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vii, 216 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1979

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Philosophy, 1979.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

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This monograph is an empirical study of the competition between the French movement verbs amener/apporter and emmener/emporter, regarded as partial synonyms in the sense that they are interchangeable in certain contexts. The main purpose of this study is to account for these competing verbs from the perspective of actual language use, and to determine to what extent they are synonymous. The study is based on a corpus of French newspaper texts, some literary texts and the answers from a group of informants. It is shown that these lexemes cannot be defined by the principle of shared properties of all the senses represented. They are best analysed as polysemous within the framework of the prototype theory, according to which there is a basic sense from which the other secondary senses are derived through metaphor or metonymy. In the case of these verbs the competition between them arises through the widening of the semantic content of the verbs amener and emmener, extended to the use of inanimate objects uncapable of movement. This case normally calls for the use of the verbs apporter et emporter. In response to the question of the degree of synonymy between these verbs, when adopting a cognitive perspective, it is argued that they are to be considered as lexical variants rather than as perfect synonyms, in the sense that they focus on different aspects of the described movement. In other words, there is an aspectual difference between these closely related lexemes which is determined not only by inherent semantic properties, but to a large extent also by non-linguistic properties, such as the perspective adopted by the speaker in describing the mouvement. Finally, it is pointed out that the prototypical sense of each verb not only explains the different derived senses it gives rise to, but also accounts for the aspectual difference between these competing verbs. / digitalisering@umu

This study is a critical inquiry into the changes of the conceptualisations of the term &ldquo / program&rdquo / in architectural discourse, particularly after the 1960s and early 1970s. The aim of this thesis is to benefit from the difficulty of defining &ldquo / program&rdquo / in architecture as a fruitful, pragmatic and intellectual source. Although several terms, such as &ldquo / function,&rdquo / &ldquo / use,&rdquo / &ldquo / occupation,&rdquo / &ldquo / activity,&rdquo / and &ldquo / event&rdquo / fulfil some aspects, none of them suggest an exact definition of the term &ldquo / program&rdquo / in architecture. Neither does the introduction of the existence of the terms &ldquo / temporary activities,&rdquo / &ldquo / spontaneity,&rdquo / &ldquo / coincidence,&rdquo / &ldquo / hybridisation,&rdquo / and &ldquo / interface spaces,&rdquo / which consider the emergence of &ldquo / temporality&rdquo / as a more considerable variable in contemporary architecture, provides an adequate definition for the term. Therefore, in this research &ldquo / program&rdquo / in architecture is problematized as a &ldquo / weakly&rdquo / defined phenomenon. This study introduces the idea of &ldquo / programmatic experimentation&rdquo / by exploring and re-reading the work of Gordon Matta-Clark, in which &ldquo / experimentation&rdquo / led to the evaluation of &ldquo / program&rdquo / as &ldquo / concept.&rdquo / &ldquo / Program&rdquo / is re-conceptualised under two theoretical statements defining the general framework of this study: &ldquo / Concept&rdquo / and &ldquo / Experimentation&rdquo / . &ldquo / Concept,&rdquo / as introduced by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, produces a direction towards thinking to allow a new understanding by constructing multiple situations rather than constricting program&rsquo / s definition with specific terms. &ldquo / Experimentation&rdquo / suggests that the consequences of the experimental attempts of the 1960s and early 1970s are more than just technological possibilities inserted into architecture, revealing a shift in architectural &ldquo / program.&rdquo / In the end, the implementation of the constructed togetherness of the two terms is traced through the work of Matta-Clark as a radical criticism of the established conventions of architectural discourse.

This thesis argues that one can fruitfully think of Nelson Goodman's New Riddle of Induction as a reductio ad absurdum of a certain set of views of the relationship between similarities, on the one hand, and properties, concepts, or predicates, on the other. It argues that any view which takes similarities between particulars to be most fundamentally explained by those objects' sharing a property, satisfying a concept, or falling under a predicate leaves itself without the resources to provide a satisfying answer to a Goodmanian sceptic who proposes that inductive inferences using "grue" are equally as warranted as those using "green". I argue for an alternative view of similarity and inductive warrant which holds that the content of perceptual experience includes non-conceptual content the satisfaction conditions of which include that concept-independent similarities obtain. I argue further that it is only on the basis of that non-conceptual content that we are able satisfactorily to distinguish predicates like "grue" from those like "green." We must make such a distinction if we are to provide an acceptable account of inductive warrant. In the course of developing this view, I critique a range of mainstream, contemporary accounts of the relationship between similarities, concepts and properties, and of the role of perceptual experience in justifying empirical beliefs. Chapter 1 argues for a realist view of similarities between particulars which takes our concepts of properties to spring from our observations of those similarities. This view is contrasted with David Armstrong's universal realism, which is rejected. Chapter 2 argues that Goodman's approach to his New Riddle based on entrenchment fails, and argues that if and only if one embraces the view of similarity and concepts that I favor then the New Riddle can be reduced to traditional Humean concerns about induction. Chapters 3 through 5 discuss difficulties for Donald Davidson's approach to the New Riddle, his account of the justification of empirical belief, and his rejection of the very idea of a conceptual scheme, tracing each of these difficulties to Davidson's view that similarities must always be understood in terms of concepts under which particulars fall. Using John McDowell's Mind and World as an example, Chapter 6 argues that any account of perceptual justification of empirical belief according to which the content of perception is limited to conceptual content will fall into the New Riddle, while accounts which permit non-conceptual content can avoid this problem.

I argue that having an emotion is having a network of multiple components—typically feelings, bodily changes, evaluations, and action tendencies. By making this claim, first, I reject the classical approach which singles out an element that defines emotion and propose that multiple elements mutually explain emotion. Second, I reject that there is a clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions for emotion; emotion is a family resemblance and a prototypical category. Third, I reject that there is a fixed order among the elements of emotions; elements can come in any order. The interactions between elements are bi-directional and circular, rather than linear. The multiple elements attract each other and form a network. / Philosophy

I outline and defend a theory of mental representation based on three ideas that I extract from the work of the mid-twentieth century philosopher, psychologist, and cybernetician Kenneth Craik: first, an account of mental representation in terms of idealised models that capitalize on structural similarity to their targets; second, an appreciation of prediction as the core function of such models; and third, a regulatory understanding of brain function. I clarify and elaborate on each of these ideas, relate them to contemporary advances in neuroscience and machine learning, and favourably contrast a predictive model-based theory of mental representation with other prominent accounts of the nature, importance, and functions of mental representations in cognitive science and philosophy.