifiés au nom d’un bien commun, et que les principes de justice (les droits fondamentaux) ne peuvent être dérivés d’une conception du bien et doivent au contraire être établis indépendamment de toute conception du bien. Libéral, John Rawls, situe le malaise de la tradition démocratique par l’incapacité de cette dernière à articuler de manière équitable les notions de liberté et de l’égalité. S’amorce ainsi un débat, pour les communautariens, autour de la définition de l’identité démocratique : le politique et le culturel précèdent-t-ils le droit ou les droits subjectifs libéraux l’emportent toujours par leur priorité ? / If the study of the movement known as ‘‘communitarianism’’ seams worthy of attention, this is precisely because its arguments are not advanced on behalf of regressed and closed communities but in the name of democracy itself. The ‘‘philosophical communitarianism’’ that interests us here is radically different vision of holistic ethnic or political link. In brief, the communitarian argument supports the priority of the good on the right, priority in the double meaning of a primate politic and has a prior moral and cultural anteriority, that is to say, the content of the course procedures guaranteeing fairness. Conversely, for the liberals, priority of the right over the good means that individuals rights can’t be sacrified in the name of a common good, and that the principles of justice (human rights) cannot be derived from a conception of the good and instead must be established independently of any conception of the good. Liberal, John Rawls, situates the discomfort of the democratic tradition by the inability of the latter was handed manner to articulate the concepts of liberty and equality. Begins as a debate, for communitarians, around the definition of democratic identity : do the political and the cultural define the right or are the liberal subjective rights won by their priority?

O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o papel da religião em sociedades democráticas liberais. Inicialmente, descrevo os principais elementos das teorias exclusivas e inclusivas da religião. Os argumentos de tais teorias dizem respeito à (in)validez da justificação de razões religiosas para leis estatais de caráter coercitivo. Após apresentar estas linhas gerais, trago ao debate duas posições liberais a respeito da tolerância religiosa: primeiro, a de Ronald Dworkin, depois a de John Rawls com o intuito de defender uma concepção liberal igualitária de tolerância religiosa. Embora Rawls esteja normalmente situado entre os teóricos ditos exclusivistas, pretendo lançar mão de alguns elementos de sua teoria que sugerem, no entanto, a presença de uma certa visão inclusiva em seu argumento, ou ao menos uma visão menos restritiva de sua ideia / ideal de razão pública. Por fim, avalio os limites da teoria normativa rawlsiana ante as formulações de Jürgen Habermas a respeito dos desafios que a religião suscita em sociedades pós-seculares. / This work has the main goal of analyzing the role of religion in liberal democratic societies. First, I describe the main tenets of the exclusive and inclusive theories of religion. These theories concern the (in) validity of religious reasons to justify state laws of a coercive nature. After presenting the general outlines of the debate, I discuss how two different liberal theories, the Ronald Dworkins normative framework and then the rawlsian one, are both able to offer a liberal-egalitarian defense for a conception of religious tolerance. Although normally located among theories called exclusive I intend to use some elements of John Rawls theory that suggest, nonetheless, the presence of a certain inclusive vision in his argument, or at least a less restrictive view of his idea/ideal of public reason. Finally, I take up Jürgen Habermas assumptions on the place of religion in post-secular societies in order to test some normative limits which the theory of John Rawls must face.

Thesis advisor: Michael Kelly / This thesis is an assessment of the notion of justice through the eyes of various philosophers including Aristotle, Montesquieu, the Federalists/Anti-Federalists, Rawls, and Sandel. These philosophies of justice are then applied to the Republican and Democratic platforms to assess which platform is the most just. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Carroll School of Management Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This dissertation is an attempt to better understand the moral and political thought of John Rawls. I begin by calling into question the conventional, though misleading, image of Rawls as a thoroughgoing Kantian. While the influence of Kant upon Rawls is undeniable and therefore well documented, there are important theoretical differences between them, and these differences open up the necessary interpretive space for the under-appreciated influences of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and G.W.F. Hegel. That neither Rousseau – a theorist of recognition – nor Hegel – a theorist of reconciliation – is regarded as an important influence on Rawls is a major oversight in the history of political thought – an oversight that my dissertation hopes to amend. But there is more at stake here than the addition of a new chapter in the history of political philosophy: when we expose the full extent of the Rousseauian and Hegelian heritage of justice as fairness (and later, political liberalism), we get a more complete, nuanced – and, in my view, a more attractive – image of the moral and political philosophy of Rawls. This new, richer image of Rawls’s political philosophy is captured by what I call “robust reasonableness”: what Rawls offers, in the end, is a more conspicuously demanding account of the reasonable – of our obligations towards our fellow participants in social cooperation. Justice as fairness is thus anchored by a morality of engaged and committed citizenship. This is precisely what Rawls sees as missing from Kant’s ethical philosophy. In response, he turns to Rousseau and to Hegel, both of whom provide, at least on Rawls’s view, persuasive solutions to the pathologies of social and political life. Rawls incorporates many of these solutions into the normative and practical landscape of his own philosophical doctrine, and this compels us to reconsider that doctrine in the light of these unrecognized influences.

This dissertation is an attempt to better understand the moral and political thought of John Rawls. I begin by calling into question the conventional, though misleading, image of Rawls as a thoroughgoing Kantian. While the influence of Kant upon Rawls is undeniable and therefore well documented, there are important theoretical differences between them, and these differences open up the necessary interpretive space for the under-appreciated influences of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and G.W.F. Hegel. That neither Rousseau – a theorist of recognition – nor Hegel – a theorist of reconciliation – is regarded as an important influence on Rawls is a major oversight in the history of political thought – an oversight that my dissertation hopes to amend. But there is more at stake here than the addition of a new chapter in the history of political philosophy: when we expose the full extent of the Rousseauian and Hegelian heritage of justice as fairness (and later, political liberalism), we get a more complete, nuanced – and, in my view, a more attractive – image of the moral and political philosophy of Rawls. This new, richer image of Rawls’s political philosophy is captured by what I call “robust reasonableness”: what Rawls offers, in the end, is a more conspicuously demanding account of the reasonable – of our obligations towards our fellow participants in social cooperation. Justice as fairness is thus anchored by a morality of engaged and committed citizenship. This is precisely what Rawls sees as missing from Kant’s ethical philosophy. In response, he turns to Rousseau and to Hegel, both of whom provide, at least on Rawls’s view, persuasive solutions to the pathologies of social and political life. Rawls incorporates many of these solutions into the normative and practical landscape of his own philosophical doctrine, and this compels us to reconsider that doctrine in the light of these unrecognized influences.