Thesis advisor: Timothy W. Crawford / Images of burly men painted in green, outfitted in camouflage and a Rambo-esque bandana, donning night-vision goggles, and armed with the newest weaponry are drawn forth when thinking of the phrase "Special Operations." There is a certain myth surrounding the community: Special Operators are the greatest warriors in the world. The use of these warriors is usually only thought of in a tactical context. This thesis, in looking beyond the battlefield adventures of Special Operators, asks the question: "How do these warriors do this job, and what ends do they serve in greater US security strategy?" The thesis discusses the development of the special operations capability since World War II and shows that special operations forces can be precisely tailored by U.S. policy-makers to meet specific high-level strategic objectives. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2006. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Subject: An analysis of whether Special Operations Forces should use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and re-supply capability deficiencies. Cover page date: June 1995. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Warfare planners and tacticians are seeking ways to leverage information technology to gain advantage on the battlefield. With the advent of Internet technologies, complex systems are becoming more networked, and access to information is more critical than ever. The increasing utilization of special operations forces in ad hoc, dynamic operations poses a need for adaptable communications to support the unit. Effective communication within the unit and critical information exchange with the command center affect the overall outcome of the mission. An adaptive, mobile network with UAV relays is well-suited to support the ad hoc nature of special operations. The area of research for this thesis is the role of the tactical network operations communication coordinator in mobile UAV networks. The coordinator's purpose is to oversee the management and status of the network and provide feedback to network participants, thus resulting in an effective and well-functioning environment. The tactical network coordinator is an important and integral part of network operations by establishing what is known as network awareness. This thesis will be a model for sharing network awareness, and it will explore the potential benefits of incorporating network performance as a planning objective rather than a constraint. / First Lieutenant, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / This thesis defines the strategic utility of Special Operation Forces (SOF), identifies why SOF only provide limited strategic utility, and presents an operational concept for the reorganization, alignment, and employment of SOF to overcome these shortf alls. The thesis is presented in a deductive manner that argues that SOF were designed for strategic purposes, and leads the reader to conclude that reformation must occur for SOF to provide strategic utility and meet their intent. SOF would be in an optimal position to meet their organizational intent by becoming a fifth armed service within the Department of Defense (DoD). Through the creation of mission-based units and a holistic employment strategy, SOF would become a strategic instrument capability of assisting national decision -makers in blending the elements of national power. Finally, the thesis concludes with additional required areas for research to make this concept become a reality, but that are beyond the scope of this study. / Major, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / On 1 October 2003 the USAF transferred control of its CONUS-based combat search and rescue(CSAR) assets from Air Combat Command to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). Transferto AFSOC was CSAR's fourth major reorganization in twenty years, and was the latest in a turbulentprocession of attempts to improve the combat effectiveness of CSAR forces. Despite possessing anabundance of brave, motivated, and extremely capable personnel yearning to accomplish their mission, dysfunctional organizational arrays and nagging organizational constraints have prevented USAF dedicatedCSAR forces from "getting to the fight" for the onset of hostilities in three of this nation's past four majorarmed conflicts. Special operations forces had to fill the void. This analysis evaluates CSAR's positionwithin AFSOC's organizational array to determine if this latest reorganization is likely to produce durableimprovements in CSAR combat effectiveness. My conclusion is that "CSAR friendly" organizational cultureand effective organizational constructs within AFSOC Headquarters, combined with highly receptiveattitudes among CSAR crewmembers, form a historically unique organizational mix that favors the long termsuccess of CSAR forces in AFSOC. To ensure AFSOC's favorable organizational posture is translated toimproved combat capability, leadership must immediately increase CSAR representation on HHQ staffs. / Major, United States Air Force

The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise -- UW is the military’s doctrinal term for support to resistance activities and movements. This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic option for the nation. Through a qualitative methods case study analysis utilizing macro- and micro-level process-tracing with a conceptual framework based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory, the author shows that viable and acceptable resistance elements existed in Syria in March 2011 to June 2014 and that the conventional US military failed to recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and craft a strategic UW option for the national security decision-makers to consider. This finding is significant in that it exposes a deficiency in the US military’s culture, structure and process that results in an incomplete and insufficient menu of military options for the president. If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this strategic error in the future. The author identifies specific recommendations for national security practitioners; however, the overarching theme is the need to change the institutional culture and the old structures of the conventional military to be able to provide the president a more complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of options to consider when assessing and responding to violent political crises short of conventional war.

Flygvapnets specialoperationsförband produceras i den konventionella delen av Försvarsmakten vilket innebär högre krav på byråkrati och styrning uppifrån i dess utvecklingsprocesser än okonventionella organisationer. Detta innebär att snabb operativ innovation, som är en framgångsfaktor inom specialoperationer, försvåras. Studiens syfte är att genom en kvalitativ intervjustudie utreda hur en specialoperationsenhet som utvecklas, utbildas och utrustas i en konventionell organisation ges förutsättningar till innovation till stöd för specialoperationer. Till stöd används bland annat Spulaks teori om kreativitet och innovation för specialförband. Studien visar att det går att genomföra snabb innovation nerifrån och upp under förutsättning att det finns en koherent uppdrags- och riskuppfattning samt om det råder en organisationskultur som uppmuntrar till kreativitet och innovation. Snabb anpassning kan även ske uppifrån och ner genom närhet till beslutsfattare som skapar förutsättning för att prioritet kan möjliggöra att resurser frigörs. Ett anpassat regelverk, decentraliserad ledning och förståelse för uppdraget är andra avgörande faktorer som skapar förutsättningar till snabb innovation. För att kunna uppnå detta krävs även en tydlig styrning från central nivå för att undvika att specialoperationsförbandens behov fastnar i försvarsgrenskonkurrens. / The Swedish Air Force's special operations forces is produced in the conventional part of the Armed Forces, which means higher demands on bureaucracy and control from higher hierarchy in its development processes than unconventional organizations. This means that rapid operational innovation, which is a success factor in special operations, is hampered. The purpose of the study is through a qualitative interview study to investigate how a special operations unit that is developed, trained and equipped in a conventional organization is given the conditions for innovation in support of special operations. Spulak's theory of creativity and innovation for special operations forces, alongside with other research, is used as a theoretical framework. The result show that it is possible to implement rapid innovation from the bottom up, provided that there is a coherent view of the mission and risks and whether there is an organizational culture that encourages creativity and innovation. Rapid adaptation can also take place from the top down through proximity to decision-makers, which creates the conditions for priority to enable resources to be allocated. An adapted regulatory framework, decentralized command and understanding of the mission are other decisive factors that create the conditions for rapid innovation. In order to be able to achieve this, a clear guidence from the central level is also required to avoid the requirements of the special operations forces getting caught up in intraservice competition.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The need for a well thought out, planned, and rehearsed command and control organization to conduct special operations in the US Northern Command Area of Responsibility is vital to success in defending the Homeland. Currently, USNORTHCOM does not have an apportioned or assigned command and control structure for the conduct of special operations. This thesis analyzes three courses of action to fulfill this requirement: use the current USNORTHCOM battle staff command structure including the integration of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North; rely on the newly formed US Special Operations Command's Joint Task Force Structures; and establish a Theater Special Operations Command North assigned to USNORTHCOM. Through the conduct of analysis and research this thesis recommends that The Joint Staff direct the reorganization required to establish a Theater Special Operations Command North to exercise command and control of special operations forces conducting operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. / Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / Trying to adapt to the post-9/11 challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, the Romanian Ministry of National Defense continues its efforts to modernize and professionalize the country's armed forces in accordance with NATO standards. Part of this process is the development of a Special Forces (SF) capability that is to accomplish initial operational readiness by FY 2005. With appropriate organizational arrangements and focused combat training, the Romanian SF will increase their performance during future deployments in joint and combined settings. This project analyzes Romania's strategic documents, identifies the missions that can be conducted by the country's General-Purpose Forces or other security services, and finally proposes five appropriate tasks for the SF: Combating Terrorism, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Security Detail for Romanian officials in crisis zones. In exploring what are the most effective structural arrangements for the Romanian Special Forces, this thesis uses a design program the recommendations of which lead to the proposal of a new organizational structure. Thus, it is determined that Romania's Special Forces elements should develop into a flexible, highly-mobile and joint organization displaying a flat hierarchy and centralized command and control. / Lieutenant, Romanian Army

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:27:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:48:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 jorge_bwga_me_mar.pdf: 806060 bytes, checksum: c3dbcac513f11151071767ea461e5ad7 (MD5) / A reação inicial da administração de George W. Bush aos atentados de onze de setembro de 2001 foi atacar o governo Talebã no Afeganistão, visando a derrubar o regime do pregador religioso Omar do poder e a estabelecer bases que serviriam para a caçada à al- Qaeda, que tinha naquele país um santuário para planejar suas ações. A capital Cabul, assim como outras regiões no interior afegão, foram conquistadas rapidamente, isto teoricamente em função do plano militar estadunidense, baseado no emprego de Forças de Operações Especiais, poderio aéreo e na utilização de um parceiro local: a Aliança do Norte. O suposto sucesso dos Estados Unidos seria decorrente, conforme o discurso oficial norte-americano, da “transformação militar” que estava sendo promovida pelo secretário de Defesa Donald Rumsfeld. O chamado modelo afegão foi considerado um “novo” modo de guerra americano e, a partir de então, dentro do contexto de “guerra ao terror”, as Forças de Operações Especiais passaram a ocupar, como nunca antes na história dos EUA, um lugar por demais proeminente dentro da concepção estratégica de Washington. Todavia, passados cerca de sete anos dos movimentos iniciais de invasão, a situação afegã não é das melhores, o que leva ao questionamento da validade e aparente inovação daquelas ações militares americanas. / The initial reaction of the George W. Bush administration to the violent acts of september 11, 2001 was to attack the Taliban government in Afghanistan, aiming to bring down the Mullah Omar regime and to set up bases that would serve to the hunting of al- Qaida, organization which had that country as its sanctuary to plan its actions. The capital Cabul, as well as another regions in the countryside, were quickly conquered, theoretically because the american military plan, based on Special Operations Forces, air power and in the use of a local allie: the Northern Alliance. The supposed success of the United States would be the result, according to the official speech, of the “military transformation” that was being encouraged by the Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The afghan model was considered a “new” american way of war and the Special Operations Forces, inside the context of “global war on terror”, went on to the center of the american strategic conception. However, after seven years of the invasion, the afghan situation is not good, so it is possible to question the validity and the apparent inovation of that american military actions.