Modernity has generally been interpreted as a radical expression of human progress in the light of the advances of modern science and technology. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, however, modernity is a project "doomed to failure". Given the progressive-linearity of the modern model of rationality, the past has, in principle, been ruled out as a source of moral-political wisdom and guidance. From the perspective of modernity, the present (as the progressive moment of the future) has therefore nothing to learn from past traditions. MacIntyre contends that the moral confusion within modernity comes from its loss of telos, mediated in terms of the past. Modernity therefore harbours a paradox based on its inability to provide a philosophical justification for establishing the possibility of human solidarity in the present, while simultaneously affirming its faith in the future. In this regard, MacIntyre's work is an important contribution to the philosophical debate on modernity. / Philosophy / M. A. (Philosophy)

Thesis (PhD) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress. The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas, while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists, is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of metaphysical thinking. In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual legacy of the metaphysical tradition. In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely, that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the overcoming of metaphysics. The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject. In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel 'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang. Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan. Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp. In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie. In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is, naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post- metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe, wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika bewerkstellig. Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek. Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.

In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant's ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference. In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence. In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant's claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions. In chapter 3, I discuss Kant's conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing. In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant's method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-06-07T12:02:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriano Perin_.pdf: 3224127 bytes, checksum: b72439ae1e819fdfb1006a14c16d100a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-07T12:02:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriano Perin_.pdf: 3224127 bytes, checksum: b72439ae1e819fdfb1006a14c16d100a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-28 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Este trabalho apresenta uma reconstrução e uma defesa do pensamento crítico-transcendental kantiano no que concerne ao problema do sistema da razão. Sustenta-se a tese de que a consideração kantiana do problema do sistema se fundamenta na autossuficiência dos domínios teórico e prático da razão. Garante-se, para tal, que essa consideração parte da certeza da necessidade de um método próprio para a filosofia em relação à matemática e culmina na justificação crítica do mesmo método enquanto sintético a priori. Assegura-se, outrossim, que a posição kantiana mantém a sua singularidade ao conceber as determinações teórica e prática da razão ambas como ativas e determinantes em seus domínios próprios de atuação. A estrutura da tese é amparada por quatro momentos na argumentação do trabalho. Inicialmente, pondera-se a (in)dependência de justificação da filosofia em relação à matemática no pensamento de Leibniz, Wolff e na posição de Kant da década de 1750. Num segundo momento, considera-se a defesa kantiana, na década de 1760, do método da filosofia enquanto analítico, e a retomada dessa posição, na década de 1770. Num terceiro momento, apresenta-se a justificação crítica do método da filosofia enquanto sintético a priori no empreendimento da dedução das categorias. Num quarto e último momento, por fim, atende-se especificamente à consideração do problema do sistema nas décadas de 1780 e 1790. Apresenta-se, como resultado desses quatro momentos da investigação, a conclusão de que a abordagem do problema do sistema deixa-se ler, na própria formulação kantiana, como um “sistema da Crítica”. Fórmula essa que representa uma filosofia que, desde que estruturada enquanto Weltbegriff, nutre-se da positividade das determinações teórica e prática da razão e, para tal, é justamente resultante da observância de um plano concebido segundo o seu Schulbegriff. / This PhD research presents a reconstruction and a defense of Kant’s critical-transcendental philosophy concerning the problem of the system of reason. The thesis presented here sustains that Kant’s approach to the problem is grounded on the self-sufficiency of the theoretical and practical domains of reason. For this purpose, it is argued that Kant’s approach departs from the guarantee of the necessity of a specific method for philosophy in relation to mathematics and ends up with the critical justification of this method as synthetic a priori. It is also argued that the Kantian position maintains its singularity while conceiving the theoretical and practical determinations of reason as both active and determinative in their own domains. The structure of the thesis is grounded upon four steps of argumentation. Initially, the (in)dependent justification of philosophy in relation to mathematics in Leibniz, Wolff and the Kantian position in the 1750s is taken into account. Secondly, Kant’s account of the method of philosophy as analytic in the 1760s and its reconsideration in the 1770s is pointed out. After that, the critical justification of the method of philosophy as synthetic a priori in the enterprise of the deduction of the categories is set forth. Finally, a consideration of the problem of the system of philosophy in the 1780s and 1790s is carried out. As a result of these four moments of investigation, the conclusion reached is that Kant’s approach to the problem of the system of reason is better read, in his own words, as a “system of the Critic”. This being the formula of a philosophy that, as Weltbegriff, is nourished by both theoretical and practical determinations of reason, and, as such, counts on the consideration of a plan which is precisely conceived according to its Schulbegriff

In der vorliegenden Studie wurde mittels der Bildgebung des funktionellen MRT die Dynamik der neuronalen Hirnmechanismen untersucht, die es dem Menschen erlauben, durch kurzfristigen Verzicht auf Belohnungen seinen Verhaltenserfolg langfristig zu optimieren. Durch den Vergleich zweier Extremgruppen gesunder Probanden (hoch- versus niedrig- impulsive Probanden) sollte ein möglicher Zusammenhang zwischen der Impulsivität und dem funktionellen Zusammenspiel frontostriataler Regelkreise während des aktiven Prozesses der Entscheidungsfindung dargestellt werden. Die vorliegende Studie hat gezeigt, dass gesunde, nicht- klinische Individuen, die sich selbst mittels der Barratt- Impulsivitätsskala als hoch- impulsiv charakterisiert haben, ihr Verlangen nach einer direkten Belohnung erfolgreich durch Aktivierung zweier komplementärer Hirnmechanismen kontrollieren können. Als erster Mechanismus ist festzuhalten, dass selbstkontrollierte Entscheidungen zu einer Abschwächung der belohnungsabhängigen Aktivierung im Nucleus accumbens führten, welche von einer ansteigenden inversen Verbindung mit dem anteroventralen präfrontalen Kortex begleitet wurde. Der zweite Mechanismus ist, dass HI- Probanden ihren Wunsch nach einer höherwertigen, aber suboptimalen Belohnung in Abhängigkeit von der Wertigkeit der unmittelbaren Belohnung durch Downregulation im ventromedialen präfrontalen Kortex kontrollierten. Diesem Mechanismus folgte eine ansteigende inverse Kopplung mit dem ventralen Striatum. Von entscheidender Bedeutung ist dabei, dass sich diese neuronalen Mechanismen qualitativ von denen der extrem- kontrollierten Probanden unterschieden. Insgesamt lässt sich sagen, dass diese Ergebnisse darauf hindeuten, dass es persönlichkeitsspezifische neuronale Mechanismen gibt, die es hoch-impulsiven Probanden ermöglichen, ihren Wunsch nach einer unmittelbaren Belohnung zu kontrollieren.

Modernity has generally been interpreted as a radical expression of human progress in the light of the advances of modern science and technology. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, however, modernity is a project "doomed to failure". Given the progressive-linearity of the modern model of rationality, the past has, in principle, been ruled out as a source of moral-political wisdom and guidance. From the perspective of modernity, the present (as the progressive moment of the future) has therefore nothing to learn from past traditions. MacIntyre contends that the moral confusion within modernity comes from its loss of telos, mediated in terms of the past. Modernity therefore harbours a paradox based on its inability to provide a philosophical justification for establishing the possibility of human solidarity in the present, while simultaneously affirming its faith in the future. In this regard, MacIntyre's work is an important contribution to the philosophical debate on modernity. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M. A. (Philosophy)

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:20:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 ArquivoTotalJosicleide.pdf: 2447454 bytes, checksum: 49200095e1d93140360955279b0d33ed (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Taking into account the changes in this globalized world, whose consequences echo in the accounting setting, in which their effects are manifested in reflections, theories and social, tax or normative practices, it is realized that the accountant needs a theoretical and practical formation that fosters a professional profile which makes feasible better organizational results and social development. Hence, accounting formation should encompass the necessary competences so that the course s graduate student can be placed in the labor market so as to respond to its demands as well as to the settings of the global economic policies, consciously and critically, ensuring thus the citizenship exercise by envisaging better life conditions and information democratization. Due to this fact, this research aimed at analyzing the existent relationship between the theoretical knowledge and the practice knowledge in the Accounting formation from the pedagogical-political fundamentals of Higher Education in the state of Paraíba. Consequently, Jürgem Habermas´ contributions to the Theory of Communicative Action were used with the intention to understand the relation established between the theoretical discourse and the practical one, having as starting point the definitions of instrumental reason and communicative reason . For the development of this research of empirical classification and quanti-qualitative approach, the exploratory typology was adopted having bibliographical and documental research as procedures. As to data collection, a questionnaire with closed questions was answered by students/trainees from the following public institutions: UFPB Campus I, UFPB Campus IV, UFCG Campus Sousa, UEPB Campus I and UEPB Campus VI. The results obtained from the content analysis of the Pedagogical Projects of the Courses (PPCs) denote the fulfillment of the National Curricular Guidelines (DCNs) by the researched Higher Education Institutions. The analysis of syllabuses of the Laboratory of Practices demonstrates that the activities inherent to the exercise of accounting profession were not fully covered. Time dedicated to the total course load is reduced thus highlighting that there is concern with reflection and understanding originated from the objectives of the accounting technique, and with the means on attaining the specific goals, providing instrumental rationality. Questionnaire results reveal that the courses have a highly theoretical design. Practices are not carried out in full time and their focus is on the modus operandi . The training students feel fairly qualified for their entry in the labor market and they are not fully prepared to perform all the activities that are fulfilled by means of technological systems. The duality, that the obtained data make reference to the hypothesis, corroborates the dichotomy itself of the accounting formation that is related to the imperatives of instrumental rationality as well as to the communicative one. It can be concluded, however not acceptable, that in the accounting formation, the practice is dissociated from the theory and vice versa. / A Estratégia Saúde da Família enfrenta hoje o grande desafio de superar um modelo de atenção biologicista, e consolidar-se como espaço de cuidado integral, de inovação, e de aprendizagem contínua. Reconhecer as diferentes subculturas nas organizações e potencializar a aprendizagem individual e coletiva é essencial em espaços como este. Nesta pesquisa estudamos a Aprendizagem e a Cultura Organizacional em uma unidade docente-assistencial, campo de prática para alguns cursos de graduação e para a residência em medicina de família e comunidade da Universidade Federal da Paraíba. Fizemos um estudo de caso com uma abordagem qualitativa apoiado na hermenêutica-dialética. Realizamos 15 entrevistas com profissionais (incluindo residentes), apoiadores e preceptores da residência. A equipe se mostrou com traços positivos de coletividade, tolerância ao outro, compreensão, e como aspectos negativos uma relação tensa com a gestão e, poucos e difíceis espaços de conversa. A residência foi um ponto discutido como fator de mudança de práticas, qualificação do cuidado, e de construção de propostas para a unidade de saúde. Ao mesmo tempo, as mudanças ocorridas neste período geram ansiedades e conflitos trabalhados pela equipe. As unidade estudada apresentou algumas identificações com princípios da Atenção Básica, principalmente com o trabalho em equipe, e o cuidado ao paciente. Diversos aspectos foram levantados sobre a valorização e desvalorização do trabalho, principalmente o reconhecimento do trabalho no primeiro, e condições difíceis de trabalho no segundo. O acolhimento e o papel do apoiador, foram temas repetidamente discutido nas entrevistas.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Vanessa Brun Bicalho.pdf: 823140 bytes, checksum: 841a6cd082d29ce940ff0f686c8893b7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This research has as main purpose to analyze the validity from argument from Faktum of reason how possible founder of the moral law and freedom in Kant's practical philosophy. In order to explain the moral-practical domain in which conceptualized the argument from Faktum of reason, our text will demonstrate initially from the reading of the Critique of Pure Reason, the limits of theoretical reason by which, by the distinction of objects in general phenomenon and noumena, Kant founds both the speculative domain of reason as well, then the practical reason. The determination of the limits from the understanding´s faculty is crucial to establish the thematization of the freedom´s concept as a concept not only speculative (transcendental freedom), but also practical reason (practical freedom). Only so are presented the conditions to be thought of as not contradictory Nature and Freedom. Through the understanding of how theoretical reason (Verstand) knows, and the proper way to understand what pure reason (Vernunft) admits in favor from thinking of ideas that relate to the knowledge (ex., soul, God, and freedom), Kant developed the project of transcendental reason, the systematic point of view. The presence from the argument from Faktum of reason, a single fact admitted this as the reason (Vernunft) contrasted with the Kantian moral theory, developed and explained to the Groundwork from the Metaphysics of Morals. The argument of a Faktum at this reason, brought by the Critique of Practical Reason, caused a disturbance in the reception of Kant´s moral theory, giving breath to a debate on the possession, by reason, of the freedom´s concept. This new foundation argument was explained by Kant as an consciousness of immediately practical, awareness by itself and in itself guarantees the cogency of justification of possession from freedom, in our view, as the only critical argument can be provided by the faculty of pure practical reason. Unfavorable interpretations and receptions from Kant´s strategy of reasoning from freedom in Faktum of reason are discussed in this dissertation. Many current proposals to counteract the appearance of coherent Kant´s strategy brought by Critique of Practical Reason is shown attached to the previous movements of proof to demonstrate the freedom´s concept. In opposition to these proposals, which are a deconstruct component in the Kant´s argument of the perspective from critical-transcendental reason or systematic conformation, our text establishes a dialogue to elucidate the possible incongruities argumentative these interpretations, the themes of freedom (transcendental) and defense of Faktum as compatible arguments with the main transcendental perspective of reason, so kept in accordance with the project of reason from founding a Metaphysics of Morals. / Esta pesquisa tem como proposta principal analisar a validade do argumento do Faktum da razão como possível fundador da lei moral e da liberdade na filosofia prática kantiana. A fim de explicitar o domínio prático-moral no qual tematizamos o argumento do Faktum da razão, nosso texto demonstrará inicialmente a partir da leitura da Crítica da Razão Pura, os limites da razão teórica mediante os quais, pela distinção dos objetos em geral em fenômeno e númeno, Kant funda tanto o domínio especulativo da razão como também, em seguida, o da razão prática. A determinação dos limites da faculdade do entendimento é decisiva para instituir a tematização do conceito de liberdade como conceito não apenas especulativo (liberdade transcendental), mas também prático da razão (liberdade prática). Unicamente por isso são apresentadas as condições para serem pensados como não contraditórios Natureza e Liberdade. Por meio da compreensão do modo como a razão teórica (Verstand) conhece, e do modo adequado de compreender aquilo que a razão pura (Vernunft) admite em favor do pensamento de ideias que têm relação com o conhecimento (p.e., alma, Deus e liberdade), Kant desenvolveu o projeto da razão transcendental, do ponto de vista sistemático. A presença do argumento do Faktum da razão, de um único fato admitido como presente à razão (Vernunft), contrastou com a teoria moral kantiana, desenvolvida e explicitada até a Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes. O argumento de um Faktum presente à razão, trazido pela Crítica da Razão Prática, provocou uma inquietação na recepção da teoria moral kantiana, dando fôlego a um debate em torno da posse, pela razão, do conceito de liberdade. Esse novo argumento fundamentador foi explicitado por Kant como uma consciência do imediatamente prático, consciência que por si mesma e em si mesma garante a irrefutabilidade da justificação da posse da liberdade, a nosso ver, como o único argumento crítico possível de ser fornecido pela faculdade da razão pura prática. Interpretações e recepções desfavoráveis à estratégia kantiana de fundamentação da liberdade no Faktum da razão são debatidas na presente dissertação. Muitas propostas atuais de neutralizar o aspecto coerente da estratégia kantiana trazida pela Crítica da Razão Prática se mostram apegadas aos movimentos anteriores de prova para demonstrar o conceito de liberdade. Em oposição a essas propostas, que encontram na argumentação kantiana um componente descontrutivo da perspectiva da razão crítico-transcendental ou da sua conformação sistemática, nosso texto estabelece um diálogo visando elucidar as possíveis incongruências argumentativas dessas interpretações, pela tematização da liberdade (transcendental) e da defesa do Faktum, como argumentos compatíveis com a própria perspectiva transcendental da razão, mantidos por isso em conformidade com o projeto da razão de fundar uma Metafísica dos Costumes.

This paper considers the way Herbert Marcuse’s re-formulation of the instrumental reason as a technical reason can be understood as an intensification or acceleration of some of the themes presented by Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer in The Dialectics of Enlightenment. By reading Marcuse´s The One-Dimensional Man in dialogue with Martin Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, the paper explores a thesis that Marcuse draws on concepts from Heidegger, especially Ge-stell and Bestand, in his notion of the “technical reason” and “technological rationality” to think and think beyond modern technology. By positing modern technology as the focal point of the instrumentalization of reason, Marcuse sheds light of historical and contemporary problems with human thinking. The staging of this conversation with Marcuse and Heidegger that never really took place allows the paper to fully explore and understand Marcuse’s invoking of the aesthetical dimension, as well as his re-appropriation of Freudian terminology, as a model to re-establish negative thinking as a necessary counteraction to the one-dimensional positive thinking that is dominating private and public sphere.

Rationality is very widely regarded as a normative notion, which underwrites various everyday normative practices of evaluation, criticism, and advice. When some agent behaves irrationally, she is likely to be critically evaluated, and advised to change her ways. Such practices seem to presuppose that agents ought to behave as rationality requires. But some philosophers question this thought. They argue that at least some requirements of rationality cannot be ones that we ought to comply with. This thesis aims to dispel such sceptical doubts over the normativity of rationality; it defends the idea that the requirements of rationality are indeed normative, in the sense that if one is rationally required to F, one ought to F because rationality requires one to F. The normativity of three requirements of practical rationality in particular is the main target for defense in the following pages. They are: [ENKRASIA] Rationality requires of A that, if A believes she ought to F, then A intends to F. [MEANS-ENDS] Rationality requires of A that, if A intends to E, and believes that she will not E unless she intends to M, then A intends to M. [INTENTION CONSISTENCY] Rationality requires of A that, if A intends to F, and believes that she cannot both F and G, then A does not intend to G. After presenting some of the grounds for scepticism about the normativity of these three requirements in chapter 1, the thesis goes on in chapters 2 & 3 to critically examine several different accounts of why rationality is normative, concluding that they are all unsuccessful; a novel account is called for. An account of this kind is offered over the course of the two following chapters, 4 & 5. Each requirement is shown to be constituted by a certain kind of ought, while at the same time corresponding to a rule of correct reasoning. Chapter 6 is devoted to answering an objection to that account, according to which the rules of reasoning are given by permissions rather than requirements. Chapter 7 offers a digression into a related issue in action theory: it unfavorably explores the idea that reasoning is a factor that can be used to analyse not only rational action, but also intentional action more broadly; the chapter suggests that treating intentional action as irreducible is the more fruitful approach. Finally, chapter 8 summarizes the main conclusions of the thesis and comments on some remaining questions.