This dissertation seeks to conceptualise and operationalise the concept of soft balancing in international relations by articulating a “theory of tripartite strategic balancing” which is applicable to both international and regional unipolar systems. It has a twofold purpose: one theoretical and the other empirical. First, it seeks to develop a theory of tripartite strategic balancing which encompasses three forms of strategic balancing: internal, external, and soft balancing. The second part seeks to test the theory’s utility in explaining international political outcomes in the post-Cold War international system. In particular, it seeks to ascertain whether and how “second-tier great powers” have strategically balanced against the United States on a global level since the end of the Cold War. The analyses will focus largely on the foreign policies of Russia and France – the chief soft balancers. However, this dissertation also seeks to extend the concept of soft balancing into the regional level of analysis by examining whether and how minor-regional powers soft balance against regional unipolar leaders. For instance, it will examine whether and how the Russian Federation has been soft balanced against by states in the “European Near Abroad.” The analyses will focus primarily on the foreign policies of Poland – the chief soft balancer in the region. The dissertation will employ three in-depth case studies – the Kosovo Crisis (1999), the Iraqi wars (1991-2003), and the Georgia Crisis (2008) – to verify whether or not tripartite strategic balancing is actually occurring as the theory predicts. It will heavily rely on sources and interviews conducted during my time working at the United Nations Security Council and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These findings seek to contribute a more nuanced strand of thinking to the realist paradigm in international relations, and they offer practical implications for both US and Russian foreign policymaking.

Le Moyen-Orient représente un « Sud » souvent occulté dans l’analyse de la politique étrangère de la Russie. Or, la politique de Moscou au Moyen-Orient constitue un indicateur souvent révélateur des dynamiques, des atouts et des limites de la puissance russe. Sur la période étudiée (2000-2013), la poursuite d’objectifs « rationnels » – maximisation de la sécurité de l’État dans un système international perçu comme anarchique – n’exclut pas une quête identitaire éclairant la manière dont la Russie se perçoit au monde, souvent en opposition à l’Occident. Notre recherche interroge ainsi le réinvestissement du Moyen-Orient par la Russie de Vladimir Poutine en se penchant sur les logiques internes et extérieures de la politique russe. D’une part, à sa prise de fonctions, Vladimir Poutine est ainsi confronté au double défi d’éviter la polarisation ethnique et religieuse de la population russe et d’améliorer l’image de la Russie dans le monde arabo-musulman après les guerres de Tchétchénie. D’autre part, le Moyen-Orient reste le lieu traditionnel de l’affirmation de la puissance russe. À travers les grands dossiers sécuritaires de la région, Moscou jauge celle-ci à l’aune de l’Occident, en particulier des États-Unis, tout en faisant le pari, depuis la crise financière internationale et la guerre de Géorgie en 2008, d’un déclin inexorable de la puissance américaine. À partir de 2011, les « printemps arabes » révèlent une politique russe conservatrice par instinct, prudente dans son exécution, faite de manœuvres et de compromis si nécessaire et privilégiant les partenariats tactiques aux alliances contraignantes. / A highly and recurrent belligerent region, the Middle East represents a “South” which is often neglected in the study of Russian foreign policy. However, Moscow’s policy in the Middle East constitutes a particularly relevant indicator of the dynamics, assets, and limits of the Russian power. In our study period (2000-2013) the pursuit of “rational” objectives – the maximization of the state’s security within an international system perceived as anarchic – does not exclude an identity quest which enlightens the way Russia sees itself in the world, often in opposition to the West. Our research thus questions the reinvestment of the Middle East by Vladimir Putin’s Russia by addressing both the domestic and external rationales of Russian policy there. Once elected president in 2000, Vladimir Putin faced the twofold challenge of preventing an ethnic and religious polarization of the Russian population, and of improving Russia’s image in the Arab-Muslim world after the two wars fought in Chechnya. On the other side, the Middle East remains the traditional area for asserting Russia’s power. Through the main security issues in the region, Moscow mainly gauges the Middle East with regard to the West, most notable the United States, while betting, since the world financial crisis and the Georgia war in 2008, an inexorable decline of the American power. Since 2011, the “Arab Spring” uprisings have revealed a conservative by instinct and a cautious in its execution Russian policy, made of maneuvers and compromises if necessary and favoring tactic partnerships to constraining alliances.

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of Political Science, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references.

В 2002 году, в ходе встречи президента Бразилии Фернандо Энрике Кардоса с президентом России Владимиром Путиным в Москве, главы соответствующих государств дали свое согласие на кооперацию в сфере стратегического сотрудничества. В рамках встречи Россия оказала поддержку кандидатуре Бразилии на постоянное членство в Совете Безопасности ООН. Бразилия , в свою очередь , поддержала вступление России во Всемирную торговую организацию (ВТО). В 2004 году, впервые, российская глава государства (Владимир Путин) посетил Бразилию, где на основе взаимной договоренности была создана новая концепция в контексте бразильско-российских отношений: "Технологический альянс". В то время, ожидания результатов от двухстороннего сотрудничества были положительны благодаря общей договоренности глав государства. Однако, после 10 лет большинство двухсторонних проектов в разных сферах еще не начались, хотя желания обоих стран в сфере сотрудничества не угасли и продолжают существовать. Как объяснить подобную проблему? Реальные факторы, как например, смена органов власти государств и влияние международной системы могут быть значительными в этом вопросе. На самом деле, в некоторых случаях отмечаются вмешательства других стран, как например, США в вопросах освоения космоса и военного сотрудничества. В теории реализма и неореализма подобные факторы влияния достаточны для объяснения «заторможенного» научно-технического партнерства между Бразилией и Россией. В настоящей работе отмечены другие «нематериальные» особенности, играющие важную роль: взаимная неопределенность в переговорах между правящими лидерами двух стран, а также нестабильность в бразильских программах модернизации военных сил и развитии ядерной энергетики. / Em 2002, durante a visita de Fernando Henrique Cardoso a Moscou, Brasil e Rússia consagraram a expressão “Parceria Estratégica”. Na mesma ocasião, a Rússia deu apoio à proposta de inclusão do Brasil como membro permamente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e, em troca, o Brasil apoiou a adesão russa à Organização Mundial do Comércio. Em 2004, Vladimir V. Putin realizou a primeira visita de um chefe de Estado russo ao Brasil, os apoios mútuos foram confirmados e um novo conceito foi adicionado às relações bilaterais: a “Aliança Tecnológica”. As expectativas de cooperação bilateral pareciam bastante positivas, dada a vontade política de ambos os governos de iniciar as discussões.Porém, ao se observar a situação atual da cooperação em diversas áreas, conclui-se que a grande maioria dos projetos sequer foi iniciada. Havendo vontade política de ambos os países, o que explica a não realização desses projetos? Fatores materiais, como variação de poder dos países, bem como pressões do sistema internacional (e de outros países) podem ser relevantes para o problema. De fato, identifica-se, em alguns casos, a ingerência de terceiros países, como os EUA, em alguns projetos específicos, como no caso da cooperação espacial e militar. Teorias realistas e neorrealistas assumem que esses fatores explicariam satisfatoriamente a incipiente cooperação técnico-científica entre Brasil e Rússia. Destoando-se das teorias realistas “ortodoxas”, entretanto, defendemos que outros fatores de natureza não material e aspectos de ordem doméstica foram significativos. Especificamente, percepções recíprocas errôneas dos dirigentes russos e brasileiros, bem como indefinições e instabilidades nos programas nacionais brasileiros de reaparelhamento das forças armadas (como o Projeto FXBR) e de desenvolvimento de energia nuclear, podem ser chave para entender o problema. / In 2002, when Brazilian President Fernando H. Cardoso visited Moscow, Brazil and Russia established the expression “Strategic Partnership”. At the same occasion Russia supported Brazilian bid as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council and, in return, Brazil supported Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. In 2004 Vladimir V. Putin conducted the first visit of a Russian Head of State to South America, the mutual supports were reaffirmed and a new concept was added to the bilateral relations: the “Technological Alliance”. Expectations of bilateral cooperation seemed to be very positive, given the political will of both governments to start the discussions. However, observing the present situation of the cooperation in different areas, it is possible to conclude that most of the projects was not even initiated. Despite of political will of both countries, why such projects were not implemented? Material factors such as variations in national capabilities and influences from international system (and from other countries) might be relevant, but not enough, to fully understand the problem. Actually, it is possible to identify some negative influences of other countries (in particular of the USA) in space and military cooperation. Realist and Neorealist theories would assume that such factors alone would be enough to explain the current low level of scientific and technical cooperation between Brazil and Russia. Diverging partially from “orthodoxy” in international relations realism, we contend that other non-material and domestic factors were indeed significant. Specifically, reciprocal misperceptions of Russian and Brazilian leaders, as well uncertainties and instabilities in Brazilian national programs of modernization of Armed Forces (such as the FX-BR Project) and of development of nuclear energy may be crucial to better understand the problem.

В 2002 году, в ходе встречи президента Бразилии Фернандо Энрике Кардоса с президентом России Владимиром Путиным в Москве, главы соответствующих государств дали свое согласие на кооперацию в сфере стратегического сотрудничества. В рамках встречи Россия оказала поддержку кандидатуре Бразилии на постоянное членство в Совете Безопасности ООН. Бразилия , в свою очередь , поддержала вступление России во Всемирную торговую организацию (ВТО). В 2004 году, впервые, российская глава государства (Владимир Путин) посетил Бразилию, где на основе взаимной договоренности была создана новая концепция в контексте бразильско-российских отношений: "Технологический альянс". В то время, ожидания результатов от двухстороннего сотрудничества были положительны благодаря общей договоренности глав государства. Однако, после 10 лет большинство двухсторонних проектов в разных сферах еще не начались, хотя желания обоих стран в сфере сотрудничества не угасли и продолжают существовать. Как объяснить подобную проблему? Реальные факторы, как например, смена органов власти государств и влияние международной системы могут быть значительными в этом вопросе. На самом деле, в некоторых случаях отмечаются вмешательства других стран, как например, США в вопросах освоения космоса и военного сотрудничества. В теории реализма и неореализма подобные факторы влияния достаточны для объяснения «заторможенного» научно-технического партнерства между Бразилией и Россией. В настоящей работе отмечены другие «нематериальные» особенности, играющие важную роль: взаимная неопределенность в переговорах между правящими лидерами двух стран, а также нестабильность в бразильских программах модернизации военных сил и развитии ядерной энергетики. / Em 2002, durante a visita de Fernando Henrique Cardoso a Moscou, Brasil e Rússia consagraram a expressão “Parceria Estratégica”. Na mesma ocasião, a Rússia deu apoio à proposta de inclusão do Brasil como membro permamente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e, em troca, o Brasil apoiou a adesão russa à Organização Mundial do Comércio. Em 2004, Vladimir V. Putin realizou a primeira visita de um chefe de Estado russo ao Brasil, os apoios mútuos foram confirmados e um novo conceito foi adicionado às relações bilaterais: a “Aliança Tecnológica”. As expectativas de cooperação bilateral pareciam bastante positivas, dada a vontade política de ambos os governos de iniciar as discussões.Porém, ao se observar a situação atual da cooperação em diversas áreas, conclui-se que a grande maioria dos projetos sequer foi iniciada. Havendo vontade política de ambos os países, o que explica a não realização desses projetos? Fatores materiais, como variação de poder dos países, bem como pressões do sistema internacional (e de outros países) podem ser relevantes para o problema. De fato, identifica-se, em alguns casos, a ingerência de terceiros países, como os EUA, em alguns projetos específicos, como no caso da cooperação espacial e militar. Teorias realistas e neorrealistas assumem que esses fatores explicariam satisfatoriamente a incipiente cooperação técnico-científica entre Brasil e Rússia. Destoando-se das teorias realistas “ortodoxas”, entretanto, defendemos que outros fatores de natureza não material e aspectos de ordem doméstica foram significativos. Especificamente, percepções recíprocas errôneas dos dirigentes russos e brasileiros, bem como indefinições e instabilidades nos programas nacionais brasileiros de reaparelhamento das forças armadas (como o Projeto FXBR) e de desenvolvimento de energia nuclear, podem ser chave para entender o problema. / In 2002, when Brazilian President Fernando H. Cardoso visited Moscow, Brazil and Russia established the expression “Strategic Partnership”. At the same occasion Russia supported Brazilian bid as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council and, in return, Brazil supported Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. In 2004 Vladimir V. Putin conducted the first visit of a Russian Head of State to South America, the mutual supports were reaffirmed and a new concept was added to the bilateral relations: the “Technological Alliance”. Expectations of bilateral cooperation seemed to be very positive, given the political will of both governments to start the discussions. However, observing the present situation of the cooperation in different areas, it is possible to conclude that most of the projects was not even initiated. Despite of political will of both countries, why such projects were not implemented? Material factors such as variations in national capabilities and influences from international system (and from other countries) might be relevant, but not enough, to fully understand the problem. Actually, it is possible to identify some negative influences of other countries (in particular of the USA) in space and military cooperation. Realist and Neorealist theories would assume that such factors alone would be enough to explain the current low level of scientific and technical cooperation between Brazil and Russia. Diverging partially from “orthodoxy” in international relations realism, we contend that other non-material and domestic factors were indeed significant. Specifically, reciprocal misperceptions of Russian and Brazilian leaders, as well uncertainties and instabilities in Brazilian national programs of modernization of Armed Forces (such as the FX-BR Project) and of development of nuclear energy may be crucial to better understand the problem.

В 2002 году, в ходе встречи президента Бразилии Фернандо Энрике Кардоса с президентом России Владимиром Путиным в Москве, главы соответствующих государств дали свое согласие на кооперацию в сфере стратегического сотрудничества. В рамках встречи Россия оказала поддержку кандидатуре Бразилии на постоянное членство в Совете Безопасности ООН. Бразилия , в свою очередь , поддержала вступление России во Всемирную торговую организацию (ВТО). В 2004 году, впервые, российская глава государства (Владимир Путин) посетил Бразилию, где на основе взаимной договоренности была создана новая концепция в контексте бразильско-российских отношений: "Технологический альянс". В то время, ожидания результатов от двухстороннего сотрудничества были положительны благодаря общей договоренности глав государства. Однако, после 10 лет большинство двухсторонних проектов в разных сферах еще не начались, хотя желания обоих стран в сфере сотрудничества не угасли и продолжают существовать. Как объяснить подобную проблему? Реальные факторы, как например, смена органов власти государств и влияние международной системы могут быть значительными в этом вопросе. На самом деле, в некоторых случаях отмечаются вмешательства других стран, как например, США в вопросах освоения космоса и военного сотрудничества. В теории реализма и неореализма подобные факторы влияния достаточны для объяснения «заторможенного» научно-технического партнерства между Бразилией и Россией. В настоящей работе отмечены другие «нематериальные» особенности, играющие важную роль: взаимная неопределенность в переговорах между правящими лидерами двух стран, а также нестабильность в бразильских программах модернизации военных сил и развитии ядерной энергетики. / Em 2002, durante a visita de Fernando Henrique Cardoso a Moscou, Brasil e Rússia consagraram a expressão “Parceria Estratégica”. Na mesma ocasião, a Rússia deu apoio à proposta de inclusão do Brasil como membro permamente do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas e, em troca, o Brasil apoiou a adesão russa à Organização Mundial do Comércio. Em 2004, Vladimir V. Putin realizou a primeira visita de um chefe de Estado russo ao Brasil, os apoios mútuos foram confirmados e um novo conceito foi adicionado às relações bilaterais: a “Aliança Tecnológica”. As expectativas de cooperação bilateral pareciam bastante positivas, dada a vontade política de ambos os governos de iniciar as discussões.Porém, ao se observar a situação atual da cooperação em diversas áreas, conclui-se que a grande maioria dos projetos sequer foi iniciada. Havendo vontade política de ambos os países, o que explica a não realização desses projetos? Fatores materiais, como variação de poder dos países, bem como pressões do sistema internacional (e de outros países) podem ser relevantes para o problema. De fato, identifica-se, em alguns casos, a ingerência de terceiros países, como os EUA, em alguns projetos específicos, como no caso da cooperação espacial e militar. Teorias realistas e neorrealistas assumem que esses fatores explicariam satisfatoriamente a incipiente cooperação técnico-científica entre Brasil e Rússia. Destoando-se das teorias realistas “ortodoxas”, entretanto, defendemos que outros fatores de natureza não material e aspectos de ordem doméstica foram significativos. Especificamente, percepções recíprocas errôneas dos dirigentes russos e brasileiros, bem como indefinições e instabilidades nos programas nacionais brasileiros de reaparelhamento das forças armadas (como o Projeto FXBR) e de desenvolvimento de energia nuclear, podem ser chave para entender o problema. / In 2002, when Brazilian President Fernando H. Cardoso visited Moscow, Brazil and Russia established the expression “Strategic Partnership”. At the same occasion Russia supported Brazilian bid as a permanent member of United Nations Security Council and, in return, Brazil supported Russian accession to the World Trade Organization. In 2004 Vladimir V. Putin conducted the first visit of a Russian Head of State to South America, the mutual supports were reaffirmed and a new concept was added to the bilateral relations: the “Technological Alliance”. Expectations of bilateral cooperation seemed to be very positive, given the political will of both governments to start the discussions. However, observing the present situation of the cooperation in different areas, it is possible to conclude that most of the projects was not even initiated. Despite of political will of both countries, why such projects were not implemented? Material factors such as variations in national capabilities and influences from international system (and from other countries) might be relevant, but not enough, to fully understand the problem. Actually, it is possible to identify some negative influences of other countries (in particular of the USA) in space and military cooperation. Realist and Neorealist theories would assume that such factors alone would be enough to explain the current low level of scientific and technical cooperation between Brazil and Russia. Diverging partially from “orthodoxy” in international relations realism, we contend that other non-material and domestic factors were indeed significant. Specifically, reciprocal misperceptions of Russian and Brazilian leaders, as well uncertainties and instabilities in Brazilian national programs of modernization of Armed Forces (such as the FX-BR Project) and of development of nuclear energy may be crucial to better understand the problem.

本論文旨在探討俄羅斯外交政策之動機與推動因素，文中以新古典現實主義做為研究架構，並結合了體系層次因素（自變項）及個體層次的中介變項（如：領導人形象和戰略文化）。本論文所探討之時間軸橫跨1991至2014年，重點著重於以下兩研究案例：2008年南奧塞提亞戰爭及2014年克里米亞危機。針對此兩研究案例，作者使用「過程追蹤」和「歷史敘事」的研究方法，以驗證體系與個體層次因素對於俄羅斯外交政策的影響。 分析結果印證了新古典現實主義的主要假設：俄羅斯在相對物質權力提升的情況下，會同樣地擴大外交政策行動上的野心與版圖。雖然由第一個研究案例可得知，所謂的體系修正因素（如：地理位置、限制/允許因素、和體系明確性）對於俄羅斯介入喬治亞的決策有著重要的影響。而第二個假設提到，「總統普丁選擇設計、校正、調整策略上的選擇，反映文化上可接受的偏好，以維持國內的政治支持度」這個說法也已經被印證。本研究分析顯示，體系因素和個體層次中介變項對於2008年介入喬治亞及2014年併吞克里米亞的決策皆有影響。整體而言，當分析一個國家的外交政策時，新古典現實主義確實是個強而有力的架構，但作者也深知仍有進一步研究的必要。 / This thesis aims at contributing to the debate on the motives and drivers of Russian foreign policy. It uses neoclassical realism as an enhanced research framework which combines systemic stimuli (independent variable) and unit-level intervening variables such as leader images and strategic culture. The work investigates the period from 1991 to 2014 with focus on two case studies, namely the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014. This two case studies use process-tracing method and historiography to test the effect of systemic and unit level factors on the Russian foreign policy. The analysis has confirmed the main neoclassical realist expectation that an increase in the relative material power of the Russian Federation will lead to a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of Russian foreign policy activity. Although, especially the first case study showed, that the so called systemic modifiers, such as geography, restrictiveness/permissiveness and systemic clarity had significant effect on the decision to intervene in Georgia. The second hypothesis stating that, “President Putin chooses to frame, adjust, and modify strategic choices to reflect culturally acceptable preferences to maintain domestic political support” was also confirmed. The analysis has shown that both systemic stimuli and unit level intervening variables influenced the final decision to intervene in Georgia in 2008, and to annex Crimea in 2014. Overall, neoclassical realism proved to be enhanced and a useful framework for analyzing foreign policy of a state. But the author is fully aware that a further research is needed.

The question of Russia's geopolitical affiliation has been a cause of centuries long debate, whether Russia belongs to Europe or to Asia. From the geographical point of view, Russia is predominantly situated in Asia. From cultural and civilisational points of view, Russian people tend to lean towards Europe, even though they capture elements of both civilizations. By examination of the most prominent Russian schools of thought, mainly of geopolitical nature (Slavophilism, Westernism, Atlantisms, Eurasianism, etc.) the work seeks to systemize the answers to this question. At the same time, it seeks to determine through analysis of the contemporary Russian foreign policy, which of these ideological leanings plays a dominant role in foreign policy discourse in Russia since 2000. Thanks to identification of this priority direction and by determining the primary orientation of Russian foreign policy in a particular region, the aim of this work is finally to answer the following question: What is Russia: Europe, Asia, or a separate continent of Eurasia?