Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:27:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AndreoANM.pdf: 875567 bytes, checksum: e26e44e05b3601f8ad37e5f841e56b24 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-07-09 / The following study aims to verify in which hypothesis res judicata, when it comes of an unconstitutional decision, shall not prevail over Constitution. It displayed the characteristics of formal and material constitutional systems. It debated the concepts of existence, validity and efficacy of juridical rules and acts. It dissertated about the idea of Constitution s superiority and about the birth of the judicial review of constitutionality. It focused some contemporary models of this judicial review and its historical evolution in Brazil, showing its effects towards the current Constitution. It sustained that the decision given by Supremo Tribunal Federal during abstract control of rules must bind even legislative bodies, preventing them to produce the same rules previously declared unconstitutional. It held up that all parts of the decision of Supremo Tribunal Federal oblige, even the juridical arguments employed, in both diffused and concentrated reviews. It showed that, despite these models of review live together in Brazil, our constitutional system preferred the concentrated one, considering one only court over the other constitutional organs. It discussed about res judicata with the purpose of clarifying its juridical nature, its objective and subjective limits and its regulation in collective demands. It explained that the material res judicata is an effect of a decision which cannot be reviewed, which makes the law s will free of discussion, binding the contendants and avoiding that other courts, judging future demands about the same object, may decide differently. It showed how the regulation of res judicata in collective demands, in respect oh their subjective limits, is useful to demonstrate that it is not the material law who must adapt itself to res judicata as traditionally thought, but res judicata, as a warranty of juridical certainty and security, who must be shaped from the debated rule. It presented to view the main doctrinal conceptions about res judicata s review in the hypothesis of unconstitutional judgement. It concluded that the decisions forged by unconstitutional rules or interpretations reputed not compatible to the Constitution by Supremo Tribunal Federal, in spite of it can make res judicata, may be reviewed beyond the term to file a recissory claim, since while the debated law is still valid, no matter if its decision was before or after the res judicata. At the end, it asserted that, when it is not legally authorized, the judicial review of res judicata is not admissible, after the term to file a recissory claim, under the argument that there was no direct violation to the constitutional principle or rule / Este estudo colimou verificar em que hip?teses a coisa julgada, quando decorrente de uma senten?a inconstitucional, n?o deve prevalecer sobre a Constitui??o. Apresentou as caracter?sticas dos sistemas constitucionais de ?ndole formal e material. Debateu os conceitos de exist?ncia, validade e efic?cia das normas e atos jur?dicos. Discorreu sobre a id?ia de superioridade da Constitui??o e sobre o surgimento do controle de constitucionalidade. Enfocou alguns modelos contempor?neos de controle de constitucionalidade. Resgatou a evolu??o hist?rica do controle de constitucionalidade no Brasil e mostrou os efeitos resultantes do referido controle sob a ?gide da atual Constitui??o. Defendeu que a decis?o proferida pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal em controle abstrato de normas deve vincular inclusive os ?rg?os do Poder Legislativo, obstando-os de produzir norma de id?ntico conte?do ?quela julgada inconstitucional. Sustentou que, al?m dos dispositivos, tamb?m os fundamentos jur?dicos relevantes dos julgados do Supremo Tribunal Federal s?o dotados de efic?cia vinculante, sejam manifestados no controle difuso, sejam no concentrado. Mostrou que, apesar da conviv?ncia no Brasil dos controles difuso e concentrado de constitucionalidade, nosso sistema constitucional optou pela primazia do controle concentrado de normas em um ?nico tribunal, ?rg?o de c?pula de todos os ?rg?os constitucionais. Discutiu o instituto da coisa julgada a fim de esclarecer sua natureza jur?dica, seus limites objetivos e subjetivos, e seu tratamento nas demandas coletivas. Explicou que a coisa julgada material ? o efeito da senten?a n?o mais pass?vel de impugna??o, que torna a afirma??o da vontade da lei no caso concreto indiscut?vel, vinculando as partes e impedindo que os ?rg?os jurisdicionais, em processos futuros versando sobre o mesmo bem da vida, voltem a se manifestar sobre aquilo que j? foi decidido definitivamente. Explanou que o tratamento da coisa julgada na tutela coletiva, no que diz respeito aos limites subjetivos, serve para demonstrar que n?o ? o direito material que tem que se adaptar ao instituto da coisa julgada, tal como este foi pensado tradicionalmente, mas ? a coisa julgada, como meio garantidor da certeza e seguran?a jur?dicas, que deve se amoldar ao direito debatido. Exp?s as principais concep??es doutrin?rias existentes acerca da possibilidade de revis?o da coisa julgada em caso de ato jurisdicional inconstitucional. Concluiu que as senten?as definitivas fundadas em lei ou ato normativo que tenham sido declarados inconstitucionais, ou em aplica??o ou interpreta??o tidas por incompat?veis com a Constitui??o, pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal, apesar de fazerem coisa julgada, podem, al?m do prazo da a??o rescis?ria, ser revistas, desde que antes da prescri??o do direito debatido, n?o importando se a decis?o daquela corte foi anterior ou posterior ao tr?nsito em julgado daquelas decis?es. Por fim, asseverou que n?o ? admiss?vel, na falta de expressa autoriza??o legal, a revis?o de senten?as transitadas em julgado, ap?s o prazo da a??o rescis?ria, sob o argumento de que houve viola??o direta de princ?pio ou regra constitucional

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:20:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 19 / Nenhuma / O presente trabalho busca investigar as múltiplas teorias e manifestações do fenômeno contemporâneo da “judicialização da política”, o qual será enfocado em sua apreensão teórica mais importante: como manifestação do exercício do controle judicial de constitucionalidade das leis. Para tanto, a “judicialização da política” será analisada em três dimensões distintas: a institucional, na qual serão descritas as condições, causas e arranjos institucionais necessários para que a política seja judicializada; a social, na qual serão analisados os diversos usos sociais dos sistemas de controle de constitucionalidade pelos atores sociais; a normativa, em que serão estudados os conteúdos jurídico-dogmáticos que o controle de constitucionalidade envolve, e como estes podem moldar o processo de judicialização. Por fim, será explorado um aspecto ainda pouco pesquisado do fenômeno – a “judicialização da política” em âmbito local –, com a apresentação de um estudo sob o caso de Porto Alegre/RS, a partir da análise das ações / The present paper seeks to investigate the multiple theories and manifestations of the contemporary phenomenon of the "judicialization of politics," which will be focused in its most important theoretical apprehension: as a manifestation of the exercise of judicial control of constitutionality of laws. For this, the "judicialization of politics" will be analysed in three different dimensions: the institutional one, in which the necessary conditions, causes and institutional arrangements will be described so that policy is judicialized; the social one, in which the several social uses of systems of control of constitutionality by the social actors will be analysed; the normative one, where the legal-dogmatic contents that involves the control of constitutionality will be studied, and how they can shape the process of judicialization. Finally, a aspect still little researched of the phenomenon will be explored - the "judicialization of politics" in the local scope - with the presentation of a study under the ca

Dans la plupart des disciplines juridiques, le motif légitime se présente comme un standard de justification des actes. Il fait obstacle à l’application de la norme, en fondant un droit ou en exonérant d’un devoir. Le droit pénal se montre réticent à l’endroit de cette notion floue qui connaît pourtant un essor sans précédent. Afin de justifier la marge d’appréciation laissée au juge, le motif légitime est généralement conçu comme un mobile, ce qui accentue la confusion entre les causes objectives et subjectives d’irresponsabilité. L’insuffisance de l’approche formelle du mécanisme justificatif explique sa subjectivation progressive. L’analyse du motif légitime suppose de revisiter la théorie de la justification à travers une conception substantielle de l’illicéité, apte à unifier son régime. L’étude de la finalité justificative du motif légitime permet de mieux comprendre la souplesse de ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Le motif légitime renverse la présomption d’illicéité fondant la responsabilité. Le jugement de valeur porté sur l’infraction est la raison d’être du reproche social. Elle se distingue de son attribution à l’auteur qui relève d’un jugement de réalité sur sa volonté. Le motif légitime procède des circonstances extérieures à l’infraction autorisant la vérification concrète de son illicéité. La nature objective du motif légitime est conforme à son effet exonératoire de responsabilité opérant in rem et non in personam. Ses conditions d’application semblent, en revanche, doublement dérogatoires au droit commun de la justification, tant à l’égard de ses critères larges que de son domaine étroit. Il est cantonné à des infractions de risque abstrait pour des valeurs secondaires dont la présomption d’illicéité est artificielle. Le prévenu doit rapporter la preuve de la légitimité concrète de son acte, alors que la légitimité abstraite de la répression est sujette à caution. L’expansion de ce domaine dérogatoire de la répression révèle l’insuffisant contrôle de sa nécessité abstraite. En tout état de cause, la mention spéciale du motif légitime est inutile car toute infraction en fait implicitement réserve, en sorte qu’il se conçoit comme un standard général de justification. Il confère au juge la libre appréciation de la nécessité concrète de la répression, au regard du contexte de chaque espèce qui échappe par nature à la loi ne pouvant régler a priori tous les conflits de valeurs. La justification a postériori des infractions socialement nécessaires ou insignifiantes renforce l’autorité de la loi en garantissant une application conforme à sa finalité de protection des valeurs. / In many legal disciplines, the legitimate reason is a model of justification of acts. The legitimate reason prevents the enforcement of the law, either by creating a right or by exempting someone from a duty. Despite an unprecedented boom, criminal law is hesitant about this vague notion. In order to justify judges' assessment margin, the legitimate reason is commonly considered as a motive. This accentuates the confusion between objective and subjective causes of irresponsibility. The formal approach of the justificatory process is inadequate, making the process increasingly biased. The analysis of the legitimate reason requires a re-examination of the justification theory using a solid understanding of unlawfulness which can help standardize its implementation. The study of the legitimate reason’s justificatory function allows a better understanding of the flexibility of its implementation requirements. The legitimate reason reverses the presumption of unlawfulness on which liability is based. The cause of liability is conditioned by the value judgment made about the offence, whereas the judgment of the reality of the offender’s intention is the condition of his imputation. The legitimate reason stems from circumstances that are external to the offence, and which enable the review of its lawfulness. The objective nature of the legitimate reason is aligned with the fact that it exempts from liability in rem and not in personam. However, the requirements for its application seem exceptional to the common law of justification in two regards: its broad criteria and its narrow field. It is limited to offences of abstract risk that protect secondary values for which the presumption of unlawfulness is artificial. The defendant must prove the legitimacy of his act whereas the abstract legitimacy of the suppression is unconfirmed. The expansion of this dispensatory field of suppression reveals an inadequate control of its abstract necessity. In any case, bringing up legitimate reason is useless as it is implicit to any offence and is considered as a general model of justification. It leaves the judge free to assess the necessity of the penalty on a case by case basis, as the law, by nature, cannot resolve all value conflicts. The post facto justification of socially necessary offences or even trivial offences reinforces the authority of the law by ensuring an enforcement that is aligned with the law's aim of protecting values.