Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Javier Salmeron, David A. Schrady. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-53). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Technology Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006. / Thesis Advisor(s): Rick Hayes-Roth, Curtis Blais. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-68). Also available online.

Master of Engineering

During early stages of the design process, ideation methods are used to generate a set of potential solutions based on a particular need. Solutions to design problems generally require both technology and user actions (or tactics) of some sort, although solution ideas may omit explicit mention of either technology or tactics. Previous research suggests that an explicit consideration of tactics in early-stage ideation enables design teams to improve the quantity, quality, variety, and novelty of their idea sets. In this paper, a novel ideation method known as the Random Prompts method is presented, and its performance is evaluated against a Brainwriting method. The results show that the Random Prompts method improves the overall quantity, novelty, and variety of idea sets over the Brainwriting method. In addition, the techniques used to encourage tactics ideation in both methods cause a significant increase in the fraction of ideas containing tactics when compared to sample ideation results from the literature. These conclusions hold value for improving design space exploration and co-development of tactics and technology.

Embedded systems are used in many critical applications where a failure can have serious consequences. Therefore, achieving a high level of dependability is an ultimate goal. However, in order to achieve this goal we are in need of understanding the interrelationships between the different dependability quality attributes and other embedded systems’ quality attributes. This research study provides indicators of the relationship between the dependability quality attributes and other quality attributes for embedded systems by identifying the impact of architectural tactics as the candidate solutions to construct dependable embedded systems.

The initial phases of the design process -- including interactions with stakeholders, ideation of concept candidates, and the selection of the best candidates --- have a large impact on the success of a project as a whole. Much of the value generated during these phases comes from the designers' exploration of the design space as they create concepts for the final solution. Unfortunately, an entire dimension of the design space is often ignored during the initial phases of the design process -- the tactics dimension. Engineers tend to emphasize the design of technology in their work, while paying less attention to how that technology is used. By adding tactics to technology as two dimensions of the design space and creating the Tech/Tac plot as a means for visualizing those dimensions, the designer's ability to visualize, understand, and explore an expanded design space is improved. In this paper, we introduce a deliberate design-space structure that can help teams generate and evaluate integrated Tech/Tac concepts. The structure improves concept exploration during the early phases of the design process by harnessing the information provided by a two-dimensional, structured design space. This design space is represented here as a vector space with a basis of technology and tactics. Also presented are definitions and principles that facilitate the use of the technology-tactics framework to represent the design space in various useful ways. Six tests were carried out during this research to develop and evaluate the structure. The final instantiation of the concepts presented in this paper has been shown to be meaningful to design teams during ideation.

This dissertation explores the development of America’s infantry forces between 1918-1945. While doing so, it challenges and complicates the traditional narrative that highlights the fierceness of the rivalry between the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. During the First World War, both commissioned and enlisted Marines attended U.S. Army schools and served within Army combat formations, which brought the two closer together than ever before. Both services became bonded by a common warfighting paradigm, or way of battle, that centered upon the infantry as the dominant combat arm. All other arms and services were subordinated to the needs and requirements of the infantry. Intelligent initiative, fire and maneuver by the smallest units, penetrating hostile defenses while bypassing strong points, and aggressive, not reckless, leadership were all salient characteristics of that shared infantry way of battle. After World War I, Army and Marine officers constructed similar intellectual proposals concerning the ways to fight the next war. Although there were differences in organizational culture, the two were more alike in their respective values systems than historians have realized. There was mutual admiration, and targeted attempts to replicate each other’s combat thinking and spirit. They prepared for battle by observing each other’s doctrine, and sharing each other’s conception of modern combat. When preparation turned to execution in World War II, they created solutions for battlefield problems that evolved from their near-identical way of battle. At the conclusion of the war, the common bonds between the Army and Marine Corps were all but forgotten. This, ultimately, led to increased friction during the Congressional defense unification battles in 1946. / History

<p>Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra.      </p> / <p>The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel?</p><p>This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis.</p><p>The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War.</p><p>Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.     </p>

Yom Kippurkriget 1973 kan sägas vara det första sjökriget då sjömålsrobotar nyttjades av krigets respektive parter. Hur påverkade denna teknikutveckling av sjömålsroboten Israels sjötaktiska agerande? Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten har påverkat Israels sjökrigföring, samt undersöka huruvida det är tekniken som styr taktiken, eller tvärtom. Detta sker med en komparation av israelernas sjökrigföring under två krig, sexdagarskriget 1967 samt Yom Kippurkriget 1973. Analysverktyg för denna jämförelse utgörs av Wayne P. Hughes och Christopher Werners teorier angående samspelet mellan teknik och taktik. Denna teori och empiri redogörs deskriptivt med kvalitativ textanalys. Jämförelsen leder fram till att israelernas sjötaktiska agerande förändrades. I bägge krigen rådde god teknisk analys vilket påverkade deras taktik. Tekniken under Yom Kippurkriget möjliggjorde dock en offensivare taktik än agerandet under sexdagarskriget. Teknikutvecklingen av sjömålsroboten ledde således fram till en effektiv taktikanpassning. Undersökningen leder även fram till att teknik och taktik ständigt påverkar varandra. / The Yom Kippur War in 1973 is known to be the first naval war when surface-to-surface missiles were used by both sides. How did this development of technology affect the tactical actions of Israel? This paper examines how the development of technology, in form of the surface-to-surface missile, has affected the naval warfare of Israel and if technology affects tactics or vice versa. To find answers, the Israelis tactical actions are compared, in two wars, Six-Day War in 1967 and Yom Kippur war in 1973. Theories regarding the interplay between technology and tactics, by Kevin P. Hughes and Christopher Werner, are used as tool for the analysis. The result of the study shows that the tactical actions of Israel did change by the development of technology. Common in both wars is the fact that analyses of technology were carried out and affected their tactical actions. Technology during the Yom Kippur War though made more offensive tactics possible, than during the Six-Day War. Thus development of the surface-to-surface missile did lead to an effective adaptation of tactics. The result of the study also shows that tactics and technology constantly affects each other.

This paper is based on the proposition that the choice of different product tactics is influenced by the nature of the firm’s external environment. It illustrates the type of product activities suggested for a complex and turbulent environment, when viewing the environment through a chaos and complexity theory lens. A qualitative, case method, using depth interviews,investigated the product activities in two companies to identify the product activities adopted in a more successful, versus a less successful, firm in a complex/turbulent environment. The results showed that the more successful company uses some destabilizing product activities but also partially uses stabilizing product activities. These findings are of benefit to marketers as they emphasize a new way to consider future product activities in their firms. Since businesses and markets are complex adaptive systems, using complexity theory to understand how to cope in complex, turbulent environments is necessary, but has not been widely researched, with even less emphasis on individual components of the marketing mix.