This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account. Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus.

The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence.

The purpose of this paper consists of examining the different ways of thinking about death and life beyond death conveyed in the game Grim Fandango Remastered. This was done by using a theoretical framework consisting of a self invented definition of death called "Bodily death". This definition consists of common notions about death such as cessation of life functions like movement, metabolism, respiration and overall cessation of brain functions. It also included cessation of vital processes, which includes the ability to make energy transfer, making reparations, for example by cell replication, as well as the waste system of the body.  Besides this, the study examines the prevalence of dualism, a conception that views the soul essential to the individual's mental state. Two kinds of dualism were investigated, simple dualism with the assumption that the individual is made up of the soul, and compound dualism, where soul and body are dependent on each other for the survival of the individual. The study also examined the prevalence of materialism, a mindset where the individual is comprised of a combination of things without life or consciousness, in other words an existence dependent of the body. The results showed mainly a view that was non agreeable with bodily death, as the characters had many life signs such as breathing, ability to move, nutrition, metabolism and other signs of functions that would not be possible without the brain's functionality. Furthermore as shown with sprouted, the death within death in the game which consisted of becoming overgrown with flowers, showed signs of life rather than bodily death, as flowers have the vital process of photosynthesis. The game also showed mainly ideas of ​ dualism as the characters often was referred as souls. The kind of dualism that occurred most however was compound dualism because the game often implied that characters died when their bodies became destroyed.

Ce mémoire a pour but de définir le rôle de l’expérience sensible à l’intérieur de la théorie de la connaissance des dialogues de maturité de Platon, à savoir le Phédon, le Phèdre, le Banquet et la République. Pour atteindre ce but, nous nous questionnons d’abord sur la notion de réminiscence, principalement par l’étude de l’extrait 72-77 du Phédon et des différentes interprétations qu’il est possible d’en donner. Ensuite, nous montrons que les quatre dialogues partagent une structure épistémologique commune, pour finalement nous concentrer sur les différentes fonctions attribuées à l’expérience sensible. L’objectif poursuivi par cette étude est de démontrer qu’en dépit de l’attitude critique de Platon à l’égard des sens et de l’imperfection du monde sensible, il n’en demeure pas moins que la perception joue un rôle épistémologique et pédagogique important : elle fait partie intégrante du processus qui mène à la formation de concepts chez tout un chacun, elle incite le philosophe en devenir à se retourner vers le monde intelligible, et elle permet au philosophe accompli de se remémorer, à chaque instant, les arguments en faveur de l’immortalité de l’âme et de la nécessité de la philosophie. / The purpose of this dissertation is to define the role of sense-experience within the theory of knowledge applied to Plato’s middle dialogues, namely the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the Symposium and the Republic. To achieve this, we will initially examine the notion of recollection through the study of Phaedo 72-77 and its different interpretations. Then we will establish that the four dialogues share a common epistemology, to finally look at the different functions of sense-experience. The objective of this study is to demonstrate that despite Plato’s critical views regarding the senses and the imperfection of the sensible world, sense-perception nevertheless plays an important epistemological and pedagogical role : it is part of the process that leads to concept formation, it directs the philosopher-to-be towards the intelligible world and it allows the experienced philosopher to remember the arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul and the necessity of philosophy.

Ce mémoire entend présenter les formes de connaissance de soi développées par Thomas d’Aquin: la reditio incompleta, la réfraction sur les phantasmes, la conscience préréflexive, la réflexion par réfluence, l’analyse abstraite, le jugement critique et la reditio completa. L’âme humaine ne pouvant se connaître directement, elle a accès à son essence par le biais de tous ses actes ou actes de conscience. Notre analyse se concentre sur la connaissance habituelle, habitus de toutes les connaissances, qui est la racine de l’image trinitaire en l’homme et garantit la vérité des intellections humaines. Pour ce faire, nous avons procédé à la traduction des questions 87 à 89 de la Somme théologique, dans lesquelles Thomas présente la connaissance humaine des substances séparées et le statut de l’âme séparée, montrant en quoi l’esprit de l’homme partage un certain commun avec les autres esprits de son univers. / The purpose of this thesis is to present the different theories of self-knowledge developed by Thomas Aquinas: namely reditio incompleta, refraction of the soul on its own phantasms, preconscious reflection, reflection by reflux, abstract analysis, critical judgment and reditio completa. Although the human soul cannot have knowledge of itself directly, it can however approach its essence with its own acts or acts of consciousness. The analysis is based on the cognitio habitualis, habitus of all knowledge, that is the root of the trinitarian image in humankind and that guarantees the truth of human intellection. This involved translating questions 87 to 89 of the Summa Theologiae, in which Aquinas considers humanity’s understanding of immaterial substances and the separate soul’s knowledge. This demonstrates how the human soul shares common ground with other substances of the universe.

The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence.

The purpose of this study is to present the different approaches, which Hegel and Marx have developed regarding the relation between consciousness and life, consistent with their aims. Hegel&rsquo / s aim is to combine all the opposed ideas and beliefs proposed throughout the history of philosophy into a unified whole. Hegel&rsquo / s dialectics which is immanent to life can also explain the opposition between consciousness and life. Self-consciousness, which appears as subjectivity in Hegel&rsquo / s philosophy, at first, treats the life as an object of desire. Later, however, self-consciousness which cannot thus realize itself desires another self-consciousness who will recognize itself, so it relates with an other self-consciousness. This relation is defined as a &ldquo / life and death struggle&rdquo / . At the end of the struggle, there arise new forms of self-consciousnesses, Master and Slave. While the Slave produces for its Master, it relates itself to Life and this relation between Slave and Life brings about Slave as self-consciousness. On the other hand, the aim of Marx is not only to combine the oppositions but also to create a worldly philosophy. To this end, Marx puts economic relations of human beings at the centre of his theory. According to Marx, relations of production condition classes. While one class produces, the other exploits the productions of the former class. In Hegel, the Slave obtains its certainty as self-consciousness while it produces, whereas in Marx, the worker, who produces, is alienated form him/herself in the capitalist mode of production. To sum up, both Hegel and Marx emphasize the mutual relation between consciousness and life, but their divergent aims lead to them constructing this relation with different concepts on different foundations.

Nikos Kazantzakis� Captain Michales is a freedom fighter in nineteenth century Crete. Patrick White�s Voss is a German explorer in nineteenth century Australia. Two men struggling for achievement, their disparate social contexts united in the same fundamental search for meaning. This thesis makes comparison of these different struggles through thematic analysis of the texts, examining within the narratives the role of food, perceptions of body and soul, landscapes, gender relations, home-coming and religious experience. Themes from the novels are extracted and intertwined, within a range of theoretical frameworks: history, anthropology, science, literary and social theories, religion and politics; allowing close investigation of each novel�s social, political and historical particularities, as well as their underlying discussion of perennial human issues. These novels are each essentially explorations of the human experience. Read together, they highlight the commonest of human elements, most poignantly the need for communion; facilitating analysis of the individual and all our communities. Comparing the two novels also continues the process of each: examining the self both within and outside of the narratives, producing a new textual self, arising from both primary sources and the contextual breadth of such rewriting.

Η παρούσα μεταπτυχιακή διατριβή έχει ως στόχο να μελετήσει την έννοια του σωκρατικού δαιμονίου όπως αυτή εκφράστηκε κυρίως στον φιλόσοφο Πρόκλο, καθώς επίσης να εντοπίσει το περιεχόμενο, την έκταση και τις προθέσεις αλλά και τους μεθοδολογικούς τρόπους με τους οποίους ο ίδιος ο νεοπλατωνικός σχολάρχης θεωρούσε ότι έπρεπε να προσεγγισθεί η παιδαγωγική σχέση ανάμεσα στον Σωκράτη και στον Αλκιβιάδη, ώστε να κατανοηθεί το βαθύτερο περιεχόμενό της. Ως κείμενο αναφοράς και ανάλυσης έχουμε το υπόμνημα του Σχολάρχη της Ακαδημίας: Εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος πρῶτον Ἀλκιβιάδην , 85.19-93.28, σ’ ένα εδάφιο του πλατωνικού διαλόγου Αλκιβιάδης Ι (103 a-b), στο οποίο παρουσιάζεται η αφετηρία της επικοινωνίας ανάμεσα στον Σωκράτη και τον Αλκιβιάδη, η επικοινωνιακή σχέση δηλαδή μεταξύ δασκάλου – μαθητή, η οποία τροφοδοτείται επαναληπτικά και από την θεϊκή έμπνευση του Σωκράτη, από το σωκρατικό δαιμόνιο. Στο πρώτο κεφάλαιο της εργασίας μας επιχειρούμε μια αναδρομική έρευνα στην έννοια του σωκρατικού δαιμονίου όπως αυτή εμφανίστηκε στην σύγχρονη ιστορία – πορεία της φιλοσοφικής έρευνας. Στο δεύτερο κεφάλαιο γίνεται μια σύντομη εισαγωγή στον πλατωνικό διάλογο Αλκιβιάδης Ι και στο υπόμνημα του Πρόκλου Εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος πρῶτον Ἀλκιβιάδην αναδεικνύοντας το συνθετικό φιλοσοφικό εγχείρημα του νεοπλατωνικού φιλοσόφου. Στο τρίτο κεφάλαιο γίνεται μία απόπειρα σχολιασμού ενός ευσύνοπτου τμήματος του υπομνήματος του Πρόκλου, με κύριο στόχο να δοθούν απαντήσεις στις «κατηγορίες» που απέδιδαν ορισμένοι στην θεία αυτή έμπνευση του Σωκράτη ως προς την διαφθορά του νεαρού Αλκιβιάδη. Στην συνέχεια, επιχειρήσαμε να οδηγηθούμε σε ορισμένα συμπεράσματα (καταρρίπτοντας τις κατηγορίες), καθώς επίσης έγινε μία προσπάθεια καταγραφής των εννοιών που συναντήσαμε. Προχωρήσαμε επίσης στην σύνταξη ενός ευσύνοπτου φιλοσοφικού λεξικού των εννοιών που χρησιμοποίησε ο νεοπλατωνικός φιλόσοφος στην προσπάθειά του να αναδείξει την θεϊκή αυτή έμπνευση του Σωκράτη ως μία δύναμη αγαθή και προνοητική με «προβλεπτικό» και «γνωστικό» χαρακτήρα, που κατ’ επέκταση καθιστά την σχέση διδασκάλου – μαθητή παιδαγωγικώς και προσωπικώς αναγκαία και θείων προδιαγραφών. Η εν λόγω εργασία ανήκει κυρίως στους θεωρητικούς κλάδους της φιλοσοφίας της θρησκείας και της μεταφυσικής, αλλά και συγχρόνως εντάσσεται στην ιστορία της φιλοσοφίας, καθότι παρουσιάζει ένα στάδιο της εξέλιξης μιας θεωρίας που αναπτύχθηκε τον 4ο αιώνα π.Χ. / The main aim of this M.A dissertation is to explore the sense of the daimonion of Socrates as it was mainly examined by the philosopher Proclus. We will try to identify the content, scope and intentions, but also the methodology by means of which the Neoplatonist scholarch himself approached the pedagogical relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, in order to understand its deeper content. Our textual source is Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Alcibiades I, 85.19-93.28, which refers to Alcibiades I, 103 a-b. This is the starting point of communication between Socrates and Alcibiades, that is to say the communicative relationship between the teacher and the student, the content of which is repeatedly defined by the divine inspiration of Socrates, the Socratic daimonion. In the first chapter of our study, we attempt a retrospective research on the concept of Socrates’ daimonion as it appeared in the frame of modern philosophical research. The second chapter is a brief introduction to the Platonic dialogue Alcibiades I and to Proclus’ Commentary on Plato's Alcibiades I, highlighting the synthesis which is evident in the philosophical project of the Neoplatonist philosopher. The third chapter is an attempt to analyze a brief part of Proclus' commentary, aiming to provide answers to "accusations" attributed by some against Socrates’ divine inspiration with reference to the corruption of the young Alcibiades. We also attempt to describe the relevant concepts and reach some conclusions after the refutation of these accusations. We also proceed to a compilation of a concise philosophical dictionary of concepts-terms used by the Neoplatonist philosopher in his attempt to prove the divine inspiration of Socrates to be both a good and providential power with the possibility to acquire foreknowledge. This in turn makes the relationship between the teacher and the student pedagogically and personally necessary and gives it divine properties. The dissertation belongs to philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and history of philosophy, as well, since it examines a stage in the evolution of a theory developed in the 4th century B.C.

This thesis examines representations of the intimate as experienced by female protagonists, through expressions related to the heart, the soul and the body, in a comparative study of novels by French women writers from the 19th century and the present day. The corpus consists of seven novels : Ourika by Claire de Duras (1822), Lélia by George Sand (1833 & 1839), Monsieur Vénus. Roman matérialiste by Rachilde (1884), Femme nue, femme noire by Calixthe Beyala (2003), Vous parler d’elle by Claire Castillon (2004), Le Cœur cousu by Carole Martinez (2007), and Mon cœur à l’étroit by Marie NDiaye (2007). As a starting point, the thesis provides an extensive literature survey of existing research on the intimate as well as an introduction of the feminist and psychanalytic approaches underpinning the subsequent analyses, which are conducted in two parts, according to the personal and relational dimensions of the intimate. The theories of Beauvoir, Kristeva and Lacan offer perspectives on the intimate experience of women characters which is conveyed in literary imagery as the desire of the Other, and which is oppressed in a patriarchal symbolic order, although an aesthetic with specific narrative techniques related to women’s experience of the intimate is identified in most of the novels. These features include blurring and fragmentation of spatiotemporality, a marked intricacy of narrative voice, proximate first-person narrators, and the development of themes such as the writing of the body, sensed as a container. A discrepancy is noticed between the dominating androcentric posture of the heroines which is found in underlying discourse, and the sensorial dimension of their experience. This leads to a sublimation of body and sexuality in the romantic novels, a masochistic exaltation of the body and pain in the decadent novel and a psychotic and paranoid state in the novels from present day literature. The themes of female sacrifice and of death and denial of the body are very strong throughout the corpus. Relationships within the family are explored, including the mother-daughter relationships that are emphasised in the recent novels but not in those from the 19th century. Family structure, Christian culture and patriarchal, hierarchical social organisation are analysed as grounds for women’s alienation in the novels. The issue of perversion, which is striking in the novels on several different levels, is described as a transgression which involves the reader.