À partir des réflexions du phénoménologue tchèque Jan Patočka et des études du philosophe français Michel Foucault, on interroge le thème du souci – de soi, de l’âme, des autres, du monde – en tant que forme de relation éthique. Dans l'éclipse des systèmes de valeurs traditionnelles, les recherches sur la notion du souci peuvent ouvrir une perspective éthique à même de reformuler les termes de la responsabilité collective.Le point de départ c’est un passage du dernier cours de Foucault au Collège de France (Le courage de la vérité), où le philosophe renvoie à la pensée de Patočka. Foucault reconnaît à l'auteur tchèque d'avoir été le seul philosophe contemporain à avoir approfondi le principe ancien de l'epimeleia. Cependant, selon Foucault, sa propre recherche – construite autour de la notion de epimeleia heautou, c'est-à-dire le souci comme mise à l'épreuve, problématisation et stylisation du soi – différerait de celle de Patočka, qui vise plus l'étude de l'epimeleia tes psychés, à savoir l’âme sous le profil ontologique et gnoséologique.Tout d’abord, la thèse de Foucault encourage une analyse de la signification du terme « âme » dans le contexte de la phénoménologie asubjective élaborée par Patočka. En second lieu, elle invite à étudier la notion de « soi » à l’oeuvre dans les derniers textes de Foucault. En interrogeant les rapports entre les processus singulières de subjectivation et le bios en tant que « mode de vie » ou « style d’existence », on arrive à poser le problème de la vie en tant qu’horizon ontologique de l'être en commun. On s’interroge sur la possibilité d’un « souci dubios » qui soit à la fois « lien de vie » et « forme de vie » : souci du bios comme ontologie critique des conditions rendant possible la reconnaissance de la vie en tant que dimension de la co-appartenance, et, en même temps, attitude éthique à se faire charge de sa vulnérabilité. / Starting from the research of the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka and the studies of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, this thesis investigates the question of the care – of the self, for the soul, of the others, of the world – as a form of ethical relationship. In the twilight of the traditional value systems, the ethical perspective in researches on the notion of care enables a redefinition of collective responsibility.The starting point is a paragraph of the Foucault’s last course at the Collège de France (Courage Of Truth), where the philosopher refers to Patočka’s work. Foucault marks a separation between his work, focused on the theme of the bios, as opposed to that of Patočka, centred on the issue of the psyche. According to Foucault, his own research on epimeleia heautou as problematization and stylization of the self is different from that of Patočka, who is interested in the ontological and epistemological facets of the concept of soul .First, Foucault’s thesis encourages an analysis of the meaning of the word “soul” in the context of the asubjective phenomenology developed by Patočka. Second, it suggests to focus on the notion of “self” in last texts of Foucault.Questioning the relationship between the processes of subjectivation and the bios as a “style of existence”, we start considering life as ontological horizon of being in common. This thinking allows for the possibility of “care for the bios” as both “bond of life” and “way of life”: as critical ontology of the conditions that govern the recognition of life as ontological dimension of being in common, on the one hand; and as ethical attitude to protect the bios’s vulnerability on the other. / A partire dalle riflessioni del fenomenologo cèco Jan Patočka e dagli studi del filosofo francese Michel Foucault, questa ricerca intende esplorare il tema della cura – di sé, dell’anima, degli altri, del mondo – in quanto forma di relazione etica. Nell’eclissi dei sistemi valoriali tradizionali, le ricerche sulla nozione di cura possono offrire una prospettiva etica capace di riformulare i termini della responsabilità collettiva. Il punto di partenza è un passaggio dell’ultimo corso di Foucault al Collège de France (Il coraggio della verità), dove il filosofo fa riferimento al pensiero di Patočka. Foucault riconosce all’autore ceco di essere stato il solo autore contemporaneo ad aver approfondito il principio antico dell’epimeleia. Tuttavia, secondo Foucault, la propria personale ricerca – articolata attorno alla nozione di epimeleia heautou, cioè di cura come messa alla prova, problematizzazione e stilizzazione di sé – differirebbe da quella di Patočka, più interessata allo studio dell’epimeleia tes psyches, ossia all’anima sotto il profilo ontologico e gnoseologico.Innanzitutto, la tesi di Foucault incoraggia un’analisi del significato del termine “anima” nel contesto della fenomenologia asoggettiva elaborata da Patočka. In secondo luogo, invita a studiare la nozione di “sé” presente negli ultimi testi di Foucault. Indagando i rapporti tra i processi singolari di soggettivazione e il bios in quanto “modo di vita” o “stile di esistenza”, si arriva a porre il problema della vita in quanto orizzonte ontologico dell’essere in comune. Ci si interroga così sulla possibilità di una cura del bios che sia insieme “legame di vita” e “modo di vita”: cura del bios come ontologia critica delle condizioni che rendono possibile il riconoscimento della vita, intesa come dimensione della coappartenenza, e allo stesso tempo attitudine etica a farsi carico della sua vulnerabilità.

In this paper I will examine the sources for the tradition of the address of the soul to the body or the dialogue between, the two. I will consider the Old and Middle English poetic expressions of the body-and-soul legend in terms of the criticism of the ten poems which specifically belong to that tradition and the elements which constitute that genre. I will also deal with those poems written at the same time which exhibit one or more of those elements, with the body-and-soul tradition in English morality plays, with the Ars Moriendi, and with the Dance of Death. I will demonstrate that a shift occurs in the consideration of death from a concern for the soul to a preoccupation with the grotesque and gruesome aspects of death. The address and dialogue forms fall into disuse as a vehicle for theological argument concerning the responsibility for sin, and the view of death reflected by the popular pictorial representations of the Dance of Death becomes prominent.

No description available.

The thesis focuses on the irreducibility of the concept of a person to scientific view of the world. The main inspiration for thematising this specific aspect of folk dualism comes from Donald Davidson (two realms) and Wilfrid Sellars (two images). The theoretical sections are complemented by reflexion on results of empirical studies provided mostly by experimental philosophy in order to demonstrate how this approach benefits attempts to reach complex view of philosophical questions that have close connection to moral dimension of human life. The first chapter addresses a wider concept of self and introduces the idea of the necessity to bring the two conceptual realms on the scene: there is a specific conceptual realm (irreducible to physical realm or scientific image) enabling proper grasp of the concept of a person. The subsequent chapters address particular sub-concepts of the concept of self. The second chapter focuses on the concept of free will, and by referring to different views it points to the necessity to bring folk concepts into consideration. It concludes that the folk concept of free agent is transcendent with regard to scientific accounts and bears certain "supernatural" characteristics connected to the concept of conscious will. The third (and central) chapter brings focus on the...

The period 1889-1891 has been regarded as crucial in Oscar Wilde’s (1854-1900) career. Having been somewhat unsuccessful as a writer during the 1880s, and turning to journalism to earn a living, Wilde in this period saw the publication of his dialogues which led to his sole novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (hereafter, Dorian), serialised in 1890 before being republished as a novel in 1891. It has been characterized as a turning point in his career, and critics have studied these works in detail, as well as those which followed, especially the four society’s comedies: Lady Windermere’s Fan (1892), A Woman of No Importance (1893), An Ideal Husband (1895), The Importance of Being Earnest (1895). However, besides this selection, much of Wilde’s work remains under-researched, particularly his fairy tales, whose study suffers from the prejudicial categorisation as children’s literature. Research to date has tended to privilege a single aspect of Wilde’sfairy tales, as in Jarlath Killeen’s The Fairy Tales of Oscar Wilde (2007) focusing on a Victorian societal perspective, rather than studying the fairy tales as a coherent and integral part of Wilde’s lifework. The essay focuses on ‘The Fisherman and His Soul’ (hereafter, ‘Fisherman’), recognised as the most sophisticated tale from Wilde’s A House of Pomegranates (1891) (hereafter, Pomegranates). It will establish the essential role of ‘Fisherman’ in understanding Wilde’s complex aesthetic philosophy by examining the tale from two distinct levels of intertextuality. First, Wilde borrowed some of the most emblematic aesthetical and narrative elements from Andersen’s ‘The Little Mermaid’ (hereafter, ‘Mermaid’) and other similar fairy tales from the early nineteenth century for explicitly positioning ‘Fisherman’ as a response to Andersen’stale. Taking the opposite approach to Andersen’s ‘Mermaid’, Wilde’s ‘Fisherman’ stands as a social critique against the Victorian doxa, especially denouncing its nefarious effect on art. Second, through epistolary and textual evidence, the essay reveals the connections between ‘Fisherman’, Dorian, and ‘The Soul of Man’ (1891), including their genesis, design, themes, and discourse. This dual intertextuality of ‘Fisherman’ allows us to reassess Wilde’s tale as an influential text. It contributes simultaneously to comprehending better how consistent Wilde’s aesthetic standards and societal view were.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

After a short introduction concerning the problem of "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) the work continues with a summary of the state of the art.Thereafter, it goes on to profile four different basic scientific views of human beings and AI: symbolism, connectionism, biologism and physicalism. The emphasis is on the elucidation of anthropologically relevant statements to intelligence, spirit, thinking, perception, will, consciousness, self-consciousness, feelings and life.It is demonstrated that the basic views referred to represent greatly abbreviated and distorted pictures of human beings. Theories that do not go beyond the quantifiable level cannot adequately encompass the nature of relevant concepts and capabilities. That is above all because of the fact that generally a philosophical materialism is advocated, which considers the existence of intellectual substances impossible. For this reason a philosophical critique is necessary. The position of moderate and critical realism is advocated, whose anthropological statements are secured by epistemological and metaphysical investigations.The work comes to the conclusion that human beings cannot be understood symbolistically, connectionistically, biologistically or physicalistically. Man is a physical-intellectual entity, endowed with reason, a living social being. He is formed and led by his intellectual and therefore immortal soul, which gives him uniqueness, irreplaceability and the value of personhood. He is capable of thinking and thus of objective, abstract perception, and therefore is intelligent. Humans have an unfettered will, which, led by mental perception, is to be directed toward the good. They are moreover, through reflection, self-conscious. Humans live an intellectually determined life, which essentially differs, despite biological similarity, from that of animals and cannot possibly, due to its substantial superiority, have developed from animal life.All substantial anthropological abilities (such as intelligence, will, consciousness etc.) presuppose spirit. Because it is not within the power of human beings to create a simple substance such as spirit, a thinking, perceptive, intelligent, willing, self-conscious, sentient living being can at best be only technically imitated, modelled or simulated but never be reproduced, copied or created. The relationship of humans to AI is thus determined by an insuperable difference between their natures.

This research journey examines the process of co-creating, along with my co-travellers (research participants), a more holistic approach to trauma debriefing. Whilst incorporating elements of Mitchell's (1983) Critical Incidence Stress Debriefing model (C.I.S.D.), our point of difference has been to adopt a narrative pastoral approach. This was achieved by introducing spirituality and narrative therapy practices. Our research pathway has been further shaped by adopting a qualitative research approach within a postmodern, social construction discourse. My research curiosity was invited by both the mind, body and soul divide expressed in psychology; and the healing possibilities of spirituality I have witnessed in both my own and in the lives of others. While my co-travellers predominantly preferred to express their spirituality in terms of Christianity, our narrative pastoral approach to trauma debriefing is offered to people of all religious persuasions. / Practical Theology / M.Th. (with specialisation in Pastoral therapy)