Abstract Whether the public affairs are executed by central or local government in Taiwan is based on the constitution, law and orders. The clauses of constitution were derived from the ¡§Principle of proper separation of competence¡¨, asserted first by Dr. Sun Yet-sen. From these clauses local and central governments in Taiwan should deal with different things which are properly divided according to their nature. But those clauses were not executed because of the unpredicted failure in mainland. For the reasons to initiate and regulate the local-self government institution, many acts and decrees had enacted after 1949, which gradually twisted the meaning of previous clauses that are ought to be obeyed. Besides, the increasing chaos happened recently about the struggle of expenditure in local and central authorities, showed the problems as the result of deviation. This thesis elaborates on the articles of institution which combines the clauses in the constitution and the ultimate aim of local self-government, includes democracy, separation of power in vertical level, and how the local governments are protected by law. This thesis also describes and analyses the whole juristic construction in separating local and central affairs, and, with a new-institutionalist approach, tries to find the key factors which make this institution evolved, changed and disobeyed the principles which they should be fulfilled. With these factors, this thesis finds that the deviation of the institution which is ought to be fulfilled is evolved by the ¡§path¡¨, the way it changed the previous aim or purpose. Consequently, once the ¡§path¡¨ had formatted, the actors of institution-local governments and central governments, will not obey the constitutional clauses and will keep exercising the deviated system of institution about the separation of central and local affairs.

Les travaux sur la séparation des pouvoirs dans l'Union européenne ne manquent pas, mais rares sont les écrits qui s'interrogent sur l'identification de la nature du pouvoir dans l'Union européenne. Cette thèse s'inscrit dans cette voie. L'idée que le pouvoir dans l'Union pourrait ne pas être de même nature que celui d'un Etat souverain a guidé cette recherche. Dès lors, le schéma de séparation du pouvoir dans l'Union européenne devait se calquer sur la spécificité de l'Union et de son pouvoir.Afin de marquer cette différence, l'expression séparation des pouvoirs, propre aux fonctions étatiques, est délaissée au profit de séparation du pouvoir, laquelle rend davantage compte de la spécificité du pouvoir de l'Union tout en posant la nécessité de caractériser ce pouvoir avant de le séparer, de l'organiser.Dès lors, en tenant compte de la nature spécifique du pouvoir dans l'Union, cette thèse entend découvrir l'organisation du pouvoir permettant à l'Union d'atteindre les objectifs qu'elle s'est fixés. / The works on the division of powers in the European Union do not miss, but rare are the works which wonder about the identification of the nature of the power in the European Union. This thesis responds to this logic. The idea that the power in the Union could not be the same nature as the power of a sovereign State guided this research. Therefore, the pattern of separation of powers in the European Union should be modeled on the specificity of the EU and its power.To mark this difference, the expression division of powers, appropriate to the state functions, is abandoned for the benefit of separation of the power, which makes more account of the specificity of the power of the Union while posing the need to characterize the power before to separate, to organize it.

Le droit constitutionnel vit aujourd’hui un rayonnement sans précédents. Cette splendeur est la conséquence d'un long processus historique de maturation juridique qui s’est accéléré durant les derniers temps. La généralisation du mouvement de constitutionnalisation est l’un des principaux résultats de ce processus juridique qui amène le remplacement de cette discipline juridique. Ainsi, la constitutionnalisation est-elle considérée comme un phénomène juridique complexe qui se produit par l'irradiation du pouvoir normatif de la constitution sur tout l'ordre juridique. Actuellement, avec l'adoption généralisée du constitutionnalisme, l’influence de la force normative constitutionnelle est vivement présente dans la plupart des systèmes juridiques. Du même, le processus constitutionnalisant est par conséquence responsable des importantes transformations contemporaines du droit public que particulièrement entraînent une dense spécialisation des disciplines inspirées dans une efficace protection de l’intérêt public. C’est à propos de cette question qu’on perçoit qu'il existe une profonde influence de la valeur juridique constitutionnelle sur le domaine du droit public où est enrichie la notion de chose publique. Pour cela, il existe un rapport naturel et essentiel dans l’évolution commune entre la notion d’État et pouvoir politique. La constitutionnalisation devient actuellement un des phénomènes plus répandus, sa récurrence dans l'ordre juridique révèle une tendance à la consolidation du pouvoir normatif de la Constitution et la ferme détermination à garantir l’efficacité des droits reconnus au texte constitutionnel. Deux arguments permettent d’expliquer l’origine de ce phénomène, le premier, est lié au développement propre des concepts de la théorie constitutionnelle et correspond à ce que l’on pourrait appeler des causes générales. Le second renvoie aux éléments particulières qui caractérisant chaque branche de droit touchée par la constitutionnalisation à ce que l’on pourrait appeler des – causes spécifiques. On observe par exemple une certaine complexité dans le processus de constitutionnalisation du droit administratif qu’on pourrait expliquer en raison de la proximité théorique avec le droit constitutionnel. En termes pratiques dans le cas colombien la constitutionnalisation du droit administratif a des circonstances propres qui tournent autour de la hiérarchie normative. Ainsi, en premier lieu, l'analyse de la constitutionnalisation du droit administratif devra intégrer l'influence des causes générales du processus. Ce qui nous permettra en second lieu à partir des causes communes du processus de constitutionnalisation, de faire ressortir plus aisément les causes spécifiques qui sous-tendent la constitutionnalisation du droit administratif en Colombie. / In the contemporary world, many states, at different latitudes and with varying legal systems, are experiencing a constitutionalization process of the law as a real legal phenomenon, which presupposes a new look at the constitutional law, based on the recognition of the normative force of the constitution’s law as well as the influence which is spreading in the legal order and which can lead to the unification of law.This new vision of constitutionalism represents a real paradigm shift, especially for legal practitioners, for whom the idea of the hierarchy of law sources, or the main legal point of constitutionalization, is to consider the Constitution as the source of the essential sufficient right placed at the centre of the entire legal order to define the conditions of production and application of the law. Yet today, public law and more specifically the discipline of constitutional law is interested in the holistic understanding of the notion of constitution, and its various facets try to identify the influence of constitutional power to know the real impact produced by the process of constitutionalization on the branches of law.As a result, studying the scope of the constitutional phenomenon has become a subject of much debate in the contemporary world. In general, the focus of the debate remains on public law, the intersection of the normative power of the ‘Constitution’ and the content of the branches of law. In the specific case of administrative law, constitutionalization has a particular endogenous connotation: this phenomenon is systemic and produces an effect of internal collision between the different frontiers of the branches of public law. Indeed, it starts by identifying a common base on the bases of constitutional law and administrative law, which will subsequently have to produce a profound adjustment in the relationship between them.In Colombia, the adoption of the 1991 constitution produced a legal and institutional upheaval. Most transformations have been determined by an ambitious list of rights granted to citizens and the implementation of mechanisms to ensure the supremacy of constitutional norms, and to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights, imperative to the social state of law. There is no doubt that the main institutional reform brought by the 1991 Constitution was the creation of the Constitutional Court and, consequently, of its Constitutional High Court. In this way, in Colombia, public law, and especially constitutional law, have undergone significant changes that have now influenced the entire legal system. Yet, constitutionalization is a process that is present in the Colombian legal order, and research aims to study this phenomenon, which is limited to the area of administrative law, particularly for the case of Colombia.The administrative field in Colombia initially responded in the same way to the French model at the institutional, substantial and procedural level; it is the starting point for finding the interest of the analysis of the constitutionalization of the administrative law of the Colombian perspective.Nowadays, the presence of constitutionalization shows the importance of knowing the relationship between the current dynamics between Constitutional Law and Administrative Law in the role of guarantors of the protection of citizens’ rights in the rule of law. This research work seeks to analyse how the jurisdictional power, and more specifically the constitutional and administrative judges, coadministrate through their decisions, in instrumentalism the constitutionalization.

While reading a news article about the upcoming presidential election one day, I noticed a trend. The vast majority of political articles discuss what the federal government should do, but almost never cover what it could do. In elementary school, American children are taught that the Constitution, a 4,543-word document, is the place from which all federal power is derived; but the Constitution says nothing about the regulation of travel, narcotics, or the vast majority of other areas that affect the way we live our daily lives, so where does that power come from? After some preliminary research, I discovered that a great deal of it comes from how the Supreme Court has interpreted two Constitutional Clauses in particular (The Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Commerce Clause) and decided to dig deeper. This thesis is a product of that research. Through a historical overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence on these two clauses, this thesis will reveal that, one case at a time, federal power has gradually expanded through the centuries and shows no sign of slowing, the effect of which is the degradation and potential devolution of American federalism, the backbone upon which this country was founded.

The aim of this diploma paper is to analyse and define the nature of secret exercise of public authority and to asses this phenomena in respect of the fundamental principles of the democratic rule of law. Any secrecy in exercising public authority is in fact a clear contradiction to a natural concept of the human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore the republic, as a public institution, should not have too many secrets to hide away from the people if its own principles are not to be completely disgraced. Secrecy in exercising public authority is a specific feature often related to the areas such as securing the sovereignity and territorial integrity of the Czech Republic, protecting its democratic foundations, protection of the lives and health of the population as well as the right to own the property. This is in full accordance with the constitutional duty of the state. Limited access to the information has a unique and 84 inevitable role in these areas and it is clearly mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, the European Convention of Human Rights and Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The question of choice between the security and the liberty has been recently heavily discussed by the people as a natural follow up to the...

Les actes délégués ont été introduits en droit de l’Union européenne à la suite de l’adoption du traité de Lisbonne. Définis à l’article 290 TFUE comme des « actes non législatifs de portée générale qui complètent ou modifient certains éléments non essentiels de l'acte législatif », les actes délégués apparaissent prima facie comme un instrument d’exécution du droit de l’Union, dans la continuité de la comitologie préexistante au traité de Lisbonne. Ils se distinguent pourtant des actes d’exécution de l’article 291 TFUE, qui sont adoptés « lorsque des conditions uniformes d'exécution des actes juridiquement contraignants de l'Union sont nécessaires ». Les actes délégués semblent ainsi formellement exclus de la fonction d’exécution. Par déduction, ils devraient alors participer à l’exercice de la fonction législative. Cette conclusion n’a cependant rien d’évident dès lors que les actes délégués sont qualifiés « d’actes non législatifs ». L’étude des actes délégués a pour objectif de clarifier cette apparente contradiction et démontrer que l’objet de la procédure de délégation de pouvoir induite par l’article 290 TFUE est de transférer des compétences de nature législative entre le Parlement européen et le Conseil d’une part, et la Commission d’autre part. Cette étude conduit à observer les incidences institutionnelles et substantielles des actes délégués pour évaluer leurs effets sur la production normative de l’Union. / Delegated acts have been introduced into European Union law following the adoption of the Lisbon treaty. Defined by article 290 TFEU as “non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act”, delegated acts appear prima facie as an instrument of implementation of EU law, in continuity with the comitology that existed before the Lisbon treaty. However, delegated acts differ from the implementing acts as defined by article 291 TFEU which are adopted “where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed”. Delegated acts thereby seem to be excluded from executive function. Instead, they should by deduction take part in the exercise of legislative function. This hypothesis is however not evident since delegated acts are referred to as “non-legislative acts”. The purpose of this thesis is to clarify this apparent contradiction and demonstrate that the aim of the delegation procedure under article 290 TFEU is to transfer a legislative power from the European Parliament and the Council to the Commission. This thesis assesses the institutional and substantive implications of delegated acts and their effects on the normative production of the Union.