In recent years, institutional shareholders have more frequently engaged themselves in dialogue with corporations on corporate social and environmental factors (ESG factors) through a new investment strategy often referred to as socially responsible investments. The Swedish public pension funds work with socially responsible investments and shareholder engagement are based on their mandate to serve the Swedish people and to manage their retirement capital in a desirable way. Since 2019, the AP funds are also legally obliged by the AP Funds Act (2000:192) to contribute to sustainable development by their investments. The findings of this thesis suggest that shareholders can positively influence the social and environmental performance of a corporation. It suggests that shareholder engagement dialogue is an effective influence instrument to generate positive social and environmental outcomes, with an open and constructive dialogue between the shareholder and the corporation. In order to build a successful long-term relationship between the shareholder and investee, it is important for the engager to enhance the preparation and try to stay fully informed on the matters being raised to the investee. This can be achieved by the shareholder by letting the engager focus the engagement on a manageable number of corporations and sectors and by having a dialogue with several different stakeholders throughout the network such as local union trade organisations or other NGOs.

This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate the value of multiple directorships. In the first chapter, I focus on potential tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of multiple directorships held by outside directors and attempt to determine how firm characteristics affect such tradeoffs. It is widely believed that outside directors of a firm play important functions of monitoring and advising. As a result, the basic hypothesis of the first essay is that multiple directorships by outside directors can have different implications for firms that have different levels of monitoring and advising needs. Consistent with this hypothesis, the evidence suggests that firm performance is positively associated with multiple directorships for firms with high growth opportunities and low agency conflicts. Such firms would benefit more from better advising while not suffering much from less monitoring. Likewise, firm performance is negatively associated with multiple directorships for firms with low growth opportunities and high agency conflicts. In the second essay, I examine how multiple directorships held by outside directors affect shareholder wealth during acquisitions. The evidence indicates that not all busy outside directors have the same effect and some types of busy outside directors may benefit the firms.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to describe the perception of value and risk in CSR as well as analyzing how financial institutions influence responsible behavior in business in order to create sustainable economic growth. Methodology: The study has a qualitative research method used by an abductive process. Data has been collected through semi-structured interviews with respondents from three venture capital companies and three banks. The sample of respondents was done through a convenience sample with respect to access and expertise in the research area. Conclusion: The most important meanings of the research results have shown that CSR holds an intrinsic value concerning contributing value as its conceptual meaning in terms of sustainable development. CSR can also be regarded as a dimension of risk management to reduce the risk of negative externalities on corporate activities. Investors and financiers contribute to sustainable companies through active ownership and improvements in the CSR dimensions. Finally, research results demonstrated that the responsible behavior of companies contributing to profitability, which in turn is part of sustainable development.

This study mainly discusses the effect, in country level, of minority shareholder protection on shareholder wealth during mergers and acquisitions (M&A). In particular, based on the index of anti-director rights (ADRI) developed by LLSV (1998) and the index of shareholder protection index (SPI) by John Armour et al.(2009), I empirically examine the linkage between M&A activities and indexes as well as the components of these indexes. This study expects the result may show some relevance between of indices and M&A activities, and the legal value of this relevance. The purpose is to show whether minority shareholder protection is workable in M&A activities, and whether it can facilitate M&A markets. To begin with, this paper discusses LLSV¡¦s uniqueness in corporate law study ¡V using empirical method to value whether corporate law matters or not around the world. Then, I analyze LLSV¡¦s possible defects, review criticisms and effects they had incurred. Secondly, we design a study to compare the revised LLSV methodology developed by the Harvard scholar Spamann with SPI index through stock market and M&A market. I also code China¡¦s and Taiwan¡¦s data to make up the lack of samples of cross level variation, and take this as the basis for corporate institutional comparison. This study reports that each of sub-indexes from ADRI and SPI has different relevance to M&A activities: three are positive, five are negative, three are insignificant, and two are valueless of discussion (definition or design defect). Thus we may see the importance of law quantification. We appreciate further research and authorities¡¦ consideration following our work in Taiwan. Finally, the contribution of this study is to attempt to integrate empirical and comparative legal analysis, in response to global corporate governance issues of promoting cross research. On policy implications is that it can predict some investor protection mattes, direct the way of policy adjustment. Besides, this study can also suggest specific amendment for Company Law and Securities law to re-examine how to balance between market development and the protection of minority shareholders.

<p>Nyligen publicerades ett skatteupplägg, det så kallade bankupplägget, vilket innebär att ägare till kvalificerade aktier i fåmansföretag tar ett omfattande lån av en bank och tillskjuter motsvarande belopp till sitt företag som ett ovillkorat aktieägartillskott. Det ovillkorade aktieägartillskottet ökar omkostnadsbeloppet på de kvalificerade aktierna, vilket innebär att även gränsbeloppet höjs. Ett högt gränsbelopp är positivt ur fåmansföretagsägarens synvinkel eftersom utdelning och kapitalvinst upp till gränsbeloppet beskattas i inkomstlaget kapital medens överskjutande del beskattas i inkomstlaget tjänst. Kapitalvinstbeskattningen är i regel lindigare vilket innebär att den skattskyldige uppnår en skatteförmån genom erhållandet av det högre gränsbeloppet. Efter att ha företagit utdelning av allt fritt eget kapital, exklusive aktieägartillskottet likvideras företaget och allt insatt kapital utbetalas till ägaren. Därefter återbetalas banklånet.</p><p>SKV har uttalat att bankupplägget skall bedömas som stridande mot skattelagstiftningen. Den första anledningen till detta är att de anser att det inte finns någon avsikt att tillskjuta varaktigt kapital till företaget, utan att kapitaltillskottet endast sker i syfte att möjliggöra uttag av upparbetade vinstmedel i företaget till låg beskattning. Dessutom är SKV:s ståndpunkt att skatteflyktslagen är tillämplig på bankupplägget. Uppsatsen analyserar båda dessa aspekter i syfte att komma fram till huruvida SKV:s ståndpunkt skall anses riktig.</p><p>Min slutsats är att det i nuläget inte går att ge ett klart svar på dessa frågor. Det är svårt att med tillfredställande säkerhet uttala sig om i vilka situationer ett ovillkorat aktieägartillskott skall underkännas eftersom lagreglering på området helt saknas. Däremot är min slutsats att man skattemässigt inte bör acceptera transaktioner som sker huvudsakligen av skattemässiga skäl, vilket framstår vara fallet då bankupplägget genomförs, utan att de även kan försvaras ur en företagsekonomisk synvinkel. Svårigheten att ge en klar slutsats avseende skatteflyktslagens tillämplighet på bankupplägget grundar sig främst på osäkerhet huruvida det fjärde rekvisitet i skatteflyktslagen skall anses uppfyllt, det vill säga om transaktionerna som genomförs i bankupplägget strider mot lagstiftningens syfte. Frågan är svårbesvarad eftersom det i SKV:s information om upplägget inte framgår av vilka regler kringgående sker. Min åsikt är dock att kringgående sker av 3:12 reglerna, och att transaktionerna strider mot syftet för dessa regler eftersom transaktionerna i bankupplägget får som effekt just det som 3:12 reglerna avser att förhindra, nämligen att inkomster som enligt fåmansbeskattningsreglernas schablonmässiga beräkning skall beskattas i inkomstlaget tjänst istället beskattas lindrigare i inkomstlaget kapital.</p> / <p>At their homepage, the Swedish Tax Agency describes a procedure, called the banking arrangement. The procedure can briefly be described as follows. A shareholder takes a considerable loan from a bank and contributes the corresponding sum to his company as an unconditioned shareholder´s contribution. The contribution increases the expense ra-tio. The legal consequence of this increase is that the shareholder´s dividends and capi-tal gains will be taxed less heavily, which means that the person liable for tax (the shareholder and only owner of the company) has obtained a tax benefit. After having obtained this tax benefit, the company is liquidated since it does not carry on any busi-ness.</p><p>The Swedish Tax Agency considers this arrangement to be contrary to the Swedish tax legislation by two main reasons. Firstly, since they consider that the unconditioned shareholder´s contribution is done without intention to permanently strengthen the com-pany´s capital and that the only reason for the contribution is to be able to remove the generated profits to a low tax. Secondly, the Swedish Tax Agency considers that the ar-rangement is contrary to the Swedish statue against tax evasion. This essay analyzes these two statements in order to come to a conclusion whether they should be regarded as correct or not.</p>

Zugl.: Mainz, Universiẗat, Diss., 2009.

Nyligen publicerades ett skatteupplägg, det så kallade bankupplägget, vilket innebär att ägare till kvalificerade aktier i fåmansföretag tar ett omfattande lån av en bank och tillskjuter motsvarande belopp till sitt företag som ett ovillkorat aktieägartillskott. Det ovillkorade aktieägartillskottet ökar omkostnadsbeloppet på de kvalificerade aktierna, vilket innebär att även gränsbeloppet höjs. Ett högt gränsbelopp är positivt ur fåmansföretagsägarens synvinkel eftersom utdelning och kapitalvinst upp till gränsbeloppet beskattas i inkomstlaget kapital medens överskjutande del beskattas i inkomstlaget tjänst. Kapitalvinstbeskattningen är i regel lindigare vilket innebär att den skattskyldige uppnår en skatteförmån genom erhållandet av det högre gränsbeloppet. Efter att ha företagit utdelning av allt fritt eget kapital, exklusive aktieägartillskottet likvideras företaget och allt insatt kapital utbetalas till ägaren. Därefter återbetalas banklånet. SKV har uttalat att bankupplägget skall bedömas som stridande mot skattelagstiftningen. Den första anledningen till detta är att de anser att det inte finns någon avsikt att tillskjuta varaktigt kapital till företaget, utan att kapitaltillskottet endast sker i syfte att möjliggöra uttag av upparbetade vinstmedel i företaget till låg beskattning. Dessutom är SKV:s ståndpunkt att skatteflyktslagen är tillämplig på bankupplägget. Uppsatsen analyserar båda dessa aspekter i syfte att komma fram till huruvida SKV:s ståndpunkt skall anses riktig. Min slutsats är att det i nuläget inte går att ge ett klart svar på dessa frågor. Det är svårt att med tillfredställande säkerhet uttala sig om i vilka situationer ett ovillkorat aktieägartillskott skall underkännas eftersom lagreglering på området helt saknas. Däremot är min slutsats att man skattemässigt inte bör acceptera transaktioner som sker huvudsakligen av skattemässiga skäl, vilket framstår vara fallet då bankupplägget genomförs, utan att de även kan försvaras ur en företagsekonomisk synvinkel. Svårigheten att ge en klar slutsats avseende skatteflyktslagens tillämplighet på bankupplägget grundar sig främst på osäkerhet huruvida det fjärde rekvisitet i skatteflyktslagen skall anses uppfyllt, det vill säga om transaktionerna som genomförs i bankupplägget strider mot lagstiftningens syfte. Frågan är svårbesvarad eftersom det i SKV:s information om upplägget inte framgår av vilka regler kringgående sker. Min åsikt är dock att kringgående sker av 3:12 reglerna, och att transaktionerna strider mot syftet för dessa regler eftersom transaktionerna i bankupplägget får som effekt just det som 3:12 reglerna avser att förhindra, nämligen att inkomster som enligt fåmansbeskattningsreglernas schablonmässiga beräkning skall beskattas i inkomstlaget tjänst istället beskattas lindrigare i inkomstlaget kapital. / At their homepage, the Swedish Tax Agency describes a procedure, called the banking arrangement. The procedure can briefly be described as follows. A shareholder takes a considerable loan from a bank and contributes the corresponding sum to his company as an unconditioned shareholder´s contribution. The contribution increases the expense ra-tio. The legal consequence of this increase is that the shareholder´s dividends and capi-tal gains will be taxed less heavily, which means that the person liable for tax (the shareholder and only owner of the company) has obtained a tax benefit. After having obtained this tax benefit, the company is liquidated since it does not carry on any busi-ness. The Swedish Tax Agency considers this arrangement to be contrary to the Swedish tax legislation by two main reasons. Firstly, since they consider that the unconditioned shareholder´s contribution is done without intention to permanently strengthen the com-pany´s capital and that the only reason for the contribution is to be able to remove the generated profits to a low tax. Secondly, the Swedish Tax Agency considers that the ar-rangement is contrary to the Swedish statue against tax evasion. This essay analyzes these two statements in order to come to a conclusion whether they should be regarded as correct or not.

La délégation du pouvoir de gestion aux administrateurs et aux gestionnaires, une caractéristique intrinsèque à la gestion efficace de grandes entreprises dans un contexte de capitalisme, confère une grande discrétion à l’équipe de direction. Cette discrétion, si elle n’est pas surveillée, peut mener à des comportements opportunistes envers la corporation, les actionnaires et les autres fournisseurs de capital qui n’ont pas de pouvoir de gestion. Les conflits entre ces deux classes d’agents peuvent émerger à la fois de décisions de gouvernance générale ou de transactions particulières (ie. offre publique d’achat). Dans les cas extrêmes, ces conflits peuvent mener à la faillite de la firme. Dans les cas plus typiques, ils mènent l’extraction de bénéfices privés pour les administrateurs et gestionnaires, l’expropriation des actionnaires, et des réductions de valeur pour la firme. Nous prenons le point de vue d’un petit actionnaire minoritaire pour explorer les méchanismes de gouvernance disponibles au Canada et aux États‐Unis. Après une synthèse dans la Partie 1 des théories sous‐jacentes à l’étude du pouvoir dans la corporation (séparation de la propriété et du contrôle et les conflits d’agence), nous concentrons notre analyse dans la Partie 2 sur les différents types de méchanismes (1) de gouvernance interne, (2) juridiques et (3) marchands, qui confèrent du pouvoir aux deux classes d’agents. Nous examinons comment les intérêts de ces deux classes peuvent être réalignés afin de prévenir et résoudre les conflits au sein de la firme. La Partie 3 explore un équilibre dynamique de pouvoir corporatif qui cherche à minimiser le potentiel d’opportunisme toute en préservant une quantité de discrétion suffisante pour la gestion efficace de la firme. Nous analysons des moyens pour renforcer les protections des actionnaires minoritaires et proposons un survol des pistes de réforme possibles. / The delegation of power to corporate directors and officers (Insiders), an essential trait of modern firm management in the context of capitalism, presents desirable efficiency advantages. However, it also confers broad discretion to Insiders . This discretion, when unchecked, may lead to self‐interested opportunistic behaviour detrimental to the firm and to the outside shareholders (Outsiders) who supply finance to the firm but do not have management power. Conflicts between Insiders and Outsiders may emerge from either general governance decisions or from particular transactions (ie. takeovers). In extreme cases, these conflicts can lead to the bankruptcy of the firm or, in more typical cases, to the extraction of private benefits for Insiders, shareholder expropriation and value‐reducing actions for the firm. We take the perspective of an outside shareholder to explore corporate governance mechanisms available in the US and Canada. After reviewing in Part 1 the core theories underlying the study of power in the modern corporation (separation of ownership and control and agency conflicts), we focus in Part 2 on the (1) internal governance, (2) regulatory and (3) market mechanisms through which both Insiders and Outsiders draw power. We examine how Outsiders can harness these mechanisms to check Insiders, as well as to prevent and resolve various types of conflicts. In Part 3, we explore a corporate power equilibrium that helps to minimize Insider opportunism, while reserving sufficient Insider discretion for effective firm management. We make the case for strengthening protections for shareholders and provide an overview of potential legislative reform paths.

If a programme which intends to measure performance is to work successfully in an organisation, it is necessary to understand the contingent factors that need to be in place regardless of philosophical beliefs. It must be integrated with the overall strategy of the business; all approaches to performance measurement emphasise the alignment of objectives, measures, strategic decision making and rewards. This is crucial, as it is not possible to measure performance unless it is clear what an organisation is trying to achieve. Value-based management (VBM) is a powerful management framework with the aim to focus all managerial processes on shareholder wealth creation. It therefore encourages all staff levels within the organisation to focus on value creation. Various metrics have been developed to measure the value creation process within the organisation. The application of VBM principles at the lower levels within the organisation is critical to ensure that lower level staff applies value-creating principles in their daily jobs. Anglo Platinum has also adopted VBM, which will help the organisation to enhance decision-making and ensure pursuing strategies that maximise value. Anglo VBM is a management system which will enable the company to significantly improve the quality and speed of decision-making and to drive performance and profitable growth. It requires a detailed understanding of where and why value is created or consumed within the businesses through assembling a comprehensive fact base. A quantitative study was done to collect primary data through the use of standardised questionnaires that were distributed to respondents at Bleskop and Brakspruit shafts as well all the accountants at Rustenburg Platinum Mine, which forms part of Anglo Platinum. The results from this study indicate that there is a low understanding of VBM as well as a strong focus on business unit objectives and on short-term goals. A key recommendation would be to use incentive mechanisms to be aligned to VBM. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

If a programme which intends to measure performance is to work successfully in an organisation, it is necessary to understand the contingent factors that need to be in place regardless of philosophical beliefs. It must be integrated with the overall strategy of the business; all approaches to performance measurement emphasise the alignment of objectives, measures, strategic decision making and rewards. This is crucial, as it is not possible to measure performance unless it is clear what an organisation is trying to achieve. Value-based management (VBM) is a powerful management framework with the aim to focus all managerial processes on shareholder wealth creation. It therefore encourages all staff levels within the organisation to focus on value creation. Various metrics have been developed to measure the value creation process within the organisation. The application of VBM principles at the lower levels within the organisation is critical to ensure that lower level staff applies value-creating principles in their daily jobs. Anglo Platinum has also adopted VBM, which will help the organisation to enhance decision-making and ensure pursuing strategies that maximise value. Anglo VBM is a management system which will enable the company to significantly improve the quality and speed of decision-making and to drive performance and profitable growth. It requires a detailed understanding of where and why value is created or consumed within the businesses through assembling a comprehensive fact base. A quantitative study was done to collect primary data through the use of standardised questionnaires that were distributed to respondents at Bleskop and Brakspruit shafts as well all the accountants at Rustenburg Platinum Mine, which forms part of Anglo Platinum. The results from this study indicate that there is a low understanding of VBM as well as a strong focus on business unit objectives and on short-term goals. A key recommendation would be to use incentive mechanisms to be aligned to VBM. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.