African economies, including Nigeria continued to perform poorly despite the adoption of economic policy reforms in the 1980s. An explanation for the failure of economic policy reforms was therefore sought from an institutional perspective. Since active state intervention in the economy was the rationale given for the economic crisis of developing countries, the conventional case for an active state which rested on the need to correct for market failure was counterposed with the argument that the economy was best coordinated by market forces given that the state was not benevolent, omniscient or omnipotent. However, the state has played an important role in the transformation of late developers while a state-market dichotomy takes no account of institutional factors. The widespread adoption of economic policy reforms owed more to an ideological shift in the development paradigm than to the debt crisis and there was a great deal of controversy about the theoretical foundations and impact of these reforms contrary to claims of a consensus. An institutionalist political economy which recognises that the market is not the only institution and that economic transformation requires the positive use of political power was proposed. Such an approach takes account of history, politics and the institutional diversity of capitalism. A more nuanced view of state intervention was therefore advocated. The importance of institutional arrangements in the quest for economic transformation underscored the inadequacy of structural adjustment which was hampered by the lack of price and institutional flexibility as well as other institutional constraints. The Nigerian experience of structural adjustment shows that long term growth prospects were not enhanced and that the reforms tended to favour the financial sector over the real sector. The failure of economic policy reforms in Nigeria can be attributed to the continued presence of constraining institutional factors and the absence of a positive use of political power. / Economics / D. Comm. (Economics)

Submitted by Maria Emília Santos (emilianasci31@gmail.com) on 2018-05-09T18:30:44Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ CAPACIDADES ESTATAIS PARA PLANEJAR NO BRASIL ANÁLISE DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO PROGRAMA DE ACELERAÇÃO DO CRESCIMENTO (PAC)_18_05_09.docx: 1137031 bytes, checksum: acf168777ed01bde1c26e3f6d40afb4b (MD5) / Rejected by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br), reason: Boa noite Maria Emília, Para que possamos dar andamento ao seu processo é necessários alguns ajustes. Enviarei via e-mail. Lembrando que a submissão aqui na biblioteca deve ser em PDF. (não pode ser em Word) Assim que fizer os ajustes fazer novamente a submissão. ( excluir o anterior e deixar o atual ) Qualquer duvida estamos a disposição. Att. Pâmela Tonsa on 2018-05-09T22:45:24Z (GMT) / Submitted by Maria Emília Santos (emilianasci31@gmail.com) on 2018-05-11T11:09:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ CAPACIDADES ESTATAIS PARA PLANEJAR NO BRASIL ANÁLISE DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO PROGRAMA DE ACELERAÇÃO DO CRESCIMENTO (PAC)_18_05_09.pdf: 1635180 bytes, checksum: a47b8c5885f7c43f835e2d9d7e92fd76 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2018-05-11T17:12:34Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ CAPACIDADES ESTATAIS PARA PLANEJAR NO BRASIL ANÁLISE DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO PROGRAMA DE ACELERAÇÃO DO CRESCIMENTO (PAC)_18_05_09.pdf: 1635180 bytes, checksum: a47b8c5885f7c43f835e2d9d7e92fd76 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-05-11T17:17:39Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ CAPACIDADES ESTATAIS PARA PLANEJAR NO BRASIL ANÁLISE DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO PROGRAMA DE ACELERAÇÃO DO CRESCIMENTO (PAC)_18_05_09.pdf: 1635180 bytes, checksum: a47b8c5885f7c43f835e2d9d7e92fd76 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-11T17:17:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação_ CAPACIDADES ESTATAIS PARA PLANEJAR NO BRASIL ANÁLISE DA CONTRIBUIÇÃO DO PROGRAMA DE ACELERAÇÃO DO CRESCIMENTO (PAC)_18_05_09.pdf: 1635180 bytes, checksum: a47b8c5885f7c43f835e2d9d7e92fd76 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-03 / Esta pesquisa analisa o processo de implementação do Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento em seus dois momentos iniciais, PAC1 (2007-2010) e PAC2 (2011-2014), enquanto estratégia diferenciada de planejamento governamental, e discute sua contribuição ao desenvolvimento de capacidades estatais para planejar, buscando compreender como o Estado brasileiro vem desenvolvendo capacidades estatais que auxiliam na construção de um planejamento governamental mais permanente. Para isso, em um primeiro momento, identificamos quais capacidades foram construídas ao longo do desenvolvimento do Programa, em termos de arranjos institucionais relacionados a recursos - humanos, orçamentários e financeiros - e a mecanismos de coordenação e articulação. Em seguida, discutimos especificamente a capacidade de coordenação e integração, que se mostrou um potente mecanismo impulsionador de processos mais permanentes para o planejamento governamental. A hipótese inicial da pesquisa, no sentido de compreender o Programa não apenas como um mero rearranjo orçamentário à semelhança dos programas ad hoc, foi confirmada ao presenciarmos a implantação de arranjos institucionais integradores, mesmo que não completos. / This research analyzes the process of implementation of the Growth Acceleration Program in its two initial moments PAC1 (2007-2010) and PAC2 (2011-2014), as a differentiated strategy of governmental planning, and discusses its contribution to development of state capacities to plan, seeking to understand how the Brazilian state has developed state capacities that assist in the construction of a more permanent governmental planning. For this, at the first moment, we identified what capacities were built throughout the development of the Program, in terms of institutional arrangements related to human, budgetary and financial resources, and to coordination mechanisms and Joint. Then we discussed specifically the ability to coordinate and integrate, which proved a powerful mechanism for more permanent processes for government planning. The initial hypothesis of the research in order to understand the program not only as a mere budgetary rearrangement in the similarity of the programs Ad hoc it was confirmed when we witnessed the implementation of institutional arrangements, even if not complete.

In the first paper, the effects of trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality are investigated. I obtain that the effect of trade openness on inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, there exists a threshold effect: trade openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risk of internal and external conflicts is high. Moreover, I find that countries with higher risk of conflicts are more unequal, and that more ethnically diverse countries increase income inequality. Finally, I obtain that democratic regimes decrease inequality. In the second paper, we analyze the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector. Assuming that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts, we compare states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is referred to as state capacity. We obtain that public protection services can effectively act as either substitutes or complements to private enforcement, and this strongly depends on state capacity. Under low state capacity, an increase in state protection services leads to a drop in national income as labor is drawn away from the directly productive activities. The opposite holds for high-capacity states. As a result, public protection services have an ambiguous effect on national income even though they can unambiguously increase resource rents. In the third paper, we argue that the right to hold dual citizenship can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, GDP and household consumption, and improves child survival. In developed countries, however, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by US$1.44 billion, but increases FDI by US$828 billion, raises household consumption, gross capital formation and trade, and provides incentives for skilled workers to move to other countries.

本文所要討論的重點是台灣紡織業在外移與轉型的過程中，國家機關所扮演的角色，並探究在過去與現在不同的階段中國家的角色是否有所變化，研究範圍是台灣的上市紡織公司。而本文所指的外移是在國外擁有生產線；而轉型則包括了紡織業的轉業或轉投資，以及進行產業升級與提昇產品競爭力。 紡織業是國民政府遷台後，首先發展的重要產業，而紡織業之所以能夠發展，除了大陸來台的紡織資本外，因為紡織業具有創匯快的特性，因此政府提供了保護與優惠的措施，加上美援的因素都使得台灣紡織業在1950年代之後得以發展，而這也是發展型國家（Developmental State）由國家機關帶短產業發展的實例。 但1990年代之後的台灣紡織業面臨了各項生產成本的提高與工時減少，及資金不易取得等不利因素，國外的保護主義亦使得出口受到阻礙，使得台灣紡織業的獲利空間和競爭力逐漸遭到壓縮，面臨這樣的困境，台灣紡織業選擇的是將生產線外移或從事於轉業或轉投資，以及產業升級與提昇產品競爭力，藉以增加獲利空間。而本文所討論的重點即是在於面對台灣紡織業的困境、外移以及轉型的過程當中，國家機關所提出的輔導與協助措施，探究這些措施對於台灣紡織業的發展是否有所助益，以及給予正面的效果？在目前紡織業的發展上國家是否仍扮演重要的角色？ 本文的研究發現：面臨紡織業發展上的困境，以及外移轉型的選擇，國家機關即使提供了若干的政策及計畫，可是成效卻是有限。本文認為，紡織業外移轉型的選擇與國家角色的式微是全球化趨勢的表徵，因為全球化使得國家能力與國家自主性減弱，無法如過去以強國家(Strong State)的型態保護與協助產業的成長；相較於廠商經過了國家機關過去的保護與協助以及資本積累的過程，可以運用比較利益尋求低廉的生產成本，或開拓市場等因素進行跨國的投資；進行轉業或轉投資也是廠商為尋求獲利而進行的自發性策略，並不需要國家機關的協助；在產業升級與提昇產品競爭力方面，雖然國家提供了諸多輔導與協助計畫和措施，亦有部分成效，但仍無法徹底改變台灣紡織業偏重製造但研發能力薄弱的生產結構。對照於過去台灣國家機關的角色，發現目前國家機關的角色在產業發展中有弱化的現象。 最後，本文將針對研究出的結果，提出研究發現及研究建議，認為在目前的國家機關不可能再扮演領導產業發展的角色，也無法扮演管制者的角色，而是作為輔導者與支持者的角色，提供產業發展良好的投資環境，協助方式上則是在不違反市場原則下，協助業者提升在市場上的競爭力。

In the first paper, the effects of trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality are investigated. I obtain that the effect of trade openness on inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, there exists a threshold effect: trade openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risk of internal and external conflicts is high. Moreover, I find that countries with higher risk of conflicts are more unequal, and that more ethnically diverse countries increase income inequality. Finally, I obtain that democratic regimes decrease inequality. In the second paper, we analyze the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector. Assuming that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts, we compare states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is referred to as state capacity. We obtain that public protection services can effectively act as either substitutes or complements to private enforcement, and this strongly depends on state capacity. Under low state capacity, an increase in state protection services leads to a drop in national income as labor is drawn away from the directly productive activities. The opposite holds for high-capacity states. As a result, public protection services have an ambiguous effect on national income even though they can unambiguously increase resource rents. In the third paper, we argue that the right to hold dual citizenship can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, GDP and household consumption, and improves child survival. In developed countries, however, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by US$1.44 billion, but increases FDI by US$828 billion, raises household consumption, gross capital formation and trade, and provides incentives for skilled workers to move to other countries.

In the first paper, the effects of trade openness and conflict risk on income inequality are investigated. I obtain that the effect of trade openness on inequality depends on the level of conflict risk. More precisely, there exists a threshold effect: trade openness worsens income inequality in countries where the risk of internal and external conflicts is high. Moreover, I find that countries with higher risk of conflicts are more unequal, and that more ethnically diverse countries increase income inequality. Finally, I obtain that democratic regimes decrease inequality. In the second paper, we analyze the general-equilibrium consequences of property right enforcement in the natural resource sector. Assuming that exclusion requires both private and public enforcement efforts, we compare states that differ by their ability to provide protection services. This ability is referred to as state capacity. We obtain that public protection services can effectively act as either substitutes or complements to private enforcement, and this strongly depends on state capacity. Under low state capacity, an increase in state protection services leads to a drop in national income as labor is drawn away from the directly productive activities. The opposite holds for high-capacity states. As a result, public protection services have an ambiguous effect on national income even though they can unambiguously increase resource rents. In the third paper, we argue that the right to hold dual citizenship can generate important social and economic benefits beyond its political dimension. We assemble a large panel dataset on dual citizenship. We find that in developing countries, dual citizenship recognition increases remittance inflows by US$1.19 billion, GDP and household consumption, and improves child survival. In developed countries, however, dual citizenship recognition decreases remittance inflows by US$1.44 billion, but increases FDI by US$828 billion, raises household consumption, gross capital formation and trade, and provides incentives for skilled workers to move to other countries.